Do we need medieval wisdom, and to explore anew the foundations of modern rationalism? Kenneth H. Green gives a resolutely positive answer to these questions in his comprehensive study on Leo Strauss's lifelong exploration of Maimonides's work. His study is written in a personal and pleasing style which makes it a fitting companion to his recent edition of Strauss's complete writings on this twelfth-century Jewish leader, physician, and philosopher. Strauss's writings have indeed been an essential contribution to the recovery of Maimonides's work and name from the margin of the “history of ideas” handbooks where, together with the whole of “medieval thought,” they had been put away by Spinozism and modern philosophy. This recovery, according to Green, amounts to a revolutionary rekindling of philosophical, religious, and political consciousness, as a “pedagogy of truth” (56) allowing us to confront “the most significant questions.” “It should be clear that Strauss did not turn to Maimonides for traditional reasons” (74), but out of our need for resources out of the contemporary “predicament” as well as because “man as man is always in need of these questions, and cannot help but spontaneously rediscover them in their unchanged character” (110).
Green begins by unraveling the journey that brought Strauss from modern rationalism and the context of contemporary historicism to the scholarly rediscovery of Maimonides's analysis of the soul (chap. 1) and esotericism or “irony” as the work of a free mind (chap. 2). The next two chapters progressively work out the tension between the scholar and the free mind, as a key for understanding the action of such great books as the ones written by Maimonides and Strauss and for raising again “the possibility that thought can be transhistorical” (60). Under the title “Why the Moderns Need the Medievals,” the fifth chapter dwells on the different reasons compelling a self-conscious rationalism to pay renewed attention to the study of the medievals: neither “as a dogmatic practical standard” nor as “a ready-made theoretical doctrine” (101), but as a “tentative search” for truth. The last two chapters bring us to the main issue of the book, which is the confrontation between the modern reformulation of the conflict between religion and reason, always heir to Spinoza's “massive attack on Maimonides” (115), and the rediscovery of Maimonides's true “position” (109) or “program” (118). The reader will benefit from the rhetorical effectiveness of the “architectural metaphor” weaved by Green to follow the curb of modernity and the peculiarity of our (modern) rediscovery of Maimonides.
The whole volume culminates in the central conviction that philosophy (or science) and religion (or revelation) both endeavor to answer our most fundamental question (“What is truth?”), and as such are “rivals” (164) that need to be maintained in “harmony” (127), in “balance” (133) or in “conjunction” (135), “combined in the full integrity of both” (130) or kept “in civilized, even if often paradoxical, conversation” (165). The reason for that need is that the conflict between those two forces is fundamental to the West (6), hence the importance of recovering a self-conscious rationalism distinguished from the irrational faith in science as well as from historicism. The reason is also, according to Green, that “the two human poles of scripture and science will always be needed, and a single level will never be sufficient for the complexity of human nature in political order, and they will forever be bound to one another by an inextricable connection” (129). The Maimonidean revolution, be it Maimonides's or Strauss's, is unveiled as the wise defense of both reason and revelation in the garb of tradition, allowing the enduring life of the tradition (which supposes its renewal) as well as the promotion of a “surpassing human excellence” (118) essential to human providence.
This comprehensive query is one more significant contribution by Green to our understanding of Strauss's work and to the contemporary resources for thinking through the theologico-political problem. It also has the merit of leading the reader to contemplate how the understanding of Strauss's reading of Maimonides might benefit from an accurate consideration of his rediscovery of Platonic political philosophy. One wonders if the conflict between Jerusalem and Athens (or between revelation and reason) is indeed the most fundamental conflict that divides the human soul. Or could it be considered as the way in which a fundamental ambiguity essential to the human soul manifests itself or is staged in history—in which case the same fundamental ambiguity might reveal itself or be staged in the form of another conflict (between philosophy and poetry)? These lines of enquiry would deserve to be considered in more detail than was possible in the limits of Green's study, and in all freedom regarding the attribution to Strauss of what might be called atheism. Another question concerns the definition of revelation as being a rival to philosophy as “quest for truth” or as “mode of thinking.” Indeed, Maimonidean rationalism encompasses a redefinition of revelation that renders it subordinate to the quest for truth. And morality or religion is deemed necessary for the living together of people who are not altogether wise or rational. Can we consider, though, the compatibility or harmony between philosophy and religion thus redefined as being a combination “in the full integrity of both”? One might think that such a sober approach to religion already supposes its modern transformation.
These two questions amount to a third one, about the importance of “need” as in fact a key concept throughout Green's examination of the recovery of medieval rationalism as well as for the position he takes up regarding the perennial necessity of both revelation and reason. One may wonder if this is not precisely where the line separating the moderns from their predecessors should be drawn, as for the latter the quest for truth and for answers to the perennial questions does not surge from a need—philosophy being meant, as Strauss writes in “Progress or Return,” “as a way of life, a life animated by a peculiar passion, the philosophic desire or eros; it is not understood as an instrument or a department of human self-realization.” Here again, studying the rediscovery of Platonic philosophy will offer an appropriate extension to this study as the proper perspective for understanding Maimonidean revolution. But those are questions that will be raised through the reading of Green's informed and endearing presentation of Strauss's “passion” for Maimonides. The rich secondary sources quoted in the extensive footnotes would have been more conveniently identified by the reader with the help of a bibliography.
