The concept of humanity takes up a prominent place in the discourse on international (criminal) law. This is perhaps most evident in the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), where one can read in the preamble “[m]indful that during this century millions of children, women and men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity.” One may regard the ICC’s jurisdiction over crimes against humanity (in addition to that over the crime of aggression, war crimes and genocide) as a further refinement of the statement in the preamble. Paradoxically, given its central place in (the discourse on) international (criminal) law, the concept of humanity remains far from clear. There is an ongoing debate in international (criminal) law on the role and status of humanity.Footnote 1 Some scholars point to the increasing role of “human” consideration in international law,Footnote 2 and even presenting humanity as a founding principle of the international constitutional order.Footnote 3 Others, however, have greeted these references to humanity as a constitutive principle of international law with scepticism, reminding us of the political origins of all claims to universalism.Footnote 4 The picture does not get much clearer when one turns to the concept of a crime against humanity. Ever since its introduction at the Nuremberg trials, lawyers, philosophers and political theorists have been engaged in a discussion on the meaning and scope of the concept, what kind of harm and to whom it postulates and whether or not it is supposed to capture a new kind of evil, among many other aspects.Footnote 5 The philosophically interested reader may benefit from the work of Norman Geras, who mapped the different conceptions in both legal and philosophical debates.Footnote 6 These interpretations may be divided into two groups following two basic understandings of humanity. If one takes humanity in the sense of (hu)mankind or the human race, crimes against humanity may be interpreted in the following six ways: as diminishing the human race, as threatening the peace and security of humankind, as breaching the sovereign authority of humankind, as threatening its existence and, finally, as all humankind as the victims of this kind of crime. If one understands humanity as a quality of behavior or a sentiment, there are at least four possible readings of crimes against humanity: as inhumane acts, as grave or “inhuman” acts, as acts against the human status or condition and as “genocidal acts”. As Geras also argues,Footnote 7 (some of) these interpretations may be combined to achieve a more precise understanding of the concept. The work of Hannah Arendt has become a topos in this debate, without, however, offering a magical formula to answer all questions. Her interpretation of crimes against humanity as against the human status is, nevertheless, still very influential.Footnote 8
In this article, I would like to contribute to an elucidation of the concept of humanity in international (criminal) law. Instead of engaging in a purely conceptual exercise, I will analyse how the concept of humanity and the related notions of dehumanization and rehumanization are employed in the case of Duch. I have chosen this specific case because it is a relatively recent case of an international criminal tribunal which is still at work, in which the defendant was accused and ultimately found guilty of crimes against humanity. Interestingly, notions of humanity and inhumanity were used by several parties: prosecutors, attorneys for civil parties but also—and herein lies the true value of this case for our purposes—the defendant’s lawyer and Duch himself declared that the latter was dehumanized. This part of the article aims at mapping the different guises of humanity in the case of Duch.
In a second move, I will put these findings in a philosophical context. For this part of the article, I will mainly build on the work of Arendt, and not only because of the continuous relevance of her reflections on evil,Footnote 9 and the crucial place her oeuvre has occupied in the philosophy of international criminal law.Footnote 10 Another reason to make use of Arendt’s work to analyse the discourse on humanity in the case of Duch is given by several parties of the case, for they themselves refer to her work. I would like to stress that I do not intend to contribute to the already expansive literature on Eichmann in Jerusalem. Rather, I will draw on Arendt’s work to devise a conceptual framework to analyse humanity, dehumanization and rehumanization in the case of Duch. This article proceeds with a short introduction of the facts of the case of Duch (section 1). Then, I will outline the discourse on dehumanization (section 2) and on rehumanization (section 3). In sections 4 and 5, I will use an Arendtian framework to analyse these discourses in order to grasp what is at stake in the concept of humanity in international criminal law as it appears in the case of Duch.
1. Case 001: Duch
Before introducing the facts of the case, it might be useful to say something about the court which issued the decision.Footnote 11 The Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia (ECCC) is officially an ad hoc Cambodian tribunal with international assistance of the United Nations. Practically, this means that the tribunal’s staff (e.g., the judges) consists of both Cambodians and foreigners. It was established in 2006 for the purpose of bringing to trial major suspects of crimes committed during the reign of the Democratic Kampuchea regime, more commonly known as the Khmer Rouge. Its reign lasted from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979. During this period, 1.7 million people died as a result of the regime. Instituted under Cambodian law but with international assistance, the ECCC is a hybrid court. Its jurisdiction is temporally limited to the period of the Khmer Rouge regime. Its personal jurisdiction covers “senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible” for crimes committed during the period between 17 April 1975 and 6 January 1979. Regarding the subject matter, the tribunal’s jurisdiction covers both national and international crimes, such as genocide, crimes against humanity and breaches of the Geneva Conventions.Footnote 12
The defendant in the very first case before the court was Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch. Starting from 1975 until he was forced to flee from the Vietnamese army in 1979, Duch took up several positions within S-21, Taul Sleng. This was “the Khmer Rouge’s most important interrogation, detention, torture and extermination centre.”Footnote 13 Most notably, Duch was the chairman of S-21 from March 1976 until January 1979. At least 12,380 people, the majority of which Cambodians, were killed in S-21. Duch was charged with and ultimately found guilty of crimes against humanity and breeches of the Geneva Convention.
