Out of the night that covers me,
Black as the pit from pole to pole,
I thank whatever gods may be
For my unconquerable soul.
…
Beyond this place of wrath and tears
Looms but the Horror of the shade,
And yet the menace of the years
Finds and shall find me unafraid.
It matters not how strait the gate,
How charged with punishments the scroll,
I am the master of my fate,
I am the captain of my soul.
Hear, O Israel, the L-rd is our G-d, the L-rd is One.
You shall love the L-rd your G-d with all your heart, with all your soul and with all your might.
For God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten son,
That whosoever believes in Him shall not perish,
But have everlasting life.
1 Introduction
Two prevailing perspectives characterize the human person today – the secular and the spiritual. The secular view considers the human person as both “the master of [their] fate” and “the captain of [their] soul.” The person is an independent and autonomous being, the creator of individual meaning, identity, and dignity. This secular perspective of the human person has been called “expressive individualism” (Snead, Reference Snead2022: 5). The spiritual view considers the human person as an embodied and relational being whose dignity is endowed upon the creature by God. These two perspectives are on a continuum, making it possible to hold tenets of a spiritual view without committing to belief in God, or at least not in accordance with the Judeo-Christian understanding of God. Or one can hold tenets of the secular view without rejecting the spiritual view in its entirety. However, the spiritual view proposed in this Element follows the Judeo-Christian teaching that human beings are in-spiritus, or “en-souled.” Thus, though a nonreligious person might hold tenets of the spiritual view, there may be divergence on belief that the human being is essentially ensouled by God and created imago dei.
These two views shape the decision making that transpires during life, but they become particularly important at death. For the secular view, death is the ultimate challenge and the fate to conquer, either by avoidance or by taking control over one’s dying and death. Control takes different forms, either culminating in the elevation of patient autonomy and freedom of choice or in the humble acceptance of human finitude. The secular view may recognize the value of relationships, but relationships are often considered secondary to the primary good of individual autonomy.
For the spiritual view, death is a part of life. It ends one chapter and leads into the next. There is a generally shared salvific perspective that shapes the decisions made at death. The way in which one dies is not solely up to the individual but incorporates the values and beliefs of a community in a way that acknowledges the inherent dignity of the person in their relationship to God.
Technological progress in medicine complicates end-of-life decisions. What once was the inevitable decline of bodily functions and cognitive capacities is now a problem subject to medical solutions. Death is to be avoided as long as possible. Advances in technology make possible the lower rates of mortality we see today, and modern medicine allows for much unnecessary death to be avoided. The extension of life is frequently a very good occurrence, preventing people from dying when there are ways to keep them alive and even flourishing. However, the natural process of dying is challenged by artificial means of living. We may not be able to stave off death, but we can avoid it for a long time. The promise of a few more months of living offers a semblance of hope that leads to an unrelenting search for a cure, even at the cost of well-being.
Until a few decades ago, death was communal, taking place in the home where the one dying lived out their remaining days in the company of family and familiar surroundings. Today, death is medicalized, frequently occurring outside the comfort of home, where one is surrounded by strangers and technology. The common isolation that occurs in institutionalized settings darkens the dying journey. Feelings of burden, shame, loneliness, and fear surround the one dying. The discomfort and pain of trying everything to sustain life just a little longer weighs heavily on the individual. The fear of burdening the system or the family grows strong.
While fear and avoidance of death are not a new phenomenon, the emphasis on control and individual decision making shifts the narrative from accompanying the dying to enabling the individual to take death into their own hands. With the legalization of assisted suicide in many jurisdictions, for example, decisions about death include new possibilities that were previously forbidden.Footnote 1 “Death with dignity” takes new meaning in contemporary parlance largely due to the wide acceptance of the secular view of the human person. For the expressive individualist, to decide the time, place, and mode of death is the ultimate expression, their final act of control. While they may hold as good the preservation of life, the avoidance of killing, or the promotion of relationships, these goods are neither required nor ultimate. For the spiritual view of the human person, however, navigating the end of life requires weighing different notions of “a good death” in relation to religious commitments to, for example, preserving life, avoiding killing, and promoting the good of self in relationship to others.
This Element examines and explores end-of-life decision making from the two dominant perspectives of the human person just introduced. These prevailing perspectives offer a helpful lens through which to view the key values shared by different individuals and communities; values that shape end-of-life decision making. While the secular and the spiritual views presented may not exhaust the possible considerations of every religion or individual, the perspectives capture key differences that inform a basic understanding of the types of reasoning underlying and principal goods motivating end-of-life decisions. What becomes clear is that “God,” understood according to the Judeo-Christian tradition,Footnote 2 problematizes end-of-life decisions by either decentering the individual from themselves or challenging the view of the individual as a god in control of their life and death.
In full transparency, this Element assumes that most readers implicitly adopt some version of the secular view. It permeates the cultural water, so to speak, and is unreflectively adopted by most people, both secular and religious, academic, medical expert, and lay person. Thus, the task of this Element is not to defend the secular view but instead to challenge some of its central precepts by looking at what it might lack and what the spiritual view has to offer. Following the media res, it seems plausible that the best path forward in discussions regarding end-of-life issues is to strike up a balance of the goods of the secular view with the goods of the spiritual view. Autonomy, for example, is a core tenet of the secular view that is important to recognize in the spiritual view; but autonomy must be balanced with goods of dependency, proper orientation of creature to God, and objective goods such as life. Those who privilege autonomy and freedom of choice today recognize that some choices are inherently harmful and ought not to be honored. The amputation of a healthy limb, for example, merely because someone wants to be an amputee, is not recognized within the medical profession as a request that ought to be honored.Footnote 3 The final section of this Element will explore some examples of partnership of the spiritual with the secular view. Of course, it is possible for someone to hold key tenets of the spiritual view without being religious; for example, they might regard highly the importance of relationships and recognize the dependent nature of human beings. The difference will be in the source of these relationships and dependency. The spiritual view will view God as the source and the summit of the human life, from whom all good things flow. The nonreligious holder of principal tenets of the spiritual view may reject the role that God has in connection to them. They may place themselves or something else as the ultimate value.
Beginning with the human person, Section 2 explores the predominantly Western view of secular autonomy and a more universal view of spiritual communalism, and the principal goods that follow from these views of the human person. Section 3 examines the medicalization of death and dying along with different strategies to resist medicalization. It includes looking more closely at the types of decisions one can make at the end of life. Section 4 considers the role of God in end-of-life decision making through a series of examples that highlight different teloi of medicine and emphasize different commitments to either a culture of life or a culture of death. Section 5 concludes with several examples of end-of-life decision making and applies the principles introduced throughout the Element. The rest of this first section is devoted to the clarification of terminology and a more detailed introduction to the key themes of the Element.
The term “essentialism” is used to describe the view of human persons as creatures with a “nature” or “essence.” Aristotle, for example, says human beings are rational animals, so in his view their essence is rational.Footnote 4 As Aristotle understood life, all living things have souls, where the soul is understood as the life giving and organizing principle of the being. Human beings are unique among living things to have rational souls, and it is the capacity for reason that is their unique function. Aquinas affirms Aristotle’s definition and adds a spiritual component. For Aquinas, human beings are members of a natural kind and have an essence, a rationally ensouled nature.Footnote 5 For Aquinas, though, human beings are relational, made for union with God in Heaven.Footnote 6
The term “existentialism” is used to describe the view of human persons as individual beings in the world who create meaning and purpose for themselves through the exercise of their free will. There is no definitive nature or essence by which the individual is bound. There is no purpose other than to be maximally free. Jean Paul Sartre explains the first principle of existentialism to be that “existence precedes essence [which means] first, that man exists, turns up, appears on the scene, and, only afterwards, defines himself” (Sartre, Reference Sartre, Frechtman, Guignon and Pereboom1946 [2001]). For the existentialist, existence is a “dynamic process of self-making” (Aho, Reference Aho, Zalta and Nodelman2023). The individual has the freedom to create their own identity through their choices and actions. “Insofar as we exist, we are envisioning a certain kind of life, assigning a value to our identity, and making ourselves into the kind of person we are” (Aho, Reference Aho, Zalta and Nodelman2023). Sartre says that human beings are condemned to be free and what gives meaning to the human being is the “capacity to choose and create our own lives” (Aho, Reference Aho, Zalta and Nodelman2023). Capturing this idea well, Dostoevsky writes, “What man wants is simply independent choice, whatever that independence may cost and wherever it may lead” (Dostoevsky, Reference Dostoevsky and Garnett1864 [2009]). This radical embrace of freedom and individual construction of meaning contrasts quite clearly with the spiritual view of the human person as created in the imago dei, who lives into their essential nature as they grow in their understanding of and love for God.
The phrase “medicalization of death” refers to the shift of death to the hospital along with the modern tendency to use medicine’s technological power to prolong life and avoid death. In the exploration of the medicalization of death, the teloi of medicine and health care reveal contrasting goods at the end of life. The desire to save life at all costs may lead to a prolongation of life using extraordinary technological means, such as ventilators, intubation, and heavy medication to manage pain and symptoms. The temptation to use all medical means possible to extend life may provide more but not necessarily better life for the individual. Rising costs of health care burden patients and their families, while using limited resources to keep people alive becomes more difficult to justify. While there are many cases of these extraordinary treatments giving people quality of life back, the default option to use these extreme measures fosters a desire in many people to avoid the dying process altogether and to take their death into their own hands through, for example, physician-assisted suicide. When medicalized death is a default for people without clear directives, taking more direct control over one’s death before getting to that medicalized stage is attractive. In this context, thinking about the telos of medicine and health care, whether the telos is fueled by a culture of life or a culture of death, is important.
A culture of life supports the worth and dignity of each individual and works to promote their good irrespective of what they produce or do.Footnote 7 A culture of death sees the individual as having dignity and worth contingently – based on their exercise of choice, autonomy, and freedom. The efforts of hospice and palliative care provide a person-centered alternative to the medicalized options at the end of life. Though they may still include medical interventions, the focus shifts from extending life, particularly in hospice, to enhancing life as it ends.
While it may seem mistaken to discuss a culture of death in the context of medicine, throughout history, we have witnessed the participation of medical professionals in grave attacks on innocent lives, from those with disabilities, to the elderly, to minoritized groups, and to anyone whose life has been deemed “not worth living.” Describing the work of Wesley Smith on society’s culture of death, Jeffery Bishop explains how “the issue [is seen] mainly in the shift from life as sacred to the idea that a certain quality of life is sacred; and that means that other lives with different, or lesser qualities, are dispensable” (Bishop, Reference Bishop2011: 9). This sentiment is echoed by disability rights activists who challenge the very heart of Western medicine by unveiling “the power of medicine to name and then create the normal, and to obliterate its other” (Bishop, Reference Bishop2011: 10). We know that while the medical professional takes an oath to “do no harm,” there is disagreement about which actions constitute harm. While the motto to “always save a life” may be cliché, it does present a unique challenge to the medical professional whose patient may be navigating various options, including: assistance in death, removal of life-sustaining treatment, decisions about medical futility, use of extraordinary versus ordinary means of care, and other complex decisions facing the medical professional. With the debates regarding the legalization of physician-assisted suicide and permissibility of nonvoluntary and involuntary euthanasia, clarity regarding the telos of medicine is critical.
When it comes to decisions at the end of life, Bishop describes how the biopolitics of modern medicine create a “no-man’s land” between life and death, a so-called “gray zone of indistinction” where the patient must decide whether they want to let “nature take its course” or pursue aggressive treatment. This dichotomous choice between treatment or nontherapeutic care allows for a smooth movement of the patient either through the “social apparatus of the hospital” or to a “nursing home for hospice/palliative care,” either of which is coverable by insurance. Yet, Bishop argues that for those in this zone of indistinction, they have life in the barest sense. He argues:
[They] deserve the protections normally afforded to the living, but they have no chance at the good life. The only thing that allows us to abandon a person’s life is the decision by her own sovereign will to abandon herself from the protections normally afforded the living. Death must be chosen…and it must be timed…the zone of indeterminacy, the no-man’s land between life and death, grows increasingly wider, and necessitates the decision of the one with the proper sovereignty to decide whether to live or die. Death is the radical other for Western society in general and medicine in particular, and as such it is our god…Conscious choice is the central aspect of being human for those of us living in the West, and it is the deciding feature of the good death.
Bishop’s central claim here is that medicine’s relationship with death has shaped the care for the dying and informed the options given to the dying. Medicine, explains Bishop, has “failed to respond to this dialectic of life and death in an adequate manner, and its response leads to lives worse than death in the technological manipulation of the dying” (Bishop, Reference Bishop2011: 17). Medicine seeks to defer death and prevent suffering, yet because it fails to recognize the meaning of death in relation to the human person – that death can bring into focus those goods of life that have value and importance to us: family, nature, art, beauty, community – medicine may sometimes create more suffering than it alleviates. Also concerned with meaning, phenomenology can assist in exploration of these matters, though space permits only a brief mention. For our purposes, we can understand phenomenology as a philosophical method for studying lived experience; namely, a method for examining pre-reflective, subjective human experience as it is lived prior to its theorization by science. Following the approach taken by Havi Carel, phenomenology attends to the embodied experience of an individual in illness, disease, and dying.Footnote 8 It is helpful for examining the first-person experience of dying by attending to the individual person as both a subject, who is experiencing, and an object that experiences, like a hand that both touches and is touched. A fruitful area of end-of-life decision making to analyze would include, inter alia, the phenomenological encounter of the clinician and patient in the giving and receiving of a terminal diagnosis.Footnote 9 To discuss the notion of “decision making” at the end of life in some sense is very recent and due to the medicalization of death along with the view of the human person as an autonomous chooser. Before medical technology developed with its ability to keep people alive through many different means, the so-called “choices” at death were simpler or nonexistent. The community around you would care for you as best they could, mourn with you, comfort you, and help prepare you spiritually for death. It is thus instructive to see how the modern conception of the human person, the modern values of medicine, and the overarching values of society shape our end-of-life decision making.
2 Secular Versus Spiritual View of Human Person
O. Carter Snead argues that the fundamental question grounding the normative foundation for law and policy in bioethics is this: What does it mean to be human? (Snead, Reference Snead2022: 2). Contemporary anthropology attempts to answer this question by defining the human being as an atomized and solitary “will” with “the capacity to formulate and pursue future plans of one’s own invention” (Snead, Reference Snead2022: 3). On this view, the body of the human being is “inchoate matter,” not essential to the identity of the human being. The “human” and the “person” are thus distinct with personhood as the value-contributing factor. Robert Bellah and Charles Taylor label this view of the human being “expressive individualism” (Snead, Reference Snead2022: 5). Expressive individualism reveals the principal goods of secular society: autonomous choice, respect for individual preferences, and “speaking your truth.” Individual expression of meaning is the ultimate sign of freedom, and restraining individual choice is an act of injustice. An example of expressive individualism, which will be discussed in more depth later, is physician-assisted suicide. When one’s life is failing, the clearest expression of freedom and dignity is to take control over the timing and place of one’s death, allowing one to “die with dignity,” as advocates of this practice claim.Footnote 10
When the human being is atomized into disparate expressions, it renders unintelligible any claims of “unchosen obligation.” Claims such as filial piety, including a duty to care for one’s aging parents or to continue one’s life even when suffering, for example, do not have any hold on the individual apart from their willing it. So-called unchosen obligations would seem to infringe on the sovereignty of the individual’s will. What is “good” or “right” becomes determined by whatever the individual prefers, wants, or values. The goods of autonomy and self-determination are the highest goods guiding the actions and decisions of the individual. The body is instrumental to the will, which results in a dualism of mind and body, person and animal. With the elevation of the will over the body comes a right to choose that which suits the individual. Autonomy is no longer conceived as a purely negative right – for example, a right to refuse treatment – but as a positive right to control death through the control of the suffering that ensues from loss of autonomy, bodily function, and pain.Footnote 11 The dignity or worth of the individual is expressed in the control taken over their life. Thus, the ultimate threat to dignity is lack of control.
