Will China's expected emergence as the predominant state in East Asia result in hierarchy or balancing?¹

At least three major bodies of literature predict that a rising China will be destabilizing. Realpolitik pessimists see China's rise as inherently so. John Mearsheimer writes that if China threatened to dominate the entire region, “It would be a far more dangerous place than it is now … Engagement policies and the like would not dull China's appetite for power.”² Power transition theorists also see rapidly rising power as a likely cause of conflict. Robert Powell writes that, “A rapidly shifting distribution of power combined with the states' inability to commit to an agreement can lead to war.”³ Finally, those who focus on signaling emphasize that an authoritarian state has more difficulty in making credible statements about its intentions than a democratic state.⁴

However, China has already been growing rapidly for almost three decades, and there is little evidence that the region is devolving into balancing, or that China's rise is causing undue alarm.⁵

Surely, given the anticipatory nature of the pessimistic arguments—that states prepare for future contingencies today—China's growth should already have prompted a reaction from East Asian states. Stability is also not the result of the United States acting as an offshore balancer, attenuating regional conflicts and counterbalancing Chinese power, uniformly welcomed by East Asian states.⁶ Only Taiwan, and perhaps Japan, clearly rely on a U.S. security umbrella to balance Chinese power. In deciding how closely to align with either China or the U.S, states can choose to align tightly with the U.S., tightly with China, or a position somewhere between the two. While no state is completely allied with China, many states are at least accommodating its rise (fig. 1). States such as Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, and even South Korea could align much more strongly with the United States, but they have chosen not to do so. Indeed, the case of East Asia belies the notion that some states are “too small to balance.” With a potential offshore balancer in the United States, even small states have a choice about whether or not to try to balance rising power. If Taiwan, with only 22 million people and close geographic proximity to China, can seek to balance because of a U.S. umbrella, then all the other states in East Asia could as well. If my argument is right, the direction of states' alignments will move towards China and away from the United States, even though they may remain hesitant to clearly choose one side or the other.

China's expected emergence as the most powerful state in East Asia has been accompanied with more stability than pessimists believed possible because China is increasingly becoming the regional hierarch.⁷

It has provided credible information about its capabilities and intentions to its neighbors; East Asian states believe China's claims, and hence do not fear—and instead seek to benefit from—its rise. This shared understanding about China's preferences and limited aims short-circuits the security dilemma.⁸ One need only imagine the consequences of Japan attempting to undertake such a role to realize how important is this social understanding about China's position in East Asia.

Furthermore, the United States may not be the key to stability in East Asia. If the United States withdraws significantly from the region, East Asia will not become as dangerous or unstable as the balance-of-power perspective expects, because other nations will accommodate China's central position in East Asia, rather than balance against it.⁹

The microfoundations of hierarchy. A hierarchic system is one that involves a dominant power that does not fold secondary states under its wing in empire, and yet also does not cause other states to balance against it. Although much of the literature emphasizes the potential costs associated with a rising power, just as important to consider are the potential benefits to secondary states. A rising power may demand concessions or territory from secondary states, but it may also offer benefits from a growing economy and lower defense spending if relations between the two are amicable.¹⁰

Balancing a rising power puts the balancer in a better position to avoid potential costs if there is conflict. However, balancing will also be more likely to limit the benefits of cooperation with the rising power, and may raise costs through added defense expenditures and creating conflict where there was none to begin with. Thus a secondary state's decision will depend in part on the tradeoff between the costs and benefits the rising power potentially provides.

However, while material factors are important elements of hierarchy, shared expectations about state preferences are just as important.¹¹

In a system of unequal (or “unbalanced”) power, it is not just security and economic relations, but also the intentions and preferences of both dominant and secondary states that make China's emergence as the largest regional state stable and nonthreatening. This coincides with recent formal work on international conflict that has identified asymmetric information as one of the main causal mechanisms that can lead to conflict.¹² Signals must show that the state is moderate and willing to reciprocate cooperation.¹³ To the extent that China communicates restraint to its neighbors, and its neighbors believe China, then the system will be stable even in the context of its rising power.

Signaling China's intentions. Viewed in material terms, China's rise poses both potential costs and benefits. The costs are obvious: the richer and more powerful China becomes, the more it can bully other states. And were China to provoke a war somewhere in East Asia, it would effect the entire region and quite possibly the United States. However, the benefits from China's rise are just as obvious: as both a consumer and a producer, the Chinese market is increasingly seen to hold the future for many companies worldwide, and many countries—including the United States—are attempting to gain access to it.¹⁴

In addition, good relations with China also hold the possibility for regional stability and a spillover of increased economic and diplomatic cooperation.

Of all the Asian states, Japan is the most likely to have the capability to challenge China's regional leadership, and the ultimate direction of Japan-China relations is still evolving. However, Japan has not sought regional leadership and appears unlikely to do so in the future.¹⁵

Although Japan and China still have unsettled historical animosities and territorial disputes, their economic ties have been rapidly increasing, and the two countries cooperate on a range of issues.

Leaders of East Asian states believe China because its signals about its intentions have become more moderate even as its power has increased. China has toned down its rhetoric, resolved territorial disputes with its neighbors, and joined (and proposed) international and regional institutions. Most significantly, China has put in writing that it has no intention of using force in Southeast Asia.¹⁶

East Asian states increasingly see their economic and diplomatic futures tied to China. Thus states such as Vietnam, the Philippines, and even South Korea are reorienting their foreign policies to adjust to it.

Why would China reassure other East Asian states? Because its continued economic growth and domestic stability is predicated on deep integration with, and openness to, the regional and international economy. This grand strategy is often called “peaceful rise.”¹⁷

China recognizes that it needs continued economic growth and is dependent on continued open international economic relations. Indeed, the Chinese Communist Party's main claim to legitimacy is its economic record. Furthermore, China realizes explicitly that it would gain very little from conflicts with its neighbors, but has much to gain from warmer ties.¹⁸

Conclusion. Although material factors are important in predicting whether or not China's rise will be destabilizing, I have focused on the often overlooked factor of information and assessments about preferences. Focusing on how China signals its intentions to neighbors leads me to conclude that East Asia will adjust to China's rise, rather than balance against it.

If China is ascending the hierarchy in East Asia, then two other predictions follow. First, the United States may not be the key to stability in East Asia. If the United States withdraws significantly from the region, East Asia will not become as dangerous or unstable as balance-of-power theorists expect, because other nations will accommodate China's central position in East Asia, rather than balance against it. Second, if East Asian nations do not balance China as realists expect, a U.S. attempt to construct a balancing coalition against China using East Asian states will be highly problematic. East Asian states will be extremely reluctant to choose sides, and if forced to choose, many will not choose the United States.