Introduction
In September of 2017, the radical-right party Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, further referred to as AfD) celebrated a historic electoral victory. Footnote 1 For the first time since the Second World War, a radical-right party succeeded in being elected to the German Bundestag. The party had been founded in 2013, and before it entered the German Bundestag in 2017, it had already been elected to several German state parliaments as well as the European Parliament. Earlier, radical-right parties such as the Republicans (Die Republikaner) or extreme-right parties such as the National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands) had celebrated sporadic electoral successes in local and state elections. Footnote 2 However, no radical-right or extreme right-wing party had succeeded in being elected to the German Bundestag. This changed abruptly in 2017, when the AfD not only entered the German Bundestag, but even became its largest opposition party. The response of AfD party officials was explicit: ‘The government must buckle up. We will hunt them. We will haunt Mrs. Merkel (…) and we will reclaim our county and our people’, Footnote 3 rejoiced Alexander Gauland, one of the party’s lead candidates, when the results were announced.
When the AfD was founded, only four years prior, it had presented itself as a Eurosceptic party aimed at giving voters a political alternative to the government’s decision to bail out EU member states amid the Eurozone crisis. Footnote 4 However, during and after the refugee crisis in 2015, the party noticeably adopted anti-immigrant stances while increasingly gaining electoral support. The party soon ‘transitioned from being a conservative challenger to the Christian Democrats toward becoming a populist radical right party’. Footnote 5 Its previous core topic of fiscal policy was rapidly replaced by ‘a populist radical right appeal based on authoritarianism, populism, and nativism’. Footnote 6 As recently as March 2022, the German Administrative Court in Cologne followed the assessment of the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and determined that there are ‘factual indications for anti-constitutional efforts’ Footnote 7 within the party, underlining that the party’s radicalisation has advanced further. Hence, while the AfD is still referred to as a radical-right party today, the consensus is that central political actors within the party, some of whom will be presented in detail later, showcase right-extremist and anti-constitutional attitudes.
The electoral breakthrough of a radical-right party with factual indications for anti-constitutional efforts in Germany is surprising due to Germany’s historical legacy and the country’s handling of this legacy through a ‘culture of contrition’. Footnote 8 Also, the country’s nature as a militant democracy – meaning a democracy equipped with the legal means to enable the state to defend its democratic core from political actors who wish to overthrow or significantly harm its democratic order – makes the rise of the AfD surprising. Footnote 9 Considering the radicalisation of the AfD, as described above, as well as the party’s recent and effortless re-election into the German Bundestag, several questions merit scholarly investigation: how could a radical-right party with indications for anti-constitutional efforts achieve such electoral success in Germany’s militant democracy? Does the AfD’s electoral trajectory question the efficiency of militant measures when dealing with anti-constitutional challengers? Might we even have to re-examine the assumption that militant democracies create a hostile environment for radical-right parties and hence should be thought of as a clear obstacle for radical-right party success? While the scope of this paper does not allow a detailed examination of all the above questions, it hopes to lay the groundwork for these debates by focusing on radical-right parties in militant democracies and the way they react to the threat of militant measures. This paper therefore aims to answer the following research question: How do radical-right parties react to militant democratic environments in general and to the threat of militant measures in particular? While the literature generally seems to assume that radical-right parties passively accept a negative fate for their party when existing in a militant democratic environment, I challenge this assumption. Instead, when faced with the threat of militant measures, I suspect that radical-right parties actively counteract these, in order to either circumvent the implementation of militant measures against their party or to minimise the potential impact of such measures.
Building on Van Donselaar’s research on strategic changes of fascist organisations as well as on Art’s work on radical-right parties, Footnote 10 this article puts forward the concept of frontstage moderation. The concept is based on the idea that radical-right parties can undermine the negative consequences awaiting them in a militant democratic environment by concealing any anti-constitutional parts which exist within their party. To do so, they must actively put forward a moderate party-frontstage, which either negates any anti-constitutional tendencies within the party or presents the party as actively fighting such tendencies. In order to test the validity of this concept, the paper analyses how the AfD engaged in strategic frontstage moderation and concealed its anti-constitutional elements, hoping to thereby shield itself from the consequences of Germany’s militant democratic environment. While the theory of frontstage moderation is drawn from several sources from the literature of militant democracy, the analysis of the AfD’s counteractions further relies on primary interview data. Considering how ‘few of the known studies of the far right rely on interview data’, Footnote 11 I expected these interviews to be exceptionally insightful and was not disappointed.
This article is structured as follows: first, the introduction is followed by a section outlining the article’s theoretical and methodological framework. In it, the research question is placed into the context of the existing literature on radical-right parties in militant democracies, and the article’s methodological framework is discussed. The reader is introduced to the way in which Germany’s militant democracy works, and hence to the threats of militant measures as faced by radical-right parties in that country. Thereafter, the concept of frontstage moderation is presented in detail, followed by a section extensively describing the interplay between the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the AfD. The AfD’s differentiation between its front- and backstage is then the subject of analysis in a further section, before the conclusion summarises the article’s main findings and puts forward further questions which merit examination in future research.
Theoretical and methodological framework
Before engaging in an analysis of how the AfD engages with the militant environment it faces, it is essential to outline how this research relates to existing research on militant environments and their impact on radical-right parties. Also, the methodological approach used for the purpose of this research endeavour must be presented in detail. Combined with essential information on how militant democracy is put into practice in Germany, this allows for the theoretical framework of frontstage moderation to be put forward.
Militant democracy and its impact on radical-right parties
The literature on radical-right parties is extensive, and the mere existence of radical-right parties has caused enormous scholarly interest. Footnote 12 While militant measures taken by militant democracies have been a topic of discussion for decades, Footnote 13 the potential reactions of targeted parties to the threat of such measures have largely gone unnoticed. Indeed, scholars have urged that research be conducted on this matter, but these calls are still unanswered. Footnote 14 Considering this gap in the literature, this article seeks to put forward a study on how a radical-right party, the AfD, reacted to the threat of militant measures.
