Cropsey's essays in this last volume of his work remind me of Bernoulli's remark about Newton. Here, too, we can recognize the lion by his paw. His arguments reveal a mind both restless and relentless, probing back to premises and driving forward to conclusions. But the conclusions arrived at seem somehow tentative, as if they were an invitation to begin again.
Cropsey presents the dozen essays comprising On Humanity's Intensive Introspection in order of chronology, but a useful way to begin trying to see connections among them might be to try to group them. First, there are the essays on liberalism's own self-examination, always judging itself, always seeking to remedy the deficiencies of self through a more intensive application of its own prescriptions. Indeed, liberalism's obsessive openness to self-criticism seems to be one meaning of the introspection alluded to in the title. In this group, I would include not only the first three essays (two of which mention liberalism in their titles), but also the fifth essay on the open society. The last reminds us in many ways of the reflections on the American regime that serve as an introduction to Cropsey's first collection of essays, Political Philosophy and the Issues of Politics (hereafter referred to as PPIP). I would also include under this heading the essay on democracy and Marxian socialism as well as the essay on the end of history, both of which could be seen as scrutinizing different aspects of liberalism's self-scrutiny.
The second group includes three essays on Platonic dialogues. The essays on the Philebus and the Timaeus bring to eleven the number of careful studies Cropsey devoted to individual dialogues. (I am counting here the essay on the Phaedrus from PPIP as well as the eight chapters that comprise Plato's World.) The essay on the dramatic end of Plato's Socrates connects the dialogues extending from the Theaetetus to the Phaedo in a way that parallels Plato's World, but all three Platonic essays shed light on that earlier volume.
The remaining two essays might each be placed in one of the two groups above, but in my mind they are joined to each other by a revealing similarity of questions: what deserves to be called god or what is at work in the whole.
Cropsey's essays deploy no one particular method. The fifth essay, on the open society, is not a discussion of Bergson or Popper, though Cropsey does mention the “coiner of the expression,” and he replies to Popper without mentioning his name (51). Rather, as Cropsey says, he looks “at the expression ‘open society’ naively, as if to ask without partiality what an open society might be” (48). He then proceeds naively to look at the modes of openness displayed by a flower, a door, and an eye. The openness of a flower suggests an essence, the openness of an eye suggests selection and judgment, while the openness of a door is passive, admitting all without a filter. Readers of the essay “America as Regime,” which serves as the introduction to PPIP, will be reminded of the way Cropsey there dissects the difficulty of exploring the meaning of the American regime when that regime makes a principle of openness to thought which in no way has its origin in the regime. The essay on the end of history in the current volume has somewhat the same character of deliberately naive thought, reflecting as it does on what a thing is, whether history is a thing, and in what sense a thing can have an end.
The naive approach might remind us of Socrates's famous turn to speeches in the second sailing of the Phaedo. But Cropsey does not seem to have the intention of discovering or laying open a prescientific or prephilosophic ground of politics in nature or in history. Indeed, he arrives at the thought that “it is philosophy that draws the horizons that constitute, define and bound or enclose the society whose possible openness is our problem” (53). Such claims draw us back to Cropsey's earliest essays in PPIP. There, in the essay “Political Life and a Natural Order,” we find the striking claim that “the deepest current of action is the production of the ground of human life by human thought” (PPIP, 229). There are other links between the two volumes of essays. The seventh essay in this volume, “Religion, the Constitution, and the Enlightenment,” further explores the way in which thought, widely understood, permeates the American regime, which, as we have noted, was the topic of the introduction to the earlier collection.
Other essays provide a provocative commentary on Plato's World: Man's Place in the Cosmos. The essay here, “The Dramatic End of Plato's Socrates,” presents yet another perspective on the dialogues that lead from the Theaetetus to the death of Socrates in the Phaedo. Cropsey treated these dialogues, taken together, as the extended form of Plato's own trial or critical examination of Socrates. On Cropsey's reading, the examination was serious and the criticism profound. The essays presented here on the Philebus and the Timaeus are close readings that follow carefully the text of those two dialogues, and in this way contrast with the naive approach to the open society discussed above. But like the essay on the dramatic end of Socrates, the essays on the Philebus and the Timaeus provide important links to Plato's World. In both essays we find an exploration of what Cropsey calls “the mighty distinction between nature and cosmos, the former being the realm of the objects of contemplation, the latter being the world of cause and effect” (113). Given the subtitle of Plato's World, one cannot avoid the thought that Cropsey means to turn from nature to cosmos in his reflection on Socrates. The essay on the Timaeus makes explicit that this might involve a negative judgment on the famous Socratic turn of the Phaedo (129).
Between the naive reflections of the “Open Society” essay and the close readings of the Philebus and the Timaeus lie other approaches. The opening essay distills into a few pages the results of years of study of Hobbes for the purpose of illuminating by contrast the problem of sovereignty in modern liberalism. “On Ancients and Moderns,” the penultimate essay in the book, is a masterful survey of the pre-Socratics always with a view to what might have been gathered into and what rejected by the Socratic enlightenment. I would only draw attention here to “the gulf that separates [Socrates] from Parmenides” (158) and to Cropsey's careful refusal to simply give “the palm to Socrates” (156). Cropsey spent the last years of his life exploring Parmenides as we find him in the pages of Plato's dialogue by that name.
Mention of Parmenides might bring us to the paradox that in a strange way connects Cropsey's essays. The incommensurable instanced by pi or by the square root of 2 is a common theme in Cropsey's essays. But how are we to reconcile the Parmenidean notion of the one with the dualism that seems inherent in a world of incommensurables? For Cropsey, this problem is very much a political problem. One can see this in a way from the essay on statesmanship that he titled “Providential Care for Democracy.” That essay closes with a reference to “the paradigm of reason and the irrational that lies near the government of the whole” (33). The one somehow encompasses the irrational within itself, and this is what is at work in the whole. At the very least, Cropsey raises this possibility in the form of a question. He invites us to reflect on the relation between prudence and the one, and in this way to begin again at the beginning.
Joseph Cropsey was a splendid teacher, as entertaining as he was inspiring. I was never bored in his classroom. In this collection of essays we have the magisterial gathering together with benign intention of the many threads of Cropsey's own intensive introspection.
