Introduction
Democratic thought derives individual rights from moral autonomy: it conceives a human nature that is rational and an end in-itself. As a result, it credits all citizens with equal political rights – in terms of determining principles of laws and participating in the exercise of power; in terms of the equality of all before the law (isonomia). Likewise, democratic thought ascribes equal rights of addressing the political assemblies (that is, freedom of speech; isegoria) to all citizens. Central to a noble and meaningful life, personal and collective autonomy – that is, rational freedom – means making decisions based on what is understood as objectively valid reasons. Autonomy, therefore, requires the individual's or the collectivity's ability to be moved by rationally binding practical reasons, and not mere appetites. As being freedom, autonomy means action on the appeals of rational principles or knowledge of truth. Democratic citizenship involves this concept of autonomy, and, as a result, it calls for the citizens’ universal right of participation in the city's affairs. On the contrary, what I have elsewhere called the disparity of the human intellects dictum Footnote 1 repudiates the rational freedom of the many and warns against the danger of universal freedom of speech for the city. In Plato's words, freedom of speech for all makes democracy a chaotic “supermarket of constitutions” that in its short life span represents the incongruous private/appetitive wills of the intellectually incompetent many.Footnote 2 And, in Aristotle's eyes, the freedom of speech for all in democracy enables the demagogues to flatter the intellectually inept multitude, as the latter flatters the tyrant in a despotic system: the crowd of democracy and the tyrant alike hold the flatterer “in honour”. Accordingly, what Aristotle conceives as democracy may soon decline into demagogy.Footnote 3
Historically, in the case of Perso-Islamicate thought, the disparity dictum has been translated into a political doctrine that reinforces the inequality of political rights and legitimates the relation of authority/domination among men: those with inferior intellect – that is, the many – are naturally and permanently in need of the few or the wise's custodianship – since “only gods and a small group of people” possess what Plato calls “understanding”.Footnote 4 The disparity dictum lodges the idea that what is good for the intellectually superior few is naturally good for the polis – whereas what the intellectually inferior many imagines to be good is indeed harmful to the city. Accordingly, to follow “the opinion of the many about what is just, beautiful, good and their opposites” will corrupt the city and the soul – i.e. “that part of us. . .that is concerned with justice and injustice”.Footnote 5 In a sense, the dictum links the few-many dichotomy with the ethical binary of best-worse and, consequently, assigns political privilege to the left sides of the oppositions. The discrimination between the opposite sides, the dictum requires, must be maintained and institutionalised in the city's political and legal regimes. Inasmuch as the disparity dictum incorporates the idea of epistemic dependency of the many on the few, it harbours a norm of credibility that authorises some agents (the few, the wiseman, the philosopher-king, the prophet, the Islamic jurist-king etc.) as knowers, while de-authorising the many/others: the credible epistemic authority utters or testifies to truth and the de-authorised multitude must have a trust or faith akin to a background belief in the credibility of the utterer/knower.Footnote 6 It is my contention that within the spheres of Iranian thought, the hegemony-seeking disparity dictum functions as an epistemological obstacle Footnote 7 – that is, a barrier that must be removed so that a cognitive break from the non-democratic political thought and the non-democratic understanding of religion-cum-theology/power may become a more realistic possibility. In the following, I shall bring three exemplary accounts of the disparity dictum in Perso-Islamicate philosophical and mystical traditions.
Ghazzali on the disparity of human intellects
Abu Hamed Ghazzali-ye TusiFootnote 8 enumerates four meanings for the word Reason (aql). The first defines it as a quality that distinguishes man from the other animals: man has a disposition for theoretical/contemplative knowledge; a faculty of mastering abstract thinking. The theoretical truth shines in the faculty of Reason which, “like a mirror, is distinct from whatever else in its ability to reflect images” of reality. Secondly, Ghazzali defines it as what the scholastics call axiomatic knowledge such as “the possibility of the possible things and the impossibility of the impossible things”. Thirdly, it means empirical knowledge acquired through experience in the course of happenings. Lastly, it is defined as when the might of the intellect is such that it “conquers and subdues” the appetitive desire. The soul equipped with such authority is called intelligent and, accordingly, precludes concealment of the real consequences of an action under the appetitive lust for immediate pleasure. Ghazzali states that Reason in terms of the faculty of theoretical thinking is the “basis, origin and resource” of the other three conceptualisations. The second (axiomatic knowledge) is the most directly connected to the first, while the third (empirical knowledge) is an offshoot of the first and the second combined; there exists no empirical knowledge without theoretical and axiomatic grounds. The grounding status of Reason as the faculty of theoretical thinking means for Ghazzali that the “final fruit” – that is, rationality as command over appetitive desire or, Reason as virility and masculinity – does not emerge in those souls alien to theoretical wisdom: a soul void of the theoretical faculty is feminine. Ghazzali stresses that Reason as the contemplative faculty is the differentia of human being vis-à-vis the other animals: while being cognizant of the universals is an essential constituent of the human entity, those who lack contemplative faculty cease to be human proper. Ghazzali points out that Reason as theoretical faculty, and, rationality as axiomatic knowledge, are “innate/natural” virtues, whereas rationality in its latter two senses must be acquired through habits.Footnote 9
Ghazzali concurs that in all meanings of rationality, except the second, human intellects are unequal: it is only rationality as axiomatic knowledge that is equally distributed among men. Human beings, therefore, are of naturally different classes since reason in its prime meaning denotes the innate, natural and principal faculty of the soul – and men are not equal in this faculty. Accordingly, variation from one soul to another in the principal faculty of Reason in part causes a difference between the souls’ respective degrees of acquired masculinity/authority and empirical knowledge. To further substantiate his position, Ghazzali quotes a prophetic tradition affirming that “God has created the intellect in “different discrete kinds as many as the sands of the desert”. In Ghazzali's eyes, the principal disparity of the human Reason is so “evident” that only an insane man would deny it; “Indeed, he who presumes that the Prophet's faculty of Reason is equal to that of the churl peasants and desert rascals is himself lower [in Reason] than those”.Footnote 10
Ghazzali's idea of hierarchical political authority follows his version of the disparity dictum: the superiority of the prophet's intellect legitimates his political primacy over the rest of humanity. “The prophets’ politics”, he affirms “is the noblest among the activities needed for unifying people in society and helping them cooperate in providing for their livelihood”. Presiding at the highest seat in the hierarchy of the human Reason, the prophet's authority is over the mind and the body of the few/superiors as well as the inferior mind – or, better, the imagination – and the body of the many/inferiors. The second in the rank of rational faculty – that is, the king/caliph – dominates the body of the few as well as the imagination and the body of the multitude. “Enlightened by God”, the “learned men” come third in the hierarchy of authority. Their reign, however, is only over the minds of the few since, Ghazzali observes, their wisdom/truth “does not enhance the level of understanding” in the multitude due to the inferior or, better, non-existent, contemplative faculty of the crowd. Ghazzali's “learned men” are the “wise men (philosophers?) who are conscious of the limits of [the crowd's] human reason, yet do not limit themselves to blind imitation”.Footnote 11 Accordingly, he continues, the lowest in the rank of authority-holders that is, the orators/rhetoricians, hold sway solely over the crowd's imagination.Footnote 12 Unrestricted by the prophet's and the king's coercive administration of its body, and, holding an imagination untamed by the prophet's and the orator's educational administration, the crowd cannot exit “the level of the quadruped”Footnote 13 and remains a chaotic “swarm with no good in it”.Footnote 14
Ghazzali's version of the disparity dictum suggests that crowds are incapable of reaching the level of enlightenment in which men/citizens enter into rational discussion and arrive at a consensus concerning the best way to live. From a democratic/Socratic perspective, dialogical interaction has a transformative power that brings about cognitive change and cultivates awareness and responsibility in the commonsense of the masses. The transformative power of rational dialogue however, Ghazzali would respond to Socrates, is null when the interlocutors are the cognitively deficient crowds who are naturally incapable of cognitive equality with the authority. For Ghazzali, any attempt at rational enlightenment, reasoning about authority and examining its source destroys the fabric of society. It is not only because such an attempt invites questioning, and, if authority is questioned, it might be argued away. Rather, the very act of questioning, he implies, removes the crowd's respect for – or, unquestioned recognition of – the authority. Once the [ex-] obedient people demand reasons, they initiate cognitive – and, thus, political – equality between themselves and the authority. This equality implies that obedience can take place only if the [ex-] authority, that has so far been followed based on respect, can now prove through reasons that its command is truthful, noble and justified. Authority, therefore, collapses when the commanded asks why the command should be followed.