S-21 played a pivotal role in Democratic Kampuchea. As a chairman of the prison, Duch fell directly under and had immediate contact with the Central Committee, the highest executive organ of the Khmer Rouge. Furthermore, when the internal purges started, Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) cadre were sent to S-21.Footnote 14 The overall purpose of S-21 was to kill everyone who entered.Footnote 15 This is something Duch has admitted.Footnote 16 Moreover, it was the aim of S-21 to uncover as many traitors as possible.Footnote 17 Here, torture played a crucial role.Footnote 18 While he admits that he has ordered the systematic torture of detainees at S-21, Duch denies to have tortured himself.Footnote 19 It was, however, only Duch who could decide when a prisoner would be executed.Footnote 20 Even besides the torture and the killing, life for the detainees was very hard.Footnote 21 Also, “[e]vidence suggests that S21 personnel performed medical experimentation on prisoners.”Footnote 22
Regarding the life of Duch, the following aspects are of interest for our purposes. Duch was born in the province of Kampong Thom on the 17th of November, 1942. His parents were poor peasants of Chinese origin. He was a very good student and ultimately became a math teacher in 1965, working in a small village called Skoun. Learning about communism as a schoolboy, Duch was a devoted Maoist by the time he became a teacher. His students later described him as “a sincere, devoted man, always seeking to help the impoverished.”Footnote 23 In 1967, Duch joined the Khmer Rouge in hiding from the authorities. He was, however, arrested in January 1968 and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment for breaching state security. As part of a general amnesty for political prisoners, Duch was freed on 18 March 1970. Five years later, the Khmer Rouge took power. Duch married his wife in 1976 and had four children with her.Footnote 24 Before coming to S-21, Duch worked as the chairman of another security prison, M-13. He did this from July 1971 until January 1975. Here, he already worked under the orders of Son Sen, an appointed chairman of the General Staff.Footnote 25
After the capitulation of 1979, Duch still remained and fled with the Khmer Rouge for more than 10 years. He says that he was basically their prisoner. He was mainly ordered to teach, for example his superior Son Sen sent him to China to teach Khmer. Only in 1992, Duch lost contact with his commanders.Footnote 26 He was now in Phkoâm village, where he continued to teach but also traded in rice and bred pigs. He lost his wife in a mysterious burglary in 1995, for which he blames Pol Pot (Duch believes it to have been an attempt to assassinate him). In 1996, he converted to Christianity and had his children baptized. From 1997 onwards, Duch worked as a humanitarian for the American Refugee Committee, amongst others, and became a respected person in the camps. In 1999, Duch was discovered and between 1999 and 31 July 2007 he was held without a charge at the Cambodian Military Prison in Phnom Penh.Footnote 27
The psychological examination before the trial concluded that Duch was fully responsible for his acts, that he was highly intelligent and possessed a good memory.Footnote 28 Indeed, “Duch has consistently recognised his responsibility for the crimes committed at S21 under his command.”Footnote 29 His regret notwithstanding, the experts observed that Duch suffered from what they call “disempathy,” i.e., “Duch’s imagination is limited in scope, as is his ability to put himself in other people’s shoes.”Footnote 30 Unlike other defendants at the ECCC, Duch confessed his crimes, cooperated with the court and showed remorse.Footnote 31 Duch was first convicted to 35 years, and in higher instance to 40 years imprisonment for the crimes of which he was found guilty.
2. Dehumanization in the case of Duch
In this section of the article, I will analyse the discourse on dehumanization in the case of Duch. If we ask the question “who was dehumanized?”, then we find three answers, three “objects of dehumanization”. First of all, Duch’s victims were dehumanized. The people who were tortured and killed under the responsibility of Duch were dehumanized. Second, as the concept of crimes against humanity seems to imply, not only the direct victims of Duch but also humanity itself is dehumanized because of the atrocities committed in S-21. These first two dehumanizations appear in the closing statement of the prosecutor Smith and of two attorneys for the victims. The third answer to the question who was dehumanized is, surprisingly perhaps, Duch himself. In all these instances, it is Duch who does the dehumanization. In other words, Duch is both the subject and the object of dehumanization. I will now discuss these three “objects of dehumanization” in the sequence in which they were mentioned.
