This is a concise yet comprehensive account of the conflict between Israel and its immediate Arab neighbors. The book examines the conflict starting with the rise of Zionism and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, goes on to describe the establishment of Israel, and then discusses the wars and especially the diplomatic peace efforts thereafter.
Lars Blinkenberg joined the Danish foreign service in 1957 and served until 2000 in various capacities, including ambassador to Syria (1993–99). He strives for and largely achieves a balanced presentation of the conflict. He conveys how each side perceived its situation and acted on those perceptions. This treatment is valuable for analysis and for thinking about policy options.
Although avoiding a partisan position, from time to time Blinkenberg condemns actions that each side has taken. Indeed, all sides have often set objectives and used methods that have made a mutual accommodation highly improbable and have even been counterproductive and self-defeating. Many Americans tend to view Palestinians and Arabs as having behaved negatively while holding the opposite view of Israelis. Blinkenberg's accounts of instances of such conduct by Israel, therefore, may be regarded by some readers as antagonistic to Israel. I think this would be an error.
Blinkenberg relies greatly on the work of historians Benny Morris and Avi Shlaim, who have written critiques of conventional Israeli views of relations with Arab Palestinians. His book would benefit by also drawing more on analyses of Arab and Palestinian missteps, for example, by Rashid Khalidi.
He usefully examines the intermingling of domestic and foreign relations and the complex nature of numerous interlocking conflicts. The author's account of failures to act consistently and in ways that would contribute to a mutually acceptable peace process and outcome deserves attention. Certain choices not made might have averted the disastrous consequences of the actions that were taken. These include policy choices of possible intermediaries as well as various partisans. Missed opportunities to move toward accommodation may have existed in the early 1970s, for example, immediately after Anwar Sadat became president of Egypt, but the opportunities were not recognized.
Although the book provides a conventional account of the relations among Israeli officials and Palestinian leaders and Arab government leaders, Blinkenberg has a concluding chapter noting independent peace efforts: the Geneva Accord of 2003, the Copenhagen Declaration of 1997, the International Folk High School, and Neve Shalom (Wahat al-Salam/Oasis of Peace). This prompts the realization that an analysis of the multiple roles of the many nongovernmental actors in conducting, managing, and transforming the Middle East conflict, in relationship to the official negotiations and other deeds, would be a useful addition to the literature on the protracted Israeli–Arab/Palestinian conflicts.
In a relatively small book about a very large set of long-term conflicts, much material has to be omitted. Nevertheless, some omissions are surprising given the author's experience as a Danish diplomat, which is often evident. One omission is a discussion of Jimmy Carter's and Anwar Sadat's diplomatic and other activities that were precursors to Sadat's appearance in Jerusalem in November 1977. Also missing is a discussion of the limitations of the European Union (EU) in monitoring and influencing Palestinian and Israeli policies during the Oslo peace process. Issues about the role of the EU in the conflict, however, are revealingly discussed in the context of deteriorating conditions after the second intifada erupted and was repressed. The author also devotes a chapter to the efforts of the Quartet (EU, United Nations, Russia, and the United States) to lay out a road map for Palestinians and Israelis to follow to constrain and settle their conflict.
Blinkenberg depicts the horror of the extreme violence after the Israeli–Palestinian negotiations failed in 2000–2001, which resulted in many civilian deaths on both sides. He is highly critical of George W. Bush, Yassir Arafat, and particularly Ariel Sharon for the deepening disaster. His account in the book ends shortly after Arafat's death and with the slight hope that a way out of the terrible circumstances in the Middle East will be achieved.
On the whole, Lars Blinkenberg presents a descriptive account of the conflicts in the Middle East and does not systematically apply theoretical concepts, infer generalizations, or analyze comparable cases. He has written this book with sensitivity, and he shares his feelings as well as his insights and reflections about the tragic conflicts he examines. The writing style is clear, unpretentious, and informal, which makes the book accessible to a wide range of readers. There are numerous photos, mostly of leading figures in the history of the conflict. The book can be used as an undergraduate or graduate text, and it provides an overview for the attentive public of the many interconnected conflicts in the Middle East.
