Violence Against Women

“ . . .[V]iolence against women constitutes a violation of the rights and fundamental freedoms of women and impairs or nullifies their enjoyment of those rights and freedoms. . .” ^{Footnote 24}

Under the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW), States have positive duties to condemn, punish, and protect women from violence whether it takes place in the private or public arena. ^{Footnote 25} The CEDAW, through two general recommendations, ^{Footnote 26} has also made it clear that the state has positive duties to protect and prevent violence against women. ^{Footnote 27} Under the ECHR, violence against women has been found to violate Article 2 (the right to life ^{Footnote 28} ), Article 3 (the right to be free from inhuman and degrading treatment ^{Footnote 29} ), Article 8 (the right to privacy ^{Footnote 30} ), and Article 14 (the right to be free from discrimination in relation to the rights contained in the Convention ^{Footnote 31} ). Yet these broad injunctions to States need to be translated into specific understandings of what constitutes violence against women and into specific policies and legal provisions to prevent and punish such violence. ^{Footnote 32} The tenacity of women litigants, their lawyers, and the various support organizations that work to promote women’s rights in the United Kingdom is well recognized in the fight to eradicate violence against women. By examining different strategies to address violence against women in several different contexts, this paper offers an intersectional analysis of the success of rights-based activity in this domain in the United Kingdom.

Sexual Violence and Sexual Assault in the Domestic Context

Within the private sphere, there has historically been little legal interest in the protection of the female body from “domestic” violence inflicted within the family and often hidden from the attention of public authorities. ^{Footnote 33} In UK law, for example, women who had been subjected to years of physical and mental abuse and who subsequently killed their violent partner were for many years unable to benefit from the defense of provocation, which would have reduced a conviction of murder to one of manslaughter. ^{Footnote 34} Campaigns to change the law on this mobilized around the individual cases of Ahluwalia and Thornton. ^{Footnote 35} Justice For Women, a group that supports women who have fought back against violent partners, sprang up in 1990 in response to the Ahluwalia case and those coming after it. ^{Footnote 36} Campaign groups contrasted the position of these battered women who had killed with that of men who have been “provoked” to kill their partner following her nagging ^{Footnote 37} or taunts about sexual prowess. ^{Footnote 38} Men appeared more apt to fulfill the “objective” conditions attached to the legal definition of provocation through their immediate and physical reaction to the provocative word or deed and therefore had benefited to the detriment of women. By contrast women, following sustained abuse over what is often many years, and being usually of a slighter physical stature than their tormenter, would tend to wait for the “right moment” before killing him, thus giving their action the appearance of premeditation.

Only in 2000 did the then House of Lords (now the Supreme Court) accept the need to modify the definition of provocation to include a more subjective perspective, which allows for the “slow burn” effect of domestic abuse to be fully considered. ^{Footnote 39} Concern still remains, however, that despite this new approach, women who kill a violent partner continue to be treated more harshly than their male counterparts by the courts, this being now evidenced in gender-biased sentencing practices. ^{Footnote 40} This mirrors the problem raised by Judy Fudge in her analysis of the early use of Canadian Charter litigation by feminists—that changing the law without changing dominant discourses is ultimately ineffective in challenging social relations of power that subordinate women. ^{Footnote 41}

As far as the crime of rape is concerned, this too has provided opportunities for mobilization of the women’s movement as well as preoccupying feminist thought. Because of the difficulty for victims in proving that they did not consent to an assault, it is apparent that judges and juries may simply presume that consent did or did not exist based upon their appreciation of the status and identity of the victim. Following a study of prosecutions and sentencing decisions in cases of sexual assault in Scotland, Sue Moody identified an “ideal profile” of the victim of rape. ^{Footnote 42} According to this construction, the more the woman complied with a form of correct, innocent, and feminine behavior, the easier it was to establish the guilt of the defendant and the greater his sentence. The findings of Moody’s study are confirmed by other research that has identified the prevalence of “rape myths” in legal discourse, which have resulted in the proliferation in law of stereotypes of male and female sexual behavior. ^{Footnote 43} Among such myths is the presumption that women are less likely to have sexual relationships with people they have known for only a short while. In light of this, it is not surprising that judges and juries are willing to accept that a victim has not consented when the attacker was unknown to her. A telling example to this effect is the move by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to include rape within the definition of crimes against humanity, it being readily accepted that female Bosnian Muslims would not consent to sexual relations with their Serb aggressors. ^{Footnote 44}

