USS Spica

Spica, AK16, was an old cargo ship, built for civilian purposes in 1919 and bought by the navy in 1921, but not used until 1940. ‘AK’ was the Navy hull classification system indicating an armed cargo ship. The ship was built as a Hog Islander at the end of WW I. While not ice breakers, this class of ships had hulls with lapped and riveted 1-inch thick plates; thus, had a much stronger hull than the standard cargo ship of the period. Spica had a steam turbine for her main propulsion unit and was capable of 22 kph. She had four holds, two forward and two aft. She was 122 m long and had a 16 m beam with 11,340 tons at 7.3 m draft. Her typical crew was 200 enlisted men and 20 officers, and she could carry 200 passengers (Brooks Reference Brooks2000). Most of her wartime service was in Alaska waters where she participated in the battle for Attu. She made a South Pacific tour that included Kwajalein and in March 1944 returned to Seattle and resumed her work in the Alaska-Aleutian regions.

SS Jonathan Harrington

The Harrington had a crew of 49 civilian merchant sailors, and 21 to 40 naval personnel known as the ‘armed guard’ to operate defensive guns and communications equipment. In addition to the supplies, Harrington carried as passengers 5 naval officers, 14 landing craft operators, 112 CB stevedores, and 61 CBs of CB Detachment 1058. Harrington was a ‘liberty ship,’ one of 2,751 cargo ships built to the same design from 1941 to 1945. Construction of Harrington was started on 11 July 1942 and completed 17 August 1942, just 38 days, which was a little faster than the average time of 42 days for Liberty Ship construction (NPS no date). Harrington (as well as Spica) had only one screw (propeller) and thus no ability to manoeuver if there was damage.

Crew and equipment

Besides their normal ship's company and CBs, the ships transported navy stevedores, who would help with the unloading, but who would not stay on shore. The personnel of CB Detachment 1058 had some people with experience in oil drilling, but not in the Arctic. Early in the war, CBs were limited to volunteers with extensive construction experience. But after December 1942, they were assigned by the selective service system and tended to be much younger (United States 1942). The ships also carried LCMs and self-propelled pontoon barges. The LCM, (for Landing Craft Mechanized), had a flat front that could be lowered allowing equipment to drive off the craft onto the beach. The expedition had a PBY 5A flying boat attached to support the mission, mainly to scout the ice. In addition to the oil equipment, material to build the camp, and supplies for the winter, the ships carried fuel for the vehicles and heating oil in 55 gallon (200l) drums.

The navy stevedores are usually part of the Supply Corps; however, the records indicate these stevedores were ‘CBs’ and they seem to have been directed by line navy officers rather than Supply Corps officers. The commander of the mission and captain of Spica, Commander Kiley, notes there were ‘200 stevedores of the Fifth Special C. B. Detachment’ supporting the idea that these were special stevedores assigned to the CBs and not the Supply Corps.

The voyage north

Spica and Harrington left Tacoma, Washington, on 20 July 1944. Arriving at Kodiak, Alaska, on 25 July, they formed a convoy to Dutch Harbor, Alaska, with six other ships, including three warship escorts. They arrived at Dutch Harbor on 28 July and departed on 30 July. Now just Spica and Harrington sailed north and arrived at Point Hope on 2 August. There the PBY met them. While there, the ships had to transfer gasoline to the PBY. They did this by moving the gasoline in five gallon (19l) ‘blitz cans’ via a small barge. Then the cans needed to be carried over a spit to the lagoon, where the PBY was moored. ‘The natives were glad to help. . . . This was especially true after we generously distributed candy, gum, and various other ships service edibles to the very receptive and eager hands on the beach. Good-will and assistance thereafter was assured.’ Also, the ship's doctor was asked by the local people to attend to two sick, which he did (Kiely 1944: 5).

Cape Simpson attempt

On 3 August they encountered the first ice. Initially they faced small floes, then heavier ice, and then fog. They arrived off Barrow on 4 August and anchored on the west side, since the ice was in on the east. Their destination was Cape Simpson, about 80 km east of Barrow. After finding their way through the ice they anchored off Cape Simpson on the evening of 6 August, where they stayed for several days, sending out survey parties to check for routes to the beach. The water here was about 9 to 10.5 m deep, while the ships’ drafts were 7.5 m. While the area near Cape Simpson was closer to the petroleum area, the landing site was not suitable. ‘All parties agreed on the impossibility of landing and erecting camp in that area. The land was low, only a few feet above the ocean, and dotted with lakes and covered with swampy tundra. Poor drainage prevailed, landing strips would have been impossible in the summer and the unloading itself a near physical impossibility’ (Keily 1944: 9). The water was too shallow, only 0.6 m deep, up to 0.4 km from the shore.

