This book is a meditation on the ambivalence of risk as seen in the work of four canonical early modern theorists. Nacol argues that risk, understood not simply as uncertainty about the future but as “a matter of knowledge about the future that is rooted in conceptions of time, probability, and action” (6), first gained conceptual clarity in the late seventeenth century and became an unavoidable topic of moral and political reflection in the century following. As risk came to seem the defining fact of the human world, the concept of trust also grew in importance in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thought, as a kind of necessary counterweight to the anxiety produced by risk. Interpersonal trust (or credit), she argues, came to provide support for political and economic actors as they boldly took on risk and a cushion or safety net in the case of failure. Finally, and perhaps most radically, she argues that the character of the early modern subject is “worked out in the early modern engagement with risk” (7). Nacol suggests that the identity of the early modern self is defined by its awareness of the essential indeterminacy of the future and its attempts to grapple with that indeterminacy, whether by attempting to control or conquer risk or by accepting risk in the hopes of profiting from it. Moreover, that indeterminacy, and our ambivalence toward it, are still with us; yet we can, Nacol hopes, gain some clarity about our own situation, and the prospects for a healthy attitude toward risk, by reflecting on how some paradigmatic early modern thinkers dealt with it.
The book proceeds by considering the place of risk in the thought of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, David Hume, and Adam Smith. It does not offer full interpretations of these thinkers so much as it uses the idea of risk as an entry point to their thought. The book's narrative may be summarized as offering two cautionary tales about counterproductive responses to risk (Hobbes and Smith) and two more constructive portraits of possible responses to risk in politics and economics (Locke and Hume). Hobbes's political philosophy is “motivated by an epistemological obsession with the problem of uncertainty” (3). The demand for an absolute sovereign is the political face of a more fundamental demand for a certain, that is, risk-free, science. Yet Hobbes's effort failed, according to Nacol; and later thinkers turned to probability rather than certainty as the appropriate mode for dealing with risk. In the case of Locke, epistemological reflections on the ineliminability of risk are, Nacol argues, intertwined with an insight into the necessity of trust in political life. The trust and the risk are embodied in Locke's conception of prerogative, the executive power to act for the common good in the absence of a law or even against an existing law, and in his doctrine of rebellion, which is required as a response to the risk of abuse of prerogative, and like it, irreducible to a formula. Locke's citizens can only act politically insofar as they trust each other; yet entrusting anyone with power has obvious dangers, and so Locke's citizens must also engage in “the perpetual work of risk calculation” (4). Hume and Smith, by contrast, focus less on politics proper and more on the role of risk in the psychology of commercial man. For Hume, most human beings experience thinking about risk as an inherently painful, even paralyzing endeavor. Nacol interprets Hume's Essays as a subtle attempt to inspirit the bourgeoisie as a means of inducing them to take a bolder stance toward the inevitable risks of life. Smith, however, shows the dark side of such anxiety in his quite negative portrait of traders and businessmen when they try to manipulate governments. Traders seek protection from competition because they seek to free themselves from the anxiety of risk. Yet a healthy economy, and perhaps a healthy psyche, Nacol argues, require accepting the possibility of certain kinds of loss.
The book will be of evident interest to political theorists, economists, or others who wish to trace the roots of our contemporary views on risk, and scholars of the thinkers covered here will find novel angles on some well-known figures. Yet there are some lacunae in Nacol's account that may repay further thought. First, one wonders where Machiavelli is in this story, and not just for historical reasons. The case for Machiavelli's prince is that he is the original political entrepreneur, the person who faces up to the ugly necessities that the rest of us prefer to avoid and in that light willingly accepts the risks and burdens of political action, however immoral those may be. But this offers a challenge, maybe even a radical challenge to Nacol's position: could it be that the prudent willingness to accept both gains and losses that Nacol recommends depends on being part of a political order established and maintained by a no-holds-barred risk taker? Second, Nacol avoids the question of the religious views (or lack thereof) of these thinkers, perhaps prudently, given the thicket of scholarly literature on these issues. Yet Pascal's wager should remind us that belief and the lack thereof are themselves risks; and one might also think of the Enlightenment interpretation of superstition as an attempt to control fortune. Moreover, attention to the religious issue might lead us to take a more positive view of Hobbes's project; Hobbes's intention in formulating his science of sovereignty is directed not simply at the problem of risk in general but at the need to secure secular political judgment against possible challenges either from the pope or from Protestant enthusiasts. This may not be, I suspect, as easy an accomplishment as we liberals usually think. Could it be that the prudent risk taker praised by Nacol depends on a prior, and unargued, decision on the religious question?
Finally, I wonder what practical import for today Nacol draws from her studies. The thematic duality of the book is the choice between the attempt to control risk and the attempt to live with it: “an authoritarian approach to the production of knowledge about the future, informed by an endless search for security in the face of risk” or “a system that harnesses experience, intuition, flexibility, and a wider distribution of risk management” (8). That sounds a bit like a Hayekian account of the difference between (Hayekian) liberalism and progressivism. Is that, then, the upshot of this study of contrasting modes of conceptualizing and handling risk in early modernity? However that may be, this fine study will repay the attention of those who want to understand early modern political philosophy as well as those seeking to puzzle out the native human ambivalence about risk.
