Klinghoffer also seeks to make a few broader, more theoretical, arguments based on his empirical analysis. The foremost is that sovereignty is withering: The events demonstrate that sovereignty “had fallen by the wayside” (pp. 13, 61, 154) or is in “death throes” (p. 154). But more is required to demonstrate that sovereignty is close to death than merely documenting the presence of ethnic hatred, regional war, and cross-border interventions. A second theoretical point is a plea for “humanitarian realism,” that is, a serious look at the combination of altruism and self-interest that underlies many countries' behavior in such crises as Rwanda. This point has been made better both empirically and conceptually by Stephen Garret (Doing Good and Doing Well. An Examination of Humanitarian Intervention, 1999). In short, judged on its theoretical contributions, this is a rather disappointing book.

In its attempt to make an original argument that runs counter to established consensus, the book suffers from some defects. The background section is weak; it simplifies too much, draws solely on far-removed tertiary sources (see, e.g., note 1 p. 6), and occassionally contradicts itself (compare data on 1959–62 refugee flows on pp. 8 and 13). In addition, in what I take to be an effort to demonstrate the complexity of the situation, Klinghoffer seems to adopt a policy of equal criticism against the Habyarimana government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR). This creates some odd outcomes: To mention but one extreme example, the discussion of the number of persons allegedly killed by the FPR after the genocide (pp. 64–5) is significantly longer than any discussion of the number of people slaughtered during the genocide.

More generally, the author ends up following an overly simplistic “they are all bad guys” storyline, which oversimplifies the complexities and ethical quandaries involved. In order to make his points, Klinghoffer tends to overstate the degree of external peace efforts in the Rwandan crisis before the genocide. There is much very good information pointing to the diplomatic trail left by Western countries as they sought to promote peace. Simultaneously, however, a great deal was done by the international community that seemed to be totally indifferent to the dynamics of violence, exclusion, militarization, and polarization in Rwanda. (I, among others, document this at length in Aiding Violence. The Development Enterprise in Rwanda, 1998). The latter information does not fit into Klinghoffer's points, so he simply does not mention it.

This book adds some important questions to the standard story about the Rwandan genocide. It provides a nice collection of factual information to make that point. Its weakness is that it is rather obsessed with making this point, as well as a few theoretical ones that supposedly follow from it. This seriously reduces the analytical and descriptive quality of the overall work. I recommend it for those who are familiar with the Rwandan case and want a well-documented argument that asks some tough questions. I do not recommend it to people seeking a nuanced and well-grounded understanding of the Rwandan genocide's causes or, indeed, even the overall performance of the international community.