The closing statement of international prosecutor William Smith basically addresses two issues. The first is the legal interpretation of Duch’s individual criminal responsibility. The second issue regards sentencing. With regard to the former theme, it is important for our purposes that Smith wants the Court to find Duch guilty for Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE), a specific form of commission. In this way, Smith links Duch’s behaviour and the “horrific efficiency of S-21”Footnote 32 with deeds tried by other international criminal courts, including Nuremberg.Footnote 33 Without getting into the legal technicalities, this does imply that Smith wants Duch to be seen as completely in charge of the well-planned murders in S-21.Footnote 34 Regarding the sentencing, Smith mentions that the acts committed within S-21 were “heinous and shocking”,Footnote 35 to the extent that they are “rarely matched in modern history in terms of their combined barbarity, scope, duration, premeditation and callousness.”Footnote 36 Furthermore, the way in which Duch committed the crimes is telling, according to Smith: “Taken together, the evidence does not show a fearful man. To the contrary, it demonstrates a confident man who spreads terror across Cambodia through his work at S-21; a man who was irreplaceable in his position.”Footnote 37 Smith described Duch as “an experienced, hardened torturer and killer well before arriving at S-21”,Footnote 38 as someone who “committed his crimes as a devoted man with the enthusiasm and zeal of an ardent revolutionary.”Footnote 39
Asking for a severe punishment and doubting the extent and truth of Duch’s remorse, Smith pleads punishment for the sake of humanity: “We believe that to take the first step in righting the wrongs of S-21, humanity must be made whole by sternly punishing one of its own for ignoring it so gravely. Doing so will do far more for humanity, and even the accused’s humanity, than giving in to a misguided notion that a disproportionately low sentence somehow facilitates reconciliation.”Footnote 40 Due to the fair trial he received, Duch was already treated with more humanity than he ever showed to his victims.Footnote 41 In forgetting the dignity of his victims, Duch also forgot his very own conscience.Footnote 42 Finally, after arguing that Duch should be punished with 40 years of imprisonment, Smith submits that also this is for the sake of humanity: “Not just the victims and their families, but the whole of humanity demands a just and proportionate response to these crimes and this Court must speak on behalf of that humanity. It must punish the accused justly and send a clear message that crimes like these must never be perpetrated again. Cambodians have come to this Court from their towns and villages from around the country. Many have come from overseas and millions of others are watching intently on TV. They are waiting for a justice that tells us how humanity will be protected. They are waiting for a justice that tells them and tells those distant voices from S-21 that this justice was done in their name, every single one of them. Mr. President, Your Honours, let your judgement speak for justice in finding this accused guilty and imposing the sentence we have recommended; a sentence which reflects criminal responsibility for more than 12,000 crimes. In imposing this penalty, you are not taking away the accused’s humanity, but you are giving it back; back to the victims of S-21.”Footnote 43
When we analyse this closing statement of Smith, we can see that humanity appears in a number of veins. It appears as humaneness in the sense of the way in which Duch is treated by giving him a fair trial, and this humaneness he denied to his victims. Then, humanity appears as human dignity, i.e., as an impersonal norm or ideal which should have urged Duch to follow his conscience. Furthermore, humanity comes back in the meaning of the whole community of mankind which demands a severe punishment, and Smith even holds that the Court represents that humanity and should protect it.Footnote 44 Finally, humanity appears as an attribute which can be taken away and given back. Duch has taken the humanity from his victims, the Court, so Smith argues, is to give it back to them, and perhaps even to Duch himself.
In their final statements, two attorneys for the civil parties also referred to humanity. First, Ms. Jacquin denies that Duch has really asked for forgiveness because there were no “words of deep contrition, of apology, of forgiveness, and of humanity, vis-a-vis the victims.”Footnote 45 She also speaks of Duch failing “to preserve the fundamental humanitarian values such as everyone’s right to life.”Footnote 46 Humanity thus appears here in the sense of humaneness and the values inherent in human rights and humanitarian law. The other attorney of the victims, Mr. Cannone, does not explicitly mention humanity, save for pointing to the “humanism” in Roux’s final statement. Expressing his disappointment with Duch’s absence of true remorse, he submits “Mr. Kaing Guek Eav only for a very fleeing moment conferred upon them the status of a human being so that victims could transcend hatred and turn towards the future.”Footnote 47 He ends on the following note: “This is most troubling. This is most troubling because perhaps this gentleman has not understood a single thing. Perhaps he is still in his methodical mind set. He is still lost in his footnotes. He is still ensconced in the most absurd bureaucracy where reasoning, contemplation and sensitivity were completely absent.”Footnote 48 This lack of understanding and overall bureaucratic attitude of which Duch is accused here, is something we will return to in section 4.