The flip side of the coin of quasi-presumption of a lack of consent in cases of rape by a stranger is the difficulty for victims of establishing a similar absence of consent in cases where their aggressor was already known to them. Despite the decision of the House of Lords in R v. R, ^{Footnote 45} which put an end to the marital rape exemption, judges and juries are notoriously less likely to believe that there was no consent in cases involving sexual relationships between parties who already knew one another. ^{Footnote 46}

A number of women have now turned to the civil law to seek justice following rape and sexual assault. Until recently, a block to this was the rigid limitation period of six years imposed for intentional torts. In contrast, negligently inflicted personal injury was subject to a three-year limitation period, but victims could appeal to the court to have the time period extended. The law on this was changed in January 2008 when a number of victims of rape and sexual assault appealed to the House of Lords. In the most prominent case, A v. Hoare ^{Footnote 47} (termed the “lotto rape case”), the victim had been raped in 1989, but at the time she did not sue because the rapist had very little money. Later, in 2004, he bought a lottery ticket while on day release from prison and won seven million pounds. Her attempt to sue for the lasting damage caused by the rape was stopped by the six-year limitation period. On appeal to the House of Lords, limitation periods for intentional torts were brought in line with injuries caused through negligence. The recommendation given was that the more serious the assault the greater the presumption of flexibility in the limitation period. Other related appeals heard at the time included victims who had been raped or abused when they were children and were similarly time-barred from pursuing claims.

A further interesting development in the context of litigation strategy was the first private prosecution for rape brought in 1995 with support from Women Against Rape and the English Collective of Prostitutes. ^{Footnote 48} The Crown Prosecution Service refused to prosecute the rapes, beatings, and imprisonment of the victims because they were sex workers, and it believed they would not be credible witnesses. The jury believed otherwise, and as a result of the prosecution, the rapist was sentenced to fourteen years imprisonment. Concurrent with the prosecution, a report on other failures to prosecute was published by Legal Action for Women and Women Against Rape. ^{Footnote 49} As a result, an enquiry was launched into the code of practice on prosecuting perpetrators used by the Crown Prosecution Service.

More worryingly for the advancement of women’s rights and litigation is the tendency for the generation of counterclaims once rights are asserted. Where balancing of opposing claims is required within the criminal justice system, very often women’s claims are not prioritized. For instance, one of the earliest rulings by the House of Lords under the Human Rights Act 1998 in the area of gender equality, R v. A [2001] 3 All ER 1, engaged precisely in this type of balancing exercise to the detriment of women victims of sexual assault. In the context of a rape trial and a conflict between the assertion of the rights of the (male) defendant over those of the (female) complainant, the Law Lords showed a worrying tendency to replicate the Canadian Supreme Court’s early example of striking down statutory “rape shield” law reforms. ^{Footnote 50} Although citing the later Canadian case of R v. Darrach ^{Footnote 51} with some approval, and recognizing the right of the victim to dignity and freedom from damaging rape myths, the House of Lords, because of the way the English provision was drafted, followed the earlier case of Seaboyer ^{Footnote 52} in finding the rape shield provision to be incompatible with the HRA. ^{Footnote 53}

