In this volume G. brings out an understudied and underdiscussed element of Seneca’s writings – the way in which affective states can have morally salutary effects through providing a mimicry of the mental states of the wise. G. achieves this through a combination of close readings of a selection of Seneca’s texts and discussions of contemporary work in affect theory and queer theory. The point of the work, according to G., is not to show that Seneca is an unorthodox Stoic – instead it is to show how Stoic views on emotions may be more nuanced than they first appear, even for someone writing within the bounds of orthodox Stoicism. G. succeeds in complicating the picture of Stoic emotions as a universally negative element of human psychology.
As a Stoic, Seneca is committed to several binary categorisations of human psychology. People are either happy or unhappy, either wise or foolish, either virtuous or wicked. Those who are happy, wise and virtuous are sages, and everyone else is a non-sage and is equally unhappy and foolish. In contrast to the ‘good feelings’ (eupatheia), exclusive to the sage, emotions (pathē), such as fear, anger or grief, are understood to be mental movements that occur only in non-sages. G., without arguing that Seneca deviates from this essential element of Stoic orthodoxy, shows how a picture of emotions as universally negative does not have clear support in Seneca’s writings, and his role for emotions is a good deal more complex. Affective states can provide people on the non-sage side of the binary with, in certain cases, imitations of the mental states found in the sage.
This phenomenon can be seen particularly clearly in Seneca’s descriptions in the Natural Questions of natural disasters and the reactions of those who suffer them. Seneca describes how those seeing a cataclysmic flood have a reaction that is, in some ways, similar to what a sage would feel. Upon seeing the flood, the sage, with their perfect reason, knows that there is nothing bad in such an event, as it is merely an indifferent – something which might not be preferred, but which is no true evil. Because of this proper understanding of things, the sage feels no fear or distress. This seems to be quite different for the non-sage, who would normally view such a flood as a great evil, a disaster worthy of terror or grief. Yet the emotion of amazement and shock at these events drowns out the possibility of misery and fear, providing an imitation of the sage’s true detachment: a quasi-serenity.
G. does not just report on these affective elements in Seneca, but also interprets them in the light of contemporary affect theory, using this to categorise and describe the different roles that Seneca has for emotions. For the above example of the flood she shows how Seneca’s description of the numbing effects of stupefaction in the face of disaster has significant parallels with Sianne Ngai’s theory of emotion, particularly her description of stuplimity, the emotionless state that can result from a lack of comprehension. G.’s work benefits from her familiarity with both contemporary texts in affect theory and the Senecan texts she treats, and she is able to integrate these elements in a balanced and measured way.
The book further benefits from the variety of Seneca’s writings that G. sets out to cover. To show how Seneca incorporates affect in different ways, G. does not limit herself to a single work or genre of works, but discusses a variety of Seneca’s writings across multiple genres. While the Natural Questions receives the most attention, spanning several chapters, his moral letters and the tragedy Troades are also addressed in detail. In the discussion of the Troades G. draws an especially interesting parallel between Seneca’s description of Andromache’s desire not to care for her future (a desire that is foiled as long as her son is alive) and the concept of anti-futurity in queer theory. As long as these comparisons to contemporary theory are not read into Seneca in an anachronistic way, they provide a memorable and helpful way to bring out the elements of his philosophy upon which G. focuses, even if not all of the comparisons are equally apt.
Although some readers will likely be more familiar with Seneca’s texts and others more familiar with affect theory, the work is presented in such a way that familiarity with both areas is not necessary to appreciate the parallels that G. draws. While the work is geared more towards those familiar with Seneca, it could nevertheless serve as an introduction to his works for unfamiliar readers, and for those who are familiar with Seneca, her use of contemporary affect theory adds an interpretative richness to the material. Regardless of background, G.’s work will almost certainly present something new and interesting to any reader.