Recall that Duch himself was also an “object of dehumanization”. Duch is dehumanized, and even in two ways. On the one hand, “Duch has been widely described inside and outside the courtroom as a “monster”.”Footnote 49 It is important to acknowledge that what is referred to here is a “moral monster” as distinguished from the purely “scientific monster”: “While the monster in the scientific sense represents a maximal divergence with regards to normality (…) and is thus neutrally definable in statistical terms, things are seen quite differently from the moral point of view: (…) we loathe it because of its crimes, its appalling cruelty and its ‘inhumanity’. What does this mean? The corruption of a free being, the surrender to evil for the sake of evil. What does humanity then become? It degenerates, as if seized by a sort of regressive fever. (…) Moral monstrousness is an insane squandering of the possibilities of freedom.”Footnote 50 François Roux, Duch’s international defence lawyer, firmly rejects this characterization.Footnote 51 In this respect, Roux submits that depicting Duch as a monster would make his client into a scapegoat.Footnote 52 Later, Roux explains exactly what he means by this latter notion: “I would like it to be clearly understood what is meant when I use the expression ‘scapegoat’. As you well know, scapegoats in societies, including societies of old, was loaded with all the evils, with all the suffering of a society. All of this was loaded onto the head of a goat. Amongst the Hebrews, the goat was sent into the desert so that the social group could be reformed because they would say, ‘This goat bears all our wrongdoings’. That is the scapegoat.”Footnote 53
Duch is, however, also dehumanized in another way. By committing the crimes he has confessed, by dehumanizing his victims and humanity, Duch has dehumanized himself in the sense that he has made himself an outcast of humanity (inhuman, or outsider of humanity). This is a category which does not coincide with that of a monster. This can be derived from the fact that whereas the latter category was firmly rejected by Roux, the one of Duch as “an outcast of humanity” is upheld by both Roux and Duch himself. Interestingly, both Duch and his attorney understand the effects of the crimes committed by Duch to be as such. Already in his very first statement, Duch says “I am sure that the general public now regards me as a cowardly and inhumane person.”Footnote 54 On 2 September 2009, he states that “I asked them [i.e., two psychological experts involved in the trial] to counsel me about what I could do to make the world see me as a human being once again. For that is where my remorse lies.”Footnote 55 Duch returns to this problem fourteen days later: “Lastly, I asked the psychologists what I should do so that humankind might know and accept me as a person again. I am still questioning myself about this issue. I am grappling with it constantly.”Footnote 56 When back at Tuol Sleng for a crime scene re-enactment, Duch remembers “the wretched victims and their families who were subjected to suffering, torture, disgrace and countless inhumane acts before they lost their lives.”Footnote 57 He then comes to “the inevitable acknowledgment that in the role of S-21 director I participated in crimes against humanity within the entire framework of S-21.”Footnote 58 He ends his final statement saying: “I have made a genuine request to the psychological experts to help me with the ideas on what I can do to make people recognize me as part of humankind again. In order to contribute to relieving the great sorrow of the Cambodian people, I promise I will do everything for my people, should they need me in the future in whatever circumstances. I pray the Court consider this additional point when it makes its decision.”Footnote 59 Duch thus calls the acts committed within S-21 “inhumane” and acknowledges that he is guilty of crimes against humanity. This has made him into someone who stands outside of humankind. Through his remorse, his apologies and the forgiveness of the survivors, he hopes to be part of mankind again.
3. Rehumanization in the case of Duch
François Roux, Duch’s international defence lawyer, also acknowledged that Duch’s acts have cast him outside of humanity. Indeed, his whole plea consists in a proposed return to humanity of Duch.Footnote 60 In his opening statement, Roux phrases it as follows: “What allows a man who is confronting all of this, what allows him to remain today alive? If it is not because he is convinced that he still has a role to play in humanity? By requesting, by asking for forgiveness from the victims, by address[ing] himself to his people. By addressing himself to young people. By telling them ‘this is it, this is what we have done, this is what we fell into, this is what you should never repeat’.”Footnote 61 And at the end of the statement, Roux formulates the stakes of the whole trial: “I am not sure that Duch on his own has the answer to this tragic question: why all of this? Why these scenes? These unthinkable scenes, these unbearable scenes at S-21? Why these scenes that de-humanize the victims? But who also de-humanize at the same time those that perpetrated these atrocities. Will we be able at the end of these hearings to have, to be able to return to the victims all of the humanity? But to also be able to allow those or the one who, had exited humanity to return to humanity. This is the stake, for our court.”Footnote 62 Not only does Roux explicitly say that victims and perpetrators of atrocities are dehumanized, he also makes the reversal of the process—the rehumanization of both groups—the ultimate goal of the trial.