A spiritual answer to the question, “What does it mean to be human?” emphasizes the relational quality of the human being. The human person is fundamentally an embodied, living organism with a “nature” irreducible to their will. Embodiment is integral to being a person. Humans are creatures with a recognized Creator and are naturally dependent. Creaturely dependence on God and others limits what is possible for an individual to do. Embodied existence, for example, limits the possibility of immortality in this life. The body decays, it breaks down, it is vulnerable. Human vulnerability, especially when one is dying, can frustrate the plans and goals of the individual. How one makes decisions about their life when faced with death depends on their acceptance or rejection of embodied existence. The type of care given to the one dying also hinges on the value placed on the body as an essential aspect of the individual person. In recognizing dependence, one realizes that the principal goods of the human person include relationship with others, love, connection, and friendship, including friendship with God. One’s ultimate worth is not expressed by an individual’s will but in the recognition of one’s place, one’s relationship with other human beings, with creation, and with God. One lives into their dignity rather than creating it. Freedom is understood as positive – freedom for living into one’s essential self rather than primarily as freedom from interference.Footnote 12 Dignity, therefore, is not something that one can lose but is inherent.
In Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, the human being is understood as the “most precious” of all life forms (Shomali, Reference 71Shomali2008), as having inherent dignity and value (Eckstein,Reference Eckstein n.d.) and as having the dignity of a person made in the image of God, who is “not just something, but someone…capable of self-knowledge, of self-possession and of freely giving himself and entering into communion with other persons” (United States Catholic Conference, 1997). For each of these religious views, the human being is a unity of body and soul. The soul is the life giving and unitive principle of the human being. It is not possible to reduce the human being to either of these components without destroying the person. In other words, death is the “loss of that union by which a soul is united to a body as form, and at another time the loss of the operation of life” (Eberl, Reference Eberl2005).
One practical consequence of these divergent views is to segregate the person into body and mind on the one hand or to view the person as an integrated whole on the other. Medically, it is common to focus on physical problems at the exclusion of the person or to revert to “pain and symptom control” over “total person care.” On the one hand, we might treat the body with all sorts of medicinal poisons in the name of care for the “person” (e.g., chemotherapy). On the other hand, we may appreciate the reality of suffering as a total person experience of mind, body, and heart; an experience that invites compassionate accompaniment. For the spiritual framework, compassionate care includes “suffering with” or “enduring with” the person (com + patior = to suffer with). Suffering is understood as frustrating the desire to attain ultimate happiness with God through union with him. To accompany the suffering person, one aims to remove, as much as possible, the undue burden that befalls the human being in their dying.Footnote 13
Secular views of compassion, which are constructed upon an existentialist view of the person as creator of meaning and worth, focus on elimination of suffering by affirming the choice of the individual at their death. Individual autonomy is privileged in the secular view. Since the existentialist affirms that an individual’s worth comes from their exercise of autonomy, the best way to uphold the dignity of the individual who is dying is by ensuring their will is protected and honored. While right in its affirmation of the worth of the individual and right in its focus on protecting and honoring the individual at death, the secular view may lead to admitting or participating in actions that eliminate the person in the name of compassion. Defenders of physician-assisted suicide, for example, advocate for the exercise of individual freedom through the choice of death as an example of compassion, even though this position ultimately requires the elimination of the person through medically assisted death.
2.1 Determination of Death
Determination of death is one salient example of how end-of-life decision making is impacted by the two contrasting views of the human person. There are two primary ways in which death is determined according to the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA): “An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must be made in accordance with accepted medical standards” (Uniform Law Commission, 1980: 5).Footnote 14 This definition of death arose out of the need to clarify any discrepancy in the determination of death between common law and the medical profession.
Prior to the UDDA in 1980, the Uniform Law Commissioners created the Uniform Brain Death Act (UBDA), which aimed to clarify any existing legal uncertainty regarding the determination of death. Original criteria of death determination relied on measuring the cessation of respiration and circulation. New criteria focused on the brain, considered the center of the human body and its most important organ, as the determining factor for death. The commission reasoned that “[the brain’s] irreversible functioning should be accepted as death.” Thus, “the UBDA established that the ‘irreversible cessation of all functioning of the brain, including the brain stem’ is death” and this determination be made according to “reasonable medical standards” (Pope, Reference Pope2014: 1–2). Phrases such as “irreversible cessation of functioning” and “reasonable medical standards” are ambiguous and have been the subject of controversy within the medical profession.
A revision was made to the act in 1980. Replacing the UBDA with the UDDA, the Uniform Law Commission recognized that the brain-death standard omitted the traditional criteria of “irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions” along with its brain-death criteria. Thus, the UDDA adds back into law the traditional standard. Also modified was the language “reasonable medical standards,” which was changed to “acceptable medical standards” (Pope, Reference Pope2014: 1).
The motivating factor for these changes was the modern advances in medical technology, which enables artificial support for “respiration and circulation after all brain functions cease irreversibly” (Uniform Law Commission, 1980: 3). These medical advances do not accord with the former common law standard for death determination, which was that death is “the cessation of all vital functions, traditionally demonstrated by an absence of spontaneous respiratory and cardiac functions” (Uniform Law Commission, 1980: 3) To avoid the possibility of being declared dead in one state and alive in another state, the UDDA has since been adopted by all fifty states. However, this uniform adoption of the UDDA has not settled the debate over what constitutes death. Some states, for example New Jersey, allow for families to claim a religious exemption from the determination of brain death. Moreover, twelve states invalidate the use of advanced directives (such as withdrawal of life support) during pregnancy, no matter the gestational age or health of the unborn. Theoretically, a woman can be declared brain dead, yet the state recognizes her body is capable and ought to continue gestating her prenatal unborn. This recognition by some states has led to the consideration of additional revisions to the UDDA.
Currently, there is a committee considering revision of the UDDA to bring it into accord with the clinical criteria used for determining brain death. Current criteria do not test for hypothalamic function, which is present in patients determined to be “chronic[ally] brain dead.” For example, ten years after the adoption of the UDDA, it was discovered that patients declared brain dead, having met all the diagnostic tests for it, “continued to manifest certain brain functions, in particular: (a) persistent function of the hypothalamo-pituitary axis, namely the production of antidiuretic hormone (ADH)Footnote 15, and (b) cortical activity demonstrated on electroencephalogram recordings” (Nguyen, Reference Nguyen2020: 318). One notable example of someone declared brain dead who retained these functions is Jahi McMath. She lived four years after being declared brain dead, even going through puberty during those four years (Camosy, Reference Camosy2023). Jahi McMath’s family’s religious values informed their decision to move Jahi from California, a state where she was considered dead by their adopted criteria, to New Jersey, where she and her family could claim a religious exemption from the criteria used to diagnose her as brain dead.Footnote 16 To account for people in situations similar to McMath, the revision proposed by this committee is that the “whole brain death” criteria be changed to “chronic brain death” criteria. One consequence of these proposals would be that an individual declared to be chronically brain dead could continue to undergo human functions, including puberty and gestating a pregnancy. In other words, chronic brain death would not justify organ transplantation or the cessation of treatment or medical assistance. Other scholars propose not a change to the definition of death, but instead more accurate testing to ensure that the human organism is, in fact, dead. A stronger approach, they argue, is to refine a biophilosophical definition of death that captures these challenging cases of “chronic brain death,” namely, that an “organism that is judged to have irrevocably lost the fundamental capacity to be a substantially self-integrating individual member of its biological kind can be declared dead” (Sulmasy and DeCock, Reference Sulmasy and DeCock2023). The merit of this approach, they argue, is that it maintains a commitment to the human being as self-integrating, not merely a human being as rational. Thus, higher brain death is not sufficient for the death of the human organism.
For both the secular and spiritual perspectives, the determination of death is a complex matter that raises considerations about the relationship between the human person as both rational and embodied. The human being is a biological organism with the capacity for rational activity. The secular view leans heavily on the brain as the locus of rational activity, whereas the spiritual view considers also the role and nature of the soul as the life-giving principle of the body and that which integrates it. Thus, for the spiritual view, a clear diagnosis of death may be complicated by the understanding of the soul’s integrative role in the human being.Footnote 17
The debate about the determination of death reveals different ways that the spiritual and secular views may share commitments to the complexity of the human individual while also diverge in the the different weight they give to the brain’s rational capacity or the role of the soul in the survival or death of the individual. Also informative for understanding the impact that different views of the human person have on end-of-life decision making is to consider the development and implementation of various rights at the end of life, including advanced directives.
2.2 Rights at the End of Life
In the 1976 Supreme Court case In re Quinlan,Footnote 18 the right to discontinue life-sustaining treatment was guaranteed based on the right to privacy one has under the constitution. Following the Supreme Court case Cruzan v. Director, MO Dept. of Health,Footnote 19 the right to possession and control of one’s own person was established, which informed the law of informed consent and the right to refuse treatment. In other words, no one can be forced to continue life-sustaining treatment in the face of impending death or unlikely recovery.
The underlying justification for both rulings was the intention to protect autonomy and the self-determination of patients who were of “sound mind.” For those without “sound mind,” a proxy or “substituted judgement” was offered as an alternative. In these latter cases, the proxy must show “clear and convincing evidence” of their decision as that which the patient would have wanted. Also available for those of “unsound mind” was the “best interests” standard, which involved the weighing of benefits and burdens to determine the best path forward. Then, in 1990 Congress passed the Patient Self-Determination Act that required health care facilities to give patients information about advanced directives.
Advanced directives are a good example where the view of the human person informs decisions. Advanced care planning aims “to explore, document, and share a person’s wishes about their future care, such that when they are no longer able to communicate, their wishes can continue to be respected” (The Lancet Commission, 2022: 857). Advanced care planning may include advanced statements (expressed wishes for care); advanced directives (legally enforced decisions about future care); surrogate decision makers (including medical power of attorney (MPOA)); and the preferred decision-making process by others (e.g., a surrogate decision maker or substituted judgment) (The Lancet Commission, 2022: 857). A “do not resuscitate” (DNR) order may be given that instructs the health care team not to perform cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on a person if their heart stops. Individuals with DNR orders typically have a terminal or serious illness that would make them susceptible to their heart stopping. In choosing these orders, they have determined that the burdens of resuscitation outweigh the benefits.Footnote 20 The individual might request that everything medically possible be done to keep them alive, even if they must be intubated, intravenously fed, or kept alive by artificial means.Footnote 21
These advanced directives, including a living will and health care power of attorney, were attempts to keep the patient – whether in sound mind or not – in control of their life and decision making. In this way, the solitary individual asserts their will, orally or written, when faced with mortality and suffering. They are encouraged and equipped to make a “final existential choice that will express [their] deeply held views about the meaning and value of [their] life and how to live it” (Snead, Reference Snead2022: 243). The primary good orienting the legal framework promoting these choices is “autonomy,” as evidenced through the “good of privacy,” “right to possession and control of one’s person,” and “right to be left alone” (Snead, Reference Snead2022: 242).
On the one hand, these directives are positive, helpful, and empowering. They allow the individual to anticipate possible scenarios they might face and what they most desire in those scenarios. The directives are also helpful for family members or close loved ones who want to be informed of their loved one’s wishes. These directives are protective too. They ensure individual preferences are respected.
On the other hand, directives may unhelpfully constrain future choices and preferences based on present values. People’s preferences change throughout their lives because the things they value change. When you are young, quantity of years lived may be emphasized, whereas when one is older, quality of the remaining years may be emphasized. While one can modify advanced directives, not everyone does so, for reasons of choice or circumstance. Directives also operate with the assumption that the individual is best situated to make decisions for themselves, to know what is best for them. But individuals make harmful decisions for themselves due to self-deception, lack of self-knowledge, mistaken notions of what is good, and external pressures. A more communal and relational view of the individual may preference conversations with close loved ones regarding end-of-life issues over (or in addition to) binding documents. In a community where one is known and loved, other people can support the choices made in the face of death. After all, when there is a situation where no advanced directive is available and the patient lacks decision-making capacity,Footnote 22 other methods of decision making include substituted judgment and proxy decision making. In these cases, the strength and depth of the relationship are essential for promoting the patient’s well-being and protecting their dignity in the face of death.
There is a reasonable case to make that the secular vision of the human being provides the underlying framework for the development, promotion, and completion of advanced directives. DNR orders, for example, developed after the 1990 Patient Self-Determination Act, which put more decision-making power into the hands of individuals to avoid paternalism and authoritarianism in the medical profession.Footnote 23 In fact, research into advanced care planning comes primarily from high income, developed countries where there is an emphasis on autonomy and individual decision making.Footnote 24 More research is needed, therefore, on family-centered or relational decision making present in non-Western countries and in religious communities to determine the merits of a more collective decision process at the end of life.
One concern with this secular perspective is the telos of independence and autonomy. As Atul Gawande phrases the question,
There remains one problem with this way of living. Our reverence for independence takes no account of the reality of what happens in life: sooner or later, independence will become impossible. Serious illness or infirmity will strike. It is as inevitable as sunset. And then a new question arises: If independence is what we live for, what do we do when it can no longer be sustained?
While we may not be able to sustain our full independence, we can take control over some hypothetical outcomes, which is what advanced directives promise.
The secular view has resources to respond to some of the worries raised by Gawande. There is work in phenomenology that explores the role of narrative and experience in decision making at or about the end of life. Els van Wijngaarden (Reference van Wijngaarden2024) examines end-of-life decisions, including the choice of advanced directives, through Paul Ricoeur’s phenomenology of the will, highlighting aspects of the deliberative process that are undervalued: passivity of choice, hesitation, the realness of anticipated suffering, the agency involved in consent and surrender, co-responsibility with others for decisions made, and an overall emphasis on the lived experience of facing mortality.Footnote 25
While both a spiritual view and secular view of the human being can acknowledge the benefits and limitations of advanced directives, an exclusive emphasis on autonomy and individual choice may overlook the desire of many vulnerable people to have help from others regarding end-of-life decisions. It is challenging to articulate future preferences that bind people to past decisions that may conflict with present desires. The recognition of dependence and embodiment rejects the finely drawn distinction between living human beings and human “persons” when “personhood” is based on some cognitive capacity. Advanced directives risk reducing the human being into their past cognitive selves when they were not dying or incapacitated. Fear of death, not death per se, becomes the primary motivator of decisions at the end of life. Fear of death is characterized by a fear of the unknown, a fear of loneliness, fear of loss, and fear of pain. These fears frequently influence decisions more than death itself. Thus, the treatment, care, or decisions made need to reflect the plethora of experiences of the dying, not just focus on preventing death.
Example
Sara Thomas Monopoli was 34 years old and 39 weeks pregnant with her first child when she received the terminal diagnosis of an advanced state non-small cell lung cancer. Doctors wanted to treat her immediately, which meant inducing labor. A healthy baby girl was born one day, and the next day treatment began. The cancer was inoperable but there were chemotherapy options that had an 85% response rate in other patients. The focus for Sara and her family was on “aggressively managing” the diagnosis. Sara had a physical reaction to the treatment, however, and further tests showed her type of cancer was not responsive to alternative treatments; time was running out. As Sara’s condition worsened, the difficult question was: “what do we want Sara and her doctors to do now?”
