This slim edition includes thought-provoking introductory essays to the translations, helpful appendices, a glossary of Arabic and English terms, and a bibliography. Happily, Charles Butterworth announces that two other volumes are in the works, featuring Alfarabi's The Book of Letters and The Virtuous City. Butterworth thus continues to lead the translation movement of Alfarabi's political thought.

Butterworth's current translation adeptly steers the middle course between readability and literalness. He translates technical terms like jamīl (noble/beautiful) and faḍīla (excellence) in consistent ways, unless indicated in the notes. This approach helps the reader keep track of Alfarabi's philosophical vocabulary and draws attention to parallel concepts in the Greek philosophical tradition from which Alfarabi derived many of his ideas. In some minor cases, however, Butterworth makes less than ideal choices. The Political Regime’s complex discussion of physics describes the right (haqq) of matter and form. Butterworth translates haqq as “dint,” but it is unclear why he does so, since he suggests that Alfarabi intends to link the concept of right with justice and the laws of nature (51–52). He also refrains from capitalizing words describing entities such as “The First Cause” or “Active Intellect.” While minor, capitalization can help remind the reader that concrete entities are being discussed. Finally, in the Summary Butterworth uses the word “culture” (144) for unspecified reasons.

The apparatus is very useful for readers who want to follow up on scholarly debates and delve into the Arabic, although readers new to Alfarabi would likely want more guidance on Alfarabi's use of Greek and Islamic ideas. Butterworth, for example, informs the reader that the mention of On the Soul is in fact a reference to Alexander of Aphrodisias's text and not Aristotle's (69). This clarification is essential for understanding Alfarabi's epistemology of revelation. The reader would like Butterworth to share more of his expert knowledge to help elucidate the text.

According to the introductory essay, the Political Regime describes the order of the totality of existence from the immaterial world to politics. Butterworth helpfully organizes the text's often bewildering description of the unity of the whole. A fundamental concern of the Political Regime is how theoretical knowledge of the whole is necessary for human happiness and what kind of regime is most conducive to the realization of happiness. Butterworth points out that despite first impressions, the Political Regime subtly raises doubts about our ability to know the unity of the whole. Theoretical knowledge of the whole is therefore only a “likely story.” Even if we can know something about the whole, Butterworth indicates that the enforcement of this unity in political life is dangerous. In fact, Alfarabi seems to praise regimes such as democracy precisely because their lack of unity owing to freedom allows the pursuit of a vast diversity of human goods. Butterworth concludes that there is a tension between knowledge of the unity of the whole, which forms the basis of human happiness, and democratic freedom which provides the goods for happiness to flourish. The introductory essay is helpful, though at times it is unclear whether Butterworth argues that Alfarabi's description of the whole is probable or outright false. An example of this ambiguity occurs when Butterworth suggests that Alfarabi's claim that the First Cause is not the deity but only what “ought to be believed to be the deity” seems to imply that the First is not God. But in the history of philosophy “First Cause” and similar terms are the standard way of talking about God in technical language.

Whereas the Political Regime articulates a vision of politics in relation to the whole of existence, Butterworth's introduction to the Summary shows that this text examines politics from a practical perspective. The main topics of the Summary are the goals of the divine laws and how the laws realize those goals in the face of ever-changing circumstances. The purpose of divine law is to make citizens morally but not intellectually virtuous. The crucial question, however, is, how should rulers be educated in the purposes of the laws and their implementation in politics? The answer is elusive. In addition, Butterworth's introduction recounts the thorny debate over whether Alfarabi had access to the full text of the Laws or a synopsis written by someone else (such as Galen). The issue at stake is whether we can glean anything worthwhile from reading the Summary if it is in fact based on a source other than Plato. Butterworth goes through the twists and turns of the debate to make what I think is the most valid inference: given the lack of information about the manuscript tradition, Alfarabi's text nevertheless offers us insight into Plato's Laws. Indeed, the pedigree of the text is philosophically irrelevant with respect to the lessons the Summary teaches us about politics as such.

Despite a few very minor translation issues and occasional gaps in the apparatus, my main criticism of Butterworth's analysis of the texts is the lack of sustained engagement with Islam. Today there is a pressing need to expand our knowledge of Islam, and I believe Alfarabi has something of value to say. Nevertheless, Butterworth brilliantly combines in one volume the theoretical agenda of the Political Regime and the practical concerns of the Summary. Such combination offers us the opportunity to explore the dynamic tensions between theoretical and practical knowledge that undergird Alfarabi's philosophical project as a whole. This volume is an excellent contribution to Alfarabi scholarship and should be most welcome to anyone interested in Islamic philosophy.