This article’s theory builds on Goffman’s differentiation of presentation of the self in frontstage- and backstage-situations, Footnote 15 which was originally applied to far-right parties’ behaviour by Van Donselaar to account for strategy changes of fascist organisations in the Netherlands. Footnote 16 Inspired by this application of Goffman’s sociological findings to the frontstage-management of far-right parties, I argue that radical-right parties might be able to differentiate between the party’s front- and backstage, putting particular emphasis on the rather moderate frontstage, in order to temporarily circumvent militant measures and minimise their impact. This enables such parties to escape the hostile ground laid by political institutions in militant democracies.
The differentiation between the party’s backstage on the one hand and the party’s public and comparatively moderate frontstage on the other hand allows the party to adjust its political appeal to a hostile political environment, and to circumvent being portrayed as extremist. This idea is also connected to the findings of Ivarsflaten and Ivarsflaten et al. Footnote 17 Ivarsflaten points out ‘that because of widespread social norms of racial equality and abidance to democratic institutions, most voters do not want to support parties seen to be racist or extremist’. Footnote 18 Her findings shed light on the fact that some radical-right parties might be more successful than others due to their party genesis and their consequent ‘positive legacy as something other than an extremist or ultra-nationalist party’, Footnote 19 which can function as a reputational shield for the party. In this article, I argue that such reputational shields should also be thought of as protecting the party from the reputational damage that can be done by militant measures.
The theoretical concept of this paper is also related to David Art’s work, which outlines the relevance of historical legacies for radical-right parties. Footnote 20 Art finds history and political culture to be variables affecting ‘both the number and type of activists that were willing to work on behalf of radical right parties’. Footnote 21 In hostile environments, he argues, the costs for an individual of becoming an activist in a radical-right party are exceptionally high. Hence, radical-right parties in such environments suffer from a homogenous group of party activists, in which extremist activists and those with low socio-economic background come together, since these groups have less to lose than others. Hostile environments therefore affect radical-right parties ‘by selecting for the types of activists that undermine radical right party development: they discourage the recruitment of moderates with significant human capital, leaving radical right parties with an extremist or opportunist composition that is politically unsustainable’. Footnote 22 And yet, Art did not think that this could motivate radical-right parties to develop counterstrategies.
The position of the AfD presents a hard case for the proposed concept of frontstage moderation. As Art and Ellinas point out, Germany must be regarded a hostile environment for radical-right parties. Footnote 23 Its historical legacy is deeply enshrined into the political context faced by radical-right parties, not only due to the vivid culture of remembrance and the common understanding of the German responsibility for the horrors of the Second World War, but also due to its vigorous concept of militant democracy. Footnote 24 Hence, if the proposed concept is valid, and radical-right parties with anti-constitutional efforts have the ability to circumvent or minimise the effects of militant measures by strategically engaging in frontstage moderation in Germany, then this should be considered a strong indicator that radical-right parties might be able to do so elsewhere too.
Methodological approach
To test the article’s hypothesis that radical-right parties can circumvent militant measures or mitigate their impact by engaging in frontstage moderation, extensive interviews were conducted with party-officials, officials of the German Office for the Protection of the Constitution, scholars with expert knowledge of the radical-right in Germany, and journalists covering the AfD. Some 60 potential interview participants were chosen by purposive sampling. In the case of this study, those asked to participate in an interview were selected based on their special knowledge of the AfD, radical-right parties in Germany or the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, which is the political institution tasked with assessing potential anti-constitutional efforts and implementing militant measures against them. Of the potential interviewees, 40 either did not respond to the interview request or rejected it, and 20 people agreed to participate in interviews. The interviews were conducted under the regulations set by the Central University Research Ethics Committee of the University of Oxford. Implemented as semi-structured interviews, they strongly relied on the input and the openness of the interview participants.
The analysis of the AfD’s strategic reaction to the threat of being targeted by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution could be based on various sources, since the potential monitoring of the party through the Office for the Protection of the Constitution has been a topic of public debate and hence consequential public interest and scrutiny in Germany, leading to many publications on this matter.
I was able to conduct interviews with political actors who had substantive insights into the party during distinct phases of its development, including a founding member of the AfD, a former high-ranking party official who had later chosen to leave the party, and a member of the party’s federal board at the time of the interview. Considering that radical-right politicians are usually expected to be highly sceptical of interviews with unknown researchers Footnote 25 and fall under the label of a ‘hard-to-reach population’, Footnote 26 I was astonished that they agreed to be interviewed, and found myself reminded of Art’s statement that he had ‘found no support for the common perception that radical right parties deny access’. Footnote 27
Even though Damhuis and De Jonge’s insightful paper on interviewing radical-right actors was published after I had already conducted my interviews, I retrospectively notice that I have implemented much of what they advise scholars to do when interviewing radical-right politicians. Footnote 28 I cautiously shied away from using terms which radical-right politicians might view as offensive. Also, I referred to the electoral successes of the AfD as standing in contrast to the failed electoral trajectory of the German radical-right party Die Republikaner, which might have caused AfD officials to feel a sense of pride, therefore being consistent with Damhuis and De Jonge’s idea of ‘presenting your project in a palatable way’. Footnote 29 I also emphasised my student status and the fact that my research endeavour was reliant on their personal participation. Footnote 30 Furthermore, I made sure to include my official mail-signature from the University of Oxford as well as the CUREC-form and an outline of my research project, all of which contained official headers either from the University of Oxford or the Department of Politics and International Relations, hoping that this would make my interview request stand out. Looking back, I believe that both my university affiliation and my non-threatening status as a student might have led to a high level of openness. However, politicians belonging to the extremist faction of the party, the Flügel, were much more hesitant to take part in interviews than their non-extremist counterparts. Thankfully, in the end, a politician associated with the Flügel also agreed to take part in the research endeavour – and yet, it is worth taking note of this imbalance. Thankfully, I could still gain insights on the Flügel by interviewing journalists with extensive insights on the AfD and contacts with the Flügel.