Accordingly, for Ghazzali the loss of the crowds’ respect for authority will present them with nothing less than the loss of political order and social integration. Some kind of repressive mechanism, he concludes, is necessary in order to avoid the disaster. In Ghazzali's view, this mechanism is, in part, the dictatorial/disciplinary coercion of the prophetic politics and the kingly administration. Ghazzali asserts approvingly that the Caliph Omar ibn Khattab flogged a man who was inquisitive about the hidden meaning of two conflicting verses.Footnote 15 Hence, philosophical and theological debate is “forbidden by religious law”Footnote 16 since it “disturbs” the crowds’ heart, “removes their veneration for the Sharia”Footnote 17 and “loosens religion's grip” on the crowds’ souls.Footnote 18 Drawing on his disparity dictum, Ghazzali reiterates that “what befits the crowd's nature is but a free-from-deliberation commitment to worshipping; an unreflective faith in the Quran; and, a pious submission to what the prophets have brought”. Indeed, he continues, “the multitude's enquiring about anything but the etiquette of worship is a transgression that shall bring God's wrath on the crowd [since such an enquiry] takes the crowd to the verge of infidelity: when a herdsman enquires about the king's secrets, he must be punished”. The danger of the crowd's questioning is that it “causes social disorder and, therefore, the questioner must be suppressed and prevented from questioning”.Footnote 19 The crowd, Ghazzali declares, “Must be deterred from delving into knowledge” about the divine reality. “Instead” he continues, the crowd “must be diverted to pursue – and believe in – subjects that religion defines (or, that religious laws permit). This much knowledge is sufficient” for the crowd.Footnote 20 In Ghazzali's eyes, we may conclude, the moral and political health of the cognitively incompetent multitudes requires them to have prejudices, taboos, repetitive and coerced habits – all in the form of religious discipline – and, not much thinking.Footnote 21
The multitude's religiosity, Ghazzali notes, is not due to rational deliberation, but “other causes” – such as habituation by holy rites and rituals, and the fear of “being killed by [the prophet's] sword”.Footnote 22 He situates a Prophetic tradition within the framework of a political understanding of religion: “I am commanded [by God],” states the Prophet, “to kill the people until they testify that there is no God but Allah, and, once they did, their blood and property are saved from me”.Footnote 23 Cognizant of the sociological and psychological foundations of the crowd's imitative religiosity, Ghazzali states that the majority “becomes religiously faithful in its childhood when conviction is caused by [not reflection] but imitation of fathers and teachers, pure and simple.” In turn, he continues, such imitation is caused by people's confident fancy about their ancestors; by the sources of emulation's frequent self-praising; by the praises that the non-leaders bestow to the leaders; and, by the horrifying tales and dream stories about the doomed non-believers – for example, that so and so non-believer was altered into a dog or a pig in his grave. “This is how the Christians’ [. . .], Zoroastrians’, and Muslims’ child” obtains religious beliefs and “continues his dogmatic belief” throughout life, “free of doubt” and “without receiving either a sound or an artificial rationale for those beliefs”. In other words, the “dogmatic confirmation of faith does not require reflection or articulation of arguments”. Rather, the crowd's religiosity is mimetic because, in Ghazzali's eyes, fascination and imitation are natural to the crowd.Footnote 24 Whereas truth is what reason seeks of its nature, dogmatism denotes the epistemically incompetent crowd's insistence on ‘The Truth’, over and above reason. Ghazzali insists that the crowd's religious dogmatism and practice is, before anything else, about belonging; it is expressive – and constitutive – of the membership of the religious tribe or closed community. The crowd's dogmatism is imitative in that imitation (taqlid) connotes unreflected adherence to an inherited tradition and, as a result, accounts for societal integration. In Ghazzali's eyes, religious faith means “assent (tasdiq) to everything that the prophet presented”Footnote 25 and, as such, imitation also accounts for the crowd's faith. Ghazzali observes that in his preaching “the Prophet did not expect from the Arabs more than assent, and made no distinction as to whether their faith/assent results from imitation or, rather, it is a demonstrative certitude”. The crowd of believers’ faith, which is “true faith” he continues, is “on the sole basis of the prophet's appeal to the crowd's faculty of imagination” and not to its feeble faculty of Reason;Footnote 26 “dogmatic assent”, Ghazzali concludes, characterises “all crowds’ faith”.Footnote 27 A non-dogmatic assent requires both the acceptance that the messenger is truthful – that what he says corresponds to what he has actually received – and, the independent verification that the message itself is truthful. Ghazzali, however, shifts in his definition of faith-as-assent from this two-tiered structure to what he calls “assent to the prophet”.Footnote 28 The shift omits the second requirement which is the examination of the veracity of the message itself. Consequently, the crowd's assent to the prophet is said to consist of the “confession” (i`tiraf) that the prophet is truthful in the sense that he does not lie when recounting what he has seen. In other words, it is solely because of the confessed trust/assent to the Prophet's truthfulness – and not based on an independent scrutiny of the verisimilitude or the plausibility of what is uttered in his message – that the crowd believes the beings a prophet reports of their existence (for example, Paradise and Hell) do exist, and that the Book incorporates the literal representation – or, the mirror-picture – of those beings.Footnote 29 The intellectually incompetent crowd is not capable of an independent verification of the truth of the message. Demonstrative certitude about the veracity of prophecy, Ghazzali states, requires a “necessary knowledge” that only those with “purity of the soul” and with an insight acquired through their own prophetic experience, may obtain. Such individuals know the Prophet's revelation “by comparing” it with their own revelatory experience.Footnote 30 Therefore, as pure and masculine in the soul, Ghazzali's few are simultaneously equipped with the necessary knowledge of the intelligible – or, the theoretical wisdom – and are capable of prophetic experiences. In other words, purification of the soul, acquaintance with the ineligibles, and having prophetic experiences must for Ghazzali portray the deeply interconnected characteristics of the few who may coexist with the Prophet or come to the world after him. Having prophetic experiences, Ghazzali writes between the lines, the few are therefore imams/prophets unto themselves. Following the truth of their own revelations qua acquaintance with the intelligibles, their observation of the Prophet Mohammad's Sharia is only practically prudent.Footnote 31
The masses’ reverence for their religious/sacred figures, and their fascination with the political leader, Ghazzali observes, protects them against the chaos of opinion and, in so doing, saves the city from disorder. In other words, the source of authority must be absolute, mythical and terrifying enough to tame the chaotic instinct of the crowd. Rather than subjecting Him to philosophical analysis (which removes respect for God and leaves the theology/power system with drained authority), men must tremble before the despotic God – that is, the source of the hierarchy of authority – who operates dictatorially in His sovereignty and His mysterious existence goes beyond any rule of ethics, reason and nature. Man, Ghazzali preaches, must fear and tremble before the capricious God precisely like one who falls into the claws of a “rabid beast” and, fearing the beast's unqualified cruelty, cannot know if it would ignore him, so that he might escape, or will devour him at once.Footnote 32 It is the compulsive power of this image of God – drawn by the orator Ghazzali, the author of the Book of Fear Footnote 33 – that further captivates and subdues the crowd's faculty of imagination. We may conclude that in Ghazzali's account and as a requirement for social order, the religiosity of the crowd is an effect of not contemplation, but in part, the prophet's and the king's disciplinary coercion; and in part, the prophet's and the orator's disciplinary tutelage that control the crowd with the apparatus of deeply inculcated and necessarily unexamined prejudices/images. Besides popular preaching and religious sermons that are immediately understandable to whom-so-ever is blessed with “the least whiff of intellect”,Footnote 34 the disciplinary tutelage may also apply theology's highest achievements which are at best, “rhetorical [as opposed to demonstrative] proofs”.Footnote 35
Ghazzali declares his verdict about theology blatantly – and perhaps, between the lines, he reveals the same verdict about religious concepts/credos in general. In Ghazzali's words, the theologian, equipped with his entire theological arsenal, “shares with the rest of the multitude the dogma (aqida)” that ties masses together but is not a true knowledge of – or an enlightened engagement with – the divine cognition.Footnote 36 The theologian, in other words, communicates to the multitude a set of rhetorical images rather than the contemplative knowledge which the theologian himself lacks, in the first place. And, “being a master of polemics”, he and his art of making figurative arguments and metaphors are needed to safeguard the hearts of the multitudes against another set of similes/images that are heretical or just newly invented. The pilgrims to Mecca, observes Ghazzali, employ a number of guardsmen since they are afraid of being robbed and terrorized by the Arabs. But if the Arabs stop their hostility toward the caravans, then employment of the guardsman will no more be a prerequisite of pilgrimage.Footnote 37 Likewise, Ghazzali continues, the status of the theologian is the same as the guardsman's: he is required to protect the crowds – lest they should become “the victims of theft” of opinionsFootnote 38 – by prescribing to their inferior souls a set of noble similes and rhetorical sentiments that boosts their immune system against the toxic, ignoble and heretical images. “Certainly”, states Ghazzali, the theologian does not belong to the class of the Learned for, like the crowd, the theologian lacks true knowledge of the divine matter. Unlike the enlightened Learned however, he is infatuated with his theological creeds and obliviously mistakes them for the truth. Such ignorance “can conceal” the divine truth from him.Footnote 39 Hence, for Ghazzali the point is that the theologian's “arguments” are not in strictu sensu apodictic proofs, and his theological doctrines lack epistemic truth-value or epistemic truth or falsity. Rather, their meaning and worth is to be sought against a pragmatist frame of investigation – that is, in their political function; in their attuning the imaginations of the inferior souls with noble similes that protect crowds from the politically chaotic effects of the theft of opinions. The enlightened Learned, Ghazzali implies, knows this secret – whereas the theologian does not and whereas the crowd never shall.
