In this book, Victor Madeira seeks to integrate recent document releases with the existing context of Anglo-Soviet relations in the early postwar period. Although many questions regarding Soviet tactics must remain unanswered due to Russian secrecy, Madeira achieves an impressive feat by documenting the politicization of intelligence and the inherent challenges of defending society against subversion from abroad. He presents a clear and concise picture of British intelligence tracking down Soviet operatives and reveals the infiltration of several spies into establishment positions long before the famous Cambridge group. Some readers may be taken aback by the frequent allusions to contemporary political relations, but on the whole, Madeira offers a fascinating look behind the scenes. Historians of this period will need to consult this book if they want to grasp the real nature of Anglo-Soviet relations.
In the period of the study, Moscow and London perceived each other as the main enemy. For conservative Britons, Communism was a dangerous virus that had to be stopped. For the Bolsheviks, the British Empire represented the world's capitalist superpower that needed to be undermined in order to prevent any danger to the Revolution. At the same time, as Madeira points out succinctly, trade interests moderated decisions, especially during economic crises.
Madeira argues that British counterintelligence had a good idea of Soviet penetration targets in the middle and upper classes, especially from leading public schools and universities “as early as 1920–21” (97). But because of their class bias, the mainly conservative intelligence officers saw the chief threat as coming from the working class. Recruited solely from their own peers, the British intelligence establishment could not fathom any betrayal from one of their own. Their social cohesion or “groupthink” made them blind to any real appreciation of the Soviet danger. Instead, they perceived every attempt at political and social reform challenging their power as somehow Soviet-orchestrated.
Madeira points to serious blunders emanating from this worldview. There was a constant tug-of-war between lobbyists who wanted to expand trade with the Soviet Union and hardliners who desired a complete breach: “The pendulum swung from contempt to panic due to a combination of personal convictions, political expediency, domestic and foreign policy demands, and the quality and accuracy of information reaching Cabinet on Kremlin intentions and capabilities” (163). In this ping-pong game, Britain became “the first State to protest to another while acknowledging the protest relied on intercepted communications” (113). In 1927, Prime Minister Baldwin even revealed to the House of Commons that the proposed rupture of relations was due to intercepted and decrypted messages. As a result, the Bolsheviks switched to virtually unbreakable one-time pads.
Furthermore, Madeira reveals that Moscow successfully infiltrated spies into the Secret Intelligence Service and Government Code and Cypher School, pointing to the Lunn family. Although one of four sisters, Margaret, was dismissed from the Secret Intelligence Service for suspected espionage and another sister, Edith, married the prominent Soviet spokesperson Andrew Rothstein, a third sister Lucy happily continued working in sensitive positions, even at Bletchley Park, right through the Second World War (142). Another network, dubbed “Federated Press of America” and led by William Ewer, for a decade infiltrated security, intelligence, and policy circles under the pretext of a news service (176). Overall, British counterintelligence suffered from ideological blinders as well as underfunding.
Although he had access to a few Russian files, Madeira has less material to highlight the errors of Soviet policy. The Politburo often left its representatives in London in the dark or accused them, as Chicherin did with Krasin, of collaborating with the enemy (118). Based on intercepted communications, Madeira is able to reconstruct the financial and logistical assistance for trade unions during the General Strike. The money sent to Britain reached the staggering amount of over £59 million, in 2011 value (146). In response, the government set up conservative front organizations to counter Red propaganda among the workers. When the Soviets realized the strike would not lead to revolution, Moscow accused the trade unions of betraying the working class. Nobody reflected whether the support from Moscow had been counterproductive. Madeira concludes that while Moscow's policy remained “incoherent” in some areas, the ability to penetrate high levels of British government demonstrated the professionalism of Soviet officers (184–85). But the leaders back home “were equally good at ignoring common sense,” having to deal with their own ideological blinders (185). Despite repeated warnings from Chicherin and Litvinov, Moscow continued to use compromised communications for long spells.
Madeira's study is an outstanding example of what can be achieved by piecing together intelligence and diplomatic history, offering at last the “missing dimension” to shed light on many political controversies. His study can also be read as a warning to agencies to broaden their recruitment in order to avoid the political “closed shop” that hampered British intelligence during this period.
