In this insightful, clearly written, and learned study, Antonio Calcagno focuses needed attention on Edith Stein's three early phenomenological works, dating from 1913 to 1925. He argues convincingly that On the Problem of Empathy (Stein's 1916 doctoral dissertation), Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities (her 1922 Habilitationschrift), and An Investigation Concerning the State (1925) should be “read together as an original and developed social-political theory” (xiii), rather than studied separately, in seeming isolation from each other. In a refreshing move, Calcagno treats them instead as units of thought within a single unfolding argument, which builds from personal self-knowledge (in On the Problem of Empathy) to consciousness of one's self as a participant in social groups (in Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities) to political reflection on the state itself. As Calcagno shows, linking the three works together significantly alters one's perception of each. Calcagno thus achieves a revisionary understanding of Stein's aim in her dissertation, as well as an original account of her political Investigation.
Chapter 1 situates Stein's early social and political philosophy in relation to her later writings. Calcagno observes that Stein's early writings have either been neglected by scholars in favor of her later, explicitly Christian work or (especially in the case of Problem of Empathy) interpreted in retrospect as already anticipating her subsequent religious conversion, when her conscious aim became that of synthesizing “Christian philosophy with phenomenology” (3). The former tendency, Calcagno insists, neglects Stein's early work on the mistaken assumption that the young philosopher simply appropriated the ideas of her brilliant teacher, Edmund Husserl, instead of developing them, synthesizing them with insights from other sources (for example, in sociology, psychology, literature, and political philosophy), and occasionally departing from them. The latter tendency errs in overemphasizing continuities between the pre- and postconversion stages of her thought, at the expense of being blind to obvious differences. According to Calcagno, “Empathy all but disappears in Stein's later work,” which is “marked by a distinctive metaphysical turn” (17).
Chapter 2 argues that “Steinian empathy, contrary to prevailing scholarly readings, is a means of self-understanding or self-knowledge, that, in turn, subsequently gives the self a more general and encompassing comprehension of what it is to be a human person by comparing herself with others” (xiii–xiv). What ultimately concerns Stein, in short, when she pursues the question of the self's ability to grasp a foreign consciousness is not the other's experience per se, but one's own empathic experience of the other's. Beginning at the body, Stein places “self-knowledge… first, in both importance and sense,” maintaining that “it makes possible the transition to the foreign other through empathy” (57). The process does not end there, however. As Calcagno rightly emphasizes, Steinian empathy is “reiterated empathy” (5). What one feels with the other makes one capable of a reflexive empathy with one's self. Calcagno underscores the importance of this: “If the self were not capable of reiterated empathy, one could not form… an image of oneself in the world at different points with different possibilities, nor could one separate oneself from the other” (76).
His strong thesis regarding Steinian empathy as a means to self-knowledge leads Calcagno to note “a limit of empathy” (101) in Stein's account. Stein distinguishes between empathy and love, which “recognizes the person purely as a person… valued for herself and for no other derived value” (101). Thus personhood—both one's own and that of another—“is revealed not through empathy, but through love” (101). Calcagno's threefold critique of Stein's related accounts of empathy and love at the conclusion of chapter 2 suggests to this reviewer that Calcagno has identified a problem in Stein's preconversion philosophy that requires a theological supplement for its correction.
According to Calcagno, Stein's second major work, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, discussed in chapter 3, constitutes a first attempt to transcend the I-centeredness that limits empathy, defined as a “low-level intersubjectivity that grants us awareness of ourselves and others and leads to the conclusion that we all share in something larger and more complex than the I, namely the essence or idea of the human person” (109). Stein's “fuller sense of intersubjectivity,” Calcagno argues, “moves beyond empathy to another kind of consciousness: we-consciousness, or what Stein calls ‘super-individual consciousness'” (109).
In her Habilitationschrift, Stein follows the sociologists Georg Simmel and Ferdinand Tönnies in the identification of “three specific forms of social or intersubjective life: the mass, society, and community,” ordered “from lowest to highest” (112–13). Calcagno argues that “the absence of empathy at the level of the higher forms of intersubjectivity, including society and community, … reveals Stein's awareness of the limited function of empathy, which… cannot fully account for other forms of social consciousness” (120). Analyzing in positive terms Stein's account of communal lived experience, Calcagno finds it remarkable for its “phenomenal description of the basic elements of communal lived experience,” wherein the ego is never completely lost, but shares with the other a “‘we’-experience” (144).
Like chapter 2, chapter 3 concludes with a critical commentary by Calcagno, who calls attention to questions left unanswered by Stein's phenomenology of community—for example, the possibility of an unconscious experience of community (155–56).
Chapter 4 deals with Stein's Investigation Concerning the State. Calcagno argues that this third study belongs at the end of a logical sequence in Stein's thought. While the state, as Stein understands it, is not by definition identical with community, it nonetheless “achieves its highest, thickest sense through communal relations rooted in sovereignty and law” (161). Calcagno explains that Stein sees “the state as being a unique, objective entity, constituted by a community that recognizes the objective nature of the state to legislate and rule” (173).
As Calcagno shows, her high evaluation of personhood and community, clearly evident in her first two books, leads Stein to make explicit critiques of the contractarian, societal theory of the state, chiefly on the grounds that contract theory requires that the state be established through the freely chosen alienation of the natural rights of individuals. Stein questions this alienation of freedom, maintaining the existence of “pure rights” that cannot be alienated because they “belong to the very constitution of a person” (174). “Given the horror of World War I and that Stein was to perish in a concentration camp during World War II,” Calcagno observes, “one can see why Stein might wish to assert an a priori theory of pure right” (174).
In Calcagno's view, however, Stein's Investigation offers an irregular conclusion to her series of intersubjective studies, because it reflects her “own liberal political sentiments” (161), to the detriment of her customarily strict phenomenological method. Calcagno's delineation of these sentiments and of Stein's partisan departures from a pure phenomenology of the state is a major strength of this remarkable book, which provides a compelling analysis of Stein's social and political phenomenology.
