In spite of the abundance of scholarship on transitions from authoritarian rule, the role of religion and religious actors in democratization processes tends to be overlooked. This may be because secularization and political liberalization are generally seen to be moving in tandem, the separation of religion and state is assumed to be central to the democratic project, or some religions are thought to derail democratic transitions because they embody authoritarian norms and practices such as institutionalized hierarchy and inequality. Michael D. Driessen's Religion and Democratization explores what happens when religion and religious actors play an active role in transitions to democracy. Driessen seeks to explain how religious actors attempt to secure a public voice during periods of political liberalization; when and why religions with a history of indifference or outright hostility toward democracy become its champion; and how religious involvement in regime transitions not only has the potential to reorient political and religious identities, but may also impact the prospects for democratic consolidation.
Religion and Democratization is anchored in the transitions of post-war Italy (1946–1965) and post-colonial Algeria (1988–2012). This comparison is striking for a number of reasons. It brings Catholicism and Islam — two world religions with over a billion adherents between them, and which share histories of ambivalence or open opposition toward liberal democracy — to the forefront of regime transitions. It involves political transitions from different world regions and with dramatically different outcomes (Italy consolidates democratic rule, while Algeria does not). Finally, the book goes beyond the case studies to explore how voters' political-religious attitudes in Italy and Algeria change, as well as how they compare to some of their neighbors.
The book's central claim is that religion and democratization need not be seen as separate or even in competition with one another, but can work in conjunction. Fledgling democracies can embark on a process of what Driessen calls “religiously friendly democratization” (2, 39). The idea here is that once a political transition is underway, the new regime can include institutions and political arrangements that are friendly and favorable toward religion and religious actors. This means that certain religious symbols, values, and ideas may be protected and elevated by the state, that religious political parties will have the opportunity to compete in and win elections, and government regulation of religion will remain relatively low.
In building a general theory of religiously friendly democratization, Driessen argues that such processes can take place in a variety of political, economic, and social contexts, and may not necessarily lead to democratic consolidation. After all, the pathway between dictatorship and democracy is full of uncertainties. Nevertheless, Driessen suggests that religiously friendly democratization is not only possible, but also has the potential to dramatically transform the nature of religion-state relations. Religious actors are able to carve out a public space and political voice within the new regime, which gives them relevance and a stake in the success and stability of the transition. In this sense, religious groups have the ability to play a formative role in deepening democratic legitimacy and values (63–67).
Two case studies are used to flesh out what religiously friendly democratization looks like on the ground. The Italian case tells a story of a Vatican that historically saw political liberalization as a significant threat. Pope Pius IX declared voting a “grave” sin and warned Catholics voters with excommunication (94). By the post-war era, the Church had distanced itself from anti-democratic sentiments in favor of mobilizing the Catholic vote for Christian Democrats (Democrazia Christiana), a pro-clerical political party (105–106). This shift in behavior was driven in part by a post-war liberal government that was friendly toward the Church and gave it favorable treatment. As a result, the Church was able to use its influence to restrict Protestants and communists. Over time the Christian Democratic Party matured and became more autonomous from the Church, building coalitions with Socialists and shifting its platform from the sacred to the more mundane. This shift also helped reorient religious and political identities across Italy.
A somewhat similar story is told in Algeria's transition. There is a history of some Islamic leaders charging democracy as being “heretical” and a Western political import, but over time democratic rules and practices gained greater acceptance (146, 149). Again, the key is that during the process of liberalization religiously friendly institutions were put into place that protected space for Islam and Islamic movements. Electoral competition also encouraged Islamist parties to shift away from exclusively religious issues to everyday issues such as support for teacher's wages and strikes in order to remain politically relevant (163). While Algeria did not achieve full-fledged democracy, some Islamist parties and leaders transformed their political identities from “Islamists” to “Muslim Democrats” (161).
These chapters are thoughtfully executed and help illustrate the contribution of religiously friendly democratization. They convincingly demonstrate how religiously inclusive liberalization processes can transform religious identities and temper religious and political goals. Religion and Democratization challenges us to not only expand our understanding of the separation of religion and state as a key element of democratic politics, but also shows the potentially powerful role of religious actors and identities in processes of democratization. Overall, this book is an impressive read that brings together diverse cases and mixed methods. It is well suited for graduate-level courses on the politics of religion or comparative democratization.
Although Religion and Democratization asks big and important questions, some of its answers would benefit from greater elaboration. Let me here focus on three. The first is a richer discussion of transition politics. Driessen suggests that one of the goals of the book is to focus on what happens after a religiously friendly democratization process has begun (17). However, it is worth considering how the breakdown of authoritarian rule and the makeup of the new political regime impacts religiously friendly policies in the first place. A further area that deserves attention is the role of the state. In a book about democratization, the new regime, its allies, and its opponents, such as the military, are largely absent. Finally, we know that transitions to democracy are long, complex, and non-linear processes that often result in another form of authoritarian rule. Yet, democratization processes are also more than electoral contestation. What does religiously friendly democratization look like within democratizing constitutions and courts? How does religiously friendly democratization interact with secular civil society or other groups with a stake in supporting or subverting the transition?
Second, throughout the chapters religious actors include popes, nationalists, theologians, technocrats, and party entrepreneurs. Driessen borrows R. Scott Appleby's definition of religious actors as “people who have been formed by a religious community and who are acting with the intent to uphold, extend, or defend its values and precepts” (44). This definition of a religious actor is clear, but lumping together the impact of religious technocrats with theologians seems less obvious, for the simple reason that their interests and objectives, and when and how they wade into political waters, differ.
This brings up a third and final area for expansion. Driessen suggests that a religiously friendly democracy is a political system with relatively high levels of government favoritism of religion. Often one religion is identified by the government and given certain privileges. Both Italy and Algeria are relatively homogenous religious markets where Catholicism and Islam are the obvious favorites. What are the political consequences of state favoritism in more religiously plural and competitive markets? On this point Driessen is careful to indicate that such favoritism does not mean the active restriction or denial of other religions. But favoritism does imply an uneven playing field, especially if one religion has the potential to use its privileged position in non-democratic ways against other religious groups. In more plural settings, might government favoritism of religion ultimately undermine the larger democratic project?