Cape Simpson was completely unsuitable for a camp. But six days were wasted exploring this option. While at Simpson, drifting ice, pack ice, snow storms, fog and high winds, greater than 48 kph at times, hindered exploration. By 10 August it was decided to investigate Point Barrow. At that time the west side of the point [where the ships had come through the week before] was packed with ice, but the east side was fairly clear. Since the side of the point that was packed with ice would vary with the wind, the decision was made to find a camp on the point (or spit) so that if the wind changed, they could sail to the other side and thus avoid the pack ice.

Barrow landings

On 11 August both ships returned to the Barrow area and continued to ‘send out survey parties to sound waters and look over landing beach’, which was necessary, since there were no charts. The logs show that Spica started discharging cargo 12 August while it was anchored off the northeast side of Point Barrow. This beach is called Nuwuk, after the name of the abandoned village site on the point. There were no docks or unloading facilities. The ships were unloaded by lightering. Fuel wes transported in 55 gallon (200l) drums and unloaded in cargo nets onto barges for the trip to the beach. Once ashore, the cargo was manhandled off the beach to higher ground. The plan evolved that the final site of the camp would be the site that is today known as NARL, but unloading would take place at the Nuwuk site, for later transport to NARL (See Fig. 3 for locations).

Fig. 3.

Locations near Barrow.

Factors affecting the ships and unloading

In this section we summarise the weather and incidents leading up to the spill. This section is paraphrased from Keily (1944) with direct quotation of relevant items. The author's comments are in brackets.

The oil and what happened to it?

Liberty ships burned Bunker C, a heavy oil also known as ‘black oil.’ It is normally heated by steam coils in the fuel tanks for distribution to the ships’ boilers. The ships had piping and valves that allowed them to pump fuel overboard in an emergency, to lighten the ship or to reduce wave action in a rescue at sea (M. Schneider, Chairman Project Liberty Ship, personal communication, August 2009). Bunker C does not disperse well naturally and there are modern incidents in which it has remained on beaches for years. Bunker C from a 1970 spill remained on a beach in Nova Scotia for more than 30 years (Fingas Reference Fingas2004). On rough water it will form an emulsion that greatly expands its volume.

Where did the oil go?

From the logs, the author reconstructed the locations of Spica and Harrington and the wind direction on 22 August 1944. Although the incident is known as the ‘Doctor Island spill,’ it seems unlikely that the oil initially hit that island. The wind was blowing from the west, which would have pushed the slick toward Crescent Island or Deadmans Island which lay to the east of Harrington. The spit that runs from Point Barrow to the east, and the islands mentioned, are a barrier beach system collectively known as the ‘Plover Islands’ that lies between Elson Lagoon and the Beaufort Sea. Surface slicks generally are pushed in the direction of the wind. Certainly these winds that were blowing up to 38 kph would have had a powerful effect. The currents on that coast outside the barrier islands generally flow from east to west, however they are not constant and often reverse, usually with the wind. Thus, it is unlikely that the eastward push of the slick would have been prevented by the current.

Generally, the flow of water is out of Elson Lagoon toward the sea. However this direction is also not constant. While the tides in the area are small, perhaps 0.3 m or less, the wind can push a storm surge up to 1 m. Thus, current may flow into the lagoon. However the winds on 22 August were blowing west to east and would not support a storm surge into the lagoon. Thus the location of Harrington, deck logs of Spica with the reports of wind speed and direction, and the standard oceanography of the area indicate that the initial movement of the oil was eastward along the ocean side of the barrier beaches.