During the interviews, two things particularly came to my attention as helpful when trying to gain a level of rapport with interviewees: First, I was left with the impression that the (predominantly male) party officials seemed to enjoy lecturing me. This proved to be helpful, because it motivated them to share much more knowledge about their party than I had anticipated. I therefore encouraged them to be as open with me as possible by asking numerous questions and by allowing them to speak as long they wanted to – which led to two interviews lasting more than two and a half hours each. Consistent with Ellinas’ advice that ‘interviewers need to keep the conversation going until they extract the information they think exists and hope on stumbling on information they did not think existed’, Footnote 31 the length of such interviews allowed me to build a high level of rapport and extract useful information. While I cannot personally compare my experience with the experiences of male graduate students, it was my impression that my female gender was a positive attribute in this regard, as it enabled me to be perceived as a ‘status subordinate’ Footnote 32 and allowed me to receive detailed elaborations. Second, some interviewees seemed to test my integrity. To give two examples, one interviewee asked me to disclose the name of other interviewees and seemed pleased when I declined to do so, referring to the fact that I had promised them anonymity. Another interviewee demanded that we record our interview, and I happily agreed to do so, hoping to thereby eliminate any doubt that I would not cite him correctly.
An extensive analysis performed by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution on the AfD could be taken into account in the subsequent analysis and offered interesting insights into the party. Footnote 33 Unfortunately, interview requests addressed to the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and to the Federal Ministry of the Interior were generally declined or left unanswered. However, the Speaker of the Ministry of the Interior of the state of Brandenburg, the president of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution in Lower-Saxony and the president of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution in North Rhine-Westphalia presented highly valued exceptions.
The interview data was analysed through qualitative content analysis. Many interview partners saw themselves on opposing sides, had left the respective party in the meantime, or just had different views than other interview partners. Some used the interview to slander former colleagues, others used arguments which could be identified as falsehoods in later fact-checking. However, the factual claims in the interview data were later tested by comparing them with insights gained in other interviews, articles, or reports, allowing me to triangulate the data. Footnote 34
Germany’s militant democracy and the Office for the Protection of the Constitution
Several countries’ laws allow the use of legal actions against parties which are considered a threat to liberal democracy or parliamentarism in the name of militant democracy. Footnote 35 Of course, the implementation of such legal actions requires a detailed assessment of the respective party and its political nature. This assessment is typically either conducted by a political institution or by the judiciary. In democracies, repressing a party, either through a ban or through other measures, constitutes a severe democratic dilemma, since the formation of the general will, a central principle of democracy, is restricted by such an action. Footnote 36 The exclusion of a party from democratic, political competition is justified by the need to uphold and protect democratic or constitutional principles. Footnote 37
In Germany, the hostile environment awaiting those pursuing anti-constitutional efforts is institutionalised. The failure of the Weimar Republic, which had paved the way for the Nazis to rise to power and indirectly led to the Second World War, was present in the minds of those commissioned to design a new democratic system in Germany. Footnote 38 The solution was said to be found in enshrining components of militant democracy in the new German Basic Law. Ever since, Germany has been characterised as a militant democracy, meaning a democracy which features legal defence mechanisms against those who try to harm the free democratic order of the state by taking advantage of democracy itself. Footnote 39 While many democracies around the world are labelled militant democracies, the defence mechanisms enshrined in their legal codes display great variety. Footnote 40 It is therefore worth examining in detail some central features of Germany’s militant democracy.
Selected statutes of the German Grundgesetz are protected by the eternity clause of Article 79(3) Grundgesetz, meaning they can never be overturned. Footnote 41 However, Germany’s free democratic basic order is protected not only through the eternity clause, but also through the state’s ability to use militant measures against those attempting to attack the state’s free democratic basic order through democratic means. One such militant measure is the party ban. While Article 21(1) Grundgesetz underlines the importance of political parties for the formation of the political will of the people, also known as the party privilege, Footnote 42 Article 21(2) Grundgesetz states that parties which aim to harm or even abolish the free democratic basic order are unconstitutional. Footnote 43 Article 21(3) Grundgesetz further excludes such parties from state funding. Footnote 44
Also, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution has been established, with an entity at the federal level and separate entities on the state level. The task of these offices, as outlined in § 3 Bundesverfassungsschutzgesetz and the respective state laws, is to collect information and assess organised efforts to harm the free democratic basic order. Footnote 45 The Office for the Protection of the Constitution cannot take executive measures but is allowed to use surveillance measures to collect relevant information on institutions which aspire to harm the free democratic basic order. Footnote 46 Of course, the use of such measures is regulated. The decryption of personal communications, for example, is only allowed in the case of severe circumstances. Generally, whether severe circumstances exist is first assessed by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution itself. However, the institution’s compliance with the law can later be evaluated by several bodies such as the Federal Ministry of the Interior, by the Federal Representative for Data Protection and Freedom on Information, by a parliamentary control committee within the German Bundestag and respective control committees in the state parliaments and – last but most certainly not least – by the German Federal Constitutional Court. Footnote 47 The Office for the Protection of the Constitution is also restricted by the principle of proportionality. Footnote 48 Individuals or organisations opposing measures taken by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution can lodge a legal appeal in front of the Federal Constitutional Court, which can announce the measures to be unjustified or to harm the principle of proportionality, as the Court has done in the past. Footnote 49 In a ruling as recent as 2017, in a ban-proceeding against the right-extremist Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, the Federal Constitutional Court underlined that it only considers banning political parties for their goal to harm the free democratic basic order if there is a likelihood, a ‘potentiality’, Footnote 50 that the respective parties might actually be successful in their anti-constitutional efforts. Footnote 51