Ghazzali, we may conclude, espouses a pragmatist/political view on religion. He, however, is wary of the crowd's exposure to this pragmatist view. Due to the cognitive incompetence of the crowd such an exposure harms the purpose of social cohesion and, for that reason, prudence warns against it. In other words, for Ghazzali, the very pragmatist judgment that defines the prophetic function requires its own concealment from the crowd. Prudence requires Ghazzali to state that when a “demonstrative argument that is categorically sound” convinces the few to distance from the literal sense of a religious credo and code, “it is required” from the few to follow it, and thus to engage in allegorical interpretation. “Nevertheless” he continues “if, due to the ineptitude of the crowd's intellect, the communication of such a demonstrative truth causes harm [to social order], then the proclamation of such a demonstrative truth is indeed an act of heresy”.Footnote 40 Ghazzali's condemnation of the falasafa must be understood in tandem with this prudential-practical reasoning: it is, primarily, a philosopher's imprudent oblivion of the provision of concealment that causes Ghazzali's censure. In his Deliverance from Error, Ghazzali recaps the pragmatist view and recognises it as “the theist/divine philosophers’ idea, understood from Avicenna's and Farabi's books”. The “gist of prophethood” – Ghazzali describes the theists’ philosophy – “refers to [practical] wisdom and prudence. And, the purpose of the prophetic codes of prayer and conduct is disciplining the multitudes and preventing them from murder, quarrel and off-leash immersion in carnal desires”. Here, however, Ghazzali leaves this idea intact and offers no critique of it. Rather, he scolds the noxious people who overtly proclaim that “I do not imitate the prophets [for] I have read the science of philosophy and grasped the [above cited] gist of prophethood. . .I am not a member of the ignorant crowd [therefore, I need not] assume the limitations of religious obligations; with no doubt, I am among the wise who follow wisdom; I am insightful with wisdom; and immersed in it, I am not in need of imitation”. Ghazzali accuses this proclamation – and not the philosophical idea – of causing the crowd's misapprehension and, consequently, enfeebling “the multitude's belief in the very reality [factuality] of prophethood”.Footnote 41 To put the point another way, in Ghazzali's eyes, the theist philosophers believe in the facticity of prophethood and interpret the fact in a pragmatist way, whereas the intellectually inept crowd cannot comprehend this subtlety. Hence, upon hearing such a proclamation, the crowd goes astray; fancies prophethood to be fictitious rather than factual; and, prey to the chaos of opinions, refrains from following the laws whose hegemony over the crowd's heart stems from belief in their prophetic/divine origin.
Molavi on the disparity of human intellects
The repertoire of Persian literature echoes the disparity dictum in various literary tunes. The book, Masnavi-ye ma`navi, for example, exposes the dictum as a connecting point of Perso-Islamicate mysticism, philosophy and jurisprudence. In Jalal al-Din Mohammad-e Molavi'sFootnote 42 words, “there exists a natural difference/hierarchy between men's faculty of intellect (Reason). . .The human intellects’ inequality stems [primarily] from difference in their constituting elements . . . and not from the difference in men's levels of education”.Footnote 43 Although they all show similar exteriors, Molavi observes that men are of three types. The first group includes those who “like Jesus. . . are unified with the Absolute”; those whose converted soul is “freed from the appetitive/eros and the emotional/thumos”. The second group joins the class of the asses: the folks whose souls consist of nothing but “untamed thumos and uncontrolled eros”. People of this ilk do not have the verve and thus are dead – though, in practice, they might work even “harder than asses and initiate subtle techniques such as submerging and gold embroidery; or develop sciences such as geometry, astronomy, medicine and natural philosophy”. Indeed, the genus and differentiae of the members of this species, who happens to be familiar with science and technique, compose the “subtle animal” – as opposed to the rational animal (zoon logikon). And, Molavi continues, as the Quranic verse indicates, they are truly but quadrupeds with animal souls which functions under imagination and fantasy – as opposed to reason and rationality. Members of this class are “the most inferior and one should abandon them all [in his daily encounters]”. The third type of man is an amalgam; partly an animal and partly a lively maturing entity whose soul is the site of continuous scuffle between the two sides.Footnote 44
“In examination” Molavi states, “verve (jaan) is but the knowledge of truth; he who has more knowledge of truth is more alive”. Likewise, in Ghazzali's Persian writings, verve is defined as the “meaning of the kernel” and the same as the soul or the heart.Footnote 45 In other words, man is distinct from the animal only to the extent that his soul spouses more Reason and wisdom. A man, whose inferior intellect does not reach the intelligible beyond the levels of the sensible, the imaginable, and the estimative (mowhum), is in truth equal with the quadruped.Footnote 46 However, when the conversion of the soul into all-Reason is accomplished, the verve of such a soul exceeds the angel's.Footnote 47 And, “transcending human attributes” the all-Reason soul turns its nature into a divine entity.Footnote 48 Hence, Molavi concludes, “the disparity of the intellects is as immense as the diversity of men's facial characteristics. This is why the Prophet said that the [intellectual] virtues of men are hidden in their dialects”.Footnote 49 Molavi's statement presupposes that the diversity of genres in men's dialects – that is, demonstration, rhetoric, dialectic, poetry and sophistry – evinces the disparity of the human intellects. Whereas the few’s Reason grasps and operates with demonstrative reasons, the multitude's fantasy works with images and accordingly, the latter's tongue operates with rhetoric, dialectic, poetry and sophistry. It is my contention that for Molavi, this philosophical assumption grounds the above mentioned Prophetic tradition – which itself, like the rest of revelation, is offered to the multitude in the genre of rhetoric. Thus, according to Molavi's interpretation of the Prophetic tradition, the verve or the virtue/virility/masculinity of the few, is detectible of the few's demonstrative dialect – whereas, the less virtuous, more feminine many applies and understands only the remaining four dialects.
Moreover, Molavi insists, a member of the few – say, the prophet or the wise – is obligated, due to the crowd's intellectual destitution, to apply non-demonstrative dialects in communication of truth with the multitude. “A father whose intellect is capable of designing the whole of cosmos”, observes Molavi, “makes toys [or babbles]” for the new-born child: the father “is required to dispense with his own tongue and adopt the child's so that the latter may learn”. And, when it comes to the relationship between the few and the many “All the people then are as his [the divine man's/the few’s] children. When he gives them instruction, it is necessary for the wise to bear this point in mind” and use the appropriate tongue/toys.Footnote 50 “All, except the divine man, are children. None among men is mature, except he who is free from selfish desires”.Footnote 51 Religious credos and codes, Molavi implies, comprise the instruction and the rhetorical proofs uttered in crowds’/children's tongue. The divine man/few as well as the intelligible truth, however, transcend the rhetorical codes and concepts of religion. Whereas, “infidelity has a fixed limit and range” that are defined by religious concepts and legal codes, “the wise/divine man and his light [i.e. the intelligible truth] go beyond the boundaries” of religion: “Infidelity and faith do not exist in the place where he [the divine man] is, because he [unified with the intelligible] is the kernel, whereas infidelity and faith are but colour and husk”.Footnote 52
The soul's freedom from selfish desires is achievable only if the intellect/Reason enjoys primacy in the soul. The superior intellect/Reason, observes Molavi, “is a fetter”,Footnote 53 controlling the animal parts of the soul and the society of the multitude. It is in this sense of power and governance that for Molavi Reason is masculine. “Neither in the moment of lust. . .nor in the instance of anger” would the superior Reason shake and cease control. “Masculinity means this, not having beard or pines – otherwise, the donkey's phallus was the king of men”.Footnote 54 Accordingly, femininity is the quality of the “trifling intellect”Footnote 55 or, the “particularistic intellect”,Footnote 56 which is malleable by the appetitive and the emotional; the lower parts of the soul. Like an instrument, the substandard intellect (the particularistic-instrumental reason) submits to the desire of eros and the might of thumos – especially, to the latter's thirst for domination over other human beings. “Pity to one whose intellect is female and his/her [carnal] nasty soul is male and prepared [to please itself through conquering the female/intellect]. . . Blessed is one whose intellect is male and his/her [carnal] nasty soul is female and debilitated.” In Molavi's view, the “womanly soul” is the feminine soul that manages to conquer even the bodily appearance: women's female bodies are embodiments of the womanly souls – though a male body may also be employed by a feminine soul. Womanly souls, therefore, “lack Reason” and their female bodies are not the cause but an indication of this reality: “The animal nature prevails in woman, and this point is evident in her inclination towards color and scent”.Footnote 57 Women's inclination towards the entities for the senses (i.e. the sensibilia in the world of becoming) mediates her opinion (doxa) while, weak in intellection (noesis), she fails contact with the (other-) world of noetic being. Similarly, the male/man's individual and political authority over women (and, the supremacy of the “masculine” prophetsFootnote 58 over the multitude) is due to the masculine soul embodied in the male body – and not because of “[men's] bodily strength. . .otherwise, the lion and elephant would be superior to human beings. Men's supremacy over women results from man's being more regardful of the end”. If a male deviates from intellection of the noetic order/end of the becoming (that is, the divine First Cause or the being) then, “like women, he is withdrawn from those who own a destiny”.Footnote 59 Minding “the end” – that is, the noetic being which grounds the true nature, meaning and value of particular practices, entities and becomings – requires theoretical wisdom and practical reasoning, including phronesis; the skill that facilitates reciprocal movements between the intelligibles of the theoretical reason and the sensibilia. The feminine woman/crowd, however, “is one-eyed; sees only the present [the sensibilia] and is ignorant, like the quadruped, of what is the intelligible end”.Footnote 60 Indeed, the crowd whose intellect is feminine is at once quadrupedal and asinine in nature – since its “animal soul predominates and it is the predominant quality that determines the nature of an entity”. This is why in reaction to the Prophet's “taming efforts”, the crowd “kicks” and inflicts him with suffering. In Arabic, observes Molavi, the term ta`al (come) is used to address the Arabic horse. It was therefore, only out of courtesy that God, when calling the crowd to religious discipline, did not address it – that is, “the quadruped/crowd whose appetite is dominant; who, accordingly, shirks from taming practices – as He would address an ass”. In other words, by a repetitive usage of the term ta`alu for calling the multitudes to religion, the Quran gives the crowds the more dignified status of the Arabic horse, compared to that of the ass.Footnote 61
