This is a long overdue study that explores the complex structure of sociopolitical competition in the turbulent era (1341–83) that followed the reign of the sultan al-Nasir Muhammad. Steenbergen carefully defines two concepts that shape the thesis of his book: “legitimate power” and its alter ego, “effective power.” He defines legitimate power as that held by the sultan and backed by the shadow of the caliph. On the other hand, effective power is the sociopolitical expression of the military amirs. He analyzes the methods by which effective power was exercised at several crucial moments in this forty-one-year period, a period and process that came to an end only with the ascension of the Burji amir Barquq in 1382. Despite the presence of a detached sociopolitical practice, legitimate power remained a viable institutional framework to be reckoned with, even during the days of puppet sultans. One of Steenbergen's strongest assertions here deals with the way in which a court body of military manpower relied on for defense was transformed into a body politic.
Surveying the wider structure of society, Steenbergen identifies three categories of people who were generally distinguished by their social environment. The first was the common people. The second was an intermediate category of mostly cultural and economic notables, and the third layer, of an exclusively military and urban character, included the sociopolitical elite. The first group, the common people, did at times become involved in the sociopolitical power process. Large urban gangs occasionally became active in conflicts. This political involvement, however, never exceeded the level of direct action but consisted of plundering booty, throwing stones, and providing additional manpower in some violent confrontations. Although these groups could influence government policymaking, they were always used to engage others who were the real policymakers.
The same can be said of the intermediate group of cultural and economic notables and auxiliary military forces. These included the secondary court called the ḥalqa. The ḥalqa can be linked to some of the era's major political conflicts. However, again, its capacity was similar to that of urban gangs. As for the religious and legal scholars, the ʿulamaʾ, and the many clerks employed in the regime's administration, they were subordinate to the real sociopolitical elite, leaving them little room for any serious political involvement.
The third group, those endowed with military rank and income, shaped the power structure. Many amirs of 100, forty, or ten, with personal military corps, were the dynamic center of military and political affairs. Although some of them were of humble status, they all shared a potential to rise and enter the sociopolitical elite, gaining authority, power, and commensurate wealth.
Of great importance is the fact that by the middle of the 14th century, the absence of military challenges had turned the military into a social and political body. Steenbergen identifies some of the features of demilitarization of amirs and how this is reflected in the way in which amiral ranks were opened up. Some individuals—various civilians, including even palace eunuchs—acquired specific privileges that had been the sole preserve of Mamluks, including dress code, horse riding, acquiring a coterie of mamluks, lavish entertaining, and extensive iqṭāʿ income. Another symptom of this unrestricted social mobility was the elevation of awlād al-nās to positions of power and authority. Because there were so few military challenges to the sultanate during this period, it was sociopolitical power in the urban realm of Cairo that was the key focus. What was far more essential was the sultan's control of access to the amirs. Very often the sociopolitical elite's involvement in the enthronement of sultanas did not end with the registration of their consent but continued with their dominance over the new sultan and curtailment of his prerogatives.
Each amir in fact became a miniature sultan his own right. Like the sultan, each amir had his own financial administration, manned by civilians who were crucial to managing a constant flow of income. Each amir had his own soldiers, his own ustādār, a raʾs nawba, a dawādār, an amīr majlis, a jamdāriyya, an amīr akhūr, an ustādār al-ṣuḥba, and a financial advisor. It was through reliance on this staff and independent military organization that the amir became his own power broker. Each one needed that kind of financial administration, manned by civilians, that was crucial to managing a constant flow of income and was crucial in supervising the amir's expenditure to his own household, to his mamluks and their military needs. There was, in the end, a balance between the power of the amirs and the sultan with his own staff and mamluks dependent upon him.
Legitimate power equaled the sultan's God-given authority over institutions, including military ranks and offices, that hosted the sociopolitical elite. In fact, legitimate power was multiplied down the military ranks. The amiral institutions were a kind of clone of the sultan's, in a reduced form that had similar but less demanding institutional needs and solutions. This was a process of emanation from the sultan's legitimate power into clusters of parallel institutions around the amirs. Legitimate power remained crucial, but it was, as Steenbergen says, an object that could be molded rather than the vital subject of the political culture and process.
Steenbergen emphasizes what is apparent from his earlier discussions: effective power (as expressed by certain amirs or groups of amirs) carried more weight in this period than legitimate power. One of the hallmarks of effective power was reflected in the terminology used for that purpose in the sources. Terms like tadbīr and taṣarruf, often clarified as the ability of these individuals to promote people in the military ranks, stood out as prominent indicators of power—giving the power to appoint any administrative position regardless of their lack of legitimate authority. It was only in 1382 that Barquq managed to maintain order that he had created out of the chaos of the late 1370s. Now prospects for long-term stability became very real. Barquq went so far as to try to portray himself as the regime's very first sultan, cutting any link publicly with the Qalawunids. Finally, real long-lasting order emerged from chaos.