Thus, in R v. A it was found by the House of Lords that s.41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, which prohibits the giving of evidence and cross examination about any sexual behavior of the complainant except with the leave of the court, could amount to a violation of the defendant’s right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention. The case redraws the balance previously struck by parliament towards the protection of rape complainants from harassment during the rape trial. This is concerning in light of evidence showing the reluctance of women to report rape, the brutal nature of their treatment by defense lawyers aimed at undermining their credibility and character, and the disinclination of juries to convict. ^{Footnote 54}

The decision in R v. A is disturbing also in that it demonstrated a distinct incompatibility in national and European interpretations of the Convention in the area of sexual violence, and a partial sightedness on the part of the national judiciary in its willingness to look to decisions of the European Court of Human Rights when interpreting Convention rights (despite the instruction to do so in s.2, HRA). ^{Footnote 55} There lay at the time within the jurisprudence of the European Court the possibility of drawing a different conclusion upon the correct balance between the rights of the defendant and those of the complainant in cases of sexual violence. In the case of SW v. United Kingdom and CR v. United Kingdom (1996) 21 EHRR 363, dealing with the end of the marital rape exemption that had existed in the United Kingdom until the landmark decision of the House of Lords in R v. R [1991] 4 All ER 481, the European Court found that defendants convicted of the new offense could not rely on Article 7 of the Convention (the principle of non-retroactivity of the criminal law) in order to challenge their conviction. Furthermore, the decision of the European Court recognized that sexual violence is inherently contrary to the spirit of the Convention, “the very essence of which is respect for human dignity and human freedom” (SW v. UK and CR v. UK (1996) 21 EHRR 363, paras. 44 and 42, respectively). The decision in R v. A seemed, therefore, to represent an initial loss for women’s rights in the new HRA culture, and this despite the existence of legal precedents to support a more sympathetic interpretation and parliamentary intention to protect claimants from harassment at trial. Similarly, the experience of Canada immediately after the Charter shows us that it is especially in cases of sexual violence that women’s rights are most at risk. While the victims in due process cases were usually women, ^{Footnote 56} court cases focused on the conflicting rights of the state and the defendant and tended to ignore the victim. ^{Footnote 57}

Yet if there is a positive side to R v. A, it is the role played by the women’s groups Rape Crisis Federation, Campaign to End Rape, the Child and Woman Abuse Studies Unit, and Justice for Women, as third party interveners in the case. The potential for feminist activists to influence judicial decision making through third-party interventions is of increasing importance, as such interventions offer the opportunity to build a litigation strategy that can help shape the development of case law under the HRA. ^{Footnote 58} So much had already been recognized in the pre-HRA case of R v. Smith [2001] AC 146, which concerned the defense of provocation to murder and in which a coalition of feminist groups successfully made a written intervention in the House of Lords in order to represent the interests of battered women. ^{Footnote 59} In this regard, the participation of feminists and women’s groups in the litigation process may be seen as a good in itself with success not being measured purely in terms of winning or losing a specific case but rather in raising public awareness of the extent of sexual violence against women and the need to tackle gender-based harms.

Sexual Violence, Asylum, and Refuge

Asylum and refuge provisions are not always examined as preventative measures in relation to violence against women, yet the experience or threat of violence is implicit in the concept of “persecution.” The intersection of non-citizen status, race, and religion with gender in relation to women seeking asylum make asylum-seeking women one of the most vulnerable groups in the United Kingdom. ^{Footnote 60} This also makes women seeking refuge and asylum more vulnerable to violence within their domestic relationships, particularly where their status in the United Kingdom is dependent on a partner’s asylum claim. Therefore it is important that persecution against women is recognized when the Convention is applied to claims, and that women make claims in their own right. Moreover, the need for economic and social support for women seeking refuge is recognized as a necessary tool to protect against domestic violence in the United Kingdom.