In the past, death and dying were a more precipitous process; before the intervention of modern medicine, the time between realizing one had a terminal condition and actual death was not more than a few days or weeks. There were customs used to accompany dying; for example, ars moriendiFootnote 26 guides were popular dating back to 1415. Now with the technological ability to sustain our bodies for long periods of time, knowing when to give up or when the battle is lost is difficult to ascertain (Gawande, Reference Gawande2014: 155–157). Hospice attempts to offer a new guide or ideal for dying; an ars moriendi for our time, “but in doing so represents a struggle – not only against suffering but also against the seemingly unstoppable momentum of medical treatment” (Gawande, Reference Gawande2014: 165).
Sara and family were not ready to face the reality of her disease – she was young, she had a healthy baby; it was shocking and disorienting. The family clung to every semblance of hope – even unsubstantiated trial drugs. Sara was ready to try everything and anything, but she continued to worsen. They were clinging to the thin long ‘tail’ of possibility; the hope of something working. Sara developed pneumonia and a ventilator was the next best option to help her survive. Sara and her family decided not to put her on a ventilator. They stopped all intervention to let her die in peace. Upon reflection they realized “almost nothing we’d done to Sara – none of the scans or tests or radiation or extra rounds of chemotherapy – had likely achieved anything except to make her worse. She may well have lived longer without any of it” (Gawande, Reference Gawande2014: 189). At the end, Sara’s husband sat weeping at her bedside. He whispered to her that it was okay for her to let go. Shortly after she let out her final breath.
It is difficult to discuss death. It is easier, in some ways, to talk through options, treatment, and outcomes. Studies have found, however, that people want to talk about their end-of-life preferences and options. The Coping with Cancer study, for example, found that the patients who had discussions with their doctors regarding their end-of-life treatment goals and care preferences:
were far less likely to undergo cardiopulmonary resuscitation or be put on a ventilator or end up in an intensive care unit. Most of them enrolled in hospice. They suffered less, were physically more capable, and were better able…to interact with others… [and] were markedly less likely to experience persistent major depression. In other words, people who had substantive discussions with their doctor about their end-of-life preferences were far more likely to die at peace and in control of their situation and to spare their family anguish.
While it may be surprising that more discussions about end-of-life preferences do not occur, it is not surprising that they are effective for patients. It supports the position that human beings are relational and dependent, especially in states of vulnerability. Genuine autonomy about end-of-life preferences is fostered through honest conversations about their fears and anxieties; about their outlook on death; about what and who is most important to them. Active listening and compassionate accompaniment through this time is an authentic form of human connection.Footnote 27
The next section explores how the history of death and dying has led to the medicalization of death. Tracing the rise of medicalized death, we will see better how God problematizes end-of-life decisions into our present time.
3 Medicalization of Death
O. Carter Snead identifies two fundamental issues regarding the legal underpinnings for end-of-life decision making: (1) the refusal or discontinuation of life-sustaining measures; and (2) assistance with suicide (Snead, Reference Snead2022: 234). He defines the first decision as the discontinuation of medical interventions that are necessary to preserve one’s life when they become unduly burdensome and/or futile. The second decision is the intentional taking of one’s own life through the self-administration of a lethal drug prescribed by a physician. The latter decision, unlike the former decision, is aimed at hastening death by actively causing death rather than allowing death to occur.
Both these decisions make the good of autonomy central. Snead argues that these legal developments in end-of-life decision making highlight the solitary individual’s assertion of their will over death. These legal frameworks, which are rooted in the “good of privacy,” the “right to possession and control of one’s person,” and the “right to be left alone,” underpin the individual’s “final existential choice [to] express his deeply held views about the meaning and value of his life and how to live it” (Snead, Reference Snead2022: 243). While Snead is surely correct in the growing emphasis on patient autonomy, the story of this autonomy-centered end-of-life decision making merits deeper attention to its birth and growth. Michael Connelly (Reference Connelly2023) and Allen Verhey (Reference Verhey2011), for example, trace the challenges with end-of-life decision making back to the medicalization of death in the mid-twentieth century. The evolution in societal thinking about death and dying shapes the reality of end-of-life issues today, revealing an important history behind current trends and challenges with end-of-life decisions. By attending to this evolution, we can better grasp the role that God has for end-of-life decision making and see better how the secular and spiritual views inform these decisions.
In their study on “The Value of Death,” the Lancet Commission proposes that Western society’s relationship with death and dying “has become unbalanced” (The Lancet Commission, 2022: 838). The recent societal shift of death and dying from the loci of family, community, and the home to the locus of the health care system is one reason for this unbalancing. Consider that in 1945, 40% of deaths happened in hospitals compared with 90% in 1995 (Verhey, Reference Verhey2011: 14). According to the Lancet Commission, the rising rate of hospitalized deaths has resulted in “families and communities [being] pushed back. Death is not so much denied but invisible. Dying people are whisked away to hospitals or hospices…The social and cultural setting of death, essential for providing meaning, connection, and lifelong support for those grieving, risks disappearing” (The Lancet Commission, 2022: 845). In her groundbreaking book On Death and Dying, Elisabeth Kübler-Ross makes a similar claim about the evolution of dying. She says,
We would think that our great emancipation, our knowledge of science and of man, has given us better ways and means to prepare ourselves and our families for this inevitable happening. Instead the days are gone when a man was allowed to die in peace and dignity in his home…dying becomes lonely and impersonal because the patient is often taken out of his familiar environment and rushed to an emergency room.
The simultaneous sanitization of death and sequestration of death and the dying person from society contributes to the fear of death experienced by many people today. Medicine aims to prevent death and people resist reflecting on death. Yet, these efforts cannot ultimately succeed, and end-of-life decisions must be made. What Kübler-Ross and the Lancet Commission both recognize is that death and dying need rebalancing to avoid depersonalization and over-medicalization of it.
In addition to the movement of death from the home to the hospital, there is an expanding number of treatment options for the sick and dying. In this shift from what Philippe Aries calls “tame death” or death in community to “medicalized death” or death in the hospital, the focus on control and avoidance of death is notable (Verhey, Reference Verhey2011: 11–14). Michael Connelly argues that the dying process and end-of-life care in America have been overly medicalized; that technology and scientific advancements make extending life at all costs possible despite the high cost of these technologies and the ensuing suffering, emotional suffering in particular, they frequently bring (Connelly, Reference Connelly2023: Introduction). Connelly not only calls for increased funding for palliative care, more end-of-life planning, and a return to the art of medicine,Footnote 28 but also insists that we need to learn when to accept and embrace death. A shift in attitude is needed. He says, “we should stop trying to medicalize death because it is, and should be, a natural process” (Connelly, Reference Connelly2023: xiii). To resist the medicalization of death and dying, Connelly suggests a need for “death literacy” along with a renewed emphasis on the importance of understanding life rather than extending life (Connelly, Reference Connelly2023: xiv). Before attending to what it might mean to be “death literate,” it is helpful to trace the origins of the medicalization of death back to its roots in the “Baconian project [which] set the stage for the medicalization of death in the mid-20th century” (Verhey, Reference Verhey2011: 39).
In the familiar words of the Hippocratic oath, doctors pledge to “do no harm” to their patients. For its time, the Hippocratic oath represented a reform within medicine in its commitment to “give no deadly medicine to any one if asked, nor suggest any such counsel.”Footnote 29 Such commitment responded to the practice of mercy killing for those in pain with no chance at survival. At the same time as the physician pledged not to administer deadly drugs, they also would not prolong death. Thus, there was a balance between not hastening death through direct killing and not prolonging life with futile treatment (Verhey, Reference Verhey2011: 27).
In the mid-sixteenth century, Francis Bacon praised medicine for its role in the preservation of life, and he rejected the view that one might be “overmastered by disease” (Verhey, Reference Verhey2011: 30). In a promethean attempt to master death, the Baconian view of medicine as the great preserver of life resulted in the “curative movement” (Verhey, Reference Verhey2011: 30). In this movement of mastery over nature, the body became an object that was subjected to the “clinical gaze” of the physician or medical team; a gaze that reduced the human being into an “it” to be calculated and measured, quantified, and controlled (Verhey, Reference Verhey2011: 34). What emerged from this objectification of the body was the “biomedical view” – the model of disease that “assumes disease to be fully accounted for by deviations from the norm of measurable biological (somatic) variables. [The view that] leaves no room within its framework for the social, psychological, and behavioral dimensions of illness.” The biomedical view recognizes diseases as entities “independent of social behavior” and it “demands that behavioral aberrations be explained on the basis of disordered somatic (biochemical or neurophysiological processes” (Engel, Reference Engel1977: 130). In his critical essay articulating the need for a new medical model, Engel describes the biomedical view as reductionistic in its oversimplification of complex processes to a singular physical (or natural) phenomenon.
Like Engel, Verhey identifies five resulting assumptions about the body that originate from the biomedical model: a dualism of mind and body, a reductionism of the body to its materiality, a focus on the etiology of disease, an emphasis on the body as a metaphorical machine, and a view of the body as an object. In each of these ways, the human being was reduced to their mechanical physical body (Verhey, Reference Verhey2011: 34–35).
Verhey laments the limitations of empirical science and the epistemological assumptions it makes. When the “I-Thou” relationship of physician to patient is replaced by the “I-It” of physician to material object, significant meaning is lost in the treatment of the patient in their sickness and dying. The objective nature of the biomedical view cannot give knowledge of ends, but only of means. It can give people knowledge about what might be possible to do with medical power but not about what limits to place on that power (Verhey, Reference Verhey2011: 35–36). Subsequently, compassion and care for the sick and the dying became a visceral response to suffering, demanding only that something be done without knowing what ought to be done to care for the human being in their vulnerability and complexity. Contemporary movements, such as “Death with Dignity,”Footnote 30 claim compassion as their motivation, thereby championing the use of medical tools to stop suffering, yet they fail to understand the richness of the concept, which is to patiently suffer with the one in their suffering. In other words, “science would arm compassion with artifice but not with wisdom” (Verhey, Reference Verhey2011: 36).
In response to the medicalization of dying and death, three main movements emerged. First is the movement for patient’s rights; second is the Death Awareness Movement inspired by the work of Kübler-Ross, among others, and third is the modern-day hospice movement founded by Cicely Saunders (Verhey, Reference Verhey2011: 41–43). Each movement the medicalization of dying with varying success, highlighting different strengths and weaknesses of the secular and spiritual perspectives.
3.1 Movement for Patient’s Rights
The logic of the Patient Self-Determination Act spurred the further expansion of patient’s rights. Focus on patient’s rights grew out of the development of bioethics, which expanded expertise on medical matters beyond the sphere of the physician. The growing emphasis on “rights language” was an attempt to resist those in power (i.e., the physicians) and empower individuals in their medical decision making. In this movement, we see a renewed focus on individual autonomy and freedom, limited only by the freedom of others. While the shift in power from physician to patient was a largely positive development, one aimed at preventing abuses of power in the name of medical progress (e.g., the Tuskegee experiments), many bioethicists believe it swung the pendulum too far in the opposite direction.
A key concept in the development of patient’s rights is the concept of patient autonomy. Patient autonomy can be understood as “being in control of your own medical decisions without outside influence,” where outside influence could come from family, society, or the medical team (Connelly, Reference Connelly2023: 72). Patient autonomy is a principle grounding the legal right to “demand [every available medical intervention to prolong life] regardless of the cost even if the intervention they seek has a nominal chance of restoring them to health.” It also grounds the right to refuse treatment. The patient, not the physician, “has become the final arbiter of the medical care he or she will receive” (Connelly, Reference Connelly2023: 71). It is important to appreciate the significance of patient autonomy before critiquing it.
In the 1914 legal case of Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, Mary Schloendorff was admitted to the hospital for an examination of a stomach ailment. She consented to the examination but explicitly refused surgical intervention. Overriding her wishes, the attending physician performed fibroid removal surgery without her consent. Following surgery, Schloendorff developed gangrene in her left arm, which resulted in amputation.Footnote 31 Schloendorff sued the hospital for her mistreatment.Footnote 32 This case, and the language used in it, became a landmark in the development of patient rights and emphasis on patient autonomy. In his affirmation of the ruling, Justice Benjamin Cardozo states that “every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.”Footnote 33 It is evident here that patient autonomy has a critical role in medical treatment as a shield of protection against unwanted treatment. But it can be taken to an extreme position depending on how one interprets “what shall be done with [one’s] own body,” and whether there are, or should be, any limits to such bodily autonomy. The question of limitations to bodily autonomy will be explored in more detail in the remainder of this Element, but for the evolution of patient’s rights in the twentieth century, affirmation of these rights included the right to demand the cessation of treatment and to determine end-of-life preferences through Advanced Healthcare Directives or a living will.
As discussed in Section 2, the passage of the Patient Self-Determination Act in 1990 following the series of court cases (i.e., Quinlan and Cruzan) required health care facilities to inform their patients of their “right to choose the medical treatments they will receive at the end of life and about the nature of those treatments” (Connelly, Reference Connelly2023: 80). Thus, patients can choose cessation of treatment, determine their preferences for care at the end of life, and, in some cases, determine their desire to end their life with assisted suicide.Footnote 34
It is certainly true that patient autonomy is an important principle within end-of-life decision making. It cannot be the sole or final arbiter, however, of end-of-life decisions. Jesuit ethicist John J. Paris offers moral caution regarding the use of autonomy as the primary criterion of rightness for decisions. He explains that “when the rightness or wrongness of a decision is reduced to an individual [patient’s] choice, the result is autonomy gone amok” (quoted in Connelly, Reference Connelly2023: 76). His worry is that undue elevation of autonomy to the belief that the sheer act of choice makes the choice morally obligatory fails to recognize that what is decided matters too. Writing about the role of self-determination in the debates around euthanasia, bioethicist Daniel Callahan likewise illuminates the distinction between an autonomous value judgment about suffering and quality of life and the clinical diagnosis of an illness. He recognizes the temptation to move beyond the proper role as a clinician to answer patients’ autonomous requests for ending their suffering. In the context of euthanasia, he suggests that a physician moves beyond their proper role as clinician when they use medical interventions, such as lethal injection, to solve the problem of mortality and suffering experienced by a patient.Footnote 35 When autonomy extends beyond treatment preferences, including the decline of unwanted medical intervention, to “the right to be provided whatever medical intervention [one desires] … [it] results in the chaos of present-day healthcare delivery in the United States” (Verhey, Reference Verhey2011: 48).Footnote 36 Based on the state of health care and dying today, even with all the positive outcomes of patient’s rights, it isn’t clear that the elevation of patient autonomy ultimately has helped people die well (Verhey, Reference Verhey2011: 47).
3.2 Death Awareness Movement
Beginning in the late 1950s, the Death Awareness Movement emerged as a mobilization of leaders and followers to cultivate greater awareness of and devote more attention to issues of death, dying, and bereavement. The Death Awareness Movement includes research, clinical work, popular mantras about death (e.g., “Death is a natural event, and we ought to accept it”), and advocacy on behalf of “dying hospital patients and bereaved families” (Bregman, Reference Bregman and Moreland2018: 409). Lucy Bregman argues that the Death Awareness Movement has been more successful in “creating a new popular vocabulary and set of ideas about death and dying, than in its efforts to transform hospitals or medical care for the terminally ill” (Bregman, Reference Bregman and Moreland2018: 411). The interdisciplinary nature of the movement includes conferences, journals, and professional societies – the Association for Death Education and Counseling (ADEC), for example. But it is not only professional voices who contribute to the vocabulary and influence of the movement; individuals with terminal illness and bereaved family members have also contributed to the literature.