The assessment of a party regarding the presence of factual indications for an aggressive, combative attitude towards the free democratic basic order in the sense of § 16(1) Bundesverfassungsschutzgesetz is conducted by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. If the Office finds sufficiently important factual indications for suspecting such anti-constitutional efforts within the respective party, it can treat the party as a ‘case of suspicion’ and inform the public about this assessment. Footnote 52 Should the suspicion that the party aspires to actively harm or abolish the free democratic basic order with an aggressive, combative attitude be confirmed, then the party can be treated as a ‘case of observation’. Only if these observations lead to factual evidence of an aggressive, combative attitude of the party against the free democratic basic order of the state, can a request for a party-ban based on Article 9(2) Grundgesetz be submitted to the Federal Constitutional Court. This has been the case in two unsuccessful attempts to ban the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands. Footnote 53
Based on § 16(1) Bundesverfassungsschutzgesetz, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution’s task is to not only collect information and assess possible threats to the free democratic basic order, but also to inform the public about threats to this order as soon as ‘enough sufficiently important factual indications’ Footnote 54 exist. Following § 16(2) Bundesverfassungsschutzgesetz, the Ministry of the Interior publishes an annual report, informing citizens about organisations that have been assessed as being a threat to the free democratic basic order. Footnote 55
This summary of militant measures in Germany demonstrates three things: first, the state has many different militant measures at its disposal, ranging from monitoring a party to banning it; second, militant measures cannot be exerted arbitrarily. Legal conditions for their practical application exist and must be upheld; third, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution must not only assess potential threats to the free democratic order but is also instructed to inform the public about its assessments. Considering the severe consequences of such public disclosure for the electoral trajectories of radical-right parties, this should also be understood as a militant measure threatening radical-right parties.
Frontstage moderation
Now that I have outlined the nature of Germany’s militant democracy, and explained the exact measures that must be feared by radical-right parties in Germany, it is possible to take a closer look at the potential reactions of radical-right parties to this militant democratic environment. How might radical-right parties react to a militant democratic political environment such as the one in Germany?
Van Donselaar proposes the following logic, based on his analysis of fascist organisations in the Netherlands: ever since the Second World War, fascist and racist ideological stances have been ostracised, meaning that the survival of far-right organisations depends on their ability to adopt a suitable frontstage behaviour. Footnote 56 In order to approach as many voters as possible, fascist organisations need not rid themselves of their far-right ideology, but merely need to ensure that their public frontstage remains reputable and societally respectable. In parallel with Goffman’s sociological findings on individual-level self-portrayal, the party frontstage can be defined as the self-portrayal of the party, while the party backstage includes everything which the party tries to conceal from public view. Footnote 57 I argue that Van Donselaar’s concept can be a crucial key to understanding the strategies of radical-right parties.
Showcasing a moderate frontstage when militant measures against the party are impending might allow radical-right parties to build a reputational shield against militant measures, or at least spread doubt regarding such measures’ legitimacy. Differentiating between the public, moderate party frontstage and the radical or even extremist party backstage enables radical-right parties to point to an unobjectionable frontstage. This might hinder institutions of militant democracy from taking militant measures, fearing that the legal requirements might not be met without any doubt, since radical-right parties will be able to point to an unobjectionable frontstage in court proceedings. The strategy of frontstage moderation can also undermine militant measures in another way: the existence of an unobjectionable frontstage allows the radical-right party to question the legitimacy of militant measures in a public debate.
Varying party stages are commonly assumed to be a consequence of a fragmented party with severe inner-party struggles. Generally, the literature on parties assumes that contradictory party stages causes party breakdown. As Lupu argues when describing party breakdown in Latin America, ‘Party breakdowns occur when the party’s brand is diluted’, Footnote 58 leading to an erosion of voter attachments. However, as cases of successful radical-right parties with numerous and severe inner-party struggles show, the equation might not be so simple when examining the electoral trajectories of radical-right parties. Footnote 59 Instead, different party stages could even be advantageous for radical-right parties, shielding them from reputational damage and legal battles if they enable the party to strategically emphasise a moderate frontstage when the threat of militant measures is imminent. Radical-right parties’ front- and backstages are likely to differ regarding the parties’ portrayed hostility towards the democratic order of the state, the parties’ understanding of the party as an organisation of political resistance, or the parties’ demarcation from right-extreme groups.
This article shares Art’s assumption of the enormous relevance of a country’s historical legacy for societal and political responses to a newly emerged radical-right competitor. Footnote 60 However, while Art seems to portray radical-right parties as passive recipients of hostile environments, I argue that radical-right parties will try to bypass the negative consequences arising from such environments. The strategic use of frontstage moderation can ensure that while the party’s backstage might appeal to right-extreme voters and right-extreme party members, normally leading to ostracism by the rest of society, the party’s moderate frontstage lacks any point of reference for accusations of being a threat to the free democratic basic order of the state. This frontstage shields the party from ostracism in general and militant measures of the state in particular. Hence, I argue that radical-right parties can persist even in the most hostile environments by engaging in frontstage moderation.
I understand radical-right parties to be organisations capable of strategically emphasising a moderate party frontstage to avoid becoming the target of militant measures. At the same time, I assume that institutions tasked with the implementation of militant measures and competing parties will become aware of this strategy and try to adjust to it accordingly. Hence, I expect institutions to aim at changing the political context for radical-right parties by increasingly pointing towards the fascist or racist ideology which is apparent in the party’s backstage. This produces an increasingly cautious radical-right party, which in turn places even more importance on putting forward a moderate party frontstage.