Asylum and refuge provisions are based on the premise that states within the international community should provide protection for human rights even where rights breaches take place outside their state control. ^{Footnote 61} Despite the fact that women equal or exceed men in relation to global refugee populations, ^{Footnote 62} UK figures for asylum applications show that far fewer women than men make applications for asylum under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (hereafter the Refugee Convention). ^{Footnote 63} To claim official refugee status a person must fit within Article 1.A (2) of the Convention. This article provides that anyone who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his [sic] nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself [sic] of the protection of that country” shall be considered a refugee. ^{Footnote 64}

Despite its clear application to both men and women, Article 1. A. (2) makes no explicit reference to gender, and historical and prevailing perceptions of asylum claimants have been narrowly drawn as male. ^{Footnote 65} Understandings of political activity or religious opinion have excluded women’s experiences. This is an area where women are at a particular disadvantage, because their experiences do not conform to the “dominant perception of a refugee within the meaning of the [refugee] Convention,” ^{Footnote 66} and within the refugee system, women have been viewed at best as secondary claimants dependent on those defined as refugees. Berkowitz and Jarvis suggest that the relative dearth of applications from women in their own right is due to two factors: firstly, that there is a lack of jurisprudence that examines claims from the female experience, and that women may therefore not be encouraged to apply, and secondly because “procedural and evidential requirements of the domestic asylum process are not equally accessible to both men and women.” ^{Footnote 67}

In 1991, in an effort to redress some of these inequalities, the UNHCR produced Gender Guidelines ^{Footnote 68} to be read alongside the Refugee Convention as an aid to interpretation and process. These introduce gender awareness in several ways: by discussing the specific situations that might bring women under the different heads of the Convention; by asking countries to recognize that a “particular social group” can be constructed along gender lines; and by directing countries to examine their procedures and processes, including recognizing the additional difficulty that women may encounter in providing documentary or other evidence. While there is acceptance of the failure to properly take gender into account in considering claims for refuge and asylum, there is some controversy in relation to both the concept and consequence of Gender Guidelines. For instance, some authors argue that guidelines promote a focus on women as a social group and underplay the recognition of women’s political and religious persecution, thus encouraging a view of women as passive victims rather than political actors. ^{Footnote 69}

In 1998, following the example of Canada, the United States, and Australia, as well as recommendations by the European Parliament, the UK Refugee Women’s Legal Group produced Gender Guidelines for the Determination of Asylum Claims in the UK. ^{Footnote 70} Despite a campaign by the Refugee Women’s Legal Group, the guidelines were never adopted by the Home Office. Yet the House of Lords Judicial Committee recognized the value of these guidelines in the appeal case R ., IAT. Ex p Shah ^{Footnote 71} (known as Shah and Islam). Shah and Islam involved asylum appeals by two women from Pakistan who had been subjected to violence by their husbands. ^{Footnote 72} One of the applicants was given advice in her application by the women’s group Southall Black Sisters, and this group continued to support the legal team and to campaign on behalf of the women. The court drew on an Amnesty International report on Pakistan, which gave general evidence on the parlous position of women without family protection in some parts of Pakistan and on the seriousness of accusations of infidelity against women.

Both women were unsuccessful in claiming political persecution, but the House of Lords Judicial Committee did find that they could claim membership of a particular “social group” comprising “all women in Pakistan.” There is no doubt that gender guidelines were significant in the determination of this case. The UNHCR, as a third party, provided submissions based on the UNHCR gender guidelines, and these were praised by the court. ^{Footnote 73} All the individual judgments also referred to the Canadian case of Attorney General of Canada v. Ward, ^{Footnote 74} which had recognized that gender and sexual orientation could form the basis of a “social group” for the purposes of the Refugee Convention. In accepting the concept of social group status based entirely on gender, Lord Hoffman also referred explicitly to the gender guidelines for the United Kingdom drawn up by the Refugee Women’s Legal Group. The case gave explicit support for the campaign for gender guidelines to be officially adopted. In November 2000, Berkowitz and Jarvis produced and issued gender guidelines on behalf of the Immigration Appellate Authority. The Refugee Women’s Legal Group was credited as providing the basis for this official guidance. Yet the status of these guidelines remained unclear. Although they were placed on the Immigration Appellate Authority website, there was no obligation on adjudicators to use them and no training given. Further campaigning eventually led to the issue of a “watered down” ^{Footnote 75} version in 2004 that was just twenty pages long ^{Footnote 76} (the original guidelines produced in 2000 were over sixty pages).