For Molavi, the fact that the few, transcending even the angels and unifying with the Absolute, are not of the same genus of the inferior multitude must be kept from the multitude's eyes. For “homogeneity is a wondrous attractor”, and being of the genus of the angels, a prophet attracts the latter from the heavens; being of the devilish genus makes the pagans’ souls follow the Satan; and, this is why in the Quran the Prophet called himself “a man like you” so that the masses might feel congeneric attraction towards him and not become lost.Footnote 62 It is better thought of what Molavi has in mind here in terms of prudence: practical reason calls the Prophet to offer the masses of the inferior genus a noble falsehood according to which the few and the many are of the same human nature. Similar in its function to Plato's Myth of the Metals – though, opposite in its conceptual content – this noble falsehood of homogeneity attracts the masses to the prophet and integrates them into the religious community or, the closed city. In using a noble rhetoric like this, the prophet/wise – including Molavi himself, in his story-telling throughout the Masnavi – applies the “language suited to children since my [the few’s] business happens to be with a child [the crowd]; saying, ‘Go to school, so that I may buy a bird for you or bring you raisins and walnuts and pistachio nuts’”.Footnote 63
Molavi's notion of disparity bears with it the idea that the child/crowd cannot – shall not – know the pragmatist logic behind the children tongue used by revelation. The many shall not know that the few actually offer it a figurative simile of truth in the genre of noble rhetoric: the intellectually wanting crowd shall understand religious credos as but mirror-pictures of reality. Otherwise, discerning the disparity dictum and its resulting figurative makeup of religious language, the crowd forfeits its feeling of homogeneity with the few and, thus, the congeneric attraction falls flat. In other words, if the crowd realises “the infinite difference” in nature between itself and the few, it feels alienation from the prophets and accordingly, does not imitate the latter. Molavi, therefore, can be taken as saying that the communal integrity of the religious society hinges on the noble rhetoric – including, but not limited to, what Molavi would have called the Myth of Homogeneity of all members of the society.
Conversely, Molavi warns early on in the Masnavi that the crowd's very cognitive incapability of grasping the disparity of natures causes the disaster: “The whole world is gone astray” failing to recognise the distinct nature of the few that is, “God's substitutes”. The crowds “claimed equality with the prophets and supposed that the divine men are like themselves. ‘Behold’ the crowds said, “we are men, they are men; we both need to eat and take rest’”. The crowds nevertheless, “were too [cognitively] blind to see the infinite difference in-between”.Footnote 64 If they had not been blind, they would, by definition, have joined the rank of the few and in result, “seeing the truth plain and clear, they would not need to receive it through the prophet” and via religious similes.Footnote 65 Being in the truth (haqiqat), they would know the grounding principles of religious credos/metaphors and laws (shariat). “To the child, the lifeless doll is as dear as life. . . These images and fancies are like the doll: so long as one is [intellectually] a child, one has need of them. But, when man escaped from childishness, or when the soul got unified [with the Absolute], it is done with sense-perception and imagination and fancy”. Molavi knows only too well the political and personal danger of further disclosure of the point. Hence, he leaves the clues to the reader of the appropriate reading mode: “There is no confidant around so that I should speak the truth candidly and without dissembling”.Footnote 66
In Molavi's eyes the two horns of the above-mentioned dilemma are in fact diverse results of the multitude's intellectual ineptitude. Furthermore he knows that, after all, the myth of homogeneity may not have the same gravitational function as a genuine homogeneity (which, in its turn, as the disparity dictum implies, does not exist). His solution to the difficulty is a political one. In Molavi's view, the coercive might of political governance, including the theopolitic of the closed city, makes up for the weak gravitational power of integration among diverse and intellectually base crowds. In the tale of the Prince who harassed a sleeping man, Molavi accounts for the coercive nature of the few’s authority over the multitude in terms of the latter's incapability of handling the truth. While riding along, a wise man – later identified as the prince – detected that a snake entered into the mouth of a sleeping man. “Since he had rationality in abundance”, he violently struck the sleeper with his mace, making the poor man cry of pain; run before his horse in the scorching sun; and, eat rotten apples beneath a tree – so many that they were falling out of his mouth again. Meanwhile, there is no rational dialogical interaction between the two; the wise man's violent practice takes place in silence. The wise man/prince inflicts pain incessantly and the miserable man curses and weeps. Heavy blows of the mace continue; “the rider was like the wind; swift in his act”. At the dusk, the wretched man's feet and face were covered with “a hundred thousand wounds”, but the rider kept dragging him back and forth. Until at last, the boiling bile caused him to vomit and the snake flung out from him along with the rotten apples he had eaten. “When he saw the snake outside of him, he fell on his knees before that beneficent man. Once he saw the horror of that black, ugly, big snake, all his suffering disappeared”. Praising the prince, he confessed: “truly you are the agent of divine mercy [. . .] blessed is the moment that you saw me. I was dead, you gave me new life”.
The subjected man's subsequent query and the prince's response reveal the point that legitimates the despotic nature of political authority in the eyes of many Perso-Islamic thinkers: the inferior intellect of the many cannot handle the truth for the truth, as the few knows it, is deadly to the many. Hence, the few’s command over the many cannot be anything but authoritarian as the communication of reasons cannot take place: either mute violence – that does not exchange reasons – or, at best, rhetoric, dialectic and poetry facilitates the command. “O fine man, I wished you had given me a single hint to the truth. But you, keeping silence . . .continued to beat me on the head so that my head became giddy and half-wit [so, I cursed you] – especially as this head has but little brain”. The prince answers: “If I had uttered a hint of it, your gall would melt into water. If I had told you the qualities of the snake, the terror would have killed you”. The wise's truth, therefore, is literally deadly to the intellectually weak man. However, the deadliness of truth is here portrayed in the figurative language of the story, and as such it symbolises a truth which, due to the intellectual inferiority of the crowd, if revealed in its unembellished format, it may harm social cohesion and destruct the individual life of the “sleeping” mass whose “head has but little brain”.Footnote 67
In Molavi's account, we may conclude, the many’s imitation of the few is of a subtle makeup. It is by definition, not a practice that resulted from genuinely deliberated-upon reasons; the many’s inferior intellect cannot afford to be deliberative. Nevertheless, imitation is not a merely coerced practice. Rather, it incorporates a mental mechanism that is expedited by the noble rhetoric of religion. As formerly pointed out, for Molavi, the crowd's particularistic intellect is dominated by eros and thumos. It is particularistic in the sense that it stays aloof from the universal intelligibles. It does not have an understanding of, or a care for, the universal/public good. Rather, it is private, self-centered and particularistic: “the ox moves for its fear of hard blows, not for the sake of taking the wagon [to a destination]. Likewise, every shopkeeper works for himself – not for the improvement of the world” and not for the public good.Footnote 68 The crowd's particularistic intellect produces hearty parochialism and provincialism. Hence, it enflames conflict among the excessively narrow interests and views of the idiotes.Footnote 69 The multitudes do not know what the universal good is, but may seek or approximate it through imitation on condition, Molavi observes, that they alleviate their idiocy (read, self-centeredness) and rid from its agent that is, their particularistic intellect. Or, in other words, by substituting – what Molavi and Ghazzali call – foolishness for being idiotes. Molavi and Ghazzali imply that in contradistinction to the idiotes, religious devotion to a larger-than-self sacred helps the foolish to transcend egoism and to give up particularistic reasoning (thus, they may appear as fools to the rest of the many whose only type of rationality is particularistic). Obviously Molavi and Ghazzali are distrustful about other potential ways – say, the crowd's cognitive improvement in terms of democratic education and communicative practice – to gradually redeem the crowd from its idiocy. In their view, the single remedy for the crowd's idiocy is foolish imitation.
