The expression “living law” refers to Philo of Alexandria's conception of the biblical patriarchs who—before the Sinaitic legislation—acted in accordance with the “laws of nature” and thus literally embodied the law. It also refers to the soteriological idea of a king who embodies divine law and thus transcends the laws of the city. As conduit for the creative logos, the ruler organizes society into a perfect state. Vatter's Philo interpretation leans on a 1928 essay by Erwin Goodenough who saw Philo as a mystic and, at the same time, as a political thinker who combined Jewish and Hellenistic influences in radical and novel ways. For Vatter, Philo's idea of nomos phuseos, or natural law, returned in twentieth-century iterations of Jewish political theory, specifically in the writings of Hermann Cohen, Franz Rosenzweig, Gershom Scholem, Leo Strauss, and Hannah Arendt.
For Philo, the Mosaic Nomoi were given by the wisest of all men who encoded in it the laws of the cosmos. The society founded by Moses thus actualized what Plato, piously understood as a student of Moses, envisaged as the founding of a just republic ruled by a philosopher-king. Philo's creative synthesis of Greek, Roman, and Hebraic sources had no direct heirs in rabbinic Judaism but became foundational in the Christian theological tradition, to wit, the Johannine notion of the logos, which translated the Jewish messianic/apocalyptic trust (emunah) in the imminent end to the evil kingdoms of this world and the establishment of the kingship of God on earth into the language of individual belief (pistis) in theosis.
Vatter does not claim direct influence of Philo on the twentieth-century German Jewish thinkers he discusses. Rather he thinks of the connection as one rooted in a common perception of Jewish political thinking that looks to the Bible as an alternative to Roman imperial politics, and hence as a source of orientation for modern critical conceptions of the political. At first glance, the twentieth-century revival of Jewish political thought grounded in the Bible is surprising, given the destruction of biblical authority wreaked by Spinoza, a destruction that was not just rendered commonplace by Protestant Old Testament scholarship, which thoroughly undermined the historicity of scripture's claims, but supported the Protestant prejudice of the absence of a metaphysical foundation to the Mosaic legislation and the lack of moral value of Jewish messianism. While Jesus remained politically relevant in modern Christian civil religions, Moses and the prophets were frequently obscured. In response, Cohen and others mindful of the “pariah” status of Jewish and other minorities in the Christian nation state articulated their political thought in light of an unfinished significance of the Bible for Western political thinking.
Vatter's argument in favor of a renewed engagement with this tradition of Jewish political philosophy rests on the claim that it provides an alternative resource for thinking through the shift, in recent political theory, from sovereignty to governmentality, specifically to “pastoral” conceptions of government. Philo's preference for democracy and his anti-imperial Roman stance serve as correctives to the bleak Constantinian monotheism that Erik Peterson—in Der Monotheismus als politisches Problem (1935)—traced back to Philo, and as an antidote to Carl Schmitt's reduction of political theology to the question of sovereignty. Jewish thinking about the Law and constitutionality and Jewish, rather than Christian, messianism—and both conceptions in concert—thus appear as a meaningful guide to thinking about legality and legitimacy, constitutionality, democracy, and the anarchic aspects of human freedom and dignity in a postliberal key.
Vatter's argument is both religious and political. It is religious in showing that, for the Jewish thinkers in question, God, creation, revelation, and redemption remain relevant categories in thinking through the tensions between human freedom, the authority of the law, and the question of the legitimacy of revolutions justified by returns to the beginning, as Vatter particularly works out in the last chapter, “Hannah Arendt and Federalism.” It is political in that it interprets the duality of Exodus (freedom) and Sinai (collective covenantal self-binding) as a hint toward an “an-archic” future, a future of radical equality and universal human rights. God, in modern Jewish thought no less than in Platonic political philosophy, represents the eternal idea of justice that enters the world through reason as a dynamic force in the transformation of merely human politics into a struggle for justice and equality, traditionally expressed in the notion of messianic kingship. Vatter sees these two elements, divine/natural law and messianic anarchism, as necessarily related and this seemingly paradoxical tension as constitutive of modern Jewish political philosophy.
The actual execution of this ambitious program is uneven. The chapter on “Hermann Cohen and Socialist Democracy” relies mostly on Cohen's “Jewish Writings” (1924), especially on “Characteristik der Ethik Maimunis” (1908), where Cohen, leaning on the doctrine of attributes, characterizes Maimonides's ethics as essentially Platonist rather than Aristotelian. Vatter laments the absence of a critical edition of Cohen's writings but ignores the ongoing Werke edition, which includes carefully annotated volumes of Cohen's minor writings. He also ignores the fact that Cohen's interpretation of Maimonides's favorable dictum about non-Jews observing the Noahide laws is based on a problematic manuscript. Vatter's Cohen appears to believe that the trajectory of history necessarily demands that gentiles become Jews, as if Judaism was the only “religion of reason.”
The chapter on “Franz Rosenzweig and Religious Constitutionalism” works out the political implications of the third part of Rosenzweig's Star of Redemption. The fact that Rosenzweig conceives of Jewish life as representing a kind of transhistorical eternity is rightly interpreted as a political stance that both justifies and challenges the Christian “way” through history. Vatter also draws on anonymous and fragmentary political writings where Rosenzweig develops an oceanic view of global politics that serves as a counterpoint to Carl Schmitt's view, which is based on the domination of land and a politics based in territorial conflict. Also notable is Vatter's ingenious and original reading of Rosenzweig's views on Islam.
Vatter twins Gershom Scholem and Leo Strauss by relating their respective projects to a joint origin in Josephus's definition of “theocracy” that distinguishes the Jewish polity founded by Moses from forms of government known to the Greeks. While Scholem worked out the mystical and anarchic side of Josephus's definition, Strauss—according to Vatter—worked out the Platonic political conception of a divine law in light of antecedent Muslim adaptations of Hellenistic thought. The chapter on Strauss interprets “Philosophie und Gesetz” (1935) as the expression of a perfect reconciliation of Platonic philosophy and revealed law, Athens and Jerusalem, concluding that “Strauss's interpretation of Maimonides out of Platonic and Aristotelian sources remained very much within the outlines of a philosophical conception and defense of the Torah as living law, pioneered by Philo and revised by his German-Jewish contemporaries” (236).
The chapter on Arendt shows affinities between Arendt and the Weberian theopolitics of Buber's Königtum Gottes (1932), as well as between Philonic Judaism, modern republicanism, and Virgil's poetic praise of Roman civil religion. The book concludes with a meditation on Simone Weil as a Platonic political thinker. Vatter's main interlocutor throughout the book is Giorgio Agamben, who foregrounds Saint Paul as a theological political resource in thinking about pastoral government and economic theology.