The interplay between a cautious radical-right party on the one hand and increasing ostracism by political institutions on the other leads to several challenges. First, as the radical-right party shifts more and more public attention to its moderate frontstage, it becomes incapable of controlling radical factions within the party backstage. The importance of portraying it as a respectable party encourages party members and officials to either present extremist members as part of the moderate frontstage or play down their influence. This, however, makes it impossible to fight the existing influence of extremist members and officials. The strategic use of frontstage moderation may therefore shield the extremist faction of the party from significant and consequential inner-party sanctions. Efforts to shield the party from militant measures might therefore be advantageous for extremist forces within the party.
This makes the assessment of the actual political nature of the party challenging, not only for political institutions tasked with addressing the actual conditions of the radical-right party, but also for the public. When political institutions are aware that the radical-right party’s moderate frontstage does not represent the actual political core of the party, but the public is – at least in part – deceived by the frontstage’s appearance, the contrast between the radical-right party’s emphasis on its moderate frontstage and the ostracism still displayed by political institutions can endanger the public perception of the legitimacy of militant measures. This gives radical-right parties an opportunity to portray themselves as the victims of groundless accusations and thereby delegitimise militant measures.
As pointed out above, political institutions can be assumed to be aware of the radical-right party’s strategic actions. But as Carpenter observes, political institutions are organisations with a certain amount of bureaucratic autonomy. Footnote 61 This autonomy is dependent both on organisational reputation and on the political networks which support that reputation. Footnote 62 Hence, political institutions tasked with implementing militant measures are expected to pay attention to ensure that their institution’s reputation is not harmed. Consequently, their officials are likely to exercise caution when taking militant measures, aware that such measures being overruled by court or perceived as illegitimate by the public might ultimately have a negative impact on their institution’s reputation.
The interplay between the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the AfD
When the AfD was founded in 2013, the party did not immediately catch the eye of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. However, in 2016, after the AfD had taken several steps of radicalisation, a public debate about whether militant measures should be taken against the party began. High-ranking politicians publicly urged the Office for the Protection of the Constitution to begin monitoring the party. Footnote 63 Yet, the president of the federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Hans-Georg Maaßen, publicly spoke out against taking militant measures, explaining that there were no factual grounds for monitoring the AfD. He argued that while in some instances, members of the extreme-right Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands had taken part in AfD-events, these individuals would not have considerable influence within the party, and therefore militant measures would be unnecessary. Footnote 64
Discussions about the potential need to monitor the AfD also took place in the German states: In North Rhine-Westphalia, for example, the Minister of the Interior publicly called for the monitoring of the AfD in 2016. Yet, the president of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution in the same state, Burkhard Freier, denied the presence of sufficient factual grounds for militant measures. The general secretary of the conservative Christian Democratic Union in North Rhine-Westphalia, Bodo Löttgen, even demanded that the law be changed to make a monitoring of the AfD possible. Footnote 65 Freier later changed his assessment of the AfD, arguing for an evaluation of the AfD through the federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. The federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, however, did not react. Several weeks later, the AfD entered the German Bundestag. ‘We were surprised that the Office for the Protection of the Constitution did not stand in front of our door in 2017’, recalled a former high-ranking official of the AfD in one of the interviews conducted as part of this research endeavour. Footnote 66
In the summer of 2018, a former employee of Frauke Petry, the chairwoman of the AfD at the time, reported that the president of the federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Hans-Georg Maaßen, had secretly met and given advice to Petry. The former employee declared that Maaßen had urged Petry to begin exclusion proceedings against the AfD’s most prominent hardliner, Björn Höcke. If the party would not start proceedings against Höcke, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution would have to monitor the party. Footnote 67 Both Petry and Maaßen denied having spoken about a potential monitoring of the party. Yet, public discussions about this potential meddling followed. Several weeks later, and connected to a different political scandal, Maaßen was discharged into early retirement and replaced by Thomas Haldenwang as president of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. Footnote 68
In January 2019, only several weeks after the appointment of the Office’s new president, Thomas Haldenwang held a press conference, which was broadcast and extensively covered by the media. In it, Haldenwang announced that the AfD was a case of assessment (Prüffall) for efforts against the free democratic basic order. He called the AfD a ‘big party with diversity in its political statements’. Footnote 69 More substantive analyses would be necessary to investigate whether very problematic statements voiced within the party were ‘characteristic for the goals and the orientation of the whole party’. Footnote 70 Haldenwang announced that the youth organisation of the AfD, the Junge Alternative (Young Alternative) and the Flügel, the extremist faction of the party, would be treated as cases of suspicion (Verdachtsfall), allowing his office to systematically monitor these groups and use surveillance measures against them. A lengthy internal report, which these classifications had derived from, a classified document of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, was published on a news website several days later. Footnote 71 The report included a detailed overview of statements issued by party officials, connections of individual party officials to right-extremist organisations, and substantive analyses of party programs and documents.
The AfD immediately took legal measures against this assessment of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. First, the party lodged an emergency appeal against the institution’s decision to refer to the AfD as a case of assessment. While the Office for the Protection of the Constitution usually only differentiates between cases of suspicion and cases of observation, publicly announcing that a party was to be treated as a case of assessment was a novelty. The Administrative Court in Cologne later found that indeed, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution did not have a legal basis for publicly denouncing a party as a case of assessment. The announcement by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, the Court stated, had been unlawful and disproportionate. Footnote 72
The AfD also responded to the press conference of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution with its own public press conference, held in the German Bundestag. Alexander Gauland, one of the chairmen of the AfD at the time, called the assessment of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution wrong and announced that the party would take legal action. Footnote 73 Alice Weidel, leader of the AfD’s parliamentary group, described the press conference and the labelling of the AfD as a case of assessment a ‘distortion of the political competition’. Footnote 74 However, the party had long prepared itself for this event: alongside Alexander Gauland and Alice Weidel stood Roland Hartwig, the leader of the so-called working-group Protection of the Constitution (Arbeitsgruppe Verfassungsschutz).