The popular starting point of the Death Awareness Movement is Elisabeth Kübler-Ross’s book On Death and Dying, published in 1968. Although well-known for her introduction of the “five stages of grief,”Footnote 37 another important idea of the text is that death is inconceivable for us to accept as something that will happen to us personally. Whether death is denied or simply sequestered from thought, Kübler-Ross notes the absence of death in life. Society wants to hide the reality of death by silencing any talk of it or witnessing of it. Death is “handled” by medicalizing it. “The effect of high-tech medicine and hospitals was to make death invisible, to hide it from public sight and knowledge” (Bregman, Reference Bregman and Moreland2018: 413). The resulting attitude toward death from the refusal to acknowledge it was an increased “terror of death, refusal to speak about it, or plan for it” (Bregman, Reference Bregman and Moreland2018: 413). It is in this context that the Death Awareness Movement gained traction by returning our attention to dying as natural (Verhey, Reference Verhey2011: 54 and Bregman, Reference Bregman and Moreland2018: 414). Kübler-Ross notes that death doesn’t always have to be conceived as “bad.” She writes about her childhood in a Swiss village where death was viewed as a natural part of life. It was not hidden but witnessed by family and members of the community (Kübler-Ross, Reference Kübler-Ross2014: 5).
Practical outcomes of this alternative view of death include more effective communication between doctors and patients about death and dying, rules that permit visitors, and a return to “home-like” conditions for dying, which can be seen in the growth of modern day hospice care as discussed in the next section. Advocates of the Death Awareness movement encourage a normalization of death and dying along with a greater commitment to acknowledgment of it. Take, for example, the rise of “death cafes” across the developed world. Pioneered by Bernard Crettaz, Swiss sociologist and ethnographer, the mission of “death cafes” or “Cafes Mortals” is to provide a place where people can meet to discuss death and dying. In an interview with The Independent, Crettaz explains that “French people find it very difficult to talk about death.” His mission aims to “liberate death from what he calls ‘tyrannical secrecy.’”Footnote 38 Inspired by Crettaz’s work and mission, Jon Underwood organized the first “death café” in East England in 2011. Now there are hundreds of death cafes throughout the globe all dedicated to conversations about death and dying.Footnote 39
The Death Awareness Movement is not a religious one, but it can illuminate some important elements of death that complement a religious view. While a Christian may recognize the inevitability and natural occurrence of death, they also recognize that death is a consequence of sin. Death, however, offers the Christian the occasion of hope in the promise of eternal life. A different concern with the Death Awareness Movement is the push to celebrate, in the spirit of Romanticism, the self and this life as all there is. If death is merely a natural occurrence with no corresponding promise of eternal life, then death is truly the end. The Christian, however, sees death as a vehicle to something more and something better than earthly life, not as a good per se, but as a means to the hope of eternal life with God in heaven (Verhey, Reference Verhey2011: 55).
3.3 Hospice Movement
The third movement intended to combat medicalized death is the hospice movement founded by English physician Dame Cicely Saunders in the 1960s. Hospice emphasizes care for the whole person, mind, body, and spirit, rather than singular attention to the diseased body. This care model has roots in the history of Christian care for the sick and dying where the focus is on relieving pain, managing symptoms, and alleviating psychological, social, and spiritual stress (Verhey, Reference Verhey2011: 62).Footnote 40
Importantly, hospice care is not curative. It is provided for people who have stopped treatment and who have been given a terminal diagnosis of six months or less to live (Connelly, Reference Connelly2023: 104). At the movement’s inception, Saunders recognized the lack of care given to the dying that aimed at helping them die well. She recognized the loneliness and abandonment felt by her patients who were dying and desired to ease their suffering when the medical industry lacked the resources (and will) to do so. Saunder’s desired to cultivate a relationship with the one suffering – between the care giver and the dying patient. There exists in the original vision of hospice care a commitment to the dying patient to be with them in their final days, and to be with them in their suffering, thereby manifesting the richness of compassion that is not merely a matter of pain relief but of walking alongside the person in their pain.
With the expansion of hospice care in the United States in the 1980s, Saunders’ original vision of suffering with the dying has shifted to a focus on managing pain. There is a risk here that a complex reality of human suffering is reduced to an experience of pain, which can be managed with drugs and other techniques (Verhey, Reference Verhey2011: 136). In the search for how to die well, “dying without pain is important, and effective pain relief makes an important contribution to the possibilities of dying well, but dying well and faithfully cannot and should not be reduced to a death without pain” (Verhey, Reference Verhey2011: 63). The worry here is that while medical techniques can manage pain quite effectively, they often come at the cost of cogency and lucidity at the end of life. Pain management techniques also may do little to ease spiritual, psychological, and personal suffering experienced by the one dying, although there are resources within hospice to do so. Like any practice that becomes institutionalized and government funded,Footnote 41 there is a risk of depersonalization and standardization. Still, hospice offers a refreshing alternative for many people who fear the prospect of dying lonely in a hospital hooked up to a machine. Despite the expansion of hospice care, it remains an underutilized resource for many people. More discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of hospice will be discussed in Section 4. Presently, it will suffice to recognize the emergence of hospice as one of the key responses to the medicalization of death.
3.4 Concluding Thoughts
Each of the three movements to resist medicalized death discussed in this section turn to secular techniques, whether it be to manage pain when dying, to embrace death, or to attempt to control death. Patient autonomy grew in response to increases in medical authority and extreme attempts to avoid death. In the bioethical realm, autonomy was enshrined as one of four principles of bioethics by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress (Reference Beauchamp and Childress1979), defenders of Principlism, an ethical framework specifically designed to address medical issues by providing four moral principles (respect for autonomy, justice, beneficence, and non-maleficence) that help one make justifiable moral decisions without first having to determine what is objectively morally right.Footnote 42 The emphasis on autonomy gave control back to the patient to make medical decisions for themselves. One weakness in this patient-centered approach is that it failed to equip individuals with resources for making good decisions. Instead, respect for autonomy implies that any choice someone makes ought to be respected simply because it is their choice. But surely not all choices are morally equivalent, nor is every approach to death equally valuable. Non-secular resources are needed to infuse choice with value beyond the mere act of choosing.
For the Death Awareness Movement, attempts to reclaim death and dying as natural aspects of life still centralize the individual in their attempt to make meaning in this life and to fully realize themselves while they have time. The return to nature promises meaning but only brings indifference, for nature remains coldly indifferent to suffering (Verhey, Reference Verhey2011: 54). Hope for something beyond life and death, which clarifies that neither life nor death are ultimate goods, is needed to help make sense of death.
Finally, the development of hospice founded on the religious values of care for the sick and dying was a hopeful alternative to medicalized death but today risks losing sight of the patient in the attempt to standardize pain management at the end of life. In the next section, we will consider four different decision-making approaches: the curative approach, the palliative care approach, the hospice approach, and the chosen death approach. All four approaches are analyzed through the secular and spiritual views to highlight their nuanced responses.
4 End-of-Life Decisions: Curative, Palliative, Hospice, and Chosen Death Approaches
When it comes to the kind of decisions an individual can make at the end of life, most Americans are underinformed and ill-equipped. There are several reasons for this reality. One reason already discussed is the tendency to deny death as something that will happen to you. For many, death only happens to other people. Of course, this perspective is fictitious; yet, as Connelly suggests, “we cling to our childlike fantasies, hoping that old age, infirmity, and death will never catch up with us” (Connelly, Reference Connelly2023: 26). Despite technological advancements designed to delay mortality, death remains inevitable; thus, it is prudent to become informed about the choices one has at the end of life. The Lancet Commission advises that society becomes more “death literate” about their options at the end of life. Advanced directives are one obvious way to begin contemplation about end-of-life options. As discussed in Section 1, advanced directives give a person some control over the type of death they will die. But the content of the advanced directives must be decided too. Questions to consider include: What lengths are you willing to go to stay alive? What does one consider excessively burdensome treatment? Who do you want to make decisions for you should you become incapacitated? Do you want to die attached to a breathing machine? Do you want to die at home? Is there someone in your community, religious or otherwise, whom you would like us to contact? Although one cannot control all the facets of their dying, they can prepare medically, emotionally, and spiritually for that eventual reality.
The risk of not planning may result in what Connelly outlines as the “death trap.” Connelly uses this term to describe the process of “undergoing invasive, discomforting, but ultimately futile medical interventions at the end-of-life” (Connelly, Reference Connelly2023: 11). He argues that unless an individual makes clear their desire for alternative treatment, the health care system automatically is geared to pull you into this trap. To be clear, the desire to keep patients alive is not without virtue. But the extreme measures frequently taken by medical professionals to extend life even for just a few hours or days can become unvirtuous. Sometimes it is simply time to die. The spiritual view of the person can help bring this realization to fruition. Since one barrier to education about end-of-life options is the complexity of medical documentation, some additional clarity on advanced directives will be offered here before considering the most common decisions available for someone at the end of life. The Catholic Church, for example, offers helpful documents that summarize the Church’s teaching on end-of-life issues.Footnote 43
An advanced directive is a template for decision making. Specifically, it is “a legal document that allows patients to communicate their desires for medical treatment in the event that they lose the ability to make decisions for themselves” (Doran, Reference Doran2023: 49). There are three forms included in an advanced directive, which can be had individually or in combination. First is a durable power of attorney for health care; second is a living will; and third is the Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment or POLST (Doran, Reference Doran2023: 50).Footnote 44 The theory behind advanced directives has already been explored, but in short it is to give patients the ability to document their end-of-life wishes and to ensure that their rights are respected and protected. Importantly, an advanced directive is best prepared in community with others. Ultimately, the document requires the signature of the individual, who is at least eighteen years old, mentally competent, and free from coercion. The document will be notarized and witnessed in most states. It is valid across state lines and can be revised if one desires (Doran, Reference Doran2023: 50).
Stephen Doran argues that the most important form contained in the advanced directive is the durable power of attorney for health care. It is this document that designates a surrogate decision maker to make medical decisions on your behalf should you become incapable of deciding for yourself due to your medical condition. Reasonably, this individual should be someone who knows you well and who is committed to honoring your wishes, even when it is difficult or if they disagree with them. Doran explains that “the most important factor in choosing someone to be your medical decision maker is that person must know your values and preferences for end-of-life decisions” (Doran, Reference Doran2023: 51). For someone to know your values and preferences means you must be vulnerable with them. For the autonomous individual who wants to be in control of their life (and death), this vulnerability may be challenging. It requires trust in someone else to decide on your behalf and to surrender some of your freedom to another. It also requires serious consideration of one’s values and preferences.
It is in this context that the spiritual view may offer a helpful framework for the content of decisions. It offers some guidance regarding which decisions are permissible or not, along with moral parameters for the lengths one ought to go to remain alive. It also keeps central the fundamental dignity of the human person that is not eclipsed even at death. Consultation with relevant religious documents or a chaplain or a spiritual leader along with family or friends is helpful in making these decisions. Connelly articulates three main decisions one can make about the care one receives at the end of life: curative care, palliative care, and hospice care. To Connelly’s list I will add a fourth option: the chosen death approach. Each of these options will be considered in turn.
4.1 A Curative Care Approach
According to Connelly, physicians acting under the “curative paradigm” will use “all available medical means to extend your physical existence regardless of the side effects” (Connelly, Reference Connelly2023: 102). In some cases, such medical intervention adds significant years to an individual’s life that they otherwise would not have had. In most cases, however, death is simply put off for living a little longer, often in discomfort and distress. The individual usually dies in the hospital, the location of death that is experienced by one-third of the Western population. Hospital deaths have been found to be a source of anxiety for people and conjure up visions of delayed death, increased suffering, diminished dignity, and higher cost – what many think of as a “bad death” (Crowley-Matoka, Reference Crowley-Matoka, Youngner and Arnold2016: 294–295).
Though the curative approach may seem to protect agency in the attempt to extend the individual person’s life, it tends toward a lack of agency by turning one’s control over to technology and medicine to support the person as they are dying (McCarthy and Kuczewski, Reference McCarthy, Kuczewski, Arnold and Youngner2016: 332). It offers the sense of control by promising life-saving technological intervention, while actually taking away autonomy by offering “too much technological intervention [and] too little personal say” (Crowley-Matoka, Reference Crowley-Matoka, Youngner and Arnold2016: 297). This approach seeks to avoid death by all means technologically possible, including the use of CPR for resuscitation, defibrillation for restoration of a normal cardiac rhythm, feeding tubes down your throat or nose and into your stomach, dialysis for kidneys, or use of a ventilator to aid in breathing (Connelly, Reference Connelly2023: 102). Additional treatments include invasive surgery. The advantage of these treatments is that they will likely delay death. But they often “increase your misery” by bringing “physical pain, mental disorientation, and emotional distress.” (Connelly, 2023: 102)
Some philosophical approaches to death, such as Stoicism, teach that a life is not made good simply by length. In fact, it is better to destroy one’s life than it is to endure suffering and misery (Luper, Reference Luper and Moremen2018: 538). In City of God book 19, St. Augustine critics the virtues of the Stoics by emphasizing that though they claim the possession of virtue to lead to happiness, they too easily escape the miseries of this life through death.Footnote 45 The truly virtuous person, Augustine teaches, is made happy by hope, enduring suffering and misery in this life because they have hope of salvation. The virtuous choice can never be, for Augustine, to intentionally shorten one’s life. Yet, the virtuous choice does not place undue hope in the power of this earthly life. Thus, the exercise of prudence is essential in the determination of how far to use medical technology to lengthen life. The tendency to view death as a medical problem to solve and the cultural emphasis on medical progress and scientific advancement to serve an individual’s desires for remaining alive must be balanced with the truth about one’s mortality. Though it is tempting to view death as a defeat or a failure to cure, this perspective is not always an accurate one (Crowley-Matoka, Reference Crowley-Matoka, Youngner and Arnold2016: 291; 293–294).
There is humility needed here to balance the desire for curing with the determination to allow death to occur. Recognition that death is inevitable may help temper the aggressive, and ultimately futile, treatment approach. Arthur Brooks astutely highlights that “decline [and death] is inevitable… [but] misery is not inevitable” (Brooks, Reference Brooks2019). In fact, one may wonder whether a shift is needed to make the default option not one of doing everything possible but instead of providing palliative care (Rose and Highliand, Reference Rose, Highliand, Youngner and Arnold2014). Nevertheless, the curative approach is the default approach for anyone who has not planned ahead or who lets the fear of death take control of their decision making. In a study by American psychologists Greenberg and Pyszczynski, investigating different responses to fear of death, religion was found to play an important role in combatting fear. It offers people the belief that existence continues after death and provides hope of “immortality” or “eternal life.” They also found that psychological well-being “depends on our belief that we are valuable contributors to a meaningful world” (Connelly, Reference Connelly2023: 86). Perhaps then a belief in life after death provides the following conclusions: We are not fully in control, death is a passage, not a conclusion, and we ought to resist the desire to remain alive at all costs.
4.2 A Palliative Care Approach
According to the National Institute of Health (NIH):
Many Americans die in facilities such as hospitals or nursing homes receiving care that is not consistent with their wishes. It’s important for older adults to plan ahead and let their caregivers, doctors, or family members know your end-of-life preferences in advance. For example, if an older person wants to die at home, receiving end-of-life care for pain and other symptoms, and makes this known to health care providers and family, it is less likely he or she will die in a hospital receiving unwanted treatments.Footnote 46
As seen in this statement, the curative approach has become the default option for those individuals who do not plan their end-of-life preferences in advance. Moreover, it emphasizes that this default position frequently conflicts with what people truly desire. Palliative care, sometimes known as comfort or compassionate care, is an alternate care approach focused on reducing pain and increasing quality of life for the dying patient. Yet, it still allows for curative care, making it distinct from hospice care where treatment is stopped. The NIH defines palliative care as:
[…] specialized medical care for people living with a serious illness, such as cancer or heart failure. Patients in palliative care may receive medical care for their symptoms, or palliative care, along with treatment intended to cure their serious illness. Palliative care is meant to enhance a person’s current care by focusing on quality of life for them and their family.Footnote 47
Palliative care is a comprehensive care approach aimed at treating the whole person – emotionally, physically, spiritually, and psychologically. Palliative care involves a team of people working alongside the patient: a palliative care physician, nutritionist, chaplain, and social worker.Footnote 48 Palliative care can be given in a medical setting such as a hospital, a nursing home, or one’s own home. Another important aspect of palliative care is that it recognizes the patient’s family as needing care and support as well. So, it offers care for them as well through various support systems that can aid in decision making, caregiving, and psychological counseling. Finally, palliative care offers social support and practical guidance for the patient in their decision-making process (Connelly, Reference Connelly2023: 103–104).
