Brokering a revolution provides unique insights into the on-the-ground realities of the Philippine communist movement – one of the world's longest-running rebellions. The volume's greatest strength lies in the accounts of scholars with primary sources and field-research knowledge – particularly those contributions on Mindanao (McKenna), Negros Occidental (Rutten), and Mountain Province (Finin, Kwiatkowski, and Hillhorst), Mindanao (McKenna). While the book does not claim to provide theoretical results that can be generalised to other conflicts, it does suggest underlying theoretical concerns. The volume addresses the movement's experience and challenges forging alliances with constituencies varying over time, geographic areas (including internationally), and across social sectors. Authors describe and analyse how alliances formed, failed to form and how they subsequently changed or broke apart.
The book begins with a theoretical chapter by Boudreau, who traces how the line between licit and illicit activities shifts in response to government behaviour, and how individuals and organisations subsequently shape their allegiances. Rutten argues the situation is dynamic — alliances sought by any organ of the communist movement are also affected by the efforts and policies of the Philippine government, and smaller, local, political and economic brokers.
Subsequent chapters extend this logic, and suggest an interesting point — wouldn't actors (both incumbent and challenger) be aware of the situational dynamics and adapt accordingly? Organisations can be savvy about these dynamics, and in the context of this volume, it is puzzling why the communist movement sometimes failed to recognise the strategic nature of some alliances (and their susceptibility to situational change).
Subsequent chapters partially answer this question. First, in practice, overall situational dynamics affect different segments of society differently. For example, Marcos' policies unexpectedly shifted the local balance of power in favour of the NPA in Negros Occidental, producing an unlikely partnership. NGOs faced different dynamics than the Communist movement that originally nurtured them, and the populations from which they originally sprang (Hilhorst).
Second, and more specifically, these dynamics touch on what Daniel Posner (in Institutions and ethnic politics in Africa (2005)) calls ‘nested cleavages’, or identities — concentrically held identities, the outermost of which are more loosely held than those at the core. The book suggests situational dynamics often allowed (or, indeed, created) identities overlapped with the Communist movements', and with which they could subsequently ally, forging successful short-term and tactical alliances with a range of actors. However, the movement often failed to recognise these partnerships' attenuated nature and build alliances acknowledging more fundamental identities. Dynamic shifts (specifically, lifting martial law) jeopardised such alliances. Finin and McKenna outline significant differences between the indigenous populations of the Cordillera and Muslim Mindanao (respectively) — neither of which was adequately appreciated by the movement. Nor did the CPP-NPA understand or address the fact that they accessed only the outermost (anti-Marcos, anti-status quo) rings of Cordillera and Moro identity; minority issues resurged with the disappearance of the unifying threat. More material, less identity-driven concerns similarly doomed NPA-hacienda alliances in the face of Marcos' policy adaptations.
Third, brokering alliances between rebels and allies is a two-way street. Much of this volume focuses on potential allies' strategic situation and cadres' liaison work. However, the CPP-NPA-NDF's position and its internal dynamics are equally important and partially explain the challenges they faced in brokering revolution. Abinales and Quimpo add intra-movement analysis to the book. The movement faced the dual challenge of the bureaucratic and organisational difficulties, and the task of relating their ideology to on-the-ground reality. The movement had two basic options in brokering revolution: (1) to compromise their ideologies, making them more attractive to allies, but making the victory less savoury, given the compromises, or (2) to refuse to compromise, and risk losing allies, essentially trading greater strength for ideological purity.
At an extreme, Abinales' account (and to a lesser extent, Finin's) highlight how compromises, in conjunction with organisational issues, gave the movement more personnel and wider geographic coverage, but compromised the nature of the ideological struggle, to the extent that (in Mindanao) it was corrupted by government infiltrators. Alternatively, the CPP's difficulties in adapting its ideology proved troublesome in the Cordillera (Finin) (particularly the Ifugao (Kwaitkowski)) and Negros Occidental (Rutten)). The CPP's inability to adapt to local identities ultimately cost it allies in the Cordillera (Kwiatkowski, Finin), Muslim Mindanao (McKenna) and Europe (Quimpo). The movement's split following 1992s ‘Reaffirm’ document exemplifies this tension. Attempts to reclaim its ideological basis came at a tremendous cost to organisational strength in Mindanao (Abinales), and in bringing Cordillera's NGOs back to the fold (Rutten).
As a whole, the volume's greatest contribution lies in the primary-source-driven work of its researchers. The authors focus on an under-researched conflict, and specifically offer a unique concentrate on the work and challenges of the cadre corps.