The crowd's particularistic intellect, Molavi states, is like a horse that tends to follow its tail that is the carnal soul, and move backward – rather than following the head that is the superior Reason. Now, and this point is of essence, in Molavi's view religion does not change the nature of this horse/particularistic intellect: it does not change the intellectually inferior many into the intellectually superior few. Rather, respecting the natural, enduring intellectual weakness of crowds, religion offers to their dominant appetitive and emotional parts of the soul new particular objects of desire – e.g., for eros, the sensual pleasures of Paradise; the palpable tortures of Hell; and, for thumos, the psychological excitement of religious spirituality, tranquility, violence and war. A noble religion, Molavi would add, cannot eradicate the tyrannical (eros and thumos) soul of the crowd. However, its educational and enchanting effects may harmonise a tyrannical soul with the universal virtues and truths that the religious credos and laws imitate and express symbolically.
The mental element of imitation comes to the fore: once a new object of desire is mounted by religion before crowds’ imagination, their particularistic intellect resumes its routine of calculating and executing plans to achieve that pleasure or avoid that pain which associates the new object of desire. As a result, the coercive element of imitation is minimised. Let's read Molavi's verses: “A man requested the prince to give him a horse. ‘Go, and that gray horse is now yours’, the prince replied. ‘I do not want that horse’ . . .the man said, ‘because it walks backward and is restless; it steps back, back firmly in the direction of its rear.” The prince's response conveys what religion does to the crowd's inferior/particularistic intellect: “So, turn its rear towards your destination!” Molavi continues; “The tail of this beast [i.e. the carnal soul] you are riding is lust: the beast moves backward to reach the object of lust.” Religion, however, erects new and common objects for individuals’ lusts. It makes “the soul's carnal lust a lust for the world hereafter”Footnote 70 and, in so doing, it also attempts at an accord between personal self-interests. Religion, therefore, does not remove man's selfishness but modifies it into a more collective selfishness of the believer individuals who bond in pursuit of their god's consent, and against the nonbeliever enemies of their god/community. The task of religion, therefore, is not to eradicate the emotional and appetitive elements in the crowd's soul. Neither does it alter the multitude's particularistic reason into the theoretical intellect. Rather, religion is supposed to harmonise these elements with what wisdom demands which, due to the crowd's intellectual inferiority, must in turn be expressed symbolically in religious creeds and laws. Religion, Molavi implies, has the power to enchant the multitude and impress their imitative and shifting feelings. This capacity may conceivably make religion instrumental to the purpose of societal order. The “charming spell” of religion conjures up the multitude's capricious passion, diverts it to more elevated goals, and creates restrictions on the expression of the crowd's urge for domination and self-gratification. Religion's spell shapes the multitude's mentality, and, in so doing, it may help consolidate the foundation of political state and social cooperation: enchantment legitimates the authority of laws in the believer crowd's eyes, lest the self-centered individual “tear the body of his fellow man to pieces”.Footnote 71
Consequently, Molavi observes, “It is better that everyone be gladdened by his own fantasy or opinion” – that is, his or her religious beliefs. The collective fancy functions as a “veil” under which crowds “hope and fear” simultaneously, and, therefore, behave. Hence, “It is more prudent for us to be silent” – Molavi advises his fellow member of the few – and not tear apart “the veil”; for, there is “a great disparity” among the human intellects.Footnote 72 Molavi and Ghazzali are sanguine about precisely what the few’s “prudence prescribes for the multitudes and for their societal discipline”. In Molavi's and Ghazzali's view, men's prejudices, “ignorance,” and “mundane/material desires” account for people's societal cooperation.Footnote 73 The multitude's ignorance is “the pillar of this world, whereas the enlightenment of men is “the bane to this world”:Footnote 74 “Lest the hidden secrets should be divulged and, thereby, the life and livelihood [of the multitude] be destroyed. And, lest the veil of ignorance (parde-ye ghaflat) should be entirely torn apart!”Footnote 75 Moreover, the crowd's inferior intellect “is like lightning and the flash. . ., that is, not viable enough to lead; it is like the child's intellect that says to the child ‘attend school’ – but it cannot teach the child by itself. Similarly, the sick man's intellect leads him to the physician – but is not able to cure him”.Footnote 76 Hence, the rhetorical content of religion, paired with the crowd's particularistic rationality, accounts for the non-coercive aspect of imitation (taqlid). For Molavi, therefore, the crowd's religiosity is an imitation with a two-tier makeup: it has fantastic (or, figurative) as well as compulsory components.
In a story about the Prophet's encounter with pagan captives after a war, Molavi narrates a Prophetic tradition of taking the flock to Paradise by shackles that is, coercively: in order to escape execution and reach freedom, the captives should submit to religion. The captives wonder why “he (the Prophet) is called a mercy to the world's populace whereas he is cutting the throats and gullets of a large number of people”.Footnote 77 Molavi's response discloses the meaning of the compulsory component of religion to his readers. The response has two parts, both stemming from Molavi's belief in the disparity dictum. First, the pagan's soul is that which is inferior and lacks verve and, besides, refrains from religiosity as imitation (whereas the believer crowd's inferior soul submits to religiosity as imitation). Accordingly, the pagan-cum-quadruped's animal soul “has no worth . . .[and, if you do not agree, then] pass through the butchers market to see hundreds of thousand [sheep and cow] heads laid on rumens while the worth of those heads is less than that of the caudal fat”.Footnote 78 “Of necessity permission was given to shed the blood of the infidels, like that of a wild beast. All their wives and children are free spoil”, because they lack competent intellect and are “wildly averse to the august reason”.Footnote 79 Second, lacking verve, the pagan is “already dead and rotted to the verge of non-existence. In my verdict [the Prophet says] it does not behoove a man to kill the dead”.Footnote 80 Molavi's first response, therefore, denies the immorality of foisting religion on the cognitively deficient, and his second response indicates that coercive imposition is to the benefit of the imitating soul.Footnote 81
In Molavi's account, the many is intellectually and morally base,Footnote 82 and the fantastic/figurative component of religiosity as imitation is a correlative of this fact. As previously mentioned, he insists that one must “forgo this particularistic intellect [and] take up ignorance instead;” that one must “escape from whatever [the particularistic intellect designates as] one's utility”.Footnote 83 He advises the crowd accordingly: “Sacrifice your [particularistic] intellect in the presence of the Prophet”Footnote 84 since “your [particularistic] intellect is servant to appetite and defeated by it”.Footnote 85 “Make yourself foolish and follow [behind the prophet/few, since] only through this foolishness will you reach salvation. It was on this account that the Prophet . . . said ‘most of the people of Paradise are the foolish’”.Footnote 86 Ghazzali has the same recommendation for the multitude. He advises the crowd to – contrary to those whom Ghazzali scolds as incoherent philosophers – not abstain from “contentment with the ancestral religion”. “Foolishness”, he continues “is closer to salvation than futile dexterity; and blindness is closer to security than the vision of the cunning”.Footnote 87 For Ghazzali, “The simplistic and dogmatic religious faith of the rustic Arabs and the rest of the multitude – who do not probe into deliberation or theoretical analysis – keeps the crowd safe. . ., and this is the meaning of the Prophetic saying that ‘most of the people of Paradise are the foolish’”.Footnote 88 Molavi advises his crude reader in a similar vein: “Sacrifice your [particularistic] intellect in the presence of [the Prophet] Mostafa . . . Make yourself foolish and follow behind him. Only by means of this foolishness will you gain deliverance. On this account, O father, Mohammad, the sultan of mankind, stated that most of the people of Paradise are the foolish”.Footnote 89 Both Molavi and Ghazzali, therefore, suggest that the crowd should stay on the path of imitation while receiving only mimetic and rhetorical images of what true happiness or salvation really is. This is after all, the crowd's fitting happiness, which shall bring security and social integration in its wake.