The working group had been publicly established months earlier ‘to engage with the topic of potential monitoring through the Office for the Protection of the Constitution’. Footnote 75 It could base its work on an expert report commissioned by the party and written by constitutionalist Dietrich Murswiek, mapping out the legal requirements which must be met before a political party can be monitored. Footnote 76 In November of 2018, the working group’s leader briefed the AfD’s federal board about circumstances which could motivate the Office for the Protection of the Constitution to begin monitoring the party, about the kind of statements which are usually viewed as evidence of an effort against the free democratic basic order and what to do in order to avoid being monitored. The briefing was also supposed to be handed out to all party members. Footnote 77 The briefing’s presentation included several calls for awareness, such as ‘Caution: expressions of opinion from within a party can very quickly be classified as efforts’. Footnote 78 It differentiated between reasonable indications for efforts against the free democratic basic order and questionable indications for efforts against the free democratic basic order. Footnote 79 However, it stated that since avoiding the party being monitored by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution was ‘of outstanding significance’, Footnote 80 the party must also take such allegedly questionable indications into account. Even though the working group expected the party to be successful in appealing militant measures taken on the basis of such questionable indications in court, it expected such legal disputes to last for many years and that the party would already have suffered from the consequences (‘substantial disadvantages and impairments’ Footnote 81 ) in the meantime.
The following principle is presented on one of the presentation slides: ‘In order to circumvent misunderstandings, one’s own positions should be presented as differentiated and grounded on facts as possible’. Footnote 82 As well as a list of statements which should not be made in public to avoid militant measures against the party, the presentation also informed party officials about activities which could be interpreted as evidence of an aggressive, combative attitude towards the free democratic basic order, such as party officials attending demonstrations of right-extreme groups and organisations. Footnote 83 Hartwig and other members of the working group gave this presentation not only in front of the federal board of the party, but also in a meeting of the federal board with the chairmen of all party state branches, as well as at multiple events organised on this topic in different states and county chapters. Footnote 84
In September 2019, the working group presented an evaluation of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution’s leaked report to the party as an internal report. Footnote 85 Later, constitutionalist Dietrich Murswiek, party chairman Jörg Meuthen and leader of the working group Roland Hartwig presented the results of their evaluation in a live-streamed press conference, criticising Haldenwang for allegedly pursuing measures against the AfD due to his personal political motivation. Footnote 86 In March 2020, the party published a statement on its website, calling the report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution a ‘so-called report’, written ‘at the disposal of government-friendly media’. The report would document an attempt to ‘politically stigmatise the largest opposition-party’. Footnote 87 In addition to this general statement, the party also published individual statements by party officials whose remarks had been cited by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution as evidence for anti-constitutional efforts within the party. Their statements presented each of their comments as allegedly taken out of context or deliberately being misunderstood by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution.
Today, the AfD’s website includes a page containing all the above-mentioned information and links on the party’s stance towards the Office for the Protection of the Constitution: ‘The Office for the Protection of the Constitution has an important task. Party politics does not belong to it’, claims the header of this page. In short video clips, Hartwig and other party officials argue that ‘the Office for the Protection of the Constitution is being abused by politics’. Footnote 88 Additionally, the page contains several share-pics for distribution on social media platforms, targeted against the institution’s legitimacy (‘The Office for the Protection of the Constitution must protect the constitution. Not the government. The Office for the Protection of the Constitution is being politically instrumentalized.’), leaflets and brochures, all questioning the legitimacy of the Office for the Protection of the Constitutions and its actions. Footnote 89
In March 2020, the president of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution’s, Haldenwang, held another press conference and announced that the Office would now treat the Flügel as a case of observation. Hence, one year after assessing this faction within the AfD as a case of suspicion, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution had assessed that it had collected enough information to declare that the Flügel was pursuing efforts to harm or abolish the free democratic basic order. In his statement, Haldenwang referred to German history and the recent murder of district president Walter Lübcke, who had been shot by a right-wing extremist individual in June 2019, stating that ‘the so-called intellectual arsonists operate in the internet, on the streets, in stadiums or in parliaments’. Footnote 90 He then announced: ‘It is more than ever an important and at the same time challenging task for the Offices for the Protection of the Constitution as the fire-detectors of democracy, to not only identify the sources of fire, but to also identify and name all relevant arsonists and fire accelerators’. Footnote 91
After Haldenwang’s press conference, the federal board of the AfD suddenly ordered the Flügel to dissolve itself. The Flügel, the extremist faction within the AfD, which operated both a homepage and a social media presence independent of the party, issued a statement, announcing that it would discontinue its activities. A picture of the group’s leaders, posted alongside the statement, showed the word dissolution with inverted commas – a clear signal that the dissolution of the faction was nothing more than a formal act. Indeed, the Flügel’s members are still active and are reported to have not changed their collective actions in any way. Footnote 92 Newspaper articles analysed the dissolution of the Flügel as ‘a case of strategic cosmetics’, Footnote 93 in the hope of showcasing the party’s alleged ability to take decisive measures against extremist forces.
