I approached the reading of this book with an admittedly rather dismissive attitude because I was not convinced that the Conservative-led ‘big society’ programme amounts to more than a politically expedient smokescreen to dismantle the public sector. My initial prejudices proved to be partially justified. Reading the Twitter summary, at the very start of the book and before the table of contents, I noticed that the reader would have to get through five chapters rehearsing the now well-worn reasons offered by the centre right for the current British economic, social and cultural malaise before the outlines of the basic philosophy of the ‘big society’ would be addressed. I got a little impatient with Norman's political genuflection in which he struggles to remain pragmatic and balanced but just ends by blaming the Fabian influence in the Labour Party for virtually all our ills. And when he eventually addresses the idea of the ‘big society’, it lacks substance so much so that he admits towards the end of his analysis that the concept of the ‘big society’ is ‘vague at the edges’ (p. 200).
Norman's argument can be summarised fairly easily. He begins his analysis by challenging the dominant assumptions about the nature of human rationality and action in politics and economics. In particular, he argues that the model of homo economicus that lies at the heart of conventional economics has led policy makers to presume wrongly that we relate to each other as ‘economic automata’ (p. 60); selfishly attempting to maximise our utility. Few would disagree with that opinion or his observation that the 2008 global crash illustrates clearly that rationality is not always present in markets or people's actions. Paternalist conservative thinking, but more particularly Fabian statist thinking in the Labour party, has led successive governments to pursue what philosopher Michael Oakeshott called an ‘enterprise society’ in which people are mobilised from the top down for a range of national political purposes involving economic salvation, global competitiveness and so on. This, Norman argues, ignores ‘civil society’ which Oakeshott had suggested fosters the intelligent human agent capable of ‘philic association’ and empathy for others whenever social arrangements are unfettered by the state and unnecessary bureaucratic regulation. Social and human institutions, such as cooperative and mutual aid societies, were, he argues, systematically undermined and eventually destroyed by the progress of state welfare and consequently contributed to the disconnected society we now live in. His remedy for overcoming the ‘fractured’ society that he suggests we have inherited from an overly centralised and bureaucratic state system is to create the socio-economic conditions in which social entrepreneurship can flourish and, following the views of Amartya Sen, nurture people's ‘capabilities’ rather than their market utility. At the heart of this analysis, and the idea of the ‘big society’, is to recognise that people are active, intelligent and caring agents: the language is of autonomy, mastery and purpose. The development of these particular human qualities by a ‘compassionate conservatism’ can lead to a connected society; a big society in which happiness and fulfilment are gained by active citizenship rather than the passivity engendered by redistributive social policies.
I covered similar terrain several years ago when the welfare debate in the 1990s began to take welfare pluralism seriously and discussion centred around variations on the notion of a welfare society (see Rodger, Reference Rodger2000). At that time, I was struck by an observation made by William Robson in his much earlier book published in 1976 on the distinction between a welfare state and a welfare society. The former, Robson had observed, was ‘what Parliament has decreed and the Government does’ and the latter is ‘what people do, feel and think about matters which bear on the general welfare’ (Robson, Reference Robson1976: 7). This distinction also lies at the heart of Norman's analysis but he lacks the sociological insight to bring this dissimilarity to life in a meaningful and grounded way and is instead stuck in the abstractions of classical political philosophy. This leads to an obsession with human nature and behaviour, common on the political right, at the expense of seeking to understand the complexities of how social relationships and popular attitudes are socially constructed by far more than the existence of a big state. His analysis is, consequently, vacuous regarding policy ideas and largely beside the point. Few would object to greater levels of citizen activism and more financial support for self-organised welfare initiatives at a local community level. However, Norman's analysis does not engage with the scale and complexities of the social problems immanent in British society. While writing this review I came across a short newspaper article in The Observer (31 July 2011) by Kevin McKenna in which he compares north-east Glasgow to the fictional portrayal of Manhattan as a menacing walled penitentiary in John Carpenter's futuristic film Escape from New York. In ways that echo that filmic vision, north-east Glasgow is cut-off from civilisation and exists as an island of deprivation in a sea of relative affluence. The inhabitants of the area are at the bottom of every social indicator so far contrived to measure health and well being (cancer, coronary heart disease, life expectancy, knife crime, educational attainment, drug abuse, benefit dependency and so on). Over 150 years of poverty and the social and economic trauma of the post-1980s de-industrialisation of central Scotland has left the area with a legacy of congenital deprivation which the rhetoric of the ‘big society’ cannot begin to address. The area also has a surfeit of local community activism when what it actually needs is more rather than less state intervention; or at least for the local community action that exists to be properly funded by government sources. There are many areas similar to north-east Glasgow in England and Wales too. They are populated by people without hope and without a stake in society and they are unlikely to be active members of the ‘big society’. Whoever Norman's argument is directed towards, it is less than clear how it speaks to the poor and dispossessed and, therefore, its relevance remains to be demonstrated rather than asserted.