How can we understand this plea for re-humanization? If we analyse the closing statement of Roux, it becomes evident that for him it forms the opposite of a monsterization of Duch. Roux states that even though Duch admitted his moral and legal responsibility from the very first day, “the prosecutor decided to submit a conventional, traditional argument whose underlying philosophy is as follows. This man is a monster, even though they said ‘I am not saying this man is a monster’. In fact, the attempt was made to portray him as such.”Footnote 63 Instead, the task which lies ahead is that “we must try to understand the mechanisms that lead a man, who is a decent man by all accounts, to become a torturer.”Footnote 64 While depicting Duch as a monster would make him into a scapegoat, one “will not advance by so much as a millimetre in the development of humanity,”Footnote 65 the alternative of Roux a contrario does serve this aim. So, we may already distinguish between two subjects of rehumanization: Duch and humanity/mankind itself. It is striking that one dehumanised group is missing: the victims and survivors. This seems to be no omission of Roux but a deliberate choice. In the context of a legal trial, there is no place for a (full) rehumanization of the victims because the task of the judge is to render justice, as he tells the Court: “the best way forward for a tribunal is that at the end of the day justice is rendered. You are not in charge of effecting reconciliation. It is not your obligation to impose upon the victims a duty of forgiveness. That is not your work. Nobody can force the victims to forgive. This is a matter for them alone, but you must and you should render justice.”Footnote 66
As an attorney, Roux specialised in defending people who performed acts of civil disobedience.Footnote 67 For Duch, Roux makes use of what he considers the opposite category. Referring to the famous Milgram experiment, he states that Duch’s crimes were crimes of obedience.Footnote 68 This resonates in Duch’s own final statement that he was merely “a cog in an unstoppable machine.”Footnote 69 Indeed, Roux argues, making Duch into a monster is far too simple and easy a solution, for it would prevent us from asking the difficult question: “‘This will not happen again,’ they say. Well, let me tell you it will happen as long as we haven’t brought up with lucidity the phenomena that lead a normal man to become one day an executioner.”Footnote 70 As an attorney of people who consciously and deliberately disobeyed the law, he knows about their difficulties in court and his most powerful argument in this regard throws us back upon ourselves: “if we do not learn how to disobey in a democratic system, what will we do in a dictatorship? However, speaking about disobedience, that sends us so much back to ourselves, sends us back to what we live through every day. How—how in any democratic state, how do all the armies operate? Or more simply, all of the administrations, how do they function? And even more simply, all of our societies? At all levels you have a boss receiving orders and a boss giving orders to his subordinates. You know this very well. I even heard that in this courtroom, people saying to the Chamber, ‘I cannot answer you. I must ask my superior for his permission.’ Yes, indeed. That’s how we all operate; all of us. We all operate in this way.”Footnote 71 Roux’s plea for Duch’s rehumanization is thus based on the bridging of the gap between Duch and us. In other words, the difficulty of the question lies exactly in the fact that it puts us in front of the mirror, so to say: “To find the source of evil that was implemented each and every single day in S-21, we didn’t have to look any further than ourselves. This is terrifying, but this is far removed from the very easy explanation of identifying a scapegoat.”Footnote 72 The challenge is to see the man behind the torturer.Footnote 73 Given that the main purpose of sentencing is rehabilitation,Footnote 74 the issue is: “can Duch still be useful to humanity? That is the question that you will ask yourselves.”Footnote 75
Two attorneys for the civil parties take the opportunity to directly react on Roux’s plea. Both Kong PiseyFootnote 76 and Pierre-Olivier SurFootnote 77 refer to Arendt’s statements regarding Eichmann in order to refute Roux’s argument for Duch only obeying orders. More interesting still, Pierre-Olivier Sur directly takes issue with the Roux’s attempt at a rehumanization of Duch by casting doubts on the precise meaning of such a process. He states that “Duch finally is seeking through his counsel to be rehumanized. Indeed, it is important that the Chamber treat him as he was treated during these proceedings; that is to say, with respect to the defence and with respect to the person he is, but if he has to be rehumanized, what does this mean? What does it mean to be rehumanized? It means that if we have to bring him back to our community of human beings, this means that we have to consider that he is part of our social group, that he is a member of the social contract that unites us all and that generates our society. So he must be judged in his role; that is to say, the role of a criminal, a criminal against humanity.”Footnote 78 Thus, according to this statement of Sur, recognizing the humanity of Duch implies taking him seriously as a fellow human being who wronged the very community of mankind and ought to be punished for that.Footnote 79
In sum, in these last two sections we have seen that humanity is referred to in Duch’s statements and in the plea of Roux in the following contexts: inhumane acts or behaviour (crimes against humanity), the community of mankind, an outcast of humanity (inhuman), and a monster. In the next two sections, we will take up several aspects of the discourse on humanity and analyse them from an Arendtian framework.
4. Reading the case of Duch with Hannah Arendt
From an Arendtian perspective, three issues may be raised in connection to the case of Duch: the purpose of the trial, the nature of a crime against humanity, and the question of (the banality of) evil. When it comes to the purpose of the trial, recall Roux stressing that a trial ought to render justice. For him, this entailed the rehumanization of Duch. Here, Arendt seems to be in agreement with Roux, for in Eichmann in Jerusalem she writes: “The purpose of a trial is to render justice and nothing else (…) to weigh the charges brought against the accused, to render judgment, and to mete out due punishment.”Footnote 80 In this respect, Arendt stresses the importance of distinguishing the civil law suit which centres on the concept of (individual) harm from a criminal trial: “Criminal proceedings, since they are mandatory and thus initiated even if the victim would prefer to forgive and forget, rest on laws whose ‘essence’ (…) ‘is that a crime is not committed only against the victim but primarily against the community whose law is violated.’ The wrongdoer is brought to justice because his act has disturbed and gravely endangered the community as a whole, (…) it is the body politic itself that stands in need of being ‘repaired,’ and it is the general public order that has been thrown out of gear and must be restored, as it were.”Footnote 81 We might want to understand Arendt as a forerunner of the theory of criminal trials as advocated by Anthony Duff.Footnote 82 He stresses that trials are communicative enterprises in which a criminal is taken to be responsible (i.e., answerable) for his crimes and is called to account by a prosecution acting on behalf of a public, for crimes are public wrongs. This means that the next question becomes: which public is wronged in the case of Duch, where the suspect is eventually convicted for crimes against humanity?
