On July 5, 1852, Frederick Douglass spoke to the Rochester Ladies’ Abolitionist Society in what was subsequently transcribed as “What to the Slave is the Fourth of July?” Douglass outlined the immeasurable distance between those who could celebrate American independence and the living conditions of African Americans. With the “nation's ear,” Douglass poured a “fiery stream of biting ridicule … and stern rebuke”: for the American slave, the Fourth of July, more than any other day of the year, was a sham revealing the nation's “boasted liberty [as] unholy license; [the nation's] greatness [as] swelling vanity.” Daring his listeners to scour the earth for comparable barbarity and hypocrisy, Douglass declared that America, by which he meant the United States, “reign[ed] without rival.” On July 5, 2018, African-American philosopher Kathryn Belle observed that Douglass's speech was in broader circulation this July than in years past. This was no doubt a function of the glaring contradictions of celebrating national liberty while children of migrants from parts of the Americas to the south sat in cages, forcibly separated from their parents who, in most cases, were fleeing violence and dispossession in their home countries.
The historical antecedents of these contradictions are the focus of Joshua Simon's The Ideology of Creole Revolution. Adopting the hemispheric approach for which Juliet Hooker has argued (in Theorizing Race in the Americas [Oxford University Press, 2017]), Simon's highly readable work undertakes a comparative study of the US and Latin American independence movements that overthrew European empires that had ruled the New World for more than three centuries. With clear and engaging arguments, Simon joins Angélica Maria Bernal (Beyond Origins [Oxford University Press, 2017]) in breaking from most scholars of US and Latin American political thought, who work in isolation from one another. Drawing on both English- and Spanish-language scholarship, he emphasizes that although the US and Spanish American revolutionaries diverged in their success at realizing them, their aims were remarkably similar. He contends that this was a result of their unique and shared situation as Creoles.
Simon follows the usage of “Creole” employed in research on the Spanish Americas, explaining that these were Europeans within the Americas and Americans within European empires. They therefore simultaneously occupied a privileged position in the constitutions of their colonies and a subordinate position in relationship to Europeans. While subjects of the Old and New Worlds were technically equal—as both belonged to separate territories united in the person of the king—in practice defining domestic versus foreign policy within sprawling empires was subject to ongoing contestation. Over the course of the eighteenth century, the contradictory location of Creoles—which Simon describes as one of being both colonizer and colonized—led to their disenchantment. They had wanted to be recognized as subjects of legitimate monarchs with rights owed them as descendants of Europeans who conquered the New World for their respective metropoles. When they concluded they would seek independence, they reshaped European monarchical and imperial institutions in ways designed to consolidate their control. This put them in simultaneous conflict with both Europeans and Indigenous and African Americans.
Simon illustrates this distinctive ideology through a focus on three Creole men, Alexander Hamilton, Simón Bolívar, and Lucas Alamán, who, in spite of differences of settler colonial contexts, personal station, and philosophical background, all asked: How would they free themselves of imperial domination and European rule without threatening the internal hierarchies of the colonies or Creole rule? The response to this dilemma was what Simon calls an “anti-imperial imperialism,” evident in their revolutionary, constitutional, and international political thought. Specifically, while periodically invoking natural law or universal rights, they claimed that their right to rule themselves originated in their European forefathers’ conquest of the New World. They sought constitutional designs that would protect against the twin perils of tyranny and anarchy through blending some dimensions of popular sovereignty with a strong centralized authority. They thereby sought a union of former colonies under common government marked by presidentialism and a separation of powers that limited the influence Americas’ heterogeneous populations could exercise. Insisting that it was key to avoiding reconquest and consolidating domestic control, they sustained projects of external conquest and internal colonization, proclaiming that they were liberating those they forcibly integrated into their states.