Molavi's anecdote of Moses’ taking offense at the shepherd's vulgar manner of prayer conveys Moses’ gradual awareness of the point that foolishness is the best policy for the crowd; and, that a member of the few shall not disturb the many’s fantasy – read religious beliefs and devotion – insofar as it brings individual and societal security and integration. At the beginning, quite comparable to the formerly visited Ghazzali's theologian, Moses accuses the ignorant shepherd of blasphemy – that is, of having a religious belief that does not accord with the official creeds of Moses’ own. At this stage, Moses is unaware of the point that religion is not to substitute the crowd's images and figurative opinions with demonstrative intelligibles about the divine entity; that “in relation to the Absolute [both the shepherd's and Moses's religious credos and] praises are maimed”; and, that not different in its makeup from the shepherd's, Moses’ own religious concepts are “images which appear in a mirror [when the shepherd or Moses stay before the mirror]; they are [Molavi instructs his Moses] your own images and fancies – not the image of the mirror”. Religious credos are like “the breath which the flute-player puts into the flute” for they “correspond to [the narrow capacity and character of] the flute. Take good heed! Whether you speak [of the divine entity] or thank Him, know that it all is as inappropriate as the words of the shepherd. . . [in being] blemished with assimilation and similes”. At last, Moses joins the few, and recognises that his prophetic mission is “to unite/integrate and not to sever” people. He finds the despondent shepherd in the wilderness and tells to him, “Do not seek any etiquette of worship; say whatsoever your distressful heart desires. Your blasphemy is the true religion . . . [because due to your religious devotion] you are secured and through you [and your religiosity] the world/society is secured”.Footnote 90
Belief in the disparity dictum explains why for Molavi the diverse motifs which harbour tension, inconsistency and indeterminacy may reside in religious credos without harming the functional value of the Book. Whereas logical accuracy and coherence are required from scientific or philosophical discourses, a rhetorical text's meaningfulness and political function do not presuppose logical consistency between its conceptual elements. The image-like ideas of the rhetorical text are not necessarily bonded or connected by logical sequence. And, their internal inconsistencies may not necessarily be a political disadvantage, partially because the multitudes, lacking critical spirit, do not care for or even notice inconsistency in their adopted images. Moreover, Molavi declares that the conflicts and confusions among believers about religious creeds will eternally continue and never resolve.Footnote 91 He can plausibly be taken as explicating the eternal conflicts, in part, as a direct outcome of the very makeup of the religious text with its tensions and indeterminacies – and not exclusively of the misunderstandings of religious denominations. As a matter of historical fact, the adherents of determinism and the proponents of freewill, the supporters of peace or tolerance and the advocates of war or violence, and in general the opposing sides of innumerable and mutually-inconsistent theological standpoints, political positions and moral stances etc. have found their views quite harmonious with one section or the other of the same Book. “The Sunni” theologian, Molavi observes, is unaware of the religiosity of “the Jabri” theologian who believes in determinism – and, vice versa. “The Sunni has a particular mode of glorification; the Jabri has the opposite thereof in taking refuge” with God. “The Jabri says ‘The Sunni is astray and lost,’ and the Sunni says, ‘What awareness has this Jabri of truth?’ – they are predestined to be cast in this strife”.Footnote 92 Molavi further uncovers the cause that partially destines these disputes: it is the Book itself that harbours diverse, indeterminate or even opposite motifs and incoherent rhetoric which in turn contribute to the irresolvable conflicts among believers and prevent a crucial and deciding judgement about meaning: “sometimes it appears like this and sometimes the contrary of this”. Accordingly, one may conclude that “bewilderment is the work of religion itself”.Footnote 93 In Molavi's view, the conflicts partially stem from the very manner in which the prophet communicates with the multitude and subsequently establishes the religion/Book as the aggregate of those verbal interactions. Respecting the limited intellectual capacity of the multitude, the prophet applies rhetorical rather than demonstrative language. Moreover, the prophet's verbal encounters with his audiences take place in incommensurable contexts. He is required to address audiences who are as different in their personality, imagination and attitude as “hoopoe and eagle”. Appropriate to each specific context/audience, the prophet applies a rhetoric that is necessarily indexed to the singularity of the moment. Rhetoric lacks the logical vigour, coherence and soundness of the demonstrative statements. Though it is a “commonplace” mode of speech, it is required in communication with the “common people”.Footnote 94 “I speak in commonplace tongue according to the measure of [the crowds’ feeble] minds. There is no fault [in using the commonplace language]; this is indeed the practice of the Prophet”.Footnote 95
Molavi conveys his point to the careful reader in an intricate allegory whose parts are dispersed in three separate sections of the Masnavi. “O Solomon, amidst the crows and falcons be a manifestation of divine clemency and accordingly adapt yourself [and your language] to all birds”.Footnote 96 Four pages later, Molavi returns to his reading of how a prophet, a wiseman or a prophet/philosopher/king such as Solomon must communicate with different people in their own tongues and, simultaneously, establish a religion for all of them. “O Solomon, apply your mastery of the bird-speech and sing the song of every bird that you meet [in its own tongue]. [. . . Since] you are sent to the multitude of birds and have the divine knowledge of the note of every bird, to the bird who believes in determinism, speak the language of determinism. To the bird whose wings are broken, speak of patience and of the virtue of quietism. Say comforting words to the bird who is characteristically humble [and obeys the rules], and that would be enough for it. [. . . But] to a spirited bird like Anqa, recite the descriptions of the Mount of Qaf. Advise the pigeon to stay away from falcon; to falcon, talk about virtues such as kindness and forbearance. And, as for the bat that is left in destitution, talk about light and make it familiar with it. Talk about the virtue of peace to the warlike partridge. And, to the cocks [who are infatuated with the dawn,] talk about its signs”.Footnote 97 The kingly/prophetic mission of Solomon is to help the diverse members of the many to coexist nobly. He performs his service by knowing and respecting their diverse “tongues” which reflect their diverse intellectual limitations, attitudes, psychological capabilities, life experiences and aspirations. There exists, however, a set of elites who do not need Solomon and his bird-speech-cum-religion. Molavi adds this point one hundred and seventy pages later. “Everyone else has turned his face in some direction” and obtained a target of religious worship (qebleh). However, “those worthy” elites “have turned towards that which transcends direction. Every bird flies on some course, but these dear ones “fly in a region of no region”. We, the elites say, “are neither birds of the air nor domestic fowls: our grain is the grain of grainlessness”; our religion is the religion of religionlessness! “Our daily bread is so ample, because for us stitching the coat has become the tearing of it to pieces”. In other words, whereas the crowd busies itself with religious credos, rules and etiquettes to secure a cloak of safety and status, the richness of the elites’ proper life correlates their rising above religion.Footnote 98
Sadra on the disparity of human essences
Sadra-ye ShiraziFootnote 99 dedicated eloquent arguments to philosophical – and, accordingly, political – inegalitarianism. Highlighting the movement-in-substance, he rejected the Peripatetic negation of change in the substance, and in so doing transcended the canonical scholastic idea that is known as static quiddity. According to Sadra, in substantive change movement and that which moves – that is, the existence, or the real – are identical.Footnote 100 The concrete being/entity is not a composite of an abstract/static essence and existence. As diverse modes and moments in the unfolding current of becoming, entities are transient concrete-universals at once – without the universal/essence being anything like the Real/Idea of the Peripatetics. Like the ever-changing waves of the sea, entities emerge without being anything but the very water/existence; without anything differentiating between the entities/waves besides the respective degrees of intensity of existence/water. The Peripatetic essence claims to be the Real/Universal, responsible for the is-ness – or, the what-it-is – of an entity. Sadra's existence “is” ising: the very creating-anew of the diverse modals of existence – while the creator, the created and the act of creating are identical. As the form/shape of the entity, an essence therefore, is a derivative from a modal of existence and is unceasingly substituted by another form, in the subsequent moment of existence. Accordingly, existence-cum-ising “is” simultaneously the ising of the essences and the metamorphosis of the substances. From an individual entity to another, essential characteristics transmute while the in-between of the two actualities hosts a “potential infinity of middle points”.Footnote 101 Consequently, an essence is a moment of ising fixated in (the Peripatetic) mind as a structure of genus, species or differentia – while, far from being a given rēs, an essence is but a concept abstracted by mind from/during the process of substantial movement. The being of a quiddity, Sadra implies, emerges in an extremely fleeting moment of the mind's experience of the flow/existence – a fragile experience which is itself a moment of dynamic existence. As regards the content of such a quiddity (which represents the what-it-is of the corresponding entity), it is readily swept away by the next moment of the existence: the entity is but the course of its own becoming and hence, the fragility of (the Sadraic) mind's acquaintance with the essence/whatness of an entity. The flood of existence, therefore, continually obliterates all (Peripatetic) “substantial” content of an essence and leaves nothing of the essence but the virtual grin of the Cheshire Cat.Footnote 102 The “mind's analysis” may reify the essence as an immutable order of reality concealed beneath the so-called appearance/material entity; the mind may forget that “the existence of an entity and the existence of its essence are not two things”;Footnote 103 that, as the form of an entity, the essence is “purely virtual”Footnote 104 and, if ontologised, it fails to capture the dynamic reality of existence.
In Sadra's view therefore, scholastic and Peripatetic essentialism is reification: a mode of thought that itself discloses a real moment – or, an epoch – in the process/existence, the only real reality. In other words, the Peripatetic mind, its very being, emergence and duration, its cognitive capability and method (and, its product that is, the Peripatetic metaphysics) are but a mode of existence; a specific complex of existential reality; or, a certain transient phase of unconcealment and unfolding in the systematic flux of existence. In the course of this phase, the Islamicate Peripatetic mind holds that differences, increases and decreases, are not within a singular essence but only in particular existences of an essence that is, in accidents. The metaphysical structure and its binaries follow: existence-essence, nature-supernature, substratum-form, and changing-unchanging. For Sadra, however, the real and authentic reality – that is, the systematic unrest of existence – evinces that as a moment of the flux “each entity is a new emergence”;Footnote 105 that the new is genuinely new, “there is no repetition in [the real/existence's] manifestation”;Footnote 106 and, that no static structure/arche such as the Peripatetics’ essence can establish sameness between unique individuals. Far from being a case of an immobile Universal Essence – say, the Man – each individual entity – say, Socrates – is singular; a product of the course of its own becoming within the processuality of existence which de-stabilises the individual entity. As an eventual flowing moment, the singular in its occurrence shatters the fixity of Peripatetic categories of substance, genus and species. Such categories fancy non-temporal classifications of a totality while motion is (in) existence/totality. Historical contingency, introduced by Sadra to the Peripatetic metaphysics, succumbs the latter's formal structure to what the Peripatetics wished to frame and fixate as the content of such structure – that is, the contingent reality. Its rejection of a common static structure/essence (arche) in individuals makes Sadra's radically inegalitarian world an-archic. His philosophy, therefore, is not metaphysics-as-archaeology. One may detect in Sadra's philosophical corpus a call for overcoming the metaphysics of presence.
