Do arguments about the origins of political concepts help us answer the question of how we should live? This is not a question that is asked explicitly very often, yet it is central to our understanding of meaning in the social and political sciences. A professor of history, Samuel Moyn casts a particularly scrutinous eye on the telling and retelling of human rights. Can this history tell us anything about their nature or usefulness now and for the foreseeable future? Does it really help us to have this intellectual genealogy propping up human rights—providing us with clues, or perhaps even assurances, as to where we have come from and therefore what we can (or even must) become because of this? Moyn thinks not.
The reality of the human rights regime is, according to Moyn, illustrative of how putting a start date on the parameters of politics (such as 1648 with state sovereignty and 1948 with human rights) is a largely meaningless exercise. This is history and metaphysics versus pragmatism. And politics, as the case is argued here, is a pragmatic discipline.
Having the past history of human rights written for us like this inevitably colors our perceptions of how they should be implemented now—what their meaning is, their relevance, application, and justification: “The past is treated as if it were simply the future waiting to happen” (11).
Aside perhaps from being a useful reminder that we are on a vague journey of self-improvement, keeping human rights as a historical narrative means that they remain largely symbolic. Historically, what we really have is a tangled mess of humans, citizens, states, individuals, community, purpose, and rights. What we have been referring to as “human rights” is generally (if not always) mired in this state of confusion. Perhaps this goes some way toward explaining why human rights are at once so powerful and so ineffective. When they are used as the substance of an argument, that argument often crumbles in the face of challenges to its logical foundations.
The book follows a simple linear path, charting the failed utopias that litter our intellectual landscape. The chapters are concise, and Moyn is an accomplished writer in that he conveys a very readable account of some very big ideas. What he does most skillfully is to cut down these ideas, or rather our presumptions of their relevance, and re-present them as context-dependent moments in history that have not taken turns in augmenting some kind of universal destiny. Sometimes the presentation is more florid: chapter titles “Death from Birth” (chap. 2) and “The Purity of This Struggle” (chap. 4) reference idealism (Václav Havel in the case of the latter) and sandwich the plainly descriptive “Why Anticolonialism Wasn't a Human Rights Movement” (chap. 3). This works, because for all of the pragmatism in asserting a more contemporary backstory for human rights than is usually taken to be the case, Moyn must keep an unwavering eye on the metaphysics of all this.
The early chapters do move swiftly. Very soon, readers find themselves right in the heart of Moyn's central thesis—unpacking the postwar decades up until, and then beyond, the 1970s watershed. This recap of history and events (revolutions and natural law, mainly) might be too brief for some, but it is not without merit here. This story has been told many times, and Moyn dwells on the salient points long enough to establish that this present volume wishes to discard them.
Having this very particular narrative history for human rights, including the revolutions of eighteenth-century America and France, ties rights to a notion of citizenship. Then, with no real philosophical or ideological work being done in the interim (we have depended instead on poorly thought-out reactions to warfare and totalitarian or fascist regimes), we have the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. Of course, this is linked to an ideological aberration in the preceding decade or two, but it is only a response to it. Therefore, the declaration is not a fully formed concept in and of itself. And being universal, it is asserting the rights of individuals but without any corresponding higher authority to which claims can reliably be made. These new “citizens,” then, have no political space. The outcome is that those who may wish to claim their human rights are left without the means to a satisfactory hearing or result, and the concept of a human right itself occupies a curious space in our minds, but lacks legislative and cultural uniformity. This is “a very precarious kind of cosmopolitanism” (13) according to Moyn.
Despite this criticism, Moyn points out that it is only these very recent developments in the last century, including the Universal Declaration, that have any bearing on the status and meaning of human rights now. The declaration is the furthest point we can reasonably trace back to without making inaccurate historical/intellectual assumptions. And this is not particularly because the UN has managed to deliver and underwrite universal human rights for individuals. Moyn, in fact, cites the spectacular failure of the twentieth-anniversary celebrations for the declaration held in Tehran as the catalyst for the events that actually define the purpose and meaning of rights.
The historical timeline of human rights is problematic for Moyn because it is so consistently contingent upon the prevailing political and social environment. Ways of dealing with situations (hypothetical and real) and even the institution of norms that may well have carried across borders alongside trade and warfare have been invested with a misguided significance.
In structuring his argument, Moyn quite quickly gets from this misleading “ancient history” to the more relevant mid-twentieth century of global restructuring fueled by the terror and oppression of war and particularly decolonization. We are very wrong again, though, to assume that self-determination is synonymous with human rights.
The movement toward nationalism was neither “because of” nor despite human rights. Postcolonial sovereignty was the aim and in many cases the end product. Human rights played a very subsidiary role (if any at all) in the heat and noise of state building. Anticolonialism, in other words, was about the state. The collective enterprise of autonomy is not to be mistaken as having prioritized the status of individuals: “the brutal postwar years when the Universal Declaration's framing was a sideshow compared to the world reimposition of empire” (95). Moyn also points out how, in the years immediately following the Universal Declaration, colonial powers (upon witnessing and experiencing this global shift) aimed to maneuver themselves out of a binding agreement involving rights and responsibilities. During this period, and in many accounts since, “human rights were defined by antiracism and anticolonialism” (99).
The real decade of change, from the late 1960s to the late 1970s, was a landmark period for several reasons. Two in particular dominated: failure and frustration. Historically, utopias had failed to materialize, at least from the point of view of the individual. Revolutions, and most recently the disintegration of empires, had not delivered man from the binds of the state and state-level forces. The tipping point, according to Moyn, is both the failure and frustration engendered by the Tehran conference which marked the twentieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration. Observers witnessed nothing at the event to suggest that the essence of human rights as contained in the declaration had even been understood, let alone implemented. The conference was, in Moyn's words, a “catastrophe” (127). The observers became quickly motivated to change this misdirection.
This point signaled a shift in consciousness—the realization that governmental control of human rights would not suffice. It was now up to NGOs, most prominently through Amnesty International, to structure human rights awareness on an international scale. Amnesty, itself the product of disappointment in past utopian efforts (namely, in this case, the Cold War impasse) drove forward the agenda.
Chapter 5, “International Law and Human Rights,” similarly recounts the struggles of this utopia in the face of a statist legal establishment. Moyn again links the legal “enlightenment” to a widespread acknowledgment that having anticolonialism do the work of human rights, or act somehow as a symbol for them, was deeply unsatisfactory. The breaking of states demanded a reappraisal of individuals and their role as agents in this new kind of political arena.
Moyn's epilogue sums up his position and reflects on the depths of entrenched thinking he has argued against. He will perhaps inevitably face some criticism for having pulled apart previous attempts to “date” human rights and then proceeded to provide his own. But Moyn's project arguably overcomes this by its utter necessity—human rights require a much firmer footing to be effective today. And he himself anticipates this critique, ending his book with the words “the last utopia cannot be a moral one. And so whether human rights deserve to define the utopianism of the future is still very far from being decided” (227). This is required reading for those wishing to understand the relationship between current human rights thinking and practice.