On the afternoon of 22 August, about the time Spica reported that Harrington was afloat, the wind changed and began coming from the northwest, although not as strong as earlier, and this wind continued for the next two days. Thus the wind may have pushed the slick through any of the several shallow channels along the barrier beach. Around noon on 25 August, the winds changed to a more easterly direction that persisted for several days. Thus, if the slick was not grounded, it could have moved back toward Doctor Island and Eluitkak Pass. A computer model of the spill based on wind information from the ships logs indicates that most of the oil would have impacted Crescent and Deadmans Island, with some entering the lagoon, and after the change in wind direction, some oil would ground on the lagoon-side of the spit and the barrier islands (Amy MacFadyen, NOAA Spill Response Center, personal communication, 14 December 2011).

Based on the logs, the most likely locations where the oil would have met the beach are the north side of Crescent and Deadmans Island. The author conducted an investigation in September 2010, boring over 50 holes on beaches of Crescent, Deadmans and Doctor Islands and found no trace of the oil. Although Bunker C can remain a long time on firm rock beaches above the usual high tide line, it is not surprising that none was to be found on the sandy barrier islands as these islands move. There is a steady migration of the barrier islands towards the west; some reports have movements up to 70 m in the average year (Short and others 1974). Hence, a section of the ‘beach’ from 70 years ago could be almost 5 kilometers further west. As the sand moves west it would eventually find its way into the northward currents from the west side of the Barrow Spit and finally into deeper waters to the north.

Harrington's woes

Harrington had problems on this voyage. A collision with a ship in Dutch Harbor at the beginning of the voyage, a fire in a hold off Barrow, two groundings, the one discussed above and another as the ship left Kodiak on the return voyage. There were many injuries to personnel; the more serious were taken to Spica where there was a doctor and were noted in the log. Besides the exposure, most injuries were from the loading and stevedore operations. Accidents, such as a 2.5-cm cable parting, caused injuries such as sprained backs, sprained and broken ankles and other injuries severe enough to warrant admission to Spica's sick bay. Clearly the unloading accidents were understandable, given the mission and the hurry to unload before the ice closed in. Handling the 55 gallon [200l] fuel drums was an ordeal. They each weighed about 180 kg and were unloaded with cargo nets onto barges. The edges of the net were lowered and stevedores lifted the barrels upright, then rolled them into order, and then received another net, etc. All this was done in waves up to one meter and often with 32 or 48 kph winds and snow or fog. Larger boxes were dragged off the LCMs or barges with cats. All those operations took place in the surf, on the soft beach, or both. Available records do not say much about the master of Harrington. The record of the armed guard does not disparage him in any way. Most of the injuries were to stevedores, who were navy troops not directly under his command. Also, although the master was in command of the ship and responsible for all aspects of the voyage, the actual duties were discharged by his mates, and the mates were young. The same master, Charles L. Stone, commanded Harrington on its voyage to Barrow the following year (NAS nd), implying his services were deemed satisfactory (See Fig. 4).

Fig. 4.

Harrington’s troubles did not end in 1944. She returned in 1945, this time she was stuck in the ice. Photo U.S.Navy from Reed, 1958.

Gathering respect for the Inupiat

The CB yearbook (Anon. 1945) does not mention the Barrow people except in one small passage that could be taken as disparaging them. Although the book has pictures of the people and their lifestyles, it does not have names of the people or notes about the pictures. Could it have been that, although Alaska natives participated bravely in the war effort as scouts and guards in the Aleutians and southwest Alaska, there may have been a lack of communication between the local people and the CBs? Of course the logs and reports follow a very formal format and would have downplayed any personal relations (and, of course, commonly troops are discouraged from fraternising with the local residents, since troops may overwhelm the existing social structure). Jim Sours, the managing editor of the CB yearbook, who was one of the expedition members who spent the winter after the ships left, in an interview 40 years later, had this to say: ‘When we got up there, the clothing was all wrong. They gave us stocking masks that would freeze to your cheeks. It took about three months to get that squared away. They finally bought mukluks (fur-lined snow boots) from the Eskimos.’ The navy personnel also learned about survival from the Eskimo people. ‘They wear four or five layers of thin clothing,’ he said. “You get air in between those layers and it provides great insulation. It was a lot smarter than what we were wearing.’ They also learned to adjust to temperatures that dropped beyond 50 degrees below zero [– 45 C]. Sours learned to appreciate some native food, the boiled polar bear and raw whale notwithstanding. ‘The next time I tried muktuk (raw whale), this Eskimo lady had prepared some type of hot oil sauce,’ he said. ‘Tasted . . . like coconut. You dip the muktuk in there and it isn't bad at all’ (Mail Tribune (Ashland OR) 4 January 2002). So, presumably in the winter, after the frenzy of the unloading and setting up the camp, the CBs did have some friendly relations with the locals.