In palliative care, the agency of the individual is respected: first, in their decision to request palliative care in contrast to another care approach; second, in their active role in deciding treatment and care options. Importantly, this agency is nestled within the community of family and caregivers. The approach recognizes the human person as “embodied and worthy of compassionate care within a community that acts both prudentially and lovingly” (McCarthy and Kuczewski, Reference McCarthy, Kuczewski, Arnold and Youngner2016: 330). It also acknowledges the decline of the individual based on their diagnosis and, while not foregoing treatment, also recognizes that technological interventions must be done in a caring way, not only in a curative way. It respects the idea that “there are good and not-so-good ways to die” and that good ways to die may include letting nature take its course. In other words, to die in accordance with nature as creatures who work with nature, not in an attempt to control or overcome it (McCarthy and Kuczewski, Reference McCarthy, Kuczewski, Arnold and Youngner2016: 330). While receiving palliative care, the patient or surrogate works with the physician to determine when treatment may no longer be beneficial and may decide to transition to hospice care, where all curative treatment is stopped. To qualify for hospice, however, the patient must receive a diagnosis of six months or less to live; thus, if this timeframe is not yet present, the patient may request that more emphasis be given to comfort care in place of curative treatment.Footnote 49
There are downsides to palliative care, though many of them are external to the care itself. It can be difficult to access either because it is not offered by the physician, not requested by the patient, or there may be limited professionals to provide it. It may be covered by Medicare or Medicaid or the VA, but one would need to check coverage to be sure. Interestingly, a study on the costs of palliative care following a cancer diagnosis found that palliative care reduced care costs by the following amounts: $1285–$20,719 for inpatient palliative care, $1000–$5198 for outpatient and inpatient combined, $4258 for home based, and $117–$400 per day for home/hospice, combined outpatient/inpatient palliative care.Footnote 50
Other studies have confirmed that the curative approach to treatment at the end of life costs the health care system and patients significantly more money than the care-based approaches, including palliative care and hospice care.
4.3 A Hospice Care Approach
Modern-day hospice began in England in the 1960s. According to the NIH:
Hospice care focuses on the care, comfort, and quality of life of a person with a serious illness who is approaching the end-of-life … Like palliative care, hospice provides comprehensive comfort care as well as support for the family, but, in hospice, attempts to cure the person’s illness are stopped. Hospice is provided for a person with a terminal illness whose doctor believes he or she has six months or less to live if the illness runs its natural course.Footnote 51
Thus, the two features that distinguish hospice care from palliative care are the diagnosis for the patient of six months or less until death and the cessation of curative treatments. To qualify for hospice, two doctors must confirm an individual has less than six months to live. Following that determination, a patient who chooses hospice may receive it in their home or in a designated facility – hospital, nursing home, or designated hospice center. Hospice, like palliative care, emphasizes the whole person. English physician and modern-day hospice founder Cecily Sanders describes the essence of this care approach by acknowledging the worth of each dying person. She says, “you matter because of who you are. You matter to the last moment of your life, and we will do all we can, not only to help you die peacefully, but also to live until you die” (Quoted in Connelly, Reference Connelly2023: 104). Saunders’ philosophy of care was rooted in the Christian focus on caring for the sick and dying by providing pain relief, managing symptoms, and alleviating psychosocial and spiritual stress (Verhey, Reference Verhey2011: 62).
Importantly, hospice care does not deny death. It acknowledges the approaching death of the patient and allows the patient to “experience a natural death, a death as free of pain and distress as can humanly be made possible” (Connelly, Reference Connelly2023: 105). Like the other approaches, there are challenges to hospice care. One risk of it is that the care for the patient focuses solely on pain and symptom management. Though pain and symptom management are surely important, when other forms of suffering are overlooked – emotional, social, and spiritual – it reduces the patient to their physical pain. As will be discussed in Section 5, people receiving hospice have social, relational, and spiritual needs as they die. Other challenges with hospice care today are that the Christian community that surrounded the dying person in Saunders’ original vision – to relate to the suffering and dying person as a “thou” – may be replaced with a generic spiritual comfort offered to the patient by a medical team (Verhey, Reference Verhey2011: 136).
The hospice movement in America faces other challenges too. Medicare is the largest payer of hospice in the United States, since the passing of the Medicare Hospice Benefit in 1982, which means that it structures the guidelines for caregiving, makes the care highly centralized, and systematizes hospice care (Braswell, Reference Braswell2019: 13). What happens in this system is that “long-term care” or care designed to help individuals with the activities of daily living (i.e., feeding, bathing, general safety, and routine hygienic maintenance) is left to the family, who may be ill-equipped to care for their loved ones. Hospice provides the medical care needed by the patient, but the rest of the care – whole person care – is left to family or friends. Harold Braswell explains that “the primary caregivers in the US at the end-of-life are the family members of dying people” and argues that hospice, as it is structured today, depends on these caregivers such that without them, hospice itself would become inadequate (Braswell, Reference Braswell2019: 1–3).
Expanding on the problem, Braswell argues that family caregivers are inadequate because they lack three related qualities, namely, the skill needed for highly technical medical tasks; the physical, mental, and emotional abilities needed for end-of-life care giving; and the resources (financial and emotional) they never knew they would need (Braswell, Reference Braswell2019: 2–3). He clarifies that this inadequacy of care is not a personal failure (i.e., not a lack of love) but rather a political failure. To this we might add that inadequate care is also a cultural failure with our shift away from community to more individual networks. Multigenerational families living together is less common than it used to be. Families live across the country from each other, which makes caregiving difficult. Our society demeans dependency, which makes the reliance on others at the end of life even more challenging. Braswell continues by noting that the current design of US end-of-life care “maximizes the extent to which we will be a burden” to others, and it also constrains our freedom to decide the quality of care we receive at the end of life (Braswell, Reference Braswell2019: 20). Money, family, location, and facility availability are all circumstances that limit one’s freedom at the end of life. Not everyone can move into their child or relative’s home and expect quality and competent care, like the example given in Section 5 explains.
Finally, in his book, The Crisis of US Hospice Care, Braswell offers two distinct examples of end-of-life care that provide a clear distinction between a secular, individual freedom-driven hospice system and hospice care that is spiritual, holistic, and person driven. In the comparison, Braswell highlights the importance of expanding end-of-life discussions beyond the debates about having a “right to die.” He shows how a properly functioning hospice system protects individual freedom and resists the movement toward physician-assisted suicide that many people feel driven to request when in the grip of inadequate hospice care. It is to this final decision, the chosen “right to die” approach that we now turn.
4.4 A Chosen Death Approach
In bioethics discussions, the conversations about “dying” have largely centered on the idea of “the right to die” (Braswell, Reference Braswell2019: 27). As hospice physician Ira Byock notes, the debate regarding whether to legalize physician-assisted suicide (PAS) has become “a proxy for how we die” (Braswell, Reference Braswell2019: 28). In America, it is understandable why this debate has gained so much traction. One of the enduring ideals of American national identity is freedom or independence; thus, it is no surprise that conversations about death and dying center around an individual’s freedom at the end of their life or a fear of being dependent on others. PAS offers the promise of freedom and control over one’s body by giving individuals the ability to choose death when their situation becomes intolerable and/or incurable. Yet, as Byock (Reference Byock2018) notes:
People who argue for the right to die invariably relate one or more stories of people they loved who died badly – tethered to machines in an intensive care unit or left to languish in a nursing home with their pain and emotional suffering ignored. It’s easy to understand how people in such situations would want to be freed from such anguish. Casting physician-hastened death as a freedom is disingenuous at best. If doctors don’t communicate with you about your condition and listen to your priorities, if they are unskilled in alleviating your pain, if medical bills are bankrupting your family, asking to die may be entirely rational. As the lyric goes, “Freedom’s just another word for nothing left to lose.”
Byock astutely recognizes that the freedom desired in requests for PAS is a myth. Too often, the desire for PAS comes from a state of inadequate care, where there appear to be no better options to address one’s suffering and pain. Framing the PAS debate, then, around autonomy and individual freedom masks some of the realities of the situation leading individuals to make this request. Before diving deeper into the debate around PAS, a note on terminology is warranted.
Advocates for legalizing the practice of PAS more widely in the United States, along with some Bioethicists, reject the use of “suicide” in reference to it. These groups prefer terms such as “assisted dying” and “medical aid in dying (MAID)” because they argue that the practice is fundamentally distinct from suicide. One way it is distinct is due to the terminal illness present, rather than a severe bout of depression, for example.
It is understandable why the term “suicide” is controversial to use for a practice that is increasingly becoming medically and socially sanctioned. The practice garners more public support and empathy when language is changed to “aid in dying” or “assisted death” (Braswell, Reference Braswell2019: 29). It reinforces the view that individuals considering PAS have a medical condition that is incurable and causes suffering. Moreover, “[b]ecause this suffering originates in an incurable medical condition, it too is surmised to be incurable. This incurable medical suffering is presumably the cause of the individual’s desire to end their life through PAS” (Braswell, Reference Braswell2019: 29). In this respect, the idea of suicide is rationalized. It is, after all, rational to avoid suffering and to choose its absence when possible. Some advocates of PAS argue that these individuals are not choosing to die at all; because of the terminal illness they are already dying, thus the choice of death is “forced on them” by the illness and they are simply asking to die faster with a physician’s assistance.
Though there is resistance to the term “suicide” in naming this practice, there is strong rationale to continue using the term out of intellectual honesty. Philip Reed argues that the term “suicide” is accurate and should be retained. He says, “intending one’s death is essential to the nature of suicide, and this intention is normally required on the part of the terminally ill patient when she takes a life-ending drug” (Reed, Reference Reed2019: 124). Reed explains three conditions are necessary to make an act a suicide: “(a) an agent causes her own death, (b) foresees, at least roughly, how the act will cause her own death, and (c) intends her own death” (Reed, Reference Reed2019: 124). PAS, according to Reed, meets all three of these criteria. He, and others, suggest that terms like “medical aid in dying” risk inaccurately representing the practice and turn it into one more medical treatment option at the end of life. In a more recent discussion of this terminology, Fox and Braswell also defend the use of PAS instead of MAID “because it highlights the role of human agency in causing death, [and it] more effectively expresses the best arguments for and against the practice” (Fox and Braswell, Reference Fox and Braswell2024: 2).Footnote 52 Following Reed along with Fox and Braswell, the term “suicide” will be used in the following discussion of PAS.
PAS is the common name given to the practice whereby a patient with a terminal diagnosis of six months or less to live chooses to ingest a fatal combination of drugs prescribed to them by a physician (Reed, Reference Reed2019: 123). It is important to distinguish the practice of PAS from the practice of “euthanasia,”Footnote 53 which is a practice whereby the physician acts in such a way to intentionally bring about one’s death by actively hastening it at the patient’s request (voluntary active euthanasia [VAE]) or by removal of life-sustaining support (voluntary passive euthanasia). Confusion arises over the latter practice and whether the removal of life-sustaining treatment constitutes euthanasia. More about this distinction will follow, but the feature that makes an action euthanasia is the intention behind the action, whether it is passive or not. If the intention behind the action is the death of the patient, then it is reasonable to call this action euthanasia. In the United States, VAE is illegal in all fifty states. PAS is legal in ten states and the District of Columbia. Eleven states explicitly ban the practice of PAS (Snead, Reference Snead2022: 253).
PAS can be thought of as a middle position between two other medical interventions at the end of life, namely, VAE and the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment (WLST). These three interventions mark the spectrum of options available for people who want to end their lives faster than is currently taking place. In all these instances, the individual decides that they want to die, but the direct cause of death differs in each case. In VAE, the physician is the direct cause of death; in PAS, the patient is the direct cause of death; and in WLST, the underlying disease is the cause of death.Footnote 54 Of these three options, VAE is not permitted in the US, and those who advocate for PAS want to distinguish themselves from such a practice. WLST is practiced widely and most debates are not focused on banning it.Footnote 55
Debates over the permissibility of practices such as euthanasia, PAS, and suicide are not new. The Hippocratic oath banning physicians from participating in direct patient deaths was a response to earlier medical writings which instructed physicians to help ease patient suffering by helping them die by suicide or euthanasia. Historically, philosophers have been divided about the practice with some objecting to suicide and “mercy killing” (e.g., Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, and Kant) with others defending the rationality of it (e.g., Stoics and Hume) (Kopelman and De Ville, Reference Kopelman and De Ville2001: 1).Footnote 56 Some contemporary philosophers in favor of PAS include Peter Singer, Margaret Battin, and Ronald Dworkin. Philosophers writing in opposition to the practice include Sissela Bok, Daniel Sulmasy, and Jeffrey Bishop, to name a few.Footnote 57, Footnote 58 In the United States, there remains significant divergence on the permissibility of PAS, though in other countries there is more support for the practice.
The Netherlands and Belgium, for example, formally legalized PAS and euthanasia in 2002 with the passing of Euthanasia Acts.Footnote 59 The legalization of PAS and euthanasia in the Netherlands was simply a formalization of a robust ongoing practice. The most significant change the legalization brought was the formation of review committees to ensure the practice was not abused.Footnote 60 In the United States, Oregon passed the “Death With Dignity Act” in 1997, permitting PAS only. Countries where active euthanasia is legal in certain circumstances include Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland.Footnote 61
In the United States, several important court cases have shaped the legal terrain around PAS and euthanasia. In Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill, both decided in 1997, the US Supreme Court ruled that it is constitutional for states to prohibit assisted suicide, and therefore PAS, because “assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause” (Kopelman and De Ville, Reference Kopelman and De Ville2001: 5).Footnote 62 There is, however, a right to refuse lifesaving treatment, including hydration and nutrition or other unwanted treatments based on the “well-established legal tradition that forced medication is battery” (Kopelman and De Ville, Reference Kopelman and De Ville2001: 2–10). Here we can see the line drawn between active euthanasia (direct and intentional killing of another person) and allowing a person to die by withholding or removing life-sustaining treatment. As was stated earlier, whether the latter event constitutes euthanasia or not remains a topic of debate (Kopelman and De Ville, Reference Kopelman and De Ville2001: 13).
Central to debates regarding PAS and euthanasia are the following concepts, each of which will be expanded on in the following sections: (1) Killing versus allowing to die, (2) action versus omission, (3) ordinary means versus extraordinary means of life-saving treatment, (4) withdrawal/withholding life-saving treatment versus refusal of treatment, and (5) cause of death as intervention versus cause of death as underlying pathology (Kopelman and De Ville, Reference Kopelman and De Ville2001: 13).
4.4.1 Killing Versus Allowing to Die
According to the “traditional view,” the distinction between killing and allowing to die is both coherent and morally meaningful. In defense of such a position, Daniel Sulmasy (Reference Sulmasy1998) articulates the difference between killing and allowing to die in the following way:
Killing: an act in which an agent creates a new, lethal pathophysiological state with the specific intention in acting of thereby causing a person’s death.