When several media outlets reported that the Office for the Protection of the Constitution was planning to categorise the AfD as a case of suspicion in March 2021, the AfD immediately lodged a legal appeal against any public announcements on this matter in front of the Administrative Court in Cologne – which indeed decided to prohibit the institution from making such an announcement before a regular court proceeding could take place on the matter. Footnote 94 One year later, the Administrative Court dismissed the party’s appeal against the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. After an extensive hearing, the Court underlined that the institution had been able to provide sufficiently important factual indications which enabled it to treat the AfD as a case of suspicion and to publicly name it as such. Footnote 95
This interplay between the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the AfD reveals that the radical-right party had prepared itself for potential activities of the institution, long before militant measures had been taken. The party had opened a working group, presented internal reports, and had given its officials and members clear instructions regarding which words and activities to avoid, hoping to thereby hinder the Office for the Protection of the Constitution from taking militant measures against the party. Furthermore, the party sought to publicly delegitimise the Office for the Protection of the Constitution as a political body used by the government, aiming at questioning the legitimacy of the institution’s actions.
The AfD’s front- and backstage
The AfD can certainly be thought of as a party of several frontstages. Many interview participants, especially journalists, emphasised that the party ‘often uses completely different faces depending on which medium the party communicates on’ Footnote 96 and gives clear instructions to officials not to use certain words or phrases. As one journalist noted, the AfD is a party of several faces, shifting its appearance dramatically to suit the present audience. Footnote 97 Several interviewees suggested that some party officials use signals, hence not naming their exact thoughts, but sending respective, calculated signals to radical and extremist voters or activists. Footnote 98 In doing so, the party can send signals, but at the same time refer to an alleged misunderstanding when later being confronted with such signals either by journalists or by political institutions such as the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. One journalist strongly believed such calculated provocations to be ‘prepared for weeks’. Footnote 99
Party officials are reported to adjust their speeches not only to social preferences but also to legal boundaries, hoping to hinder the Office for the Protection of the Constitution from taking militant measures against the party. As a journalist at one of the largest German newspapers, Die Zeit, declared: ‘The AfD is very careful in its communication. Now that the monitoring through the Office for the Protection of the Constitution seems to be an option, the party seems to be even more careful (…). There is a camouflage – and it has never been as strong as it is today’. Footnote 100 She referred to party officials deliberately avoiding the use of specific words such as ‘Umvolkung’ (a term for ethnicity inversion used by the Nazis), aware that the Office for the Protection of the Constitution could otherwise point to this reference as an indicator for anti-constitutional efforts. Footnote 101 I also made similar observations when conducting interviews with AfD officials. They presented themselves as well informed about the way in which the Office for the Protection of the Constitution assesses potential targets of militant measures. In one of the interviews, a former high-ranking AfD official underlined his awareness of the fact that statements from individual party members would not be perceived as fulfilling the legal requirements for monitoring a party. Instead, official documents of the party such as resolutions, programs and statements of the federal board would be of much more interest to the Office for the Protection of the Constitution when deciding about the use of militant measures. Footnote 102 Beyond just being generally informed, one high-ranking official of the AfD revealed to me that the party had commissioned a survey in order to find out what impact the Office for the Protection of the Constitution’s press conference had on the electorate. Footnote 103
The party’s frontstage seems to strongly differ between the former East and former West of the country. In the former East, as one journalist underlined, the Flügel:
plays with the threat of being monitored by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution in their speeches, it almost seems to be kind of an honour to be monitored, because there is a critical attitude towards institutions, or a disdain towards institutions (…). Due to the history of the Stasi, intelligence services have a negative connotation. Footnote 104
Other interviewees also referred to the Office for the Protection of the Constitution being perceived as less credible in the former East compared to the former West of Germany. Footnote 105 Referring to many citizens’ experiences of being spied on by the Stasi and to low levels of trust in political institutions, one AfD official interviewed for the purpose of this research endeavour called the Office for the Protection of the Constitution a Stasi 2.0, a common narrative within the Flügel, aimed at delegitimising the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, and portraying it as an illegitimate government agency spying on democratic activists. Footnote 106 While AfD officials in the former East of Germany and particularly within the Flügel do not seem particularly fearful of negative consequences brought upon the party through militant measures, the rest of the party is more concerned. In other state branches, the party seems to show a different frontstage, emphasising the supposedly moderate nature of the party. One journalist called the party’s use of contradictory statements ‘a game with the media’. Footnote 107 I argue that this difference in the party’s frontstage as portrayed in the former East and former West of the country underlines that the party is using frontstage moderation and that this moderation is dependent on the expected consequences of militant measures on the respective electorate in the particular state. If the party is convinced that being targeted with militant measures and therefore being perceived as a threat to the free democratic order of the state is a disadvantage for the party’s electoral trajectory, then the party strongly engages in frontstage moderation. However, if the party has reason to believe that militant measures taken against the party, such as the monitoring of the party through the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, might not be a disadvantage, then the party does not pay particular importance to consistently engaging in frontstage moderation.
