“Whereas Hobbes and Locke learned about civility in the drawing room,” writes Teresa Bejan, “[Roger] Williams experienced it on the frontier” (153). Locke's “demanding” set of ethical requirements for acceptance into the gentleman's club of free and open debate impose what Bejan calls an “unabashedly elite and elitist standard” compared to Williams's “mere civility.” Moreover, Locke's toleration harbors its own form of insincerity: unlike Williams, Locke fails to explicitly defend the rigorous Protestant ideals he nevertheless tries to sneak in under the guise of a rational and cosmopolitan language of mutual trustworthiness. Williams's faith is strong and unabashed, and seeks only enough civic space in which to openly practice its evangelical work. This is the “mere civility” that Bejan's admirably provocative book wants us to adopt, not, presumably, so that we can continue the work of Puritan conversion, but in the name of a commitment to liberal ideals that would be as virile and undisguised, in their own way, as Williams's Puritanism.
The elitism of Locke's model is countered, as Bejan demonstrates, by the egalitarianism of Williams's more traditional Puritan insistence on universal depravity. If civility describes the possibility of community, even a transnational or universal human community, it does so, for Williams, not because of mankind's admirable capacity for sincerity and promise making (as Locke said) but because all men are “alike uncleane … until it pleaseth the Father of mercies to call some out to the Knowledge and Grace of his Sonne, making them to see their filthinesse and strangenesse” (quoted at 61–2). Williams's toleration, Bejan explains (pace Martha Nussbaum), was inseparable from his deep desire to persuade others (with rhetorical rather than political force) to follow the true religion. Bejan sides with Williams, then, because he advocates the most tolerant model of free public expression, and the fact that his tolerance grows out of a powerful conviction of God's sovereignty and man's depravity seems to be largely irrelevant. For Bejan, we might say, a liberal notion of democratic equality has displaced Williams's universal depravity, and who would not want to say amen to that?
But what, in Bejan's liberal political theory, takes the place of God's absolute (inscrutable) sovereignty? Which is also to ask where Thomas Hobbes fits into this argument. Because if Locke and Williams, despite their differences, both insist on a sovereign space outside of and apart from that of the state (whether it be the ground cleared for evangelism or Locke's more cosmopolitan space of “elite” humanist sincerity), Hobbes strenuously resists any such notion of church-state separation as at best a theoretical absurdity and at worst a Trojan horse for promoting religious power over that of the state. Hence, Hobbes plays a familiar role in Bejan's book: his Leviathan represents the political philosophy of intolerance and governmental “overreach,” par excellence. “Hobbesian civility,” Bejan writes, “was not a means to disagreement, but an end to it, its corresponding toleration a hollow simulacrum of concordia with the heart and tongue cut out” (108). “Simulacrum” is the key term here, because where Locke will emphasize the human capacity for sincerity and trustworthiness, Hobbes explicitly defends the social value of the discontinuity between an individual citizen's private or inner beliefs and desires and their public expression. Bejan's promotion of Williams over Locke, in other words, is a tactical move in her battle to defend liberal humanism from Hobbesian political philosophy.
In Bejan, as elsewhere in the liberal tradition, pat condemnations of the Hobbesian commonwealth combine an antipathy towards the social with a suspicion of anything that smacks of performance, artifice, or theater. Hence, Bejan, who is insightful enough to appreciate Hobbes's latent egalitarianism, nevertheless cannot reconcile this tendency with his penchant for what, to her, sounds like falsehood: “Leviathan transformed ‘civil spirit’ from an elite, supererogatory ethic of gentility into a fundamental law of nature applicable to all,” she writes; but what was thus extended, she adds, was “a duty of inauthentic profession beyond one's interactions with the sovereign to those with one's fellow men” (101). Hence, Hobbes “embraced” the “hypocritical or dissimulating aspect of complaisance along with discretion … [and] turned the ‘shared heart’ of concordia inside out” (101).
As Bejan notes, much of Hobbes's particular interest in legislative intervention with respect to religious expression (and, indeed, all forms of public discourse) was motivated by his antipathy towards the unregulated Presbyterian preachers who, he maintained, were a primary cause of the civil war that had torn seventeenth-century England apart. Hobbes's infamous remark (in Behemoth) to the effect that killing a thousand Presbyterian preachers prior to 1642 would have been preferable to a civil war that took the lives of many more, would undoubtedly, Bejan remarks, “repulse many modern readers” (110); but is this as obvious as she suggests? Would any forceful defense of communal life “repulse” us? Are we all Lockean theocrats concealing our relationship to political violence behind the veil of an idealized fantasy of community without force? Hobbes's remark may have been more than a little polemical, but it asks us to think about the choices our communities make every day about who should or should not pay the price to secure a better future for the rest of us. Bejan may admire Williams on the frontier, but she is less comfortable residing with Hobbes on the horrific internal border of the English Civil War.
Ultimately, therefore, all the nuance that Bejan herself demonstrates in Mere Civility (and that she discovers in Hobbes) dissolves in the face of a preference not so much for qualitatively “mere” civility as for quantitatively “more” toleration—and it is on these grounds that Bejan finally opts for Williams over Locke or Hobbes. Hobbes is simply not as “tolerant” as Williams (98–99), Bejan explains; more Hobbes means less “free speech.” What our world needs, she argues, is not Hobbes's “difference without disagreement” (not, that is to say, regulated difference), but “difference and disagreement” (111). This sounds brave enough, until we read the next clause: “difference and disagreement,” writes Bejan, “so long as we can keep the latter ‘civil’” (111). Doesn't this conditional afterthought beg the whole question? Or, more to the point, doesn't it confirm Hobbes's position? Like Locke and, to a lesser but no less significant extent, Roger Williams, Bejan wants to have the cake of “free” expression and eat it too. She wants a public space for “difference” that is not regulated by a Hobbesian sovereign authority, but only as long as “we” can keep it “civil”! But who is this “we” if it is not John Locke's elite cadre of sincere and morally superior “natural” policemen who know the difference between civil and uncivil behavior even before entering a political state? And doesn't her remark remind us that it was Hobbes who insisted on the irreducibility of this appeal to a forceful “we” in the construction of any space for meaningful interrelation?
