While the literature on Immanuel Kant is certainly not for lacking, on his practical philosophy or otherwise, Jeanine Grenberg’s Kant’s Defense of Common Moral Experience: A Phenomenological Account etches out for itself a pleasant niche among the host of other books. Part of that is the fact Grenberg writes in clear language that avoids the technicality of Kant’s lexicon for a more readable text. The other part is that by emphasizing the ways in which Kant’s practical philosophy matches up with our own experience of morality in the world at large, through an appeal to a ‘phenomenological’ reading of Kant’s theorems, Grenberg brings Kant more so into our everyday lived experience. This is not to say that Grenberg’s text is without issue or fault. It certainly has a few of those, notably in her rendering of phenomenology and her own preferences when it comes to reading Kant; but one should certainly praise Grenberg for what is, at the very least, an intriguing read.
Grenberg’s central claim is that we can have an experience of the Categorical Imperative, or at least categorical obligation, by way of a special ‘feeling’ that manifests itself in common human consciousness. This ‘feeling’ is neither sensible intuition (sensation or otherwise) nor is it an emotional response. Sensible intuitions and emotions fail in the classical Kantian analysis for they are contingent aspects of a subjective experience; that is they could be otherwise than they are. Grenberg, instead, looks to the Second Analogy of the Critique of Pure Reason for a leg up into her phenomenological analysis of this ‘feeling’. In the Second Analogy, Grenberg notes that if “we simply attend carefully to the structure of one carefully chosen experience” (52) we can become aware of the structures present in that experience (in the case of the Second Analogy, necessity). From there, she argues that if such is the case for theoretical reason, practical reason (and by extension morality) might work in the same way. That is, if we pay sufficient attention to our moral consciousness, we might reveal categorical obligation as present to us in some way. Grenberg also notes that this reflection is not something peculiar to the philosopher but is accessible to the common human person. Grenberg aims to accomplish this task by appealing to a “phenomenological reflection [which] involves inward reflection on oneself as an agent” (16). This, she says, is a first-person account which is devoid of an object of experience because it focuses on itself. This reflection then produces a ‘feeling,’ which is not sensation but which still brings forth an obligation on the person.
Grenberg’s second large claim is that this common, felt experience is the conflict between happiness and morality, of the dear-self and the rational self. This claim runs through the bulk of the latter half of the book, which focuses on a reading of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason. Grenberg finds fault with the Groundwork in that, while it does present an account of the conflict between the two sides of the self, it ultimately chastizes the common person as having a “natural tendency to resolve this conflict by deceiving himself” (82) and that Kant leaves no room for ‘felt’ experience to play in determining the will of the moral agent.
In the Second Critique, however, Grenberg notes a ‘great reversal’ in the thought of Kant. He is much more willing in the Second Critique to allow for felt experience to play a role in the determination of the will, and is even so willing as to allow the Categorical Imperative to be ‘felt’ (as phenomena and not noumena), by Grenberg’s own phenomenological description. Grenberg looks specifically to the Gallows Man example, wherein an individual is threatened with death if he gives into his lustful inclinations for another, as a paradigmatic piece of the shift in Kant’s work. The Gallows Man is aware of his inclinations to fulfill his desire but is also aware of an obligation to do otherwise, to not harm others. Grenberg takes the awareness of this obligation to be the result of her special attention to our ‘felt’ phenomenological experience. The fact that Kant renders the presence of moral obligation in a common person’s experience so clearly represents for Grenberg an acknowledgement of this ‘felt’ experience. She then links much of her account with many traditional aspects of Kantian practical philosophy (universality, a priori synthetic statements, etc.).
While Grenberg’s analysis is certainly interesting and intriguing, there are two key issues that arise when reading it. The first concerns her rendering of phenomenology. It is peculiar. It omits both intentional consciousness (the awareness that consciousness is always an awareness of something) and eidetic reduction (the famous bracketing out of common prejudices), both of which are fairly standard features of any phenomenological approach. She does note that, obviously, Kant predates Husserl and Phenomenology’s formal development but this then raises the question of why she chooses to adopt the formal phenomenological moniker to begin with.
The second issue has to do with the way in which Grenberg reads Kant. She admits early on that “my understanding of Kant does demand that we abandon certain long-held beliefs about his practical philosophy” (31), notably its concern with choice and action. Additionally, her tendency to jump between texts (pulling from the First Critique for setting up her initial premises, then augmenting the Second Critique with support from the then-unwritten Metaphysics of Morals) might prove off-putting for those who seek a more traditional text-by-text analysis.
On the whole though, Jeanine Grenberg’s Kant’s Defense of Common Moral Sense is an excellent read. Her prose is good and her project an interesting and worthwhile one. Despite the objections raised herein to portions of her approach, Kant’s Defense of Common Moral Sense is heartily recommended to those with an interest in Kantian practical philosophy.