Allowing to die: an act in which an agent either performs an action to remove an intervention that forestalls or ameliorates a preexisting fatal condition or refrains from action that would forestall or ameliorate a preexisting fatal condition, either with the specific intention of acting that this person should die by way of that act or not so intending
According to these definitions, the substantial reason for the intention in acting is critical. Thus, if the intention in acting is to make the patient dead, then it is morally equivalent to killing or euthanasia, whether the act itself is passive or active (actively injecting the patient with a lethal dose of morphine or not providing a life-sustaining treatment in order to cause the person’s death).
Within the definition of “allowing to die,” the substantial reason for intention in acting determines whether the act counts as a killing or not. If the intention in acting is merely to concede that there are no further moral obligations to continue medical interventions and one’s intention in acting is fulfilled when the patient is no longer receiving the medical intervention, then one’s allowing the patient to die is justifiable on traditional moral grounds, providing that the judgment that the burden of treatment outweighs the benefit of treatment is reasonable (Sulmasy, Reference Sulmasy1998: 55–64).Footnote 63 If, however, the intention in acting is fulfilled by the patient’s death, and not merely the removal of a ventilator, for example, then this particular instance of allowing to die is also an act of killing.
For Sulmasy, the wrongness of killing depends, therefore, on some combination of the act, the outcome, the circumstances, and the intention.Footnote 64 Since one’s intentions may or may not be uniform, inquiry into why someone acted may be needed to determine the moral permissibility of the action. The variation in intentions distinguishes acts that are made with uniform intentions from acts made by or with varied intentions, thereby creating two classes of acts (Sulmasy, Reference Sulmasy1998: 59). In some cases of allowing to die, for example, the death of the patient may be intended, while in other cases it may not be intended. Thus, the intentions are varied in cases of allowing to die. In cases of killing, the intentions would be uniform.
Another distinction made in this debate is active versus passive means of intending death. The killing and allowing to die distinction should make it clear that one can intend to kill by either active or passive means (sometimes called acts of commission vs. acts of omission). The moral permissibility of an action, however, would not rest solely in this distinction given that the intention behind actively causing death versus passively refraining from stopping it may both be aimed at the patient’s death (Woollard and Howard-Snyder, 2024).Footnote 65 More information regarding intention is needed to determine the permissibility of passively allowing death to occur.
4.4.2 Ordinary Versus Extraordinary Means
In his address, the Prolongation of Life, Pope Pius XII says that in serious illness it is one’s duty and one’s right to take the necessary treatment for the preservation of life and health, but that “normally, one is held to use only ordinary means – according to circumstances of persons, places, times, and culture – that is to say, means that do not involve any grave burden for oneself or another” (Quoted in Doran, Reference Doran2023, 27). Though it is not always straightforward to determine which means count as ordinary or extraordinary, helpful resources can illuminate the distinction.
The Magisterium of the Catholic Church defines ordinary treatment as “treatment[s] [that are required] to maintain essential physiological functions, e.g., hydration, nutrition, thermoregulation, proportionate respiratory support, and the other types of assistance needed to maintain bodily homeostasis and manage systemic and organic pain.”Footnote 66 Extraordinary treatment would include aggressive medical treatment that offers little hope of recovery, does not extend the life of the patient, or does not promote well-being. These considerations emphasize that each medical act ought to aim at the promotion of life for the patient and that it does not aim at their death, even if that death is foreseen. Other faith communities, such as the United Methodist Church, affirm the distinction between aiming at the patient’s death and aiming at reducing their suffering in the face of death. They affirm the “distinction between medical aid in dying, which actively promotes death, and providing care appropriate to one’s stage of dying. United Methodists support individuals and families making decisions with their physicians for the sake of reducing pain and not prolonging life when there is no reasonable hope for recovery.”Footnote 67
Different faith communities agree that even though it is never permissible to hasten death with the intention to kill a patient, it is permissible to suspend treatment that has become futile. Burdensome treatment may create unendurable side effects, may create pain that is intolerable, or may do little to address the underlying condition. The principle of proportionality is helpful to determine whether treatment has become disproportionately burdensome. The principle of proportionality is determined by the overall well-being of the sick person in their reception of treatment and whether the treatment is truly promoting life and not simply prolonging imminent death. So, both the futility of the treatment and the burden on the patient are considered. There is subjectivity in this determination, however, because different patients can tolerate different levels of burden. Thus, what counts as a “grave burden” to a patient is based on a number of factors contributing to a patient’s assessment of the burdensomeness of the treatment, for example, the circumstances in which one receives the treatment and the underlying conditions being treated, which can change over time and impact what is or is not burdensome.
4.4.3 Withdrawing/Withholding Life-Sustaining Treatment Versus Refusal of Treatment
It is well established that there is no moral difference between withdrawing and withholding life-sustaining treatment even if there is an emotional difference. In both cases, the moral question concerns factors such as the effectiveness of the treatment, the imminence of death, the desires of the patient, and the burdensome nature of the treatment. If a patient has late-stage cancer and doesn’t want to undergo additional chemotherapy because they desire to spend their last days in hospice with their family, this refusal of treatment is no different than the patient who agrees to the chemotherapy treatment and later determines they no longer can endure the discomfort it brings and suspends the treatment in order to die. A different example is the withholding or withdrawing of artificial nutrition and hydration. Although there is generally a moral obligation to maintain health and utilize medical interventions when sick, if the medical intervention is ineffective or burdensome, then the patient is both legally and morally justified in refusing or ceasing treatment, including nutrition and hydration. There are stages of the dying process where a patient cannot absorb or metabolize food or drink; thus, there would be no benefit to artificially feeding and hydrating them. In the agonal phase of dying, for example, it may cause more harm than good to offer nutrition and hydration to a patient.
Once again, the grounds justifying the withholding or withdrawing of treatment depend on whether the treatment can achieve desired goals and whether it is more burdensome than beneficial to the patient. However, the removal of artificial nutrition and hydration for reasons of medical futility must be distinguished from the voluntary cessation of eating and drinking. If there are no medical reasons preventing someone from eating or drinking, then this decision amounts to suicide by starvation and dehydration. To suggest a patient stop eating and drinking would amount to assisting in suicide. This distinction is not to say that one should force a patient to eat and drink, but at minimum an attempt to dissuade would be merited. After all, respect for autonomy does not mean one needs to be indifferent to a patient’s decision (Sulmasy, Reference Sulmasy, Youngner and Arnold2016: 143–145).
4.4.4 Proximate Cause of Death as Intervention Versus Cause of Death as Underlying Pathology
When it comes to determining the cause of death, the earlier point about proximate causes is important. For advocates of PAS and VAE, it is tempting to say that the underlying pathology is the true cause of death since the patient would not be choosing their death were it not for the underlying disease. It is not the case, however, that the presence of the disease takes away responsibility from those who would actively (or passively) intend the death of the patient through medical means, thereby becoming the proximate cause of death.
4.5 Conclusion
In this section we have examined four approaches to end-of-life decisions. The first three approaches – the curative approach, the palliative care approach, and the hospice approach – benefit from different considerations of both the secular and spiritual view of the human person. The limits to treatment, the care given to the patient, and the recognition of the person as both an individual and a social being are important considerations for providing the best conditions for a good death. The secular view captures well the importance of individual freedom, independence, and choice in how one dies. The spiritual view emphasizes the goods of dependence, suffering in community, maintenance of relationships, and spiritual well-being in how one dies. Belief in God or some recognition of life after death offers hope that this earthly life is not the end, but that there is the promise of eternal life. In Samaritanus Bonus, it is emphasized that the Church offers dying people hope in God and help with dying. It can accompany those facing the end of their life and help them break from despair. There is good evidence of the benefit of having spiritual accompaniment as one is dying, whether one is religious or not.
Yet, it is in the chosen death approach where we see the secular and spiritual views come to an impasse. There is robust literature presenting arguments for the justification of PAS.Footnote 68 What these arguments share is the unyielding commitment to liberty and personal autonomy. When the expressive individualist view of the human person is adopted, the logical conclusion is that each person has a right to determine what they do with their life. The justification of PAS is that it is an autonomous choice made by a rational and unconstrained individual.
In contrast, the spiritual view of the human person recognizes that individual life is a gift first and foremost. Unlike a property right that one can surrender if they choose, life is a right that is inviolable by either oneself or another. Belief in and commitment to the inherent and inviolable dignity of the human person means that it is never permissible to intentionally choose death. One does not have a “right to die,” but one does have a right to the protection and promotion of life. This simplification of the arguments is not intended to suggest that the arguments for and against PAS are not worth consideration; on the contrary, they are important to consider for the nuances of the different positions. My objective is simply to point out that careful consideration of the arguments for and against PAS reveals that the permissibility of PAS hinges on whether or not one accepts that life is something sacred and unalienable, given by God, and death per se can never be directly chosen as something good – for oneself or for another.
In spite of their disagreement, defenders of PAS and its opponents can find common ground for advocacy. One common feature of end-of-life experiences is loss – loss of independence, loss of well-being, loss of routine, loss of ability, and loss of a pain-free life. There is a tendency, however, to view these losses as indications that one’s life is no longer worth living. In fact, the three main reasons for requesting PAS are loss of autonomy, loss of dignity, and inability to do activities that make life enjoyable.Footnote 69
Yet, there is a group of people who vehemently oppose equating these losses with a life not worth living. For example, disability rights advocates explain that though the loss of a formerly had ability is difficult, becoming disabled does not make one’s life unworthy of living. Advocates argue that it is societal barriers that create the undesirable conditions of life. If society becomes more accepting and accommodating for people with disabilities and dependencies, then perhaps more people would not desire to end their lives should they become disabled and dependent. To ensure that genuine choice is protected, more attention should be given to improving social networks and better patient care than to the exclusive promotion of liberty and individual right to choose (and access) PAS (Kopelman and De Ville, Reference Kopelman and De Ville2001: 20–22).
In this vein, Braswell argues that the singular focus on PAS is overly narrow and makes conversations about the “right to die” unhelpfully limiting. PAS, he argues, is not the only way to talk about freedom at the end of life (Braswell, Reference Braswell2019: 41). He goes further to suggest that the obsession in society about PAS obscures the real causes of loss of freedom for the dying; namely, society’s lack of care and support for the dying. “Rather than change that society,” he explains, “the right to die destroys people with disabilities [and terminal illness], and it does so in the name of freedom” (Braswell, Reference Braswell2019: 38). Moreover, it fails to consider why people want PAS, which in significant part is due to their situation that seriously constrains their choices at the end of life. Dying in a nursing home, for example, severely constrains one’s options and freedoms at the end of life by segregating people from society. It can force people to live “according to a routine that is designed in the interests of the home’s management… [to be] bathed, fed, and clothed according to a schedule that is not theirs. [To receive] care [that is] frequently mediocre and sometimes abusive” and to destroy most of the former freedom they enjoyed (Braswell, Reference Braswell2019: 36–38). Such loss of freedom understandably increases suicidal ideation in these populations for whom PAS is being advocated for because it offers the opportunity to reclaim one’s freedom through exertion of the “right to die.”
One of the clearest examples of this situation is in Canada’s MAID laws,Footnote 70 which now extend to chronically disabled, nonterminally ill people who “do not want to die,” but think death is their only and best option because they do not receive the social support they need to continue living.Footnote 71 A critical insight Braswell offers in his identification of this double standard is that inadequate end-of-life hospice care inevitably leads to a push for PAS. To make end-of-life decision making truly free, therefore, there needs to be an expansion of genuinely good options at the end of life that offer avenues for dying well and that expand freedom in a holistic way.
Braswell’s concerns are not unique. Connelly suggests that the movement toward PAS in the United States is “symptomatic of a heath care system that is not effectively responding to patient concerns at the end-of-life” (Connelly, Reference Connelly2023: 107). Also notable is that the resistance to legalizing PAS and other life-ending practices such as VAE is slowly waning while support is growing. The advancement of medical technologies, availability of drugs, and the provision of medical services to more people create more situations where questions about the quality of life are raised. And based on the secular view outlined in this Element, it is not surprising that there is growing support for the freedom to choose death on one’s own terms. When the human being becomes the sole arbiter of what is good and right, it is difficult to place any boundaries on what is permissible for them to do to themselves. Thus, in this complex landscape it is important that the choices offered to patients reflect a commitment to promoting a good death whenever possible.
5 God and End-of-Life Decision Making: Some Examples
In this section I will present examples of situations that reveal the difference God makes in our thinking about end-of-life decision making. The first example comes from Harold Braswell’s ethnographic study of two end-of-life care facilities, one that is a for-profit, state-supported secular organization and the other that is a nonprofit, charitable organization run by Catholic nuns. Braswell argues that the Catholic foundation of the latter institution promoted greater freedom for patients at the end of their lives than the secular foundations of the US hospice system. Section 5.1 looks at the results of his study along with the reasoning for his endorsement of the spiritual model of hospice. The second example in Section 5.2 comes from the end-of-life journey of Alfie Evans, a young boy whose unidentified neurodegenerative condition rendered him the subject of legal, medical, and theological disputes about whether to discontinue life-sustaining ventilation. Evans’ story is instructive for the different considerations made from the secular and spiritual understanding of the human person and values at issue at the end of life.
5.1 God and Hospice
The modern United States Hospice system is in crisis, or so argues Harold Braswell. This crisis impacts the freedom of people to die well when they are recipients of the Medicare Hospice Benefit (MHB) funded by Medicare since 1982. To understand the reason for this crisis, Braswell traces the history of the modern hospice movement from its roots in professional caregiving for the dying to a for-profit organization that relies disproportionately on familial caregiving for patients at the end of life. Braswell notes that in the passing of the MHB, legislators were primarily concerned with cost-saving measures for US end-of-life care and passed the benefit with little concern for the moral and ethical implications of returning care responsibilities back to the family (Braswell, Reference Braswell2019: 74). This desire to increase the cost-efficiency of end-of-life care resulted in a mismatch between the requirements of families to receive the health care benefit and the care they received – care which largely fell onto them to provide.
Braswell explains that the MHB defined hospice care to consist of 80 percent outpatient care given either at home or in a nonhospital setting, such as a nursing home. The hospice benefit would support the family with the technical medical aspects of the care needed (wound care, delivering medications, etc.) while relegating much of the care involved in activities of daily living (bathing, feeding, clothing, safety, and basic hygiene) to familial caregivers. Though familial caregiving can be successful, as the two personal examples offered below suggest, it can also be challenging due to changes in the modern family.
Unlike a few generations ago, most families do not live in multigenerational houses. Grandparents and children live separately, making care for sick and aging parents more challenging. Families have fewer children than they have had historically, leaving fewer children to bear the burden – emotional and financial – of caring for aging parents. Many households have two working adults, rather than one, making caregiving for elderly parents a second job. There are higher rates of divorce, leaving many families fractured. And the improvements in medical technology support longer life spans, which can require more financial support for aging parents (Braswell, Reference Braswell2019: 78–80). In these different ways, the delegation by the MHB of nonmedical care to the family creates a challenging reality for many families.
Additionally, the advancements in medical technology and pain relief place new pressures on caregivers to create care for the dying that meets higher standards. Braswell explains that “[b]y the mid-twentieth century, a ‘good death’ was no longer defined in theological terms. Rather it was defined in medical terms as a death in the absence of pain and suffering. This new conception of a good death changed the role of familial caretakers” (Braswell, Reference Braswell2019: 80). In response to this changing role of the family to care for the patient, end-of-life care became increasingly professionalized. The family was still involved, but more so as care managers rather than primary caregivers. But with the increase in professionalization of care giving in the twentieth century, both the cost of care and the state’s role in providing care expanded. The subsidization of end-of-life care through the expansion of social benefits proved helpful to many people; however, state subsidized professional care was then moved back to the family in the passing of the MHB.
