Professor Grant Havers has written a fine book about Leo Strauss. It is accessibly-written and well-considered, and is not just another polemic about Strauss’s culpability for the Iraq War. Indeed, Havers practices the controversial scholar’s interpretive preachment: attempt to understand the author as he understood himself. In contrast with previous critics, Havers does not portray Strauss as an enemy of freedom and equality; rather, he believes that Strauss was a Cold War liberal who upheld democracy as the eternally-best regime for all human beings. Yet it is with this formulation that Havers, a Christian conservative in the tradition of Edmund Burke, takes issue: Strauss’s defence of universal natural right bleeds into what he terms radical anti-historicism, which views any appeal to a polity’s exclusive pedigree as pernicious.
Havers wants to rescue ‘the ancestral’ from Straussian condemnation. To do so, he examines Strauss’s adulation of Anglo-American democracy and especially the United States, which he acclaimed as a regime animated by natural right, accessible ‘to man as man.’ The problem with this account, according to Havers, is that Anglo-American democracy has a relevant history—in particular, a political culture of unmistakeably-Christian origins, which Strauss not only failed to emphasize, but also disregarded as a source of wisdom and influence. Consequently, he unreasonably rejected conservative historicists for whom the Christian teachings of charity and mercy had central political implications.
Havers investigates Strauss’s peculiar claim that the American founding owed most to Plato and Aristotle. As the Greeks did not root their philosophy in the ancestral, Strauss believed that theirs was not ‘tainted’ by either Machiavallian amoralism or exclusionary historicism. And because of its supposed influence on the American founding, Greek philosophy appears in Strauss’s hermeneutic as “ancient egalitarian natural right” (38). Havers’s response is convincing and substantiated, as he demonstrates that the founders most certainly did not admire Greek philosophy and history. Alexander Hamilton wrote, for instance, that Greek republicanism’s persistent oscillation between “tyranny and anarchy” provoked “sensations of horror and disgust” (44), and John Adams wrote that Aristotle’s teachings were “the most unphilosophical, the most inhuman and cruel that can be conceived” (54). Havers goes on to dismiss the Straussian distinction of Greek philosophy and society, showing that the practices of slavery and infanticide were accepted by the philosophers, and that they did not devise any means to overcome Athens’s perpetual instability.
His general argument is coherent, though I have a few criticisms:
1. Havers refers to the pagan acceptance of slavery and to the importance of Christian civilization to its abolition (63). He adds that Aristotelian philosophy was most popular in the slave-holding American South, on account of Aristotle’s distinction between “natural” and “conventional” slavery (54). But surely the preponderant justifications for Southern slavery were Christian, not pagan, and the perpetrators were on the whole believing Christians. This is not to say that Havers’s point about Christianity being uniquely civilizing is thereby invalidated, but the culpability of Southern Christians in perpetuating slavery needs to be acknowledged nevertheless.
2. In criticizing George Grant, who subscribed to Hegelianism before following Strauss, Havers writes that “in search of a truly respectable conservatism, [Grant] unwittingly embraced an ideology that was even more radical than the Hegelian progressivism that once enchanted him” (124). This is perplexing, as it would seem to imply that, for Havers, any historicism is preferable to Straussian universalism. Yet the most radical and damaging doctrine of natural-right liberal universalism—the dissolution of sovereign borders in favour of supranational bureaucracy—was a point on which Strauss was very reliable, as we know from his debates with Alexandre Kojève, who was proposing something much more radical than Strauss. It is thus hard to see how Havers’s formulation can be correct, notwithstanding the evident problems of radical anti-historicism.
3. In his last chapter, Havers discusses Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor vis-à-vis the importance of Christianity to liberal democracy. Both men disagree that belief in Christ is necessary to maintaining the charitable character of religiously-plural societies in the West, though Taylor acknowledges Christianity’s monopoly in establishing the political order of the moral society (153). Both Habermas and Taylor are deeply concerned about answering this question in a way that does not exclude non-Christians, leading to their search for a pluralist solution. Havers, in contrast, thinks that Christian belief remains essential to Anglo-American democracy, though he does not explain the requirements for Jewish, Muslim, and non-religious citizens in the Christianity-affirming society that he prefers. An explicit answer to this point would have improved his conclusion.
4. Finally, Havers briefly departs from his exegetic method when he addresses Strauss’s anti-historicism on philosophical grounds. At the beginning of Natural Right and History, Strauss states that edicts of the ancestral cannot be accepted because they are not based on reason alone, which is conceivably accessible to all of humanity. Thus the historicist cannot provide any purely-philosophical justification for why, say, cannibalism ought not to be practiced by peoples who do not share the historicist’s ancestral tradition. Havers quickly dismisses this as a “straw man” argument (19). But Strauss’s purpose is not to rhetorically defeat a historicist case for savagery that no historicist has made; rather, he is establishing why ancestrally-based arguments cannot be valid philosophical arguments, and thus why he rejects historicism as a political theorist.
I am thus unsure that Havers’s absolutism against natural right is appropriate. Insofar as man is indeed a ‘political animal’ by nature, and not an intrinsically pre-political creature from Hobbes’s State of Nature, it would follow that the answers to at least some politically-related questions may be common to all human societies. If true, it would be reasonable for philosophers engaged in such questions to jettison tradition-particular claims. This does not justify Strauss’s own absolutism against historicism for all exercises in political thought, but it might suggest something fruitful about the terms of debate here. Allowing the above Straussian premise, one could suggest that Havers’s thesis speaks to the limits of philosophy. For if the prospective answer to a political question is indeed of a purely-rational, man qua man character, then philosophy is well-suited to provide it with authority. If, on the other hand, philosophy is incapable of accommodating the ancestral when the ancestral is relevant, it follows that some portion of political thought should be ceded from philosophy to a mode of inquiry better suited to the task.
