Books that paint intellectual history in broad strokes have become commonplace, but they are no less tricky to pull off than they have ever been. Alan S. Kahan's new book with the intriguing title Mind vs. Money sets out to prove that the work of “intellectuals” in Western history has been colored by a persistent anticapitalist bias that, as much as any single attitude, defines them as a class. That attitude is built upon three specific “Don'ts” around which Kahan crafts his third chapter (31):
(1) DON'T MAKE MONEY (JUST HAVE IT).
(2) DON'T HAVE MONEY (JUST GIVE IT TO THE POOR).
(3) DON'T HAVE OR MAKE MORE MONEY THAN OTHERS DO (IT'S NOT FAIR).
The author's attempt to simplify the maze of intellectual tradition is admirable, but the book's breadth forces Kahan to simplify the economic views of intellectuals to the point that it loses some of its pedagogical value. I learned from the book, no doubt, just not as much as I could have if the author had deepened his exploration of his subjects (narrowing the range of subjects in the process) and fleshed out in a more nuanced way the differences among them.
The expansive history that Kahan covers is impressive. He assesses classical views on wealth and money in the works of Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero; and he addresses figures from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries such as Dickens, Foucault, and Heidegger with equal ease. But to a great extent, this expansiveness is the book's undoing. No author could adequately cover such complex periods of intellectual development in so few keystrokes: social Catholicism is addressed in around five pages; the New Deal takes up only a few more than that. The reader is forced to proceed at a dizzying pace through history by accepting what the author views as the critical binding link: the anticapitalist bias of the intellectual class.
Kahan's style is effortless, almost too effortless considering that the likely audience for this book will be educated sufficiently well to explore in greater detail the relationship of intellectuals and capitalism. Some readers may suspect that the book handles too casually a complex historical relationship that deserves more thorough examination. A more empirical approach to the subject that offers at least some approximation to the proportion of procapitalist and anticapitalist intellectuals in these periods would likely convince more readers of the author's thesis. And the book's tone, at times, may even lead to confusion about the author's point of view. Some statements leave no doubt about the author's position, and a few are over the top: for example, “Intellectuals fall in love with revolution” (203), “a large fraction of the intelligentsia will always hate capitalism, even if they have no alternative to love” (205). Other comments go overboard in feigned sympathy with the objects of their criticism: “Actually communists, fascists, social Catholics, and many of those most influential in the American New Deal were all fascinated by the idea of a planned economy replacing the economic and spiritual anarchy of capitalism” (180). The reader is left to infer the sardonic nature of that sentence's final phrase. Such is common in books that are critical of a social movement or collection of ideas, but these types of comments are peppered throughout Mind vs. Money to the point that doubt begins to enter the reader's mind as to what the author's position is.
A section near the end of chapter 6 that describes Benjamin Constant's identification of the intellectual soft spot for “the ancient as opposed to the modern idea of freedom” was most interesting (204–5). Here, Kahan gives a subtle account of the difference between the intellectual's view of freedom and the view of freedom held by others, and he explains the intellectual's preoccupation with communal well-being, often to the exclusion of individual freedom. Again, however, the pace of the book comes into play, and only a couple of pages are devoted to what could have occupied a lively chapter all to itself.
Most would concede that there has been a tendency among the intelligentsia to be highly critical of capitalism, but that bias has not been equally widespread from one historical period to the next. There are likely more academics today who are supportive of the capitalist system (even if often rigorously critical of it) than there were early in the twentieth century, when we had a “Red Dean” named Harry Ward at Union Theological Seminary, and even later when there was considerable growth in so-called Communist front organizations (disproportionately populated by intellectuals) that prompted such a backlash during the McCarthy years. The collectivist utopianism of academics and public intellectuals has faded with the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Empire; one would assume that some measure of anticapitalist sentiment has faded with it.
Kahan's section on neoconservatism helps to balance the bulk of his arguments, but he could have drawn more deeply from the well of intellectual economic conservatism by addressing what Henry May called the “clerical laissez-faire” period of American history, when academic theologians in particular, such as John McVickar of Columbia and Francis Wayland of Brown, perceiving the harmony of free markets and “natural religion,” set about to educate Americans in the virtues of capitalism. Given Kahan's broad use of the term “intellectual,” educators such as McVickar and Wayland should certainly qualify. Or perhaps Kahan could have included libertarian-leaning voices such as those of Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, both of whom taught at the University of Chicago, of which the author himself is a graduate. Hayek is mentioned very briefly, in the context of neoconservative Irving Kristol's criticism of Hayek's view that the market is “amoral,” but given Hayek's influence on economic theory and the Reagan-Thatcher revolution of the 1980s, more extensive treatment would be appropriate.
The value of the book is to be found in its engagement with a topic that is undoubtedly central to the American culture war. The idea that there has been a persistent bias against capitalism among intellectuals will appeal to many: those engaged in the Tea Party movement, the “minority” of academics who are politically and economically conservative, the pundits and followers of conservative think-tanks, and educated conservatives generally who seek better grounding for their political and economic views. Kahan's arguments will come across as somewhat forced to those with more liberal perspectives on the function and form of the intellectual class. The book will challenge all readers (liberal or conservative) to reflect on periods with which they are already likely familiar and to determine for themselves whether the bias the author describes has been present throughout.
