In this book, Michael Saward seeks to explain the role and constitution of representation, that is, what representation does or “what is going on in representation” (p. 9). He is concerned with neither the history of representation nor the definition of representation and the classification of its various modes. Thus he says: “My focus … is on understanding what representation does, rather than what it is; to explore the effects of its invocation rather than its institutional embodiment; to stress its dynamic character rather than its correctly understood forms or types” (p. 4).

Saward criticizes what he calls Hannah Pitkin's “unidirectional approach,” which focuses on the representative, thus ignoring the constitutive and constructive role of representation with respect to the represented. In his opinion, “[t]his particular characteristic of Pitkin's account has influenced deeply more than thirty years of writing on the subject, encouraging an unfortunate tendency to take the represented as having a clear, readily accessible, and largely stable set of interests” (p. 10). One fundamental shortcoming of this approach is that it has encouraged the downplaying of “categories of symbolic or aesthetic representation” (p. 12). By reinstating the idea that representation “is not just there,” but is made or constructed, both descriptively and symbolically, Saward hopes to offer a fuller understanding of the real dynamics of representation.

The author concedes that the “dynamic constructedness of representation” is not altogether absent from Pitkin's (1967) The Concept of Representation. But, as he notes, for Pitkin, symbol-making modes of representation are associated with fascist forms of representation, which she does not even consider as representation: “But this activity is not what we would ordinarily call the activity of representing, and it is certainly not ‘acting for’ one's constituents. Nor is it merely ritual activity. Rather, it is a kind of activity to foster belief, loyalty, satisfaction with their leaders, among the people. Representation becomes identified with ‘effective leadership’” (Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, 1967, p. 107).

The fundamental contribution of Saward's important book is the concept of representative claim. Because the represented is not a transparent entity, but is rather constructed by the representative, representation operates through the performing of representative claims. I think that Saward makes an important contribution in suggesting that political representation is a process of claim making and claim receiving.

For Saward, the representative claim combines five elements: the maker, the subject, the object, the referent, and the audience (p. 5). Thus, the general form of the representative claim is as follows: A maker of representations (M) puts forward a subject (S) that stands for an object (O), which is related to a referent (R) and is offered to an audience (A) (p. 36). As is obvious, the author adds the maker and the audience elements to triangular conceptions of representation. This is an innovative feature. Yet its practical significance is limited since, as he concedes, the maker and the subject can be one and the same person (“internal” representative claims) (pp. 61–62). Saward gives the following example, where “MP” stands for “Member of Parliament”: “The MP (maker) offers himself or herself (subject) as the embodiment of constituency interests (object) to that constituency (audience). The referent is the actual, flesh-and-blood people of the constituency. The object involves a selective portrayal of constituency interests” (p. 37). Although the addition of the maker as a separate person in the representation relation is often superfluous, we must thank the author for showing that there is no representation without claim making.

Saward contrasts two different perspectives on representation: representation as presence and as event, and he says that this distinction informs his whole analysis (p. 43). In my opinion, the presence/event terminology is a bit awkward and the distinction itself is not a clear one. This is the section I like least in this excellent book (pp. 39–43). The “presence approach” proposes stipulative definitions that seek to capture representation as a complete and free-standing social fact. In the “event approach,” “representation is seen as a thing that is done,” that is, as a performance. I cannot figure out why Saward picked out “event” for denoting a performance. If the contrast is between a fact and a performance, then perhaps “fact” or, ironically, event, is clearer than “presence,” just as “act” and “performance” are better labels than event. Nor is it clear to me why a performance cannot be captured by a stipulative definition. Because Saward assumes that definitions must pick out static, complete entities, and that claim making is rather a process, he concludes that representation cannot be defined (in a stipulative way). But, for example, a revolution is also a process, and apart from the ambiguity of the term, I do not see why a stipulative definition of “revolution'” should in principle be ruled out.

Saward holds that the active construction of constituencies and audiences through images and symbols is essential in representative politics. Notice the distinction between the object and the referent. He says that “the thing represented is an idea of it, not the thing itself” (p. 36). It is because the represented is an idea that he can argue that the representative claimer constructs the represented. In this way, Saward can accommodate various forms of nonelective representation under the umbrella of representation (e.g., Greenpeace, Amnesty International). He believes that his argumentation “might lead us to turn on its head the orthodox modeling of the constituent–representative relationship as one of principal–agent” (p. 52). In effect, he holds that the agent typically constitutes the principal. But, even leaving aside normative issues, there is a conceptual matter that is important. How far can a representative go in the construction of the represented before the concept of representation becomes unintelligible? For instance, in October 2011, following a decision by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Congress of Uruguay abrogated the “expiry law” that prevented prosecution and punishment of crimes against humanity committed by the military and the police. In 1989 and 2009, the Uruguayan people had been consulted on this issue through a referendum and a plebiscite and, in both cases, there were direct majoritarian decisions in favor of maintaining the law. Can the Uruguayan legislators meaningfully claim that they represent their constituency on this issue? The author differentiates between intended and actual constituencies (p. 49), but for all he says, for him representation requires only the former.

In emphasizing the element of constructedness, Saward implies that nondemocratic forms of representative claim making may constitute political representation. Pitkin excommunicated forms of purported representation that symbolically mold or fictionalize a popular constituency (e.g., in illiberal democracies) as “fascist,” But Saward defends the neutrality of “representation.” He tries to avoid “a strongly and overtly normative orientation” that confines the concept of representation to legitimate representation (pp. 9, 38). Accordingly, he argues that democratic legitimacy is a contingent though desirable quality of representation. He holds that “provisionally acceptable claims to democratic legitimacy across society are those for which there is evidence of sufficient acceptance of claims by appropriate constituencies under reasonable conditions of judgment” (p. 145; italics in the original). In the end, this means that democratic representation requires an actual constituency, not merely an intended one.

This is a book I would recommend to every political theorist interested in the theory of representation. It provides an innovative and interesting account of representation. I am skeptical about the usefulness of a neutral theory of representation, but this is because I am skeptical of the claims of “positive political science” to bracket out normative concerns. At the same time, this book demonstrates how much can be gained from the careful analysis of concepts, even when such analysis seeks to avoid explicit normative theorizing.