In the years following World War II, American consumers lived in a world of small, specialized financial firms, rooted in local communities and sustained by deep, interpersonal ties between bankers and their customers. That world has largely fallen away, eclipsed over the past few decades by the one we recognize as our own. A small cohort of massive, too-big-to-fail banks now offers every conceivable financial service, online and through branch offices across the country, pushing small, specialized firms ever farther toward the margin.
In Market Rules, historian Mark H. Rose seeks to explain how and why this transformation took place. Over seven chapters and an epilogue, the work examines the multilayered regulatory structures that defined the business of banking in the postwar era and the entwined stories of bankers and policymakers who sought to transform these rules through the political process. It is a character-driven story. U.S. presidents, like John F. Kennedy, William J. Clinton, and Barack H. Obama, and leading bankers, like Walter B. Wriston, Hugh L. McColl Jr., and Sanford I. “Sandy” Weill, populate the narrative and push the action.
Rose's theory of change is straightforward: American presidents, uniquely accountable for national economic performance, sought to ensure ever-greater economic growth. Larger banks, they believed, would deliver. “Each president,” Rose argues, “starting with Kennedy and Johnson in the 1960s and extending to Bill Clinton during the 1990s made the creation of large, multipurpose banks a central policy goal” (p. 3).
The work begins in 1961, with Kennedy's appointment of James J. Saxon, an indefatigable proponent of banking liberalization, as Comptroller of the Currency, where Saxon oversaw the supervision of nationally chartered banks. Kennedy urged Saxon to “start stirring things up,” but Saxon and likeminded successors in the administrations of Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon made little headway (p. 18). Through the 1970s, Congress remained wedded to the restrictive postwar regulatory regime. After examining these disappointments, the work turns to leading bankers, admiringly chronicling how Wriston and McColl articulated visions of multipurpose banking and created the world they hoped to see through their own firms, Citicorp and North Carolina National Bank, respectively, during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. By the Clinton years, the ambitions of Wriston and McColl's successors finally converged with the interests of Congress, leading to significant financial reforms. The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (1994) and Financial Services Modernization Act (1999), commonly called the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, reordered the financial marketplace in favor of large banks.
In the final chapters, Rose documents the global financial crisis these banks ultimately helped create, and the efforts, under the Obama administration, to again circumscribe their powers. The epilogue, in turn, points to a renewed cycle of counterpressure already emerging under Donald J. Trump.
In documenting this story, Rose's book provides a useful introduction to federal-level banking politics of the period. The work features engaging character studies and is crisply written and easy to follow. The book also raises productive questions about how scholars should periodize postwar financial change. Rose rightly pushes the timeline backward, showing long-running support for financial liberalization, preceding the regulatory changes of the 1990s and the economic disruptions of the 1970s. But the question of where to begin, and why, also remains unresolved. Saxon is certainly a compelling character and a strong voice for regulatory change. But we could look earlier still, to the economic downturns of the 1950s, which prompted Dwight D. Eisenhower to fret about the capacity of the banking system to support postwar prosperity; to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, where Congress confronted the very issues of size and diversification Rose examines; or perhaps to the Fed-Treasury Accord of 1951, which established the monetary policy framework for the profitability challenges that led banks to seek size in the first place. These stories have worthy characters too—Transamerica's A. P. Giannini and Federal Reserve chairman William McChesney Martin Jr. especially come to mind.
The work also offers a novel theory of change that merits closer examination. “The creation of big banks linked to faster economic growth was a presidential project that extended from the 1960s to . . . 2017,” Rose writes (p. 3). Yet it remains unclear where this idea originated and why it achieved such salience. Why did presidents universally support this policy goal or believe this linkage between bank size and economic growth would bear out? Was this contention supported by prevailing economic theory? Was there something about being chief executive, responsible for a national rather than a local constituency, that made presidents especially receptive to this idea? Did national bank regulators succumb early to regulatory capture? The theory remains underdeveloped, as does the other side of the argument. In the same period, figures like Illinois senator Paul H. Douglas forcefully claimed that small banks, lending to small businesses, would provide a more secure foundation for broad-based prosperity than big banks, which tended to focus only on larger firms. Economic research conducted since the financial crisis, incidentally, seems to support Douglas's view.
Because the theory of change is rooted in politics and not economics, we also miss a nuanced understanding of why certain kinds of large U.S. banks sought aggressive growth in the first place. Certainly, the personalities of Rose's bankers had something to do with it. But the story is one, too, of declining bank profitability, driven in part by the political constraints imposed on U.S. banking markets and in part by more complex business and economic factors that the book largely omits.
For the nonspecialist, these omissions might well count as virtues. We don't get down into the murk of “disintermediation,” “the back-office crisis,” or “the profits squeeze.” Rose's book is more accessible for it and will hopefully inspire thoughtful readers to ask their own questions about the changing postwar financial world. As the burgeoning financialization literature demonstrates, the research question undergirding Market Rules remains a vital one—for scholars and, more broadly, for anyone doing business with a bank.