While the finding in Shah and Islam had an impact on decision making by asylum adjudicators, particularly in relation to cases involving female genital mutilation (FGM), Asylum Aid noted that the Immigration Appeal Tribunal was often overturning these decisions and adopting a much more restrictive interpretation of “particular social group” than was given in Shah and Islam. ^{Footnote 77} Similarly, in 2004, the Court of Appeal recognized problems with government appeals to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal (IAT). For instance, in P and M v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ^{Footnote 78} a case that involved the appeals of Kenyan women fearing FGM in one case and domestic violence in another, the Court of Appeal restored the decisions taken in the women’s favor by the adjudicator and stressed the importance of appellate bodies “not seeking to determine appeals to the adjudicator afresh.” ^{Footnote 79} They also warned against an “overly technical approach” to the Refugee Convention. ^{Footnote 80} Despite this positive finding, a year later, a differently composed Court of Appeal appeared to set back any progress. In Fornah, ^{Footnote 81} the male majority of the Court of Appeal found that a woman who fled Sierra Leone fearing that she would be subjected to FGM was not “persecuted,” since if she underwent the procedure it would lead to her complete acceptance in that society. The Court explicitly rejected the concept of a “social group” made up of all Sierra Leonean women, since 80 percent of them had already undergone FGM, and therefore not all women in Sierra Leone feared FGM. They also rejected social grouping based on “intact” Sierra Leone women, since if subjected to FGM, a woman would no longer be a member of that group. In her minority judgment Lady Justice Arden disagreed, rejected the majority findings, and rejected the Home Office appeal.

The decision caused widespread alarm within women’s groups, and their concerns were supported by a debate on FGM in the legislative chamber of the House of Lords that was dominated by the female members of that second chamber. ^{Footnote 82} The Court of Appeal decision was described by Baroness Kennedy, herself a QC, as an “appalling decision” and “a return to a technocratic application of the law.” ^{Footnote 83} The Home Office tried to blame the Court, but it was argued by several of the contributors that the Home Office could not “hide behind the failures of the judiciary” since it had instigated the appeal. ^{Footnote 84} Baronesses Rendell and Kennedy urged the Home Office to review its position, called for clear gender guidelines as were in use in Canada, and urged the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords to reverse the Fornah decision. For the government, Lord Bassam claimed that guidelines on gender issues in the asylum process were in use. ^{Footnote 85}

On appeal to the House of Lords Judicial Committee in 2006, their lordships upheld Fornah’s appeal and clarified the separation between the requirement of individual persecution and membership of a “particular social group.” It was stressed that the shared characteristic of the social group must reflect the “reason for persecution,” but that it could include persons who were not persecuted. ^{Footnote 86} Therefore, a social group need not be cohesive in the way that the Court of Appeal had suggested. The UNHCR intervened as a third party to the case, and in addition to the UNCHR Guidelines, the judgments referred to a range of international case laws examining the issue. The judgment also drew on the Home Office’s own advice and a parliamentary statement from Anne Widdecombe, then a government minister, stating that FGM should be considered torture for the purposes of asylum. ^{Footnote 87} Finally it referred to EU Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 ^{Footnote 88} setting out minimum standards for refugees across member states.