In Sadra's eyes the divine is not the meta-physical arche of existence. Rather, at “God's level. . . there is nothing but pure existence”.Footnote 107 God's attributes appearing in religious texts and theologies – e.g. the omnipotent creator, the willful owner of the Day of Judgment – therefore, are but instant-manifestations, or, contingent modes, of the absolute/existence. Thus, the modulation and gradation of existence accounts for Sadra's belief – as stated between the lines – in a genuine plurality of religions as unique moments of existence. Each moment is a singular unconcealment of the absolute/existence into – or, in the form of – a religion. Moreover, Sadra's belief in the radical disparity of the intellects, along with his confidence in the intellectual deficiency of the many, conveys to him two crucial points: A) religious credos/laws are products of the practical wisdom of the few (the prophets). In other words, religious credos/laws as modulations of existence are manifestations in – or, mediated through – practical wisdom; they are moments of the existential intensification of (the prophets’/philosophers’)Footnote 108 practical intellects. And, B) The unfolding of existence in – or, mediated through – practical reasoning, gives a figurative/rhetorical nature, fitting the inferior cognitive capability of the many, to religious credos/laws. These themes will be clear to some extent from what follows.
We should now take as our point of departure the Sadraic principle that an individual – say, Socrates – does not have a static universal genus and species shared by another man – say, Plato. Ideas such as the natural unity of mankind, the equality of human beings in their essence, and the very concept of mankind as a class of entities forfeit their metaphysical vigor.Footnote 109 Radical in its rejection of static/abstract essences, Sadra's inegalitarianism accounts for his belief in the radical disparity of intellects, souls and natures among men. As existential instances, the individuals have identity-in-what-differentiates: their principle of identity – that is, existence, not the Peripatetic essences – is the same as the source of their difference – that is, existence, not the Peripatetic differentia and accidents.Footnote 110 An individual existent is a unique/singular modulation of existence whose degree of existential intensity also accounts for the individual's “fundamental differences”Footnote 111 from another moment-manifestation of the persistently changing existence. Sadra believes in the existential, intellectual, spiritual, material etc., hierarchies among the individuals – also, of an individual in different moments of its own becoming – and explicates it based on differentiation through degrees of intensification of existence for nothing but existence/change is the source of change, differentiation and hierarchy among the existents. “My judgment” he writes, “is that, due to their respective degrees of [existential] intensification some individuals have superiority over others in their diverse essences and natures – in terms of having or lacking preeminence; in terms of priority and posteriority; and, strength and weakness”;Footnote 112 in terms of “perfection and deficiency; primacy and inferiority; prosperity and destitution”.Footnote 113
As formerly discussed, for Sadra the movement-in-substance passes through immeasurable forms/essences that, while in permanent state of flux, appear as motionless to the underdeveloped soul/intellect whose “very substance has not transmuted” from being a practical intellect – which is cognitively dependent on bodily organs – into a pure, needless to senses, and “superior” theoretical intellect.Footnote 114 Such a “transmutation in substance and metamorphosis in essence”Footnote 115 designates a high-level of “intensification in existence”,Footnote 116 altering the intellect into “a rational world that reveals the reality of the existence”.Footnote 117 Hence, the hierarchy among the individuals corresponds to the hierarchy of their cognitive competency. For Sadra, the existential intensification which generates preeminent individuals operates through philosophising. Philosophy, as a way of life, indicates this process of “perfecting one's soul through intellectual cognition” into an integrated soul who combines theoretical and practical knowledge. Intensified and strengthened in its self-hood, the soul whose intellect grasps/unifies with theoretical wisdom “espouses the divine” and “modifies into an intelligible world that conforms to existence” in all forms and formal/rational orders that the latter's movement takes/generates.Footnote 118 This conformity between the perfected intellect and the substantial movement's instantaneous formal orders, Sadra implies, emerges through the merger of the soul/intellect and the intellected – a merger/union which, in Sadra's view, accounts for the phenomenon of knowing. Sadra finds that the intensification of a soul's existence is mediated through furthering knowledge – that is, through further unification of the intellect with the intelligibles: the more union with the intelligibles, the greater substantial metamorphosis of the individual into a superior soul/man.Footnote 119
Through philosophy/knowledge, the more existentially intense one's intellect becomes, the stronger and more felicitous one's soul becomes. Accordingly, the degree of intensification in existence “determines each entity's [say, each man's] difference in essence and property from another being”, and, Sadra proclaims, “without doubt, there is an incredible disparity between human souls as regards perfection and imperfection; nobility and baseness”.Footnote 120 Sadra exhausts four major groups resulting from the flow of becoming of souls and affirms that each class incorporates “innumerable distinct members”. The existential inequality between human individuals, he observes, “exceeds all differences in other entities.” There exist human individuals at the existential “level of the quadrupeds, with appetitive souls; individuals in the class of the lupines, with high-spirited souls; men who are of the devils’ ilk; and, individuals who join the level of the angels”.Footnote 121 What Sadra describes as imperfect, base and inferior souls, therefore, designate human individuals who are featherless biped in their exterior and quadrupeds, lupines or devils in their reality. Far from being a rhetorical manner of speech, Sadra's exhaustion tells him that these individuals’ existential metamorphoses have formed these distinct natures in them: they really – that is, substantially – are/become of these inferior essences. And, Sadra would add, a proper/just political arrangement for these inferior individuals must take into account their existentially inferior status.
“The superior/strong soul”, Sadra upholds “is capable of majestic and extreme deeds of varied types, due to its espousing higher levels of existence – and as opposed to the inferior/weak soul”.Footnote 122 For Sadra, therefore, the hierarchy of the souls/Reasons simultaneously reflects the hierarchy of authority among men, and between man and animal/matter. In their vocations and manufactures – and, “proportionate to their level of humanity” – “the ignoble” men exercise authority over animals and matter. In contrast, “the most perfect among men” enjoy spiritual as well as political authority over the rest.Footnote 123 One among their majestic deeds, therefore, is political governance over the “deficient” or, “primitive/naïve” souls.Footnote 124 These deficient and primitive souls, Sadra affirms, make the “majority of human souls in this world”Footnote 125 and require handholding by the superior souls.