Navy recommends Inupiat technology

Even the official records indicate a trend in the interaction. At Point Hope on the voyage northward the captain's log is condescending, implying that some candy was sufficient to purchase friendship and hard work from the Eskimo. Later, after the rescues on 21 August, the appreciation in the log book can be noted. Finally, based on his experiences, the captain of Spica wrote a supplement to his log titled, ‘experiences and observations on the ‘CULA’ expedition.’ It has information specific to navigation in the Arctic, but a section that demonstrates the relations with the local people was as follows:

1. 1. A sufficient number of fawn skin shirts and pants,

2. 2. At least two pairs of mukluks for each man of the winter party,

3. 3. Fur mittens for all hands also wool mittens,

4. 4. Adequate number of snow glasses,

5. 5. Acquire at least one reindeer parka for each member of the winter party,

6. 6. One pair of sealskin pants for each member of the winter party.

7. 7. Acquire enough tanned polar bear fur or wolverine to sew around hoods of parkas to protect men's faces in case the issued parka coats are to be used.

8. 8. Necessary number of fur socks to be worn inside mukluks,

9. 9. At least three dozen pairs of skis with binding and suitable shoes.

10. 10. An adequate number of trail stakes with orange bunting.

11. 11. Two good dog teams with sleds’ and spares,

So the captain of Spica moved from a view of buying labour with candy to a more progressive view of endorsing the natives’ equipment and implying that they would be the best to repair the Arctic clothing the troops needed.

Inupiat as skilled labour

Regarding their value as skilled labour, there is a likewise progression. For example, in the spring of 1944, before the CULA expedition was approved, a preliminary scouting mission went to the area and reviewed the situation. It made recommendations, one of which stated: ‘7. Because of the prevalence of tuberculosis and the undependability of the natives as steady workers, no consideration should be given the procurement of local labor’ (Reed Reference Reed1958: 22). But by 1953, the project had hired many natives and the final report on the project notes among the achievements of the project ‘close relations with the native Eskimos and their maximum use in the project’ (Reed Reference Reed1958: 174). In 1954, when the oil project ceased, 125 Eskimo men were employed at $140/ week (Saturday Evening Post (Philadelphia, PA) 20 February 1954: 88–94), which is $1184/wk in 2011 dollars.

Native health

Besides cultural differences, health may have played a role in relations. In early and middle 20th century United States, tuberculosis (TB) was a dreaded disease, often associated with poverty. In 1946, a contractor reported, ‘An attempt was made to employ Eskimos applying for work, but TB among them was very common and only 13 were found physically fit – they were employed’ (Reed Reference Reed1958: 49). A 1937 survey found 25% of the Eskimos suffered from TB (Jenness Reference Jenness1962: 33). Simple influenza was also a problem since natives often did not have resistance. ‘A serious influenza epidemic struck the native village in February 1945 – Eskimos are especially susceptible to such communicable diseases. At one time almost all of the inhabitants of Barrow were ill. The Navy assisted..[with] surplus food and distributed oil for [the] hospital and [the] medical officer contributed his personal services unstintingly’ (Reed Reference Reed1958: 46). As antibiotics and other treatments for TB became available and natives began to acquire antibodies for flu, they became more available for work.

Possible problems with alcohol may have complicated relations between the Navy and the local Eskimos. The original Organic Act of 1884 banned the importation or sale of alcoholic beverages (Jenness Reference Jenness1962: 8). However Charles Brower reports the locals had learned how to distill spirits, although they needed flour and sugar to do so (Brower, C.D. 1994). Jenness suggests that for the natives in a barter economy, acquisition of alcohol was too expensive (Jenness Reference Jenness1962: 48, 49). However the military bases made both cash and alcohol available, to the severe detriment of the people. Of course Brower was writing about times before about 1930, while Jenness may have been referring to the DEW line (Distant Early Warning – a system of remote radar stations) and other military activities of the early 1950’s. None of the records regarding CULA and that era mention alcohol.