Francisco González's intelligent analysis of the process of ‘dual transitions in Chile and Mexico’ has a strong Huntingtonian overtone. Apart from the introduction and the conclusion, the book is structured in three sections. Part 1 presents the divergent politico-economic trajectories of Chile and Mexico between 1970 and 1982. Part 2 analyses the process of convergence during the 1980s, and Part 3 the results of that process of convergence in terms of electoral democracy and the free market in both countries.
González's argument is clearly stated on pp. 5–8: he looks to explain ‘the cases of Chile and Mexico, where authoritarian regimes controlled dual transitions in the 1980s and 1990s’, and goes on to state that ‘In this volume, successful dual transition processes mean, on the economic side, that neither Chile nor Mexico experienced the escalation of social conflict into episodes of hyperinflation and, politically, that the heads of state in both countries finished their constitutionally prescribed terms in office’ (p. 7). González maintains that his study ‘includes all available written primary and secondary sources, both domestic and international’ (p. 14). Although the bibliography is extensive, the claim is not accurate given the absence of classical studies of democratisation in Chile such as James Petras and Fernando Ignacio Leiva's Democracy and Poverty in Chile (1994) and Kenneth M. Roberts' Deepening Democracy? (1998), as well as theoretical studies which have developed the idea of simultaneous transitions, such as Clauss Offe's Varieties of Transitions (1996), and the absence of works on contentious politics in Mexico by Viviane Brachet-Márquez, Reynaldo Y. Ortega, Isabel Rousseau and Diana Margarita Favela Gavia.
In the political realm, contrary to González's argument, scholars who have been studying the process of democratisation in Chile and Mexico do not consider the endurance of authoritarianism an advantage for democracy. On the contrary, the institutional strength of authoritarianism both in Chile and Mexico is one of the main causes of the low quality of democratic politics and, at some point, of de-democratisation processes in Mexico. Democracy in Chile and Mexico was the result not of benign autocrats, but of the long struggles between the opposition and the authoritarian regimes. That struggle has a long history which could be dated at least to the Mexican social movements of the 1960s, particularly the 1968 student movement. It is in that political crisis and its consequences that we can find the origins of the democratic process, and not in the economic crisis of the 1980s. The continuous economic crisis of the late 1970s, 1980s and 1990s certainly weakened the authoritarian regimes, but without the organisation of opposition social movements and political parties, without the construction of a democratic alternative to the rulers, democracy would not have emerged. I agree with González's argument that we have to analyse economic and political changes simultaneously, but I do not see even elective affinities between neoliberal policies and electoral democracy. On the contrary, the deepness of the neoliberal project in Chile and Mexico was possible thanks to the authoritarian character and weakness of the democratic regimes in both countries.
As Petras and Leiva argue, during the heights of neoliberal economic policy in Chile, ‘The major aim of these policies was to reduce wages and keep them low, a condition maintained deliberately for a period of five consecutive years (1983–1987) as direct result of restrictive monetarist policies, implemented through the abolition of wage indexation (with the wage floor set at 1979 levels), high unemployment, and the slashing of social expenditures. Real wages in the process lost 41.4 percent of their purchasing power on average’ (p. 30). It was also the authoritarian character of the Mexican regime in the 1980s and 1990s that allowed presidents Salinas and Zedillo to impose the neoliberal agenda on the Mexican workers, who also lost in terms of real wages and standard of living. Francisco González recognises that in Mexico President Salinas developed an economic system closer to what the literature would call ‘crony capitalism’ than to real free market competition: ‘Salinas's strategy … was not simply to steer Mexican economy toward the engine of private entrepreneurship but also to craft a new power bloc loyal to his person … For example, the three largest banks … that represented more than 70% of total banking were sold to finance groups with connections to President Salinas and his close circle. Likewise, Telmex was sold to Carso, a conglomerate owned by Carlos Slim, a close associate of the president and of his brother, Raúl Salinas’ (p. 182). Two of González's strong points are, on the one hand, his capacity to link the economic restructuring of Mexico and Chile and the emergence of new political coalitions, and on the other, his ability to take into account the international character of those coalitions. Further research would be necessary to calibrate the consequences and limits of that internationalisation of politics in Mexico and Chile.
In his conclusions, González, following Acemoglu and Robinson′s Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (2005), argues that ‘Chile's transition was a case of preemption whereas Mexico was one of gradual loss’ (p. 215) of hegemonic power. The characterisation is not incorrect, but the consequences are the opposite of what he claims. González accepts that ‘opposition parties and organized civil society, aided by international calls in favor of democratization, helped to further the cause of democracy in Chile and Mexico. However, the effectiveness of these forces was enhanced by the presence of institutionalized rule, even if this rule was authoritarian.’ Contrary to that view, it might be argued that opposition political parties and mobilisation from below not only helped but led the democratic struggle and eventually forced authoritarian rulers to allow relatively free and fair elections. Without the violent uprising in Chiapas and the PRD mobilisation, to mention only the clearest events, we would not have experienced the electoral reform of 1996. Indeed, it has been shown that the institutional character of the authoritarian regime has been one of the main obstacles for a complete democratisation of Mexico, and it is one of the main reasons for Chile and Mexico's poor performance in terms of the huge social and economic disparities in both countries. Mexico and Chile's Gini coefficients are around 0.53 and 0.52 respectively, and the ratio between the most affluent quintile of the population and the poorest quintile is 16:1 in the case of Mexico and 18:1 in Chile.
Despite these criticisms, Francisco González's book is a serious attempt to understand the complex processes of political and economic change in Chile and Mexico. It is worth reading, and opens up an important debate about authoritarian rule and its pernicious consequences.
