Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, in her landmark 1982 biography of Hannah Arendt, suggested that part of the background to the tense relationship between Arendt and Leo Strauss had to do with failed romantic ambitions on the part of Strauss. Admittedly, this was a quite minor revelation relative to Young-Bruehl's real bombshell: that Arendt had been Martin Heidegger's teenage mistress. Still, it cannot be of no interest to theorists that one of the twentieth century's leading political philosophers wooed, and was spurned by, another of that century's leading political philosophers. Yet biographical entanglements surely don't exhaust why Arendt and Strauss were at loggerheads: they were philosophically and politically opposed to each other in far-reaching ways. At the same time, as we learn from Liisi Keedus, such oppositions do not rule out significant commonalities between these two resolute and headstrong thinkers.
Both Arendt and Strauss were hostile to historicism in political theory (their relation to early twentieth-century responses to historicism is a major theme of Keedus's book), so it is interesting to see how the two of them fare within a historicist/contextualist account. What are the commonalities between Arendt and Strauss according to the contextualist story that Keedus tells? Somewhat oddly, both Arendt and Strauss devoted their doctoral projects to thinkers who built their philosophies on the foundation of Christian faith (in the case of Arendt, Augustine; in Strauss's case, Jacobi). Both Arendt and Strauss went through a phase of dabbling in Zionist politics, and both moved beyond that. For both Arendt and Strauss, their role as leading postwar critics of contemporary social science can be traced all the way back to their critical reaction to Weimar-era German sociology—or so Keedus contends, though the evidence is slender. Both Arendt and Strauss regarded Hobbes as a key figure in the political philosophy canon, with both of them committed to a reading of Hobbes that associated him with liberal modernity's supposed “devaluation of the political” (148). (Although Keedus knows that Strauss's intellectual engagement with Hobbes was vastly deeper and more illuminating than Arendt's, she nonetheless attempts to treat them as if they were of equal status as interpreters of Hobbes.) It is hard to see how any of these shared, or somewhat shared, intellectual concerns of the early Arendt and the early Strauss are capable of carrying one all that deeply into what it is in their thought that renders them the vitally important voices in political philosophy that they still are.
Much more important than these relatively superficial commonalities is the fact, also emphasized by Keedus, that both Arendt and Strauss sought to develop their own versions of the spirit of Heideggerian radicalism that viewed the received philosophical tradition as a whole as decrepit and depleted, in need of authentic rebirth. (Heidegger, one might add, could easily be seen as himself an echo of Nietzschean radicalism in the same sense: see the indented quotation from Strauss at 42.) This is unquestionably a theme of real consequence, but in itself it merely sets the stage for what became the specific, radically opposed political philosophies by which Arendt and Strauss sought to realize this bold aspiration. I don't want to suggest that Keedus lacks awareness of what defines Arendt and Strauss as political philosophers. On the contrary, she knows their thought well, and has a nuanced and insightful understanding of the way they think and analyze problems. The question, rather, is whether a specifically contextualist approach to these thinkers advances that understanding, and if so, how. What's the payoff that it is reasonable to expect from Keedus's contextualism?
There is much from which one can learn in this book. Keedus has read broadly in the intellectual and political debates in Germany in the early twentieth century. Learning about the contemporary cultural impact of a Friedrich Gogarten or a Karl Barth is interesting in its own right, and the sense of cultural crisis associated with such thinkers is relevant to the political philosophies later articulated by Arendt and Strauss. Whether it significantly helps us to grasp what actually defines the Arendtian and Straussian political philosophies in their specificity, let alone how they relate to each other, is more doubtful. Sometimes, contextualization carries us further away from the thinkers rather than bringing them closer.
As already mentioned, Arendt and Strauss each in their own way were strongly hostile to historicism. Strauss famously blamed what he saw as the inexorable moral decline associated with modernity on the shift in the intellectual center of gravity within the Western philosophical tradition from nature to history. Arendt rejected historicism because she saw it as locating the meaning of life in the historical process as a whole, thereby subsuming, and hence annulling, the meaning that rightly inheres in the particular “stories” of human beings in their particularity. Arguably, Karl Löwith (who receives only occasional mentions in Keedus's book) offers a significant bridge between Strauss's critique of historicism and Arendt's, since he agreed with Arendt that it is a big mistake to look for “meaning in history,” and agreed with Strauss that the obsession with history had contributed importantly to the crisis of modernity.
From what Keedus reports, it is clear that Strauss had no interest in Arendt's work as a theorist. Arendt appreciated Strauss's studies of Machiavelli, Spinoza, and especially Hobbes, but it is far from clear that she had a good sense of what defined Strauss's philosophical project. Tellingly, neither of them could bring him- or herself to cite the other in their published works. In a letter to Margaret Canovan dated August 12, 1973, that Keedus doesn't cite, Arendt wrote: “Carl Schmitt … together with Heidegger ‘begot’ Leo Strauss whose influence in the United States is quite remarkable; he is the only one who succeeded in founding a ‘school.’ I have no high opinion of him but this should not [prejudice] you.” Even if this characterization captured anything of substance in Strauss's mature thought (which seems unlikely), one would be obliged to point out that Arendt was at least as much a child of Heidegger's philosophy as Strauss was, probably far more so.
Keedus's book offers the paradox of a historicist treatment of thinkers who (as her own argument highlights) rebelled against historicism. An Arendt-Strauss dialogue remains possible; and no one disputes that the historical reconstruction of “discursive frameworks” (3) can sometimes be a helpful source of insights into what animates the thought of particular theorists. But on the evidence of this book, tracing Arendt's and Strauss's shared roots in the political and intellectual world of Weimar Germany will be of limited help in pursuing such a dialogue between two of the most influential political philosophers of our time.
