It has often been claimed that quantum physics treats individuality very differently than does classical physics – in fact, that quantum particles are not individuals. This issue lies at the hub of Steven French and Décio Krause's complex, multifaceted and marvellous book. Identity in Physics critically scrutinizes metaphysical issues implicated in classical and quantum physics, making deft use of the history of theoretical developments, and ultimately suggesting a way of rethinking the formal foundations of quantum physics.
French and Krause are concerned ultimately with the relationships between three notions: individuality, distinguishability and identity over time. One tradition, enshrined in Leibniz's Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, holds it impossible for two distinct individuals to share all of the same properties. Another tradition treats individuality as transcending those properties in terms of which items can be distinguished. In the latter, the authors delineate ‘Space–Time Individuality’ (STI), which views individuation in terms of space–time trajectories, and ‘Transcendental Individuality’ (TI), which encompasses individuality understood in terms of haecceity, ‘primitive thisness’ and substance. Their survey of these traditions maps out the metaphysical background to their subsequent discussion, which begins with history.
Their historical discussion focuses on approaches to deriving the statistics employed in classical and quantum physics. Famously, the distributions used in determining the probability of finding a quantum system in a given energy state (Bose–Einstein statistics, or Fermi–Dirac statistics if the Pauli exclusion principle applies) are different from those used in the classical case (Maxwell–Boltzmann statistics). A common interpretation holds that this is because in quantum contexts, unlike in classical settings, all that matters are the numbers of system elements in any given state, not which particle is in any particular state, so that quantum particles are treated as if they were not individuals at all.
Thus the history highlights the role of notions of individuality, whether explicit or implicit, in the development of both classical statistical mechanics and quantum theory. In the classical developments, French and Krause focus on Boltzmann's two distinct approaches to establishing Maxwell's distribution law, abandoning a problematic approach requiring the consideration of trajectories of molecules for a ‘Combinatorial Approach’ concerned only with the distribution of molecules across different energy states. Boltzmann's first approach invoked STI to individuate particles with the same intrinsic properties. The second approach, and the classical statistical mechanics founded upon it, has been regarded as grounded in TI, since the Maxwell–Boltzmann distribution treats arrangements as distinct that differ only in terms of which particles occupy which states. French and Krause develop a field-theoretic approach to classical mechanics that can be based on STI, and they discuss the further problems that view raises regarding the individuation of space–time points.
Their discussion of these issues is representative of their approach: a careful history is followed by a distinctive philosophical proposal, which is then pursued through close engagement with further implications, noting the advantages and costs of each move. A series of reflections and arguments results that sparkles with insights for the reader with the tenacity to follow it through. The thesis that emerges – really, the central thesis of the book – is that the metaphysics of individuality is ‘underdetermined by the physics’. Different metaphysical ‘packages’ can be maintained, provided that appropriate adjustments are made in connecting the metaphysics with physical theory.
Turning to developments in quantum theory, French and Krause trace the development of the ‘Received View’, according to which quantum particles are non-individuals. The history here is complex and evades easy summary. They begin with the work of Planck and Einstein, focusing on the relationship between these two approaches. In the later developments, particular attention is given to Schrödinger as a prominent advocate of the Received View, though the views of Born, Bohr and Weyl are also considered. Weyl's work exemplifies how advocates of the Received View continued to use formal foundations employing an ontology of individuals, yet introduced additional postulates to replace, as it were, individuals with non-individuals.
The explicitly historical work is completed within the first third of the text. The most ambitious and satisfying aspects of the book arguably come in what follows, though here I can only hint at the work undertaken.
French and Krause deliver a verdict for quantum physics analogous to that regarding the classical case: one can hold to an alternative to the Received View that treats quantum particles as ‘(philosophically) classical individuals for which certain sets of states are rendered inaccessible’ (p. 189). To defend this claim requires engaging arguments – due particularly to Teller – that this underdetermination is broken by methodological considerations. Significantly, French and Krause go on to develop the ‘particles-as-individuals package’ by considering an appropriate semantics that treats particle labels as names for individuals. Doing so, however, requires some non-standard formal apparatus, for which purpose they deploy Dalla Chiara and Toraldo di Francia's quaset theory.
What about the formal underpinnings of the Received View? French and Krause devote the final four chapters to developing a formal foundation for quantum theory appropriate to the particles-as-non-individuals metaphysical package. Specifically, they seek a framework that avoids the apparent commitment to individuals found in set theory. For this purpose, they introduce ‘quasi-set theory’: a two-sorted theory with ‘M-atoms’ subject to an ‘extensional identity’ relation that has the properties of identity in classical set theory and ‘m-atoms’ to which extensional identity does not apply, but to which the primitive predicate of indistinguishability does apply. This allows for the development of quasi-sets with cardinality but not ordinality.
The authors' note that by laying the foundations for quantum theory in the quasi-set formalism, they follow the dictum of Heinz Post, who held that the non-individuality of quanta should be ascribed ‘right at the start’ (p. 379). So much effort expended on rendering the foundations for a view that, by the authors' own argument, may be the wrong one is symptomatic of their seriousness of purpose and dedication to keeping themselves honest. It is very rare to see the metaphysics of science engaged so carefully, conscientiously and even-handedly.
