Céline Marangé's study of Vietnamese communism (in French) is an ambitious, largely successful work that demonstrates familiarity with a broad range of sources. Using documents and memoirs from Vietnam, China, Russia, and France, she presents a long-term analysis of Vietnam's unique brand of communism. She sets out to avoid the clichés and Manichean view that have often marked our picture of this phenomenon. Her stated goal is to examine the problem of the export and adoption of communist political models, as well as the sources of political hegemony. Overall she succeeds in demonstrating ‘the limits of Soviet and Chinese influence in Vietnam’ (p. 30).
Marangé warns against the temptation to view Vietnamese communism as simply ‘a foreign graft’ or to ‘exaggerate the possibilities for action of the Comintern and the Soviet authorities’ (p. 33). This warning applies to both the early days of party building and the period when the communists held power, after 1945. The distance from Moscow, the slowness of communications and the secrecy of the Vietnamese comrades meant that there was room for improvisation for a leader such as Ho Chi Minh, willing to combine aspects of Confucianism with Leninist theory. Decades after Ho's early training of cadres, the Vietnamese took advantage of the competition between the Soviets and Chinese, who were vying for leadership of the world revolution, to make their own decisions on the conduct of their war.
This is not to claim that the communist system developed in Hanoi was uninfluenced by Soviet or Chinese models — but as Marangé explains, the ‘appropriation of the Soviet model grew out of the desire of the new political elite’ (p. 33). Starting with Ho Chi Minh in 1923–4, and moving on to the more fully indoctrinated Western-educated communists of the late 1920s and early 1930s, the leftist anticolonialists viewed the role of international communism as the provision of funds and organising methods to create an independent socialist state. Ideological purity and faithfulness to the current party line became the yardstick by which party leaders were measured by their own countrymen; battles for power from the 1930s to at least the 1980s were waged on the pretext that the opposing faction was deviating too far from orthodox Marxism-Leninism. In the 1950s–60s, with large numbers of Vietnamese studying in both the PRC and the Soviet Union, the military, police, cultural, and political institutions all were closely patterned on Chinese and Soviet models. After 1985, however, as the party elite grew larger and began to accumulate wealth, their promotion of the Soviet-style state, with a communist monopoly on power enshrined in the constitution, became as much a matter of self-interest as ideological conviction.
The drawback of such a lengthy compendium of information from different periods and sources (the style of the French Ph.D. dissertation) is that the research is likely to be uneven. The reader in this case is presented with a large amount of detail; some political theory, some international history; without much indication as to what the major arguments are in the historiography, either Vietnamese or foreign. What might have helped to create a more coherent book would have been an introduction to explain how the author approached her sources and what her major challenges were. Which of the available sources did she find most reliable, where did she find gaps or contradictions in the picture; why did she make certain choices (e.g. how did she decide which materials from the SPCE or French police files to use and which to ignore)?
For a study of Vietnamese communism, one would appreciate a discussion of the printed party documents found in the official collection, Van Kien Dang. This collection is highly selective and inadequate when it comes to interpreting key party turning points, such as the decision to stage the Tet Offensive; do other archival collections compensate for this lack of information? Clearly the French Foreign Ministry (AMAE) archives were essential for Marangé's research on international communist politics, while the French Communist Party (FCP) archives furnished some key pieces of information on Vietnamese decisions in 1963, when the Vietnamese party decided at its Ninth Plenum to endorse the ‘anti-revisionist’ line of the Chinese. Notably, Marangé quotes the report of 1964 discussions between an FCP delegation and Hanoi leaders Le Duan and Truong Chinh, which reveals how each man came to embrace the anti-Khrushchev viewpoint for different reasons, Truong Chinh displaying a far more ideological attitude (p. 319). One wonders what more there is to learn from the FCP archive. Quibbles aside, however, her account of the impact of the Sino–Soviet split on the Vietnamese communists is carefully assembled and avoids the two-dimensional political history that still characterises much writing on this topic. One wishes that she had sustained this level of close inquiry into the sources of Chinese vs. Soviet influence on the Vietnamese party, in particular to examine the parallels between Vietnamese reforms in the 1980s and Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost; or how the Chinese role was revived after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The author's account of the Land Reform and accompanying ‘Rectification Movement’ is somewhat erratic, as she skims over the crucial dismantling of the Land Reform Committee and the demotions of some of its key leaders. The idea that as many as 50,000 people were executed has been widely discredited, as a misunderstanding of the Vietnamese terminology. The more believable estimate of 7,000 to 15,000 executions is certainly bad enough, as is the history of those who had their possessions confiscated and their civil rights removed, until the ‘correction of errors’ restored their good names. The omission of any mention of Le Van Luong's role as head of the ‘Rectification’ campaign is also a major oversight. The purge he led hit the Viet Minh village and district committees particularly hard, as documented by Edwin Moise (Land Reform in China and Vietnam, 1983). Was this campaign aimed to weaken the power of the leaders most closely associated with the Viet Minh alliance, Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap? (Le Van Luong's rapid return to influence after his removal from the politburo, as a member of the party secretariat by 1960, makes him an intriguing figure, yet his name is rarely mentioned in discussions of the top party leadership.)
Overall, despite the odd mistake such as the misidentification of Vu Ky, Ho Chi Minh's personal secretary, as one of the victims of the Anti-Party Affair (it was an earlier secretary, Vu Dinh Huynh) this is a valuable contribution to a complex and sensitive topic, around which arguments will continue to swirl. The translated documents in the appendix, in particular, are a valuable contribution for students of Vietnamese politics.
