In this recent book, Michael S. Kochin explores the relation between the Greek philosopher's principal and longest dialogues, the Republic and the Laws. In both works, Plato seeks to transform the excessively “manly” culture of Athens that relies on the exclusion of the feminine into a more moderate one that is more conducive to his unitary view of human excellence. He does so, first, by appealing rhetorically to the macho stereotypes held by his male audience, especially those pertaining to women, and eventually by encouraging his readers to envision an alternative political society in which men and women are treated equally, as individuals. “Plato is thus willing to play on the continued existence of a distinction between male and female virtues in order to move the two standards closer to the single human standard,” Kochin writes (p. 2).

To curb the excessively masculine and thus tyrannical ambitions of his interlocutors in the Republic, Socrates constructs a view of the virtues that deals with conflicting desires by organizing them in “hierarchies aimed at final goods” and by redefining justice as “the good of one's own soul” (pp. 5, 6). To instill moderation in these men, Socrates then “incorporates the female within the city and its military life” by redefining military activity to encourage education rather than subjugation (p. 6). Socrates proffers communism in his ideal city because it best allows for the unified conception of the virtues he desires. Although the Socratic best city may be natural, it is not necessarily attainable because of the over-whelming difficulties involved in abolishing the family and redirecting the soul toward the individualized self in such a radical way.

Kochin sees the Laws as contradicting the Republic in its apparent inegalitarianism. Although in the Laws the Athenian Stranger seeks to combat the masculine cultures of Sparta and Crete, his alternative city of Magnesia still excludes women from political life and civic education, relegating them to the private sphere of the family. This is because the Athenian Stranger ultimately fails to unify the virtues and thereby present a view of human nature that overcomes the separate and unequal status of women. He constructs a city that requires a slavish obedience to law, not philosophy. Not all is lost, however, as the establishment of the Nocturnal Council allows for the possibility of improving the city through secret reform of the laws mainly by observers who travel to foreign lands. And this reform requires rhetorical skills of persuasion.

Kochin contributes to Platonic political theory by uniting several schools of thought, especially that which traces Plato's transformative use of Greek rhetorical practices and that which offers a somewhat sympathetic view of Plato's account of women and gender. His analysis also deserves praise for its close reading of important portions of the Republic and Laws. For example, Kochin challenges those who condemn the erosion of individual identity in the Republic by pointing to textual evidence in Book Five that, in fact, “the guardians do not confuse their own persons and bodies (their proper interests) with those of their fellows” (p. 74). Along similar lines, Kochin's study reveals the tension in the text of the Laws between provisions allowing for the equality of women and others that oppress women (pp. 93–100), and it calls attention to easily overlooked clues that the patriarchal society of Magnesia is indeed open to reform and improvement (pp. 126–30).

Also valuable are Kochin's provocative observations about the contradictions in modern political thought from which feminism inherits many of its conundrums, such as the contemporary insistence that individuals “enter politics with fixed preferences about the policies that affect their interests,” on the one hand, and the belief, on the other, that “men and women enter into the rhetorical situation in order to form their preferences about collective actions and organize themselves into a body capable of acting collectively” (p. 11, emphasis in original). As a result of such contradictions, Kochin argues, genuine debate among those with opposing points of view is virtually impossible. Thus we see not only the erosion of patriarchal communities but also the undermining of the very possibility of a legitimate community capable of dealing with pressing political problems, such as inequality between the sexes (p. 12).

What is striking about this very brief study, however, is what is not said. Gender and Rhetoric in Plato's Political Thought may accurately diagnose some of the problems faced by feminism, but its failure to address basic questions often raised in feminist critiques compromises the overall message. For instance, following his own arguments to their logical conclusion, should we, like Plato in Kochin's characterization, condemn male homosexuality as merely a form of exploitative pederasty that destroys the political community (pp. 114–15)? Is “right pederasty,” Kochin's term for a nonsexual relationship based on the educative needs of both parties, ever acceptable (pp. 113–16)? And would the unquestioning embrace of androgyny really demonstrate that we take “seriously the problem of the relation between the needs of the community and the happiness of the individual,” as Kochin suggests (p. 133)? It is worth remembering as well that improvement of the condition of women does not necessarily bring equality, although Kochin often refers to both interchangeably. Finally, the possibility that women would object to the less manly, more moderate, and just individual as described by Plato because it is still tinged with excessive masculinity is never really contemplated. As he bypasses important questions such as these, Kochin falls rather short of his own insistence that persuasion forms the basis of true consent.

Kochin's treatment of scholarship and his textual analysis are not wholly without difficulties either. Although he rightly questions commentaries that downplay the seriousness of Plato's political teachings in the Republic, he overlooks others that challenge the veracity of particular ideals (e.g., communism and the abolition of the family) and yet see Plato offering an alternative approach to political life as informed by philosophy. For instance, Jacob Howland argues in The Republic: The Odyssey of Political Theory (1993) that Books Six and Seven go beyond the educative warfare model Kochin claims is so central in Book Five and instead embraces a philosophic education that is even more conducive to justice. By contrast, Kochin's analysis of the Republic says virtually nothing about Books Six or Seven—arguably the most important parts of the dialogue.

Those who seek a refreshing twist on familiar texts will find much edification in this book. But those who seek to better reconcile antiquity and modernity by moving beyond unhelpful dichotomies—such as Kochin's contrast between the “perspective of the few,” which for him characterizes political philosophy, and “the true interest of the unphilosophic many,” from which he suggests feminism emerges (p. 17)—may very well be frustrated in their efforts.