This brings us to the second issue we want to discuss here: the nature of a crime against humanity. Arendt defends a specific interpretation: crimes against humanity are crimes against the human status. She traces this phrase back to François de Menthon, the French prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials.Footnote 83 Arendt argues that also Eichmann ought to have been indicted with committing crimes against the human status. Instead, he was charged with crimes against the Jewish people. While Arendt does regret this fact, she acknowledges that “[i]t was the great advantage of a trial centered on the crime against the Jewish people (…) that the difference between ‘inhuman acts’ (which were undertaken for some known, though criminal, purpose, such as expansion through colonization) and the ‘crime against humanity,’ whose intent and purpose were unprecedented, was clarified.”Footnote 84 Arendt is very critical of a confusion of crimes against humanity and inhumane acts: “I have mentioned before the Nuremberg Charter’s definition of ‘crimes against humanity’ as ‘inhuman acts,’ which were translated into German as Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit—as though the Nazis had simply been lacking in human kindness, certainly the understatement of the century.”Footnote 85 Understanding them as “inhuman(e) acts” does not capture what is at stake in the unprecedented and completely new crimes of the Nazis. It was especially difficult for Jewish people to come to terms with this newness, because they tended to understand the crimes of the Nazis as the latest in a long line of pogroms.Footnote 86
Yet, Arendt stresses that the crimes of the Nazis were “different not only in degree of seriousness but in essence.”Footnote 87 The essence of these crimes was genocide: “an attack upon human diversity as such, that is, upon a characteristic of the ‘human status’ without which the very words ‘mankind’ or ‘humanity’ would be devoid of meaning.”Footnote 88 For this reason, Arendt criticizes the Jerusalem court: “At no point, however, either in the proceedings or in the judgment, did the Jerusalem trial ever mention even the possibility that extermination of whole ethnic groups—the Jews, or the Poles, or the Gypsies—might be more than a crime against the Jewish or the Polish or the Gypsy people, that the international order, and mankind in its entirety, might have been grievously hurt and endangered.”Footnote 89 Here we can thus find an answer to the question as to which public is at issue in these crimes: “these modern, state-employed mass murderers must be prosecuted because they violated the order of mankind, and not because they killed millions of people. Nothing is more pernicious to an understanding of these new crimes, or stands more in the way of the emergence of an international penal code that could take care of them, than the common illusion that the crime of murder and the crime of genocide are essentially the same. The point of the latter is that an altogether different order is broken and an altogether different community is violated.”Footnote 90 Arendt seems to suggest that the community of mankind, or what one might call a global public is wronged. As a consequence, justice ought to be done in the name of humanity.Footnote 91
When we now look back at what we have seen in the case of Duch, we can observe that Duch was accused of inhumaneness. Notwithstanding Arendt’s efforts, the confusion between crimes against humanity and inhuman(e) acts still exists and it seems likely that it will continue to exist.Footnote 92 This is only a problem when one believes that the two notions of a crime against the human status and an inhumane act contradict one another, or if a quest for the essence of a crime against humanity demands a single definition. I believe that neither is the case, so the two understandings may work as complimentary in elucidating what is at play in crimes against humanity. What speaks in favour of Arendt’s interpretation is Smith’s statement that the ECCC should do justice for humanity and even Roux’s statement that with the case of Duch there was a lesson to be learned for the whole of mankind.
Of more interest might be the question whether we can also understand the dehumanization of Duch from an Arendtian perspective. I believe this to be the case and for this purpose, we should turn to what Arendt says about the punishment of Eichmann. Having committed crimes against the human status marks Eichmann, according to Arendt, as “in actual fact hostis generis humani.”Footnote 93 Because his purpose was “to ‘liberate’ mankind from the ‘rule of subhumans,’”Footnote 94 for Arendt this justifies the death penalty: “Because he had been implicated and had played a central role in an enterprise whose open purpose was to eliminate forever certain ‘races’ from the surface of the earth, he had to be eliminated.”Footnote 95 In her fictitious speech to Eichmann, Arendt is even more explicit: “Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that it was nothing more than misfortune that made you a willing instrument in the organization of mass murder; there still remains the fact that you have carried out, a policy of mass murder. For politics is not like the nursery; in politics obedience and support are the same. And just as you supported and carried out a policy of not wanting to share the Earth with the Jewish people and the people of a number of other nations—as though you and your superiors had any right to determine who should and who should not inhabit the earth—we find that no one, that is, no member of the human race, can be expected to want to share the earth with you. This is the reason, and the only reason, you must hang.’”Footnote 96
From these statements it is hard to understand the attempt at a rehumanization of Duch as pursued by Roux. For Arendt, someone guilty of crimes against the human status has lost his place in the order of mankind. However, at this point the analogy between Duch and Eichmann seems to reach its limits. First of all, speaking purely legally only Duch was charged with and found guilty of crimes against humanity, Eichmann was not. Second and more importantly, Arendt makes no distinction between genocide and crimes against humanity. This distinction does, however, count legally. Furthermore, without wanting to diminish the atrocities for which Duch bears responsibility, his crimes do not measure up to those for which Eichmann was hung.
