David Hume's History of England, a long-neglected classic of political philosophy, has recently become the object of serious study by political theorists. Hume's Politics, one of the best books on Hume published in recent years, shows convincingly how much political theorists and political scientists have to learn from Hume's masterpiece.
Sabl argues that the great contribution of the History is an account of dynamic coordination. The enduring problem of political life, he suggests, is what rational choice theorists describe as a coordination problem, a situation in which a given group of persons have real or potential interests in common and so a common concern for shared decision-making, yet have no obvious or agreed upon means of realizing those interests. More directly stated, human beings in society need authority, but there is no natural title to rule. Political authority can be based on neither pure force nor simple consent. Force can begin authority, but establishes no principle and so is fundamentally unstable. Consent would require that we already agree about what counts as consent; but that answer begs the question by presupposing what it is supposed to explain.
Following Hume, Sabl argues that the only viable answer is fundamental convention, a generally shared opinion in a society about who ought to be obeyed. Political authority is not a freestanding thing. It exists only because people believe it exists. Even the most tyrannical ruler cannot exploit others unless his praetorian guard obeys him willingly, that is, has an opinion that it is good for him to rule and them to obey. The core of political life then is not abstract rules of morality, but a concrete, common opinion about authority actually in existence here and now. In the eyes of reason any given constitutional tradition may well be flawed in many ways (especially in light of the almost inevitable violence of real foundings). Yet, impressed with the difficulty of creating a common opinion about authority from scratch, Hume suggests that the prudent path is almost always to work within an existing tradition of authority, since the alternative is likely civil war. This recognition of the practical necessity of tradition is not a blanket endorsement of the status quo, still less any ideological form of conservatism. Sabl shows persuasively that Hume's politics are fundamentally liberal in character, and that his respect for tradition and authority is based on the hard-headed recognition that one must start where one's fellow citizens are, even if one wishes to move them to someplace new. Respect for tradition is not the antithesis of reform but its indispensable condition.
Sabl thus makes a realist's case for constitutionalism and respect for convention as the best way of approaching political life; and he argues persuasively that this approach is superior to the available alternatives, notably contemporary forms of Kantianism. The seven chapters of the book elaborate his argument as follows. Chapters 1 through 3 describe the general shape of coordination problems; show the conditions for their solution in real or potential common interests (especially with regard to commerce and the progress of the arts and sciences); and argue that fundamental, constitutional conventions of authority and allegiance are the only viable solution to the problem. Chapters 4 and 5 show that fundamental conventions are a major theme of the History of England. Chapter 4 discusses the most important conventions of British politics: hereditary monarchy and Parliament as the legitimate taxing power. Chapter 5 takes up the question of what happens when there is tension within or between fundamental conventions and elaborates a Humean theory of statesmanship as the only available means for handling the problems inevitable in any constitutional tradition. Chapter 5 also provides a chief negative example of Sabl's thesis: the Long Parliament of the 1640s, many of whose goals Hume endorsed, rejected constitutional authority and thus predictably paved the way for Cromwellian dictatorship. In chapters 6 and 7 Sabl shows that political goods such as liberty and equality can be, and can only be, built on fundamental conventions. Chapter 6 shows that Hume thought that the effectual guarantor of individual liberty was the separation of powers; chapter 7 makes a Humean argument (although not one made by Hume himself) for expanding the franchise well beyond their limits in eighteenth-century Britain.
While there is much to learn from Sabl's book, there are some lacunae and difficulties in his argument. Perhaps the largest lacuna is the role of religion. Sabl is largely dismissive of religion, treating it under the heading of pseudoconvention. Yet Hume says repeatedly that religious enthusiasm played an indispensable role in making the key revolution against divine right monarchy that paved the way for the eventual success of Parliaments and liberal government. The British owe the whole liberty of their constitution, Hume remarks, to the absurd beliefs of the Puritans. There is an irony here of which, so far as I know, no one has yet given an adequate account, and I doubt whether we can fully understand Hume's explanation of the origins of modern politics without it.
Sabl's treatment of the vexed question whether Hume appeals to natural rights or only to ubiquitous convention is also not entirely persuasive. Against some recent scholars who have claimed that Hume does have a notion of natural rights, Sabl claims that British rights are based in fundamental, very old conventions. Thus when Hume writes that legal government and equal justice are the “great objects for which political society was at first founded by men, which the people have a perpetual and unalienable right to recall, and which no time, nor precedent, nor statute, nor positive institution, ought to deter them from keeping ever uppermost in their thoughts and attention,” Sabl reads him as referring to the Magna Carta and not any “natural” right. In this case, he claims, fundamental conventions have established such rights as effectively immune from everyday politics. This reading is not persuasive of the passage as it stands, and in the Treatise (in passages Sabl does not cite) Hume says that all men, even the vulgar, are somehow aware of the right of resistance and that not even the most despotic government can take that right away from them.
A cause of the difference between Sabl and his opponents on this point seems to be the ambiguity of nature. Hume surely does not believe that nature provides human beings anything like categorical imperatives or moral absolutes. But he does claim to have uncovered the truth about the human condition, and that this truth can guide us our political judgments. That is what it means for justice to be artificial but not arbitrary: there is a permanent problem in human life that all societies must address in one way or another, though none perfectly. Thus Hume thinks he can say what reasonable people generally should expect and demand from political society in the light of the facts of the human condition, including individual liberty, the rule of law, and a prudent, muted right of resistance to tyranny. For all practical purposes, then, Hume's political theory is indistinguishable from early modern natural law. Sabl's reading of the details of Hume's political ethics is in fact similar to this interpretation; yet it is important that we not lose sight of both the questionableness and the importance of nature for Hume.
These criticisms do not affect the main achievement of the book. Sabl shows that Hume's political theory is a more than worthy conversation partner with the political science of today. He thus points to a political science that is superior to both merely normative political theorizing and positivistic political science. Political theory, whose core is the serious study of the tradition, can and must play an important role in helping to revive that more capacious sense of political science.
