This book consists of two distinct parts. The first part of the book sets out the basic analytical principles behind pension policy. The second part applies these principles to actual pension reforms around the world with specific attention to Chile and China.
One of the main messages of the book is that there is no unambiguously best design of a pension system. Each country should develop its own pension system based on the weights it attaches to the primary objectives of pension systems, which the book identifies as intertemporal consumption smoothing, insurance, poverty relief and redistribution. Also relevant are a country's specific circumstances, such as saving and employment patterns as well as family structures. Barr and Diamond argue that a country faces a wider range of choices about its pension structures when its administrative, institutional and fiscal capacities expand. In particular, individual funded accounts should be introduced only if a country can properly regulate financial and insurance markets.
Whereas developed countries can feature a wide range of good pension systems, some pension designs are unambiguously bad. The authors identify the following main flaws in pension designs: poor coverage of the workforce in mandatory systems; excessive choice in mandatory systems giving rise to complexity and substantial marketing and administrative costs; corporate defined-benefit plans that are exposed to bankruptcy risk of the sponsoring firms; final-pay schemes that base pension benefits on pay just before retirement; nominal annuities that are vulnerable to inflation; the absence of actuarial adjustments for delayed retirement resulting in high implicit tax rates on work; the existence of mandatory retirement ages; a low earliest eligibility age for retirement benefits that does not rise in line with the age for full benefits; and lack of automatic adjustment of normal retirement ages to long-term trends such as increasing longevity. Indeed, the book argues that the pension crisis in many countries originates in the static designs of defined-benefit systems that do not automatically adjust to long-term demographic trends, in general, and increased longevity, in particular.
The style is accessible and non-technical. Concepts are explained verbally with minimal use of algebra. It starts from a few basic principles that are returned to frequently. This repetition serves an important educational role. An important principle is that one should consider the pension and tax and transfer systems as a whole. To illustrate, making the pension system actuarially neutral does not necessarily enhance efficiency if the task of redistribution is moved towards a more distortionary tax- and transfer system. Another key principle is that pension designs should take account of the second-best nature of economies. In particular, markets are highly imperfect due to all kinds of information problems. Moreover, people have a hard time making rational pension choices because of limited willpower and information processing capabilities, raising non-trivial agency and governance issues. Finally, redistribution and poverty alleviation are important objectives of pensions systems, and by their nature result in distortions. In view of all these complications, pension governance requires extensive institutional capacities. Indeed, one cannot rely only on consumer sovereignty, free choice and free competition. Even if the private sector plays a major role, non-trivial government capacity is needed to regulate and supervise private financial and insurance markets.
The second part of the book on country experiences frequently refers back to the analytical part, showing the relevance of analytical thinking for actual policy. Also in this respect, the book forms a strong coherent whole. Indeed, the authors find the right balance between describing the relevant institutional details and referring back to the main principles described in the first part of the book.
As regards Chile, the authors argue that the well-known 1981 reforms paid not enough attention to one of the main objectives of pension systems, namely alleviating poverty among those who lack a long record of covered employment. Moreover, the reform relied too much on consumer sovereignty and market competition to discipline suppliers, resulting in high administrative charges and excessive transaction costs. Chile has been addressing some of these issues in recent years but weaknesses remain.
On China, Barr and Diamond conclude that a mandatory pension system made up of a combination of, first, a redistributive flat-rate basic pension aimed at relieving poverty and, second, individual accounts aimed at intertemporal consumption smoothing could work well. In view of China's high saving rates, rapid growth benefitting younger cohorts, and limited financial and administrative capacities, Barr and Diamond maintain that the mandatory individual accounts should be notional rather than funded.
The book has no major flaws. Pressed to mention a weakness, I would have liked more attention to risk, including the distinction between idiosyncratic and macro-economic risks. An illustration of insufficient attention to macro-economic risk is the argument in the book that wage indexation of pensions is more expensive than price indexation. This is certainly true in expected terms, but whether this also holds in terms of market value is ambiguous. The reason is that real wages can decline in bad states of the world, which weigh heavily in the calculation of market values because marginal utilities are high in these contingencies.
The authors say little about how financial innovation and private–public partnerships can help to address some of the weaknesses of funded pensions, such as their exposure to the short-run volatility of financial markets. Indeed, innovative defined-contribution plans are needed that manage inflation and interest-rate risks during the accumulation phase with the pay-out phase already in mind. Government securities can play an important role here. In this connection, the book touches on intergenerational risk sharing, but this topic should be explored in more depth: what are the fundamental imperfections complicating intergenerational risk sharing, what are the resulting basic trade-offs here and what roles can both private and public institutions play in improving these trade-offs?
Other topics that may deserve more attention in a subsequent edition are the taxation of pensions and the relationship between imperfect labor markets for older workers and the low effective retirement ages in continental European countries. Indeed, European pension problems are to an important extent retirement (and thus labor-market) problems. The proposal of Barr and Diamond to eliminate mandatory retirement ages would – in continental Europe – have to go together with the reform of employment protection and other labor-market institutions.
Some of the material in the book is quite dated by now. For example, based on data for 2002, the book suggests that labor-force participation of older male workers is declining. In many OECD countries, however, effective retirement ages have started to rise rather rapidly in recent years. I very much hope that the book will be updated in the near future to take account of the rapidly changing pension landscape after the financial crisis. Indeed, this book is the best attempt I have seen in linking the economic theory of pensions to actual pension institutions and the practicalities of pension reform. It is required reading for anyone who wants to either become or remain a specialist in both the theory and practice of pension reform around the world.