Being aware that a significant group of potential voters faces an inhibition threshold and is reluctant to vote for the AfD due to public ostracism, the party’s federal board shows a comparatively moderate frontstage. However, the comparatively moderate party strategy and its official incompatibility list are aimed at sending signals to voters, the media and the Office for the Protection of the Constitution rather than to party members and supporters. As one journalist noted, when the party increasingly radicalised and the Flügel grew more and more influential, leading officials of the party reacted to this with a toxic embrace of the extremists within the party to ensure their own political survival. Footnote 108 This occasionally led to contradictory statements and actions. ‘There always tend to be two processes working at once’, one journalist said, ‘for example discrediting the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, but at the same time establishing the working group to look into their accusations’. Footnote 109 As one scholar highlighted in an interview, the Flügel ‘operates strategically smart, tolerates someone who is rather conservative as the party’s chairman, because they can thereby give themselves a conservative mantle’. Footnote 110
The party’s strategy paper calls for moderation and for appealing to the middle class. Asked about the genesis of the strategy paper, an interviewed former board member of the AfD did not deny that the strategy paper was written as a reply to the threat of being monitored by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. He also admitted that party members acting directly against this party strategy did not have to fear any consequences or within-party sanctions. Footnote 111 Journalists therefore understand not only the party strategy, but also other actions of the party’s federal board, such as numerous exclusionary proceedings which did not result in actual exclusions, to be orchestrated in order to use them against the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and journalists. Footnote 112 If sanctions are executed in singular occasions, this is done only in very extreme cases and only to publicly draw a line. As another journalist highlighted, the strategy of the federal board seems to be to cover up racism and instead portray the party as socially acceptable. Footnote 113
The AfD uses what one interviewee called a ‘strategy of calculated provocation’, Footnote 114 which is considered significant for the success of the party by several interviewees, including party officials, journalists, and officials of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. This strategy involves a calculated provocation by a party official, which is later presented as a misunderstanding, repeated in more nuanced way, or dismissed by another official. ‘This is what makes populism great’, stated a former AfD official in the interview, ‘to use statements that provoke and receive attention, but when turned back to their policy-sphere, can be explained’. Footnote 115
Bernhard Witthaut, president of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution in Lower-Saxony, and Burkhard Freier, president of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution in North Rhine-Westphalia, appeared to be aware of the difference between the AfD’s party frontstage and party backstage. Witthaut referred to an AfD parliamentarian in the state of Lower Saxony, who had published within-party manuals, informing other officials how to avoid becoming a target of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. He also pointed out that the AfD in Lower-Saxony had made a policy proposal in the state parliament, demanding that the parliament depoliticise the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. ‘We are informed about this’, he stated, apparently unconcerned, ‘the AfD is simply searching for counterstrategies’. Footnote 116 However, he highlighted that actions taken or words spoken by individuals within the party would not provide sufficient factual indications for monitoring the party in its entirety. He also referred to ‘respective, different faces’ of the party.
Both Witthaut and Freier seemed determined not to make use of any militant measures against the AfD which would later be overturned by the Administrative Court. As Witthaut emphasised, ‘We have to be so good, present such good evidence, that these hold up in front of the court’. Freier stressed the final, legal outcome to be more important to the Office for the Protection of the Constitution than taking militant measures in a swift manner, because ‘the first shot must hit. Therefore: It is quality above time’. Footnote 117 Hence, in line with Carpenter’s analysis, Witthaut’s and Feier’s statements underline that officials of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution are cautiously aware that legal mistakes made by their institutions when taking militant measures against the AfD could lead to serious consequences for their institution’s perceived legitimacy. Footnote 118
Conclusion
This article’s central claim is that radical-right parties in militant democratic environments are wrongly assumed to be passive recipients of the threat of militant measures. Aware of the enormous potential consequences of militant measures, radical-right parties should instead be expected to actively respond to the challenges posed by institutional actors tasked with the implementation of militant democracy. In short, radical-right parties in militant democratic environments do not accept the negative fate that is designated for them. They have agency. Introducing the concept of frontstage moderation, I argue that radical-right parties, when faced with the threat of militant measures, take strategic action, differentiate between the party’s frontstage and the party’s backstage and ensure that the party’s public frontstage appears as moderate and committed to the democratic order as possible. By doing so, they complicate the use of militant measures, since militant measures are dependent on the assessment of the respective party as a threat to democracy. However, while this might delay the use of militant measures against the party for some time, the party’s need to portray the party as moderate also makes it more difficult for the party to prevent extremist forces from gaining power within the party, as the extremist nature of these forces must be publicly downplayed.
Analysing the actions taken by the German radical-right AfD, I found that these actions can clearly be subsumed under the idea of frontstage moderation. Party officials of the AfD have been highly aware of the potential threat of militant measures and expected the Office for the Protection of the Constitution to take militant measures against the party long before the institution eventually decided to do so. Anticipating such militant measures against the party, as well as severe negative consequences arising from these measures, the party took steps to strategically prepare itself.
First, the party formed a working group, tasked with gathering information regarding the exact legal requirements for the implementation of militant measures. The group gave party officials examples of phrases and actions which would attract the attention of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and allow the institution to monitor the party and denounce it as a potential threat to the free democratic basic order. Second, by informing the public about the working group, the party underlined its alleged readiness to fight any militant measures taken by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution in Court. Third, the AfD publicly pledged to be committed to the free democratic basic order and began procedures to exclude very extreme, isolated party officials who had openly made statements clearly opposed to this order. However, a closer look at these exclusionary procedures suggests that the motivation for such proceedings did not derive from the party’s commitment to the free democratic basic order, but instead from the party’s wish to simulate the party’s ability and willingness to distance itself from extremist forces. The same can be said for the party’s decision to dissolve an extremist faction of the party, the Flügel, while still allowing the Flügel’s unofficial leader, right-extremist Björn Höcke, to be the party’s frontrunner in state elections and suspending an exclusion procedure against him. Fourth, the party began to delegitimise the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and actions taken by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution as instrumentalised by the government. By doing so, the party hoped to negatively impact the reputation of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and to mitigate the negative consequences of potential militant measures.
So far, scholars generally seem to agree that radical-right parties face a particularly difficult environment in militant democracies. Footnote 119 However, the effects which the threat of militant measures might have on party behaviour in general and potential counterstrategies of radical-right parties in particular have not yet been made a subject of academic debate. This article attempts to fill this gap by presenting the concept of frontstage moderation and by demonstrating the strategic action taken by the radical-right AfD when faced with the threat of militant measures. The evidence put forward underlines radical-right parties’ ability to strategically engage with the institutionalised ostracism of militant democracies. My hope is that this article will be thought of as a starting point for further research on this matter. Future research could investigate whether institutions of militant democracy are aware of the strategic nature of frontstage moderation, and whether they are legally empowered to take it into account when deciding about the use of militant measures. These and further questions certainly merit additional examination and discussion.
