In the introduction to this fine collection of his journal articles and book chapters, David Nelken reveals that in the 1980s Herbert Hart advised him ‘not to write a book about books’ but to develop his own theory (p. xi). On the evidence of the pieces reproduced in this book, Nelken has spent the last thirty years ignoring Hart’s advice. Rather than formulating his own theory about the relationship between law and society, he has sought out and analysed with great precision and sophistication the attempts of other socio-legal writers who have grappled with this daunting task. The results are at the same time chastening and illuminating. On the evidence of this book, it is no exaggeration to say that, over the years, David Nelken must have become a perpetual thorn in the side of those who claim to have found the answers to the problems that trying to combine the disciplines of law and sociology inevitably presents. These problems take the form of such pressing theoretical issues as: the law’s lack of control over social events and individual behaviour (‘the gap problem’); the distinctive nature of law’s identity within society; law’s autonomy or its dependence on politics; the relationship between structure and agency and between law and the social sciences in general. So penetrating are Nelken’s criticisms of sloppy thinking and so relentless his demolition of half-baked or ill-considered theories that one can see socio-legal theorists sweating their way through the night searching for convincing responses to Nelken’s attacks on their ideological bias, inconsistencies of arguments, simplistic reasoning, lack or distortion of evidence or their misrepresentation of theoretical masters of the past.
It should not be imagined for one moment, however, that the tone of Nelken’s writing is in any way negative or churlish. On the contrary, he always treats the ideas of others with considerable respect and takes their claims for authenticity and importance as points of departure for relentless and extensive soul-searching of his own. The answers and solutions that emerge from their theories – any theories – are for Nelken never conclusive. In Nelken’s hands, they serve only to generate more questions, which lead inevitably to a realisation of the complexity of the issues and the shortcomings of partial or partisan solutions.
Above all else, he has a huge capacity for worrying away at difficult conceptual problems. He worries about Roger Cotterrell’s ‘false dichotomies’ (p. 241) and his and Luhmann’s claims for a privileged position for sociology (pp. 176 and 224). He worries about explanations based solely on class conflict and the powerful serving their own self-interests which ‘allow broader changes in economic and political structures and ideas to be too easily avoided’ (p. 16). He worries about Habermas’s assertion that market-based values and motivation have given way to technological and bureaucratic ordering (p. 53). He worries about the way that different disciplines impose their own particular definitions of issues and then seek solutions which treat these definitions as authentic and authoritative (pp. 218–31), how virtual reality becomes real for them. This brings us to the major worry that permeates every chapter of this book and which undermines the very notion of ‘law in context’: Which or whose law? Which or whose context? Until you provide answers to these questions, it is very difficult to see how the sociology of law could be any more than a string of simultaneous relativistic accounts, each depending on how the theorists or the theory give meaning to both ‘law’ and ‘law’s context’, the social environment in which law is seen to operate.
Worrying apart, Nelken makes us recognise the limitations of any sociology of law approach, while at the same time praising the efforts of those attempting to make it work. He writes, for example: ‘As far as sociology of law is concerned, we need to ask whether there can be a sociology of legal meaning which does not merely impose sociological sense on the object of enquiry’ (p. 218). Yet he also appears to believe that a theory (or theories) will eventually emerge which will better explain law’s relationship to society and resolve all these conceptual problems – progress through improvement spurred on, in part at least, by his constructive criticisms. In 1982, he argued that ‘what is needed is a more sensitive appraisal of the complex relationship between law and society in general at this transitional period’ (p. 47). Five years later, he is writing about using Luhmann’s work as a ‘stimulus to change the framework within which sociology of law is pursued’ (p. 113), as if changing frameworks will bring us somehow closer to the truth.
One benefit of placing these diverse essays in one volume is that the difficulties in Nelken’s position become clear for everyone to see. His ambition of developing theory in pursuit of a complete sociology of law reaches its high point in his essay on ‘Comparatists and Transferability’. Here, he critically examines the existing socio-legal explanations for the success or failure of ‘legal transfers’ from one jurisdiction (or culture) to another. In this context he refers to Gunther Teubner’s account of the way that ‘binding arrangements between law and society have changed in conditions of later modernity’ (1998, pp. 31–32). What he does not make clear, however, is the fact that Teubner, following Luhmann, is not involved in the game of providing satisfactory socio-legal explanations for the successes or failures of legal transfers. For these autopoietic theorists, these transfers are entirely a matter of contingency, of chance occurrence: they could equally well have happened differently or not at all. Any subsequent explanations, socio-legal or otherwise, as to why they happened in that way and not another are merely observations, interpretations after the fact. Not only do they take us no closer to devising a socio-legal theory which will account for the success or failures of transfers or predict the outcome of future attempts to import or export laws or legal principles, but, more fundamentally, they refute any claims that such a socio-legal theory can ever reveal ‘the truth’ or produce an account of the real reasons for legal transfers.
At one level Nelken recognises this problem, but at another he continues as if the impossible were still possible. This ambivalence – in this case giving credence to Teubner’s ideas and yet not accepting the full implication of the theory on which these ideas are based – allows Nelken to keep his eyes firmly fixed on such positive goals as an improved understanding of the complexities in the relationship between law and society, going beyond law in context while existing in a state of denial over the fact that the very theories that he is recruiting for this purpose make these goals impossible to achieve.
To be fair, one can easily forgive David Nelken for wanting to continue in his career-long search for improvements in socio-legal theorising, for he is such a painstaking and engaging critic of the shortcomings of other people’s theories that, even if the ultimate object of his desire is and will remain beyond his (or anyone else’s) reach, his literature reviews are always wonderfully crafted, penetrating and instructive. We should be thankful that he ignored Herbert Hart’s advice all those years ago.