An additional consequence of MHB is the separation of long-term care from end-of-life care. For many dying Americans, Braswell explains, “hospice begins…on average, in the last two weeks of their life” even though the dying process extends longer than two weeks (Braswell, Reference Braswell2019: 93). As explored in Section 4, one reason for this late initiation of hospice is the curative approach that renders patients ineligible for hospice care. Recall that a patient is eligible for hospice only after they forgo all treatment (Braswell, Reference Braswell2019: 93). The cumulative impact of this development in hospice, labeled by Braswell as a “crisis,” is that a patient’s freedom to die well is severely curtailed. One temptation of this restricted freedom is to focus on right-to-die legislation; however, Braswell suggests that more productive conversations about increasing freedom through alternative nonfatal options are needed. It is in this context that looking at two examples of hospice providers, one secular and one spiritual, may provide lessons about freedom beyond PAS at the end of life.
Using ethnography, “a method of empirical research that is based on qualitative interviews and systematic observation,” Braswell compares two different institutions providing end-of-life care in Atlanta, Georgia: one secular (under the pseudonym “Amberview Hospice”) and one religious (Our Lady of Perpetual Help) (Braswell, Reference Braswell2019: 129). In this study, Braswell is focusing on how the US hospice system’s dependence on familial caregivers affects dying people, particularly with respect to their freedom at the end of life. He argues that “when adequate familial caregiving is lacking, the benefits of hospice are significantly limited. The result is a failure in the delivery of basic health services, but it is more than a service failure. It destroys the very freedom of dying patients” (Braswell, Reference Braswell2019: 100). Without adequate familial caregiving surrounding the dying patient, many of the freedoms that contribute to an individual’s sense of well-being are reduced. If you can’t exercise the freedom to choose activities of daily living, including food, socializing, exercising, bathing, and so on, then one’s life can seem to have lost its worth. Such loss of control can exacerbate feelings of despair, loneliness, and grief. It may also encourage people to look somewhere else for control – such as assistance with dying through PAS. Loss of autonomy is a consistently cited reason for requesting PAS.Footnote 72 The critical claim here is that the destruction of the freedom of dying patients who are receiving hospice care is due to the system itself. Because hospice is almost exclusively funded by Medicare, it must abide by the structure determined by Medicare. This structure depends on families to do the majority of caregiving for the patient. Clarifying the structure of hospice, Braswell writes:
One way of thinking of the structure of US hospice care is as an exchange. In exchange for some hospice care funded by the state, the family members of the dying person take care of certain patient needs that otherwise might require state funding. This exchange has made it possible to extend hospice care to the enormous number of dying people who have benefited from hospice’s incorporation into Medicare. But it has also created a population that is systematically underserved: terminally ill patients who lack an adequate level of familial caregiving to sustain hospice care.
By “inadequate,” Braswell means factors not related to family dynamics that impact the ability or quality of care given. Such factors might be the nature of the disease, or it might be sociological factors outside the family’s control. For example, Braswell presents the case of Steven. Although Steven was receiving hospice care for his terminal diagnosis of throat cancer, he was divorced, lived in a drug rehabilitation facility, was disabled, and had comorbidities. Without family or caregivers nearby, Steven lived mostly alone. The hospice team visited him for fifteen hours each week and he was eligible to receive five days per month of inpatient “respite” at Amberview’s inpatient facility. The one area where Steven found control during this time was in his desire to donate his body to science. But due to an emergency transfusion, which he mistakenly thought would save his life, he was not eligible to donate his body after his death.
Without familial caregivers, Steven did not receive his medical care. His drugs were stolen, lost, or forgotten. He lacked assistance with the basic activities of hygiene and environmental cleanliness…when he did die, it was not at home but in an emergency room, bleeding out among strangers, most likely without knowing that he was losing the one wish he had held onto in the preceding weeks. It was not a good death. But it was also not a fluke. Steven died because of the design of the Medicare Hospice Benefit.
Braswell explains how Steven’s case “highlights the presence of abandonment in the US hospice system.” This abandonment was not caused by the negligence of hospice per se, rather, the system does not account for those who lack the necessary support at home.
In addition to abandonment, there is also fragmentation that occurs. Not only a literal fragmentation of the body due to the underlying illness but also a fragmentation in patient care. For those living out their last days in a nursing home, the alternative to dying at home, there is often conflict between the nursing home care and hospice care policies. Collaboration between providers is challenging, and frequent turnover of nursing staff makes consistency and quality of care uncertain. Hospice directives to give higher doses of pain medication, for example, may not be carried out by nursing home staff for reasons of ability or willingness. In summary,
[I]n the US hospice system, patients with inadequate familial support are either abandoned at home or fragmented in the context of the nursing home or some other inpatient facility like assisted living, which was not designed with the care of dying people in mind…but it is not just a failure of health service delivery. It is a destruction of the freedom of dying patients to control their lives…The provision of appropriate care is not external to the freedom of the dying patient. It is the very means through which such freedom is realized.
When thinking about the freedom of a dying patient, it is important to clarify that it is not just freedom per se that is at issue. It is also the dignity of the person that is at stake. In the effort to make hospice more affordable, the quality of care may be sacrificed, which negatively impacts the possibility of dying well.
In contrast to the type of hospice care provided by Amberview, Braswell highlights the work of a second provider, Our Lady of Perpetual Help (Our Lady). This institution is a charitable one, which means it does not have to abide by the Medicare requirements that prohibit the combination of end-of-life care and long-term care. For this reason, Our Lady can offer two caregiving modalities to its residents, namely, long-term care with a focus on activities of daily living and holistic end-of-life care (Braswell, Reference Braswell2019: 129). Braswell argues that “Our Lady provides a solution to the crisis of US hospice care. It cares for patients who would otherwise be stripped of their freedom” (Braswell, Reference Braswell2019: 129). Braswell goes on to suggest that it is the Catholic religious foundation that enables it to promote freedom at the end of life. This home, for terminally ill cancer patients who cannot pay for their care, offers stability, socialization, and integration into community, all of which enhance freedom. There is one nurse assigned to three patients, which means that a relationship is formed, and consistent care is given. Braswell observed a shared sense of gratitude among the patients at Our Lady. One patient expressed the sentiment of feeling like “a person” again (Braswell, Reference Braswell2019: 137).
To understand why personhood and freedom are enhanced, it is important to recognize the role of religious commitment to the care given. At Our Lady, the “picture of end-of-life care is grounded in a participation and powerful understanding of death” (Braswell, Reference Braswell2019: 140). The sisters believe in God and in the resurrection of Christ, His Son. Christ’s death and resurrection provide the hope for Christian believers to live on spiritually after their physical death. Furthermore, eternal salvation comes by grace, manifested through one’s faith and good works done on earth. During His earthly life, Christ admonishes his followers to practice corporeal works of mercy – feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, caring for the sick, and visiting the lonely – as necessary, though not sufficient, means of their salvation.Footnote 73 The sisters of Our Lady view their care for the sick and dying as a sacrificial act for Jesus as seen in the other – the dying person in their suffering becomes a participant in the suffering of Jesus on the cross. Christ is present in the person for whom they care, and this presence reconfigures the relationship between the patient and the provider. One sister explained, “at Our Lady there is no one outside of Christ” (Braswell, Reference Braswell2019: 143). The sisters recognize that death is something toward which all human creatures are bound, but also that death is not the end point. There is hope beyond death for union with Christ through the resurrection.
The care given at Our Lady enhanced the freedom of the dying patients within its care. It did not give them unrestricted freedom, however, as the home would not provide patients with the freedom to request assisted dying or PAS. Instead, it provides other services that generate freedom through nonfatal means. While some might critique this restriction as a “lack of freedom,” what Braswell encourages readers to see is that too often the choice of PAS is not so much a free choice as it is a last resort to avoid the painful and lonely death facilitated by the realities of modern hospice shortcomings. When it comes to giving patients maximal freedom at the end of life, “instituting more nonlethal measures to promote freedom…furthers your goals regarding the right to die” (Braswell, Reference Braswell2019: 147).
When we reflect on the difference that God makes to the care received at the end of life for hospice patients, a few observations can be drawn. The first observation is about the goods of hospice care. The US Hospice system operating today has the good of the patient in view; however, other goods compete with the patient. The need to make hospice care as efficient as possible, both in terms of finances and delivery of care, limits the time and extent of care given to each individual. Yet, when it comes to dying well, there is a need for genuine human connection that may not be financially efficient. A major issue for hospice today is that institutions similar to Our Lady are scarce while the aging population is growing. Until this scarcity of hospice care is resolved, big state-sponsored hospice organizations will continue to struggle to deliver quality and personalized care to each person.
The hospice care given by Our Lady has the good of the patients at the center of their care. They connect closely with the patient, seeing each of them as deserving respect and love. But Our Lady is limited in how many patients they care for and who can be admitted to their care. They rely on charitable giving to operate. Practically speaking, the challenge for an organization offering hospice will continue to be how to balance an individualized care plan with the number of patients in need of care. On a more theoretical level, what Our Lady emphasizes is that a belief in God can orient care in a way that enhances freedom, respects dignity, and promotes the full living out of one’s final days. Importantly, it creates an environment in which the dying person can make informed and free decisions regarding their final days of life. It holds constant the variable of care given so that the dying individual’s energy can be spent focused on the people they love, the activities they enjoy, and other meaningful engagements.
A second observation is the telos of the care given to the patient. For the sisters of Our Lady, they view end-of-life care as holistic care: care for the soul of the person and not merely their body. They recognize that the person in their care will die, but they see death through the lens of hope of eternal life through Christ. For secular hospice care, the teloi of care is limited to those earthly goods such as comfort, pain reduction, and psychological relief. Within this limited scope of earthly goods, along with society’s obsession with individual freedom, the decision to end one’s life on one’s own terms is attractive. It seems to provide the freedom in the face of an uncontrollable situation that so many people desire. Thus, God makes a very great difference in end-of-life care and the decisions one has at the end of life. The spiritual view offers non-earthly goods that help make sense of the challenges one faces at the end of life and offers hope in the face of suffering and despair. It also reorients the purpose and good of caring for the dying that is never reducible to efficiency and financial incentives. Before looking at a very different end-of-life situation, I will examine a personal example of dying well.
Both my paternal grandmother and maternal grandfather died in my parents’ home. When my parents built their home, they included a “mother-in-law suite” so that my paternal grandmother (Grandma) could live with us. She had her own apartment within our home to provide privacy along with easy access to grandkids, assistance, or whatever she might need. The doors and halls were accessibly designed to allow for a walker or a wheelchair should she ever need it. Grandma received a terminal blood cancer diagnosis shortly before she died. She went into the doctor for surgery to fix a broken tooth, but when they did her preoperative blood work, the numbers were too low for surgery, revealing the blood cancer. She refused any treatment to prolong her life, which would have consisted of blood transfusions to extend her life by a few months. She returned home and immediately contacted her close friends and her church community, asking them to pray that she might die quickly and in her sleep. Once Grandma returned home, her daughter contacted hospice to send over equipment; however, before the equipment could even be set up, she died peacefully, in her own bed, surrounded by family just as she had prayed for.
Several years later, my maternal grandfather (Grandad) moved into the apartment after his wife of sixty-six years died. He was quite independent, continuing to drive and live alone, part time, up into his late nineties. At the age of ninety-eight years, he developed fluid in his lungs and was hospitalized, receiving oxygen. My parents were told that he had 10 percent or less of his heart function and would never walk or recover. Qualifying for hospice, he moved back into my parents’ home. His first night at home brought complications, and it would have been impossible for my mom to care for him without the help of her brother and sister-in-law, who were both medical professionals. Grandad needed twenty-four-hour care. He was immobile, required oxygen at first, and needed help with his bodily fluid elimination because he could not have a catheter. Hospice set up their equipment in the apartment, visiting him daily at first and then a few times each week as he grew stronger. Grandad had a DNR, so if his lungs filled with fluid again or if he had a heart attack, the only options for my parents were to administer pain management medication (e.g., morphine) or to contact the hospice nurse on call to come and administer the medication. They were instructed not to call an ambulance.
With the help of Visiting Angels, not covered under hospice, my mom cared for her dad from September until March.Footnote 74 While the doctors gave him just days or weeks to live, he soon was up walking, feeding himself, and even lifting 2–3 lb dumbbells. It was my dad who encouraged him to focus on strength and activity. He would share dinner with my parents each night, holding hands in prayer and talking about the activities of the day. His life, in many ways, was rich and hopeful until the day he died. March 1, just a few days before he died, was his seventieth wedding anniversary. Though his wife, Dena, had passed away over three years prior, he still talked to her every night. Around March 3rd or 4th, before bed one night, my mom asked him if he was afraid to die. He responded, “I’m not afraid to die, I’m afraid of the pain I might experience as I die.” Together they prayed for him to die peacefully in his sleep. His prayer was answered, and he died with his arms wrapped around a pillow made from one of his wife’s old jackets.Footnote 75
Both grandparents were faithful Christians, praying daily and hoping for heaven. They experienced pain and loss of independence and mobility, yet they also spent their final days surrounded by a loving family who provided care for them. My parents had intentionally designed their home to accommodate aging parents, and my mom had the ability to stay home and care for both grandparents, cooking for them and providing some of the activities of daily living support they needed.
Though my parents would be the first to say that those periods of life were difficult, essentially having a dependent adult living with you, they were also extremely precious. At times, other family members criticized my parents, saying that Grandma was lonely and depressed and needed to be in a care facility. My parents took the position that so long as she was of sound mind, it was her decision about how she would live out her final days. Grandma was clear that she wanted to remain in our home with my parents, and so they honored that intention.
Grandad too wanted to be at home. He had watched his wife die in a memory care nursing home and did not want to endure the trials that came with that style of care. Language barriers between the care providers and my grandparents and aunt meant that they needed to monitor the care given to her to ensure it was understood. This lack of good communication took a physical and emotional toll on my grandmother and my grandad. Thus, my family viewed the home death of both Grandma and Grandad as a blessing and answer to their prayers.
When I think of a “good death,” I think of my grandparents. They lived their final years surrounded by love, touch, good food, laughter, and conversation. They were not a burden too great to bear, but a joy to share. They died in their own beds, in their own home, receiving needed medical treatment while remaining lucid and active participants in family life. I also recognize that while hospice had a role in their good death, it was the love and commitment of their children that provided the depth of goodness in their death. It was the filial piety of their children along with the financial means and foresight that provided the context of their good death. Love of family and love of God made all the difference in my grandparents’ death.
My grandparents also died a privileged death in the sense that my family had the financial means, time, and ability to care for them. But this is not the case for every family, so ensuring that institutions have the support they need to provide loving and relational care that upholds the dignity of the individual is vital to ensure just distribution of resources and care is possible.
Now that we’ve considered the difference God makes to care received in hospice and by family, we will examine a different end-of-life situation to see what difference God makes in decision making.
5.2 Fighting for Every Breath: Alfie Evans
Alfie Evans was a twenty-three-month-old boy with an “unidentified neurodegenerative condition” leaving him minimally conscious and in need of ongoing hospital care from the age of seven months. Alfie’s “semi-vegetative state” meant he had some responsiveness to the environment, unlike a persistent vegetative state in which there is a total absence of responsiveness or awareness. Alfie was on a ventilator, missed several important developmental milestones, and was deemed by the Alder Hey Children’s Hospital in England as having a “catastrophic and untreatable neurodegenerative condition” that left his brain ravaged by mitochondrial disease and for which treatment was said to be “futile” (Coleman et al., Reference Coleman, Eberl and Winright.2018: 1–11). Alfie’s case garnered much attention from secular and religious media. The considerations raised around his life and death are instructive for applying the principles presented in this Element, both from the secular and the spiritual view. What we see in Alfie’s case is that there is significant nuance for how the differing perspectives apply their main principles, revealing where there may be agreement and disagreement.