While this represented a legal victory in relation to FGM, in the very same year a report by Black Women’s Rape Action Project and Women Against Rape found that few Immigration Judges (formerly called Adjudicators) ever referred to guidelines, and that women were being denied asylum status even where there was good evidence to support their case. Research by Asylum Aid also found that women’s claims were still very poorly dealt with and that the revised gender guidelines were not being properly applied. ^{Footnote 89} The report found that where the guidelines were referred to, women felt they had been given a fairer hearing. ^{Footnote 90}

In response to this dossier, Lord Hylton raised a parliamentary written question asking the government whether they could ensure that the Immigration Appellate Authority (IAA) Gender Asylum Guidelines 2000 were always referred to where rape was put forward as a form of persecution. ^{Footnote 91} Baroness Scotland of Asthal for the government replied that the 2000 Gender Guidelines were out of date and had been replaced by a body of jurisprudence, and that this was supplemented by the Judicial Studies Board Equal Treatment Bench Book. No reference was made to the shorter guidelines on gender issues that had been revised and reissued only the year before. Baroness Scotland’s comments appear to have misunderstood the role of the guidelines since they reach beyond jurisprudence and act as a training aid, which helps caseworkers to identify general issues in relation to interviewing techniques and the treatment of claimants. In light of the government’s response, it was perhaps unsurprising that research by Asylum Aid in 2010 found evidence of continuing problems in the handling of women’s claims. This report was supported by the United Kingdom Border Agency’s (UKBA) own disaggregated figures, which showed that a disproportionate number of women’s claims were refused at first instance and then allowed on appeal. ^{Footnote 92}

The ECHR provides an additional protection from return to a “home” country for a woman who fears violence (where there is a “real risk” of a “serious breach” of an ECHR right). ^{Footnote 93} The introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 in the United Kingdom allowed this principle and surrounding ECHR jurisprudence to be applied in UK domestic courts. Section 6 of the Human Rights Act states that it “is unlawful for any public body to act in a way that is incompatible with a Convention right.” Moreover, Article 14 of the ECHR also supports the need for a gender-sensitive asylum process. Thus, the HRA 1998 itself was a spur to the production of the IAA Guidelines, issued in 2000 just a month after the Act came into force. The Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 s.65, drafted in response to the HRA 1998, also provided that whenever a human rights issue was raised in an asylum application, an appeal should automatically be heard.

So the potential to effect positive change in this area is strengthened by the capacity of ECHR jurisprudence to recognize the state’s responsibility for private actors and to allow indirect horizontal application. The cases of Morven Marcia McPherson v. Secretary of State for The Home Department, ^{Footnote 94} Klondiana Kacaj v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ^{Footnote 95} and the case of Z and A, in Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Z, A, and M ^{Footnote 96} showed early successes in UK courts based on HRA 1998 appeals heard through the s.65 procedure. Even in the Fornah case, discussed above, the Secretary of State recognized that to return Fornah to Sierra Leone where there was a real threat of FGM would breach Article 3 of the ECHR. ^{Footnote 97}

Moreover, M (Lebanon) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ^{Footnote 98} suggested that the UK House of Lords was willing to go beyond the scope of ECHR jurisprudence. This went against the usual position of Strasbourg jurisprudence that “aliens cannot claim. . . entitlement under the Convention. . .to escape the discriminatory effects of family law in their country of origin.” ^{Footnote 99} Other cases currently on appeal to the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR might also suggest that the House of Lords in Fornah took a leading stance on Article 3 rights in this area. ^{Footnote 100}

Yet as Lord Hope recognized in Fornah, where other claims are available, refugee status under the Refugee Convention is not just “of theoretical importance.” ^{Footnote 101} A decision granting refugee status provides greater benefit and protection than a decision under Article 3 not to allow a return in the current climate.

If the campaigning by women’s groups and guidance through case law has not ensured clear use of gender guidelines, a recent civil action has shown that the failure can have financial consequences for government. In ELS v. Home Office, ^{Footnote 102} a Moldovan woman who had been trafficked to the United Kingdom, subsequently deported, then raped and trafficked back to the United Kingdom, sued the Home Office for breaching Article 3 and Article 4 of the ECHR ^{Footnote 103} when they failed to properly examine her asylum claim before deporting her. ^{Footnote 104} The case was supported by the Poppy Project, a women’s group supporting trafficked women. The government initially fought the case, but following fierce publicity by the Poppy Project, good news coverage, ^{Footnote 105} and the parliamentarians Anthony Steen, Baroness Nicolson, and Jack Dromey raising the issue in the House of Lords and House of Commons, ^{Footnote 106} the government decided to relinquish the fight and settled out of court for 130,000 pounds. ^{Footnote 107} This example of the role of the press and parliamentary debate in the settlement illustrates the importance of discursive opportunity structures in the activation of women’s rights, as discussed by Gesine Fuchs in her contribution to this collection.