If we want to understand Roux’s plea for a rehumanization of Duch from an Arendtian perspective, it might be more interesting to look into another aspect of her work: her phrase “the banality of evil”, which she coined in her report on the Eichmann case. Faced with the task of understanding Eichmann’s character, the judges “knew, of course, that it would have been very comforting indeed to believe that Eichmann was a monster, (…) The trouble with Eichmann was precisely that so many were like him, and that the many were neither perverted nor sadistic, that they were, and still are, terribly and terrifyingly normal. From the viewpoint of our legal institutions and of our moral standards of judgment, this normality was much more terrifying than all the atrocities put together.”Footnote 97 In a letter to Gershom Scholem, she would later write that evil “possesses neither depth nor any demonic dimension.”Footnote 98 In The Life of the Mind, Arendt returns to the expression “the banality of evil”: “Behind that phrase, I held no thesis or doctrine, although I was dimly aware of the fact that it went counter to our tradition of thought—literary, theological, or philosophic—about the phenomenon of evil. Evil, we have learned, is something demonic.”Footnote 99 Before attending the Eichmann trial, Arendt herself spoke of the Nazi crimes in terms of radical or absolute evil, descriptions which occur on several pages of The Origins of Totalitarianism.Footnote 100 The phenomenon of evil is, however, not a major theme of the book (it does not even come up as a concept in the index). It was Eichmann’s character which made Arendt use this specific phrase and more accurately it was his “absence of thinking”: “I was struck by a manifest shallowness in the doer that made it impossible to trace the uncontestable evil of his deeds to any deeper level of roots or motives. The deeds were monstrous, but the doer—at least the very effective one now on trial—was quite ordinary, commonplace, and neither demonic nor monstrous. There was no sign in him of firm ideological convictions or of specific evil motives, and the only notable characteristic one could detect in his past behavior as well as in his behavior during the trial and throughout the pre-trial police examination was something entirely negative: it was not stupidity but thoughtlessness.”Footnote 101
As a description of Eichmann’s character, Arendt’s phrase has been severely criticised.Footnote 102 That does not directly concern us here. What is of interest to us is whether or not Duch (or, more specifically, his character) is banal in the sense described by Arendt. Here, there is simply too little evidence to conclude that he was. On one occasion, Duch was accused of being “lost in the footnotes”.Footnote 103 Furthermore, Duch’s disempathy as diagnosed by the psychological experts and his lack of imagination may be understood in the specific Arendtian interpretation of thoughtlessness, since thinking for her has to do with imagination in the sense of the ability to take (absent) others into account.Footnote 104 On the other hand, Duch completely lacked the cliché-like behaviour of Eichmann, which was so shocking to Arendt.Footnote 105
5. Duch, Arendt and we
There is, however, another way of understanding the phrase “the banality of evil”: not so much as the description of the character of Eichmann but rather as an alternative view on the nature of the phenomenon of evil. There is also evidence for this reading in the work of Arendt. We can find it already in a text of 1945 which was reissued in her collection Essays in Understanding, where she writes that there are men who reject “the hypocritical confession ‘God be thanked, I am not like that,’”, and “[r]ather, in fear and trembling, have they finally realized of what man is capable—and this is indeed the precondition of any modern political thinking.”Footnote 106 Robert Fine captures well the significance of this view: “In short, what was at issue for Arendt in this seemingly arcane distinction between ‘radical evil’ and ‘banality of evil’ was not only the character of the accused, not only the justice of the trial itself, but also a struggle between two philosophies: one rooted in sheer alterity, the other in a politics of recognition that understands the value for ourselves of not dehumanising the dehumaniser.”Footnote 107 Fine summarizes the value by using the notion of reflexivity, a notion Roux could agree with. For reflexivity denotes that something concerns or affects ourselves. Even the most hideous atrocities committed on earth are done not by monsters but by fellow human beings. Acknowledging this may also help us to exercise prudence when judging the perpetrators of even the most terrible crimes. It might be this that Roux had in mind when he spoke of “the development of humanity,”Footnote 108 of seeing the man behind the torturer,Footnote 109 of recognising Duch as a fellow human being, indeed a brother.Footnote 110 Perhaps, this is one of the lessons humankind, not just the Cambodian people but the whole international community, has to learn.Footnote 111
In a powerful way, we are confronted with ourselves as human beings in the moving testimony of François Bizot. He was a prisoner of Duch at M-13, the prison where Duch was a chairman before he was transferred to S-21. Bizot was the only Westerner to survive imprisonment by the Khmer Rouge and he wrote a book on it (“Le Portail”—The Gate). During his imprisonment, Bizot developed “some kind of familiarity” with Duch, especially during a longer talk he had with his captor the day before his release, the evening of Christmas Day.Footnote 112 Bizot recalls “I had expected to encounter a monster, an inhumane person, but I realized then that things were much more tragic, much more frightening. I realized that in front of me there was a man who looked very much like many friends of mine, a Marxist, a human being who was a Marxist who was prepared to surrender his life for his country for the revolution.”Footnote 113 A certain understanding even results from this encounter: “So speaking of the monster in front of me, in a way it was his duty. It was his duty to be the interrogator, the questioner. (…) And then I truly realized that this monster was indeed endowed with human characteristics and this was extremely disturbing. I myself was no longer sheltered and it would be the greatest possible mistake to turn such monsters into a different category of people, a different species. (…) I then figured that it was necessary to make known that this kind of danger was not due to a person who was a monster, a different category of person; that this person was a human being like any other human being. Consequently, it is necessary to make a distinction between what humans do from what humans are.”Footnote 114