It is first worth noting that in the UK when a patient is not competent and for whom there is disagreement between physicians and parents regarding treatment, the High Court intervenes. It is the court, composed of 108 of the most respected lawyers, that makes an objective and independent decision about what they deem in the best interests of the patient. There is not an equivalent process to decide such cases in the United States, though appeal to the court to appoint a guardian in the case of a dispute would be possible (Coleman et al., Reference Coleman, Eberl and Winright.2018).Footnote 76
It is evident from the details of the case that everyone involved – his parents, physicians, bioethicists, the Pope, and the public – all wanted what was best for Alfie. No one wanted him to suffer unnecessarily. Understandably, there were divergent interpretations about which options were in the best interests of Alfie. One reason this case was so difficult was that Alfie was a young child. In so many end-of-life cases the individual is older, having had the opportunity to live a full life. It is not unreasonable that people would want to fight for Alfie to have a chance to live his life for as long as he was able. Key principles operative in Alfie’s situation include the sanctity of life, extraordinary versus ordinary means, and quality of life judgments.
The sanctity of life principle is evident in Alfie’s parents’ desire to protect his life at all costs. As philosopher Jason Eberl and moral theologian Tobias Wainwright point out, “Alfie’s parents and their supporters viewed his continued life, no matter the degree of neurodegeneration he suffered, to be intrinsically valuable and worth safeguarding at all costs” (Coleman et al., Reference Coleman, Eberl and Winright.2018: 2). In contrast to Alfie’s parents’ view, the view of both the physicians and the High Court of Justice was that Alfie’s life had little quality; thus, they recommended withdrawal of his ventilator.
This quality-of-life principle may be contrasted with the sanctity of life principle when it is based on standard assessments of well-being or what makes life go well for some individual (benefit her, be in her best interests). Quality-of-life judgments frequently use autonomy and independence as criteria for higher quality of life such that individuals with diminished autonomy or who lack autonomy and are dependent in full or in part are viewed as having lower quality of life. Recall the discussion of the secular view of the human being that emphasizes autonomy as characterized by “expressive individualism.” This view of the human being emphasizes the functionality of the individual and the capacities they have for achieving the goals they establish. It follows from this view that someone without capacities or full autonomy, with no clear way to express their individualism, would be deemed as having a low quality of life. This view is not morally innocuous. There is evidence in contemporary health care settings of quality-of-life bias against people with disabilities.
A 2020 study during the COVID-19 pandemic found four prevalent biases operative in the health care setting, namely the ineffectual bias, the fragility bias, the friendliness bias, and the catastrophe bias. Take the fragility bias for just one example. This bias supposes that because of the disability of the patient, he or she necessarily suffers more and has more severe symptoms than a patient without a disability. This bias can lead to underestimating the amount of treatment the patient can handle and result in the withdrawal of treatment sooner than with someone without a disability (Haque and Stein, Reference 69Haque and Stein2020: 285–290).
In Alfie’s case it is not certain that bias is operative, yet judgments about the quality of his life are clearly negative. Take, for example, the statement from the High Court, “[he] has a poor quality of life. He is completely dependent on mechanical ventilation to preserve his life. He has no spontaneous movements, cannot communicate and continues to have frequent seizures.” It is not unreasonable to wonder whether there is some bias present in the judgment previously mentioned. Concurring with this concern, various scholars writing about Alfie’s case have expressed deep worry regarding the devaluation of the lives of persons with disabilities. Bioethicist and theologian Charles Camosy writes, “Physicians generally rate the value of the lives of their disabled patients lower than the patients do themselves, but acute care physicians, with their near-constant exposure to horrific conditions without seeing longer-term outcomes, are particularly prone to this kind of bias.” Camosy also suggests that according to the High Court Judge, “Alfie’s disability is likely to be profound, and thus, according to the judge, it is in Alfie’s best interests to die.”Footnote 77 In Camosy’s view Alfie should have been given continued treatment, particularly since he continued to breathe once the ventilator was removed. It is out of respect for the sanctity of his life that treatment be continued. He goes so far as to remark that “Alfie Evans’s death is being aimed by the very people whose vocation it is to help and protect him. The difference in Alfie’s case is that, because he has continued to breathe, the pretense of ‘removal of burdensome treatment’” is patently absurd. In a situation that was no doubt distressing to those who hoped he would die, Alfie’s continuing to breathe has clarified the true object of the act of removing his ventilator.”Footnote 78
Even if one maintains the sanctity of life principle as fundamental, it is possible to disagree that prolonging his life is the right course of action to take or that withdrawal of treatment is aiming at his death. A third principle that comes into application here is the principle of proportionality of treatment – does the treatment in use create an ordinary and morally obligatory measure of care or does it create an extraordinary and burdensome measure of care that is morally optional? (Coleman et al., Reference Coleman, Eberl and Winright.2018).
For defenders of the sanctity of life principle, there can be a limit to the treatment taken to extend or sustain life. As discussed earlier, the criteria used for ordinary versus extraordinary care includes the results foreseen, the burdensome nature of the care on the patient, and whether the treatment given is disproportionate to the outcome. The Catholic Church carves out a distinction between one’s recognition of extraordinary treatment that is no longer reasonable contrasted with one’s hopelessness or desire for control that frequently accompanies suicide and euthanasia. They are clear that cessation of treatment when deemed medically futile does not constitute euthanasia. It recognizes the nature of humanity that is not immortal, but mortal. Yet, Catholic moral teaching also recognizes the belief in the continuity of the soul after physical death. This belief offers hope that death is not the end of a person’s existence but a necessary step on the journey to eternal life. Death is not to be aimed at, but it is also not to be feared. For those individuals where cessation of treatment is appropriate, the focus of care shifts to comforting the person as they die.Footnote 79
From the physicians’ and the High Court’s best judgment, it would “be appropriate to withdraw intensive care support and provide palliative care for Alfie for the remainder of his life” (Coleman et al., Reference Coleman, Eberl and Winright.2018: 3). They deemed the treatment to be both futile and potentially burdensome to Alfie. In this respect, it is possible to determine that respect for Alfie’s inherent dignity permits the cessation of treatment and requires accompaniment in his final days.
5.2.1 Epilogue to Alfie Evan’s Case*
*Out of disclosure, I’m not claiming to have full knowledge of the details of the case of Alfie Evans or how it unfolded. I do not have access to medical reports or all facets of decision making. I am merely trying to apply different principles based on public information about Alfie’s case to highlight the complexity of their application. His case is instructive for us because it reveals that even the strongest principles of autonomy, quality of life, sanctity of life, and ordinary and extraordinary means must be applied with nuance and humility. The context of each individual’s end-of-life decision is unique, requiring at the very least a recognition of the inherent dignity of the individual. The additional perspective that the spiritual view offers for decision making is one of hope and of an unwavering commitment to the dignity of the human person, no matter their capacity, level of autonomy, monetary value, or status. Human persons are never to be seen as disposable simply because they lack the capacities we deem most important or “worthy of life.” Application of the principles and ideas presented in this Element is difficult. But hopefully through this short examination of end-of-life issues, the reader feels more empowered in their own discernment about end-of-life decision making; or at least more aware of the complexities it contains.
Alfie’s ventilator was removed by the medical team on April 23, but despite their predictions, he continued to breathe on his own for five days. It is claimed that Alfie was given some hydration and oxygen but may have been denied nutrition, as claimed by his father.Footnote 80 Alfie died on April 28 at 2:30 am.Footnote 81 This added complexity of the case raises concerns that it was not extraordinary care that was denied Alfie, but ordinary care in the form of food and water. If the latter is true, then the spiritual view as represented by Church teaching would determine his death was not merely allowed to happen but caused to happen, making it a form of euthanasia.Footnote 82 Additional elements of Alfie’s case adding to its intricacy are the crowd of supporters known as “Alfie’s army” who protested outside the hospital, showing their solidarity and support for Alfie’s family, but also posing threats to the hospital staff working to care for him. Some followers of Alfie’s case raised concerns over equality of medical treatment given in the UK; the argument was made that the baby of Kate Middleton (Princess of Wales) would have received excellent medical treatment, whereas Kate James (Alfie’s mother) had to fight for her son’s life while being denied adequate treatment by physicians and the courts.Footnote 83 Although these remarks were speculative, the public conversation around Alfie Evans’ case highlights the complexity, nuance, and depth of critical discernment needed in end-of-life decision making. The application of key principles in decision making is further informed by one’s worldview.
5.3 Conclusion
Let us turn to India for two final examples of end-of-life care worthy of reflection and emulation. In 1952, Mother Teresa founded “‘Nirmal Hriday’ – a home for homeless sick and dying destitute, in the Kalighat area of Kolkata.”Footnote 84 When she first witnessed people dying in the streets, deemed “unwanted” by hospitals or their families, she desired for them to experience love and dignity in their journey to recovery or eventual death. Since the founding of that first home, Mother Teresa and the Sisters of Charity have become known for their commitment to loving the poorest or the poor in our society through their more than 750 houses of charity worldwide.Footnote 85
In the southwest of India, we find a nonreligious example of how society has transformed its approach to care for the dying. In Kerala, India, a care network called the “Neighborhood Network of Palliative Care” was founded in 2001 by two doctors and a volunteer who desired to transform the way people experience serious illness and dying in Kerala. The network consists of community volunteers who visit the sick, provide care for families, raise funds for child support, offer medical assistance, and work with the grieving to find or give them the support they need. The societal mobilization of community care transformed the way death and dying occurred in the state, with over 1,600 institutions formed to care for the dying in the state. This number represents 80% of India’s palliative care service and provides care for over 70% of people in need, compared to the national average of 23%. Other countries are beginning to implement some of the principles modeled by Keralans.Footnote 86
In its concluding remarks, the nonreligious Lancet Commission (see Sections 1 & 2) states, “Relationships are fundamental to death, dying and grief. Relationships and networks across society must be placed at the centre of efforts to improve experiences at the end-of-life” (The Lancet Commission, 2022: 875). The Lancet Commission on death and dying clearly emphasizes the relational nature of human persons. After surveying the state of death and dying across the globe, the commission proposes five principles for future improvement of the death system. Three of the five principles attend to the role of relationships for dying well.Footnote 87 Community involvement is critical for positive change in the death system, as we see in the Kerala and the Nirmal Hriday examples.
Throughout this Element two perspectives of the human person that influence end-of-life decision making have been examined. Though these perspectives have been defined as “secular” and “spiritual,” it is important to recognize how these perspectives might be mutually enhancing. The spiritual view is not meant to displace all that the secular view contains but instead to transform it into a more accurate picture of the human person.
For Mother Teresa and her sisters, the efforts were not a Christian community’s endeavor alone, rather, they worked alongside political and Hindu religious leaders in India who saw the value and need in society for their homes. Such interreligious and secular dialogue is critical for making positive change in the end-of-life care systems in our societies. One way in which “God” can impact end-of-life decisions is through the spiritual view’s focus on the relationality of the human person. This relationality is not meant to remove human individuality but instead to ground and protect it; we are most fully our individual selves when we are in relationship with other people. St. Augustine’s enduring phrase, namely, that our “hearts are restless until they find rest in you” assumes this relationality. We are most fully alive and most authentically ourselves when we rest in the other – God – because He has “made us for himself.”Footnote 88 The unswerving commitment to relationships, with God and with our fellow human beings, offers a beacon of hope for the dying. To care for the seriously ill and the dying, however, requires that we first see them individually as persons with inherent dignity, who are especially dependent in the dying process. Societal awareness around death and illness is growing, but it too often remains undiscussed and hidden from view. Until we face the closeness of death ourselves, either through personal illness or the passing of a friend or relative, it often remains a distant possibility rather than an immediate reality. This challenge of the hiddenness of death is one the Lancet Commission addresses with their principle to converse and tell stories about death and to recognize the value of death (The Lancet Commission, 2022: 875). Death is not an obstacle to face alone as the “master of my fate and captain of my soul” as the poet William Ernest Henley says; instead, it is a fact of life which is best faced in community with people you love and who show you love.
In this Element’s juxtaposition of the secular and spiritual perspectives on end-of-life decisions, I hope to have inspired readers to take more seriously the wisdom of religious traditions on the universal reality of death and the role for community in facing it. Identifying a similar tension, St. Augustine in his Confessions says,
He who is our very life came down and took our death upon himself… Then he withdrew from our sight, so that we might return to our hearts and find him there. He withdrew, yet look, here he is. It was not his will to remain with us, yet he has not abandoned us either; for he has gone back to that place which he never left, because the world was made through him, and though he was in this world he had made he came into it to save sinners…O mortals, how long will you be heavy-hearted? Life has come down to you, and are you reluctant to ascend and live? But what room is there for you to ascend, you with your high-flown ways and lofty talk? Come down, that you may ascend, ascend even to God, for you have fallen in your attempts to ascend in defiance of God.
His words aptly capture the modern attitude of radical and expressive individualism. He admonishes us to a posture of humility that recognizes our true anthropology as creatures in relationship to God, who is our hope of salvation.
Acknowledgments
I’d like to thank Villanova University for its funding for research of this Element through the VERITAS Grant awarded in 2024. Research for this Element was also supported by the William H. Jellema Chair in Christian Philosophy at Calvin University. Helpful research suggestions were given by Charles Camosy, Jason Eberl, and Stephen Napier, to each of whom I am grateful. Thanks also to anonymous reviewers for taking the time to leave valuable and constructive feedback on this Element. Finally, I’d like to thank Nick Lee for his comments on the initial drafts of this Element.
Series Editor
Michael L. Peterson
Asbury Theological Seminary
Michael L. Peterson is Professor of Philosophy at Asbury Theological Seminary. He is the author of God and Evil (Routledge); Monotheism, Suffering, and Evil (Cambridge University Press); With All Your Mind (University of Notre Dame Press); C. S. Lewis and the Christian Worldview (Oxford University Press); Evil and the Christian God (Baker Book House); and Philosophy of Education: Issues and Options (Intervarsity Press). He is co-author of Reason and Religious Belief (Oxford University Press); Science, Evolution, and Religion: A Debate about Atheism and Theism (Oxford University Press); and Biology, Religion, and Philosophy (Cambridge University Press). He is editor of The Problem of Evil: Selected Readings (University of Notre Dame Press). He is co-editor of Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings (Oxford University Press) and Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion (Wiley-Blackwell). He served as General Editor of the Blackwell monograph series Exploring Philosophy of Religion and is founding Managing Editor of the journal Faith and Philosophy.
Joel Archer
Asbury Theological Seminar
Joel Archer is Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Theology at y with specialties in philosophy, religion, and New Testament. He has an M.A. in Early Christian Studies (University of Notre Dame), a Ph.D. in Philosophy (Saint Louis University), and a PH.D. in Religion (Duke University, expected in 2026). He is the author of The Problem of Divine Action in the World (Cambridge University Press) and has published in academic journals such as Philosophical Studies, Religious Studies, Philosophia Christi, Journal of the Study of the Historical Jesus, Journal for the Study of the New Testament, and New Testament Studies. He has made numerous presentations at professional organizations.
About the Series
This series explores problems related to God, such as the human quest for God or gods, contemplation of God, and critique and rejection of God. Concise, authoritative volumes in this series will reflect the methods of a variety of disciplines, including philosophy of religion, theology, religious studies, and sociology.