A second focused campaign relates to the economic and social rights of female refugee and asylum seekers, their access to services and support, and their freedom from violence in the United Kingdom as host country. In 2007, a joint campaign was launched by over forty leading NGOs for women’s rights and human rights groups, opposing the application of the “no recourse to public funds rule” for women who are victims of domestic violence. Lobbying against the “no recourse” policy has been happening since the 1990s. Early, successful lobbying led to changes in the law so that women who were dependents of asylum seekers would no longer be deported—provided that there was evidence of domestic violence—in situations where their relationship broke down within the “probationary period.” ^{Footnote 108} Prior to this, the threat of deportation had forced women to remain in abusive relationships. In practice, though, the real benefit of this change in the law was negated by the fact that women who leave their partners in those circumstances have no recourse to “public benefits” while their individual clams are being determined—though they may be entitled to local government support or support from the National Asylum Support Service. While this “no recourse” rule applies to all asylum seekers, it creates particular problems for victims of domestic violence, because the nature of the assistance can mean that “women and children are often isolated in accommodation/removal centres or other inappropriate housing and designated areas, where they are easily targeted by violent spouses/partners or relatives, and lack access to essential safe and specialist refuge and support services.” ^{Footnote 109} Though Oxfam was not a member of this campaign, it also released a report in 2008 on the impact of this rule on South Asian women in the United Kingdom and raised human rights concerns around the policy. ^{Footnote 110}

Problems have been compounded by very mixed practice among councils. Some local authorities were effectively preempting the asylum process by stating that, where women could get family support in their home country, they would be offered an air ticket home but no other support. A 2010 judicial review hearing (with the NGO Shelter intervening) of just such “assistance” by Birmingham City Council, ^{Footnote 111} made it clear that this was unacceptable. Now, councils must offer local support to women while their asylum claims are ongoing, unless the claims are believed to be “abusive or hopeless.” ^{Footnote 112} Despite this success, there has been little movement by the government on other aspects, but the campaign continues to grow. ^{Footnote 113}

Pulling together both issues and highlighting discrimination against non-national women in the United Kingdom is the Every Single Woman campaign. The Rights of Women Seeking Asylum: A Charter ^{Footnote 114} was launched in 2008 ^{Footnote 115} by a number of different women’s groups under the coordination of the Refugee Women’s Resource Project. It refers to the right of all UK asylum seekers to be treated fairly under domestic and international obligations, and in relation to this, it highlights gender equality duties incumbent on the United Kingdom under CEDAW, the Treaty on European Union, the HRA 1998, and the Equality Act 2006. Among other things, the Charter calls for the implementation of gender guidelines, ^{Footnote 116} effective management of gender mainstreaming by the United Kingdom Border Agency, “accommodation, support and healthcare appropriate to their needs as women,” and specifically “the alleviation of the gender impact of policies which lead to destitution.” ^{Footnote 117} It also refers to the need “to ensure that those who may have been trafficked into the United Kingdom have full and appropriate access to the asylum determination system.” ^{Footnote 118} Two years on from its launch, it is supported by 211 groups in the United Kingdom. ^{Footnote 119} It seems that this level of coordinated mobilization has had a real impact. For instance, the UKBA appointed a Gender Champion in March 2010 and has reviewed its procedures. ^{Footnote 120} The experience of earlier campaigns shows that successes can never be taken for granted and that pressure must be kept up to ensure there are no slippages.