The processuality of existence means for Sadra that the more an entity grows into existential perfection, the less inertia its flow of essences portrays. The essence(s) of a piece of rock is more stagnant than the one(s) of a plant, a quadruped and a human, so much so that one tends to take the rock's “static” nature as the symbol of stagnation. Accordingly, the baseness of the many resides in the inertia of its essential characteristics which for the whole duration of the multitude's worldly life do not change much (and, Sadra would say, this inertia is indeed a specific mode of existence's modulation that is, the multitude). The multitude's soul/intellect does not substantially transcend the state of “imagination and sensation”Footnote 126 in order to transmute into reason in actu,Footnote 127 and then intellectus acquisitus.Footnote 128 According to Sadra, the soul is corporeal in its origination and spiritual in its survival. The disparity of intellects/souls therefore, is accounted for by the disparity in the degrees of completeness of the souls’ substantial transmutations from being a corporeal faculty into a sensing soul; then, a recollective and imaginative soul; then, a practical intellect which, though essentially incorporeal, operates with particular images produced by sensation; then, the actualised, pure and abstract theoretical intellect of a spiritual substance “most intensified in being and elevated to the highest level . . . of divinity” – that is, the prophetic/philosophic soulFootnote 129 or, “the divine rational soul”.Footnote 130 In contrast the crowd's soul reaches at best, the “lowest level of humanity” which requires a “notional” cognition of legal commands, good as well as evil deeds, and beautiful and ugly properties.Footnote 131 Nevertheless, “the majority of men”, observes Sadra, lacks freedom in terms of Reason's authority: the many is “dominated [in the soul] by appetite and material desire. . .and, therefore, needs an overwhelming and coercive political control . . . as the Prophet – peace be upon him – said, ‘it is amazing that a flock of people are directed to Paradise in/by shackles.”Footnote 132
The essential disparity among men associates what Sadra, using a Scholastic terminology (though emptied through de-stabilization from its Peripatetic content, and delivered within Sadra's own philosophical frame), calls the disparity of the human individuals’ “second natures.” The disparity of the substantially mobile essences – or, second natures – of the individuals emerges along with their diverse “sociopolitical practices and interactions as well as with their doing good or evil deeds: hence, the resultant diversity of moral characters among them; hence, the diversity of their essential realities.” “This is why,” Sadra continues “the Prophet Mohammad's luminary soul is incommensurable to the profane, wretched and ignorant soul of a pagan like Abi Lahab”;Footnote 133 indeed, “the majority of people stay aloof from wisdom” due to their social misconducts and immoral deedsFootnote 134 and “nothing is more obscene and absurd than believing that the soul of the Prophet and the one of Abi Jahl are comparable in holding the same totality of essence/species of humanity.”Footnote 135 Though human individuals seem analogous in their bodily appearances, Sadra observes, the level of intensity and perfection in few souls goes beyond comprehension. The rest of men “have a need” to the superior soul/man, the “to-be-followed commander. Otherwise, if all are [politically] equal, the whole material world shall soon collapse since [under the condition of political equality] everyman becomes both the ruler and the ruled.”Footnote 136
Aristotle defines Political Justice in terms of the equality of the citizens’ rights to simultaneously rule and be ruled. As an indicator of the noble polis, political justice is found among men “who share their life with a view to self-sufficiency, men who are free and either proportionately [in distributive justice] or arithmetically [in rectificatory justice] equal, so that between those who do not fulfill this condition there is no political justice but justice in a special sense and by analogy”.Footnote 137 Clearly, Sadra considers men's political equality the cause of not the nobility of communal life but rather of societal decay. He, however, agrees with Aristotle that political justice is only for the freemen and not for the intellectually inferior multitude whose political equality would ruin the city. Quoting from Aristotle, Sadra defines freedom in terms of Reason's “substantial governance” over the soul and concurs that the more Reason/intellect intensifies in existence and perfects in substance, the freer the essence of an individual becomes. In other words, the more a Reason transmutes in essence into a theoretical intellect, the freer – that is, the more in-control; the more masculine – the substance of an individual soul comes to be. “This is why all virtues stem from freedom and theoretical wisdom”.Footnote 138 The analogy of justice – and not the true political justice – that appears in a society of cognitively inferior unfree individuals, will bring the many their fitting felicity – akin to material welfare – and not the “most perfect happiness” accessible solely to the intellectually superior few.Footnote 139 In Sadra's eyes, inasmuch as the few's “true and complete happiness” is achievable by theoretical intellect in terms of substantial alteration of their beings into the intelligible world, the few who master such metamorphoses of essences become either divine philosophers or prophets.Footnote 140 Accordingly, the fitting felicity of the many is but a simile of the true happiness: it is the fair women, castles, banana trees, extended shades and other pleasures of Paradise “heard from religious authorities” and “imagined, fancied and erected as the final goal” by the multitude's faculty of imagination.Footnote 141 It is also “being immune from social chaos and disaster” and is achievable to the many if they are ruled by the few's – the philosopher's or the prophet's – practical intellect.Footnote 142
Similar to the happiness of the multitude in a city ruled by religious laws (which is a simile of true happiness) and analogous to the justice of such a city (which is an analogy of true political justice), religious credos and laws are “founded on metaphors since true religions are for the many” whose inferior intellect cannot surpass “the world of material sensibilia” (itself “a simile of the intelligible world” – that is, Sadra's other-world).Footnote 143 “All metaphors in the Quran and on the prophetic tongue . . . are only for the intellectually weak” – that is, the mass – who can only understand similes of the other-world in terms of Paradise, Hell, and the Day of Judgment;Footnote 144 who, its primitive soul, unaltered in substance into the intelligibles, shall not reach the “other-worldly happiness”.Footnote 145 Sadra cites a Quranic verse to evince his philosophical point – perhaps, for his non-philosophical religious critics: “And these allegories We present to the masses, and only the knowledgeable cognate [their meaning] rationally”.Footnote 146 Nonetheless, Sadra upholds that the very fear of being “punished” by the “absolute dictator” here, in the city, and, by God, in the hereafter, makes the multitude behave in this world, “reach what is beneficial to it, and find the path to its happiness”.Footnote 147 It bears repeating that in Sadra's eyes, religion and religious laws, as the means to realise the multitude's fitting happiness, are products of practical reasoning.
Sadra's above-mentioned treatment of the inequality of human essences in terms of the disparity of their socially formed second natures suggests that the flow of existence – and history – far from being deterministic, occurs, though not exclusively, through the very sociopolitical interactions of human beings. It is my contention that Sadra's text opens a hermeneutic site for the following reading: men's social interactions express/mediate – or, better, are existentially in the same order as – the substantial movement. In other words, the systematic flux of existence is not dualistically related to the emerging sociopolitical realities. Apart from the sociopolitical reality of an era, the substantial movement is a void and abstract universal/idea that is reified while given an ontological status independent from the so-called material reality. In the final analysis, social, economic, and political institutions are expressions of the existence/flux, identical to it (though, in Sadra's view, the being/becoming, and the workings of these social, political and economic factors are not the only instant-manifestations of the existence). Consequently, while the processuality of existence mediates – and is mediated through by – men's second natures inasmuch as individuals’ second natures are the socially made moments of the flow/existence, human essences (or, the instant whatnesses of men) are in part social constructions. Likewise, the baseness of crowds’ souls – socially constructed and, simultaneously, naturalFootnote 148 – is partially explicable based on their specific and historical manner of societal life and interaction. Hence, a potential reading of Sadraic philosophy: modify [democratise] the crowd's life style and its presently inferior intellect shall improve.
A Sadraic political philosophy could subsequently emerge. His philosophy entails that a certain moment of the existential process – or, a specific mode of human interaction: a particular historic bloc – might be an existential modulation through which the perfection of the intellects or the emergence of self-fulfilling – and, thus, more human humans – is better accomplished. In contrast, another mode of societal interaction may deviate from such accomplishment. In other words, a certain pattern of vita activa might be more conducive to the emergence of vita contemplativa, the genuine felicity – while another pattern of societal life may impede the citizens’ self-fulfillment into more perfect/felicitous beings with a noble life. And it is the would-be Sadraic political philosophy that examines the sociopolitical system in regards to the question of its contribution to the noble life. Theoretically speaking, Sadra's philosophy had/has the hermeneutic capital to open a site for the in-coming of such a political philosophy in Iranian thought; a site for the rise of political sensitivity to the nobility of the polis.
Reviving the “ancient doctrine of Natural Law”, the European philosophers of the Enlightenment supported the idea of a universal human nature that is “fundamentally the same in all times and places”. It was in terms of such a Nature that they defined human beings as a species with “ultimate ends” identical to all and with a “logically connected structure” of intellect that could make “the truths known in principle to any man, at anytime, anywhere”.Footnote 149 Those philosophers believed in “intellectual equalitarianism” and viewed reason as “common to all mankind, a common power of rational consideration, which is the ground and inspiration of argument”.Footnote 150 Contemporaneous with Sadra's life span, the late sixteenth-century Europe was witnessing the advent of a humanist view on the origins of the political society and power. The public equalitarian right/sovereignty was to emerge as perpetual, natural, pre-political, inalienable, and nontransferable to the statesmen who, in their turn, must now be governed by the law, give up any claim to custodianship of the masses, and protect the citizens’ natural equality of rights.Footnote 151 Now, “every individual person in the pre-political state of nature” was declared to “have been endowed with a natural right” to power.Footnote 152 Accordingly, the authority to govern and the right to forcible resistance were acknowledged “to be lodged not merely with the people's representatives but with the body of the people themselves.”Footnote 153 Subsequently, the Enlightenment thinkers were to assign universal Natural Rights to the Human Nature.
Sadra's philosophy, however, could not ground universal human rights – including public sovereignty – as Natural Rights, since the substantial flow leaves no Nature intact. But we can take heart from the fact that the philosophy of Natural Rights is not the only way we can conceive universal human rights. In a different but no less vigorous manner, Sadra's would-be political philosophy could ground the equality of citizens’ political rights as a condition of possibility of the existential perfection of men's intellects. The above inspected hermeneutic site in Sadra's philosophy hosts this transcendental argument: insofar as the individuals’ social involvements and their substantial metamorphoses are sides of the same coin, a society that better provides for citizens’ cognitive growth and epistemic access to truth, concurrently manifests the existential intensification and the felicity of citizens. Socially institutionalised human rights and political equality (including freedom of participation in the public sphere) are concrete a priories of such cognitive growth and existential intensification.Footnote 154 Democratic society, therefore, perfects the existence of citizens; it helps them more deliberately – or, more intensely, in Sadra's language – fulfill the process of their selves’ existential becoming. This hermeneutic horizon of political philosophy, however, was never explored by either Sadra or his disciples. In the following centuries, the entrenched presence of the metaphysics of presence – especially, the doctrine of the inert disparity of human natures – resonated with the Sadraic idea of inertia in inferior intellects’ existential metamorphosis, arrested the genuine flow of human essences, and cast a shadow on the Sadraic idea of the social construction of natures. As a result, the horizon of [Sadraic] political philosophy was foreclosed. In subsequent years, the disparity dictum preserved its theoretical status – in part, as an epistemological obstacle – and continued its undemocratic political and moral function.
Conclusion
Ghazzali, Molavi and Sadra, their differences notwithstanding, share the belief that men are not ultimately unified. Inasmuch as these thinkers represent the mainstream in medieval Perso-Islamicate political thought, and influence the commonsense in contemporary Iran, their versions of the disparity dictum present a set of cognitive obstacles to the emergence of democratic and egalitarian thought.