The full significance of his ambiguous feelings towards Duch comes to the fore when Bizot is asked to answer the last question on a specific passage in his book, where he writes about a certain Duong who arrested him in 1971 but for whom he nevertheless feels affection. At this point, the whole internal struggle of Bizot shines through his answer: “And, now, you referred to a specific point, this point, this idea of affection, that you can have affection for something even if it has been a source of evil. I must say that my encounter with Duch left a print on my destiny and conditioned the entirety of what I am today for a very simple reason and for a tragic reason as well. It is that I owe—I must come to terms with what’s in me in relation to a double reality, the reality of a man who was the vector, the force of massive killing, state institutionalized massive killing, I should say, and I cannot imagine being in his shoes today with so much horror behind—left behind; and on the other hand, the recollection that I have of a young man who committed his life and his existence to a cause and to a purpose that was based on the idea that crime was not only legitimate but that it was deserved. I do not know what I can make of this, Your Honour. (…) And that’s where things are particularly difficult for me. I felt that these crimes were the crimes of a man and in order to understand its horror—their horror, it was certainly not by transforming Duch into some kind of monster, but rather it was by acknowledging in him his humanity as ours, and that is—and that was obviously not an obstacle, unfortunately, to the massive killings that were perpetrated. And it is this awareness of this ambiguity of—this ambiguity in his humanity, inhumanity, that causes my tragedy, my personal tragedy today, Your Honour.”Footnote 115 Duch should not be turned into a monster. No, the truth is much more frightening, almost unbearably so for Bizot: Duch’s inhuman humanity, his human inhumanity is also ours.
The truth of Bizot might also contain a lesson for international (criminal) law: “in our world international law should not be conceived as a reconstituted form of transcendent authority, at once criminalising the Other and idealising Oneself. It should rather be conceived as a material resource we have for confronting anew the problems of living together and constituting ourselves as a collectivity.”Footnote 116 Hence, the plea of a rehumanization of Duch may be considered in another Arendtian light. If Duch himself asks to become a member of the community of mankind once again, in order, hopefully, to play a role in it, we might want to understand this plea as one of befriending humanity. In her essay on Lessing, Arendt introduces this specific discourse on friendship and humanity, where she stipulates that one is not simply born human but must become human through one’s own actions. For Arendt, action is always closely linked to speech, for “[i]n acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human world. (…) This revelatory quality of speech and action comes to the fore where people are with others and neither for nor against them—that is, in sheer human togetherness.”Footnote 117 Hence, humanization, and by the same token rehumanization, takes place through speech: “We humanize what is going on in the world and in ourselves only by speaking of it, and in the course of speaking of it we learn to be human.”Footnote 118 Here, the notion of friendship becomes relevant in the specific Arendtian sense of a friendship that “is not intimately personal but makes political demands and preserves reference to the world.”Footnote 119 And “world” should be understood as the intersubjective realm, the ethico-political background, and the constitutive horizon of our being: the common context in which friendship takes place and which may even become the object of friendship.Footnote 120 Thus, the rehumanization of Duch is only achieved when we keep open for him the opportunity for speech and action with his fellow human beings. Only in this way, may he be able to play a role for humanity and for the world.
6. Conclusion
So, where does this leave us when it comes to the meaning of the concept of humanity in international (criminal) law? Our in-depth analysis of one case may not give more than the contours of an answer. Our approach has, nonetheless, shown a number of important features of an invocation of humanity. First, the case of Duch does show how “humanity” itself comes in different guises (e.g., as the community of mankind which is the victim of atrocities, as the community in whose name justice ought to be done, as an abstract ethical ideal). Second, it shows how “humanity” is intimately connected with related notions, such as dehumanization and rehumanization. Third, with the help of the work of Hannah Arendt, these concepts were put in a larger conceptual framework. This framework is, I believe, valuable not as much for the answers it provides as for the questions it allows us to ask: What is, or what are the purpose(s) of international criminal trials? What does it mean to do justice on behalf of humanity? What is the relationship between international crimes and evil? Most fundamentally perhaps, the work of Arendt may allow one to take one’s cue from legal and political documents to ask one of the most fundamental questions man can ask himself: What does it mean to be human? Indeed, behind the many different purposes for which the concept of humanity is used and the many different meanings it takes, we are ultimately confronted with ourselves and our own (in)humanity.