Simon acknowledges that it is not new to show that American revolutionaries sought arrangements in independence that exclusively benefited them. What is distinctive is his emphasis on this specific moment when the character of these partial interests ran in parallel across the American hemisphere and his contribution to comparative political theory in moving beyond the primarily interpretive-historical or evaluative-philosophical mode to a social scientific approach that asks what caused the particular contradictory thinking of his Creole protagonists. He does this through mobilizing a qualified Marxist framework to reconstruct the background problems they sought to address. Rather than treating economic classes in a binary way, European imperial institutions invested members of different groups with opposed interests, influencing their appraisals of particular institutions and distributions of power. It was their contradictory location, rather than any specific character of liberal ideas, that informed Creole defenses of illiberal liberty, undemocratic democracy, and the autonomous right of their nations to meddle in the affairs of the rest of the world.
In addition to these contributions, the book's main strength is its emphasis on the contingency of the history that transpired. There were Americans with far more profound grievances than the Creoles. Had it not been for a particular conjuncture of imperial, colonial, and metropolitan changes, they may never have deserted known inconveniences for an uncertain independence. There was no assurance that they would win or that the particular conceptions of union that all of them sought would, in the US case, insulate the new nation from domestic unrest and foreign aggression, facilitating economic and military growth that enabled it to secure the global economic and military hegemony that included dominating much of the rest of the hemisphere in ways that determined its and their subsequent divergent development.
Simon concludes by suggesting that an appreciation of the particular, exclusive interests of the Creole revolutionaries should discourage the reifying of American Founders’ ideas and institutions. The vision of once possible hemispheric histories, he suggests, can help to envision futures that could emancipate the New World “again.” To what extent does the book facilitate such work?
Given Simon's exclusive focus on Creoles as non-racially-mixed Europeans or, in contemporary parlance, elite white people, who designed the hemisphere's institutions to serve themselves, does the US–Latin American comparison challenge claims of supposedly distinctive, greater tolerance for racial mixture in the Hispanophone Americas, demonstrating that such ideas only gained traction when the original desire to secure European-American supremacy was imposed by a now imperial North? Although the situational similarities of elites of the North and South are illuminating, is it not significant that Anglo-Protestant-US Americans did not describe themselves as Creole and instead used the term disparagingly, in Hamilton's case to impugn his biological origins and racial legitimacy? Is it consequential for Simon's comparison that the “US Creole” who most readily lent himself for inclusion was neither born nor raised in the United States? To what extent was it Hamilton's direct ties to the Americas south of the US that enabled him to set foundations from which the US nation benefited?
Relatedly, Simon ends his analysis with the Cuban intellectual giant José Martí and his formulation of our America as centering Indigenous and African Americans, but Martí was not the first American to express these aspirations. Surely, in addition to explaining whom Creoles sought to exclude, it would illuminate their shared hemisphere to engage the ideas of these other Americans? For example, many would reject the idea that Hamilton was the source of the novel idea of a confederated empire in a territory that had known and contended with the powerful Iroquois Confederacy. What of Douglass, who offered prescriptive antidotes in response to the contradictory character of US political life that he diagnosed? Mentioning but not including the Haitian Revolution in this hemispheric study similarly narrows its scope. While Simon is right that, led by enslaved and free Africans, it was not a Creole Revolution in his sense, it deserves a central place in the study of American and revolutionary thought. The aim of its revolutionaries to build an abolitionist empire would illuminate the broader range of American ways of indigenizing and creolizing political ideals.
Finally, Simon explains how the divergence between the US and Spanish America followed from the contrast between the relatively peaceful first transfer of authority in the US and unions to the south that splintered, leaving smaller states less capable of defending their interests abroad and stimulating economic growth at home. Is the implication that political stability and strength required anti-imperial imperial practices, or that there are alternative political approaches linked to distinct American political situations that envision consolidating strength without perpetual, unsustainable domination? If there are descendants of Simon's Creoles who still see the Americas as theirs by virtue of their European heritage and direct role in indigenous dispossession, would a genuinely hemispheric alternative require a fundamentally different conception of the obligations entailed in being American? Would such thought have to engage with processes of creolization to challenge the exclusive category of Creole that sought to stop them in their tracks?
