“The history of inconvertible money, the understanding of which is so important for a proper appraisal of the various theories of the value of money, is presented in a fascinating and exhaustive manner by Subercaseaux in his El papel moneda” (Wicksell Reference Wicksell and Classen1935, pp. 127–128).
I. INTRODUCTION
Guillermo Subercaseaux’s El papel moneda came out in Santiago de Chile in 1912, followed by a French edition (Subercaseaux Reference Subercaseaux1920a) published shortly after the First World War in the series “Bibliothèque Internationale D’Économie Politique” directed by Alfred Bonnet, which included translations of classic works such as Alfred Marshall’s Principles. Subercaseaux’s book attracted the attention of prominent monetary economists such as Knut Wicksell (1935, pp. 166–168), whose discussion of the relation between inconvertible paper-money issue, the exchange rate, and the price level in the second (1915) edition of volume 2 of his Lectures was arranged around the evidence drawn from El papel moneda. For the first time, a book by a Latin American economist was reviewed in a number of international journals (Sauvaire-Jourdan Reference Sauvaire-Jourdan1913, Kinley Reference Kinley1914, The Economist 1920, Hawtrey Reference Hawtrey1921, Edgeworth Reference Edgeworth1922, Supino Reference Supino1922).
According to James Angell (1965, p. 286), “the excellence of [Le papier-monnaie] at once gave it a wide and growing influence.” Angell’s book was based on his Harvard PhD thesis, supervised by F. W. Taussig and Allyn Young, who “greatly admired” Subercaseaux and recommended him as a new honorary member of the American Economic Association in 1926 (Mehrling Reference Mehrling1997, p. 53). By the early 1930s, Subercaseaux had established a solid reputation as an expert in the field, as witnessed by Crane Brinton’s (1934, p. 309) statement that “for a complete survey of paper money, both historically and theoretically considered, there is the well-established book of Subercaseaux.” Around that period, Subercaseaux was invited by E. R. Seligman to contribute the entry on paper money to the prestigious Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences (see Asso and Fiorito Reference Asso and Fiorito2001). Subercaseaux’s (Reference Subercaseaux and Seligman1933) contribution to the Encyclopaedia summed up not only the main results of his 1912 book, but also of some of his other essays on the topic, especially the forty-three-pages-long “Essai sur la nature du papier monnaie,” presented in a Spanish version at the first Pan-American Scientific Congress (held in Santiago in 1908) and published in Paris the next year. Ludwig von Mises (1980, p. 93), in the first (1912) edition of his Theory of Money and Credit, would build on Subercaseaux’s (Reference Subercaseaux1909) account of how inconvertible paper money becomes accepted as a medium of exchange.
Guillermo Subercaseaux Pérez was born in Santiago in 1872, where he died in 1959. He held the chair of political economy at the University of Chile (since 1902 until his retirement in the 1940s), and acted as Minister of Finance for brief periods (1907, 1919–20, 1923–24), president of the Central Bank of Chile (1933–1938), and member of the National Congress on several occasions (Ramón Reference Ramón1999, pp. 162–163). As a politician, he developed a broad nationalist outlook under the influence of Friedrich List’s ideas (see Boianovsky Reference Boianovsky2013a). Subercaseaux graduated in engineering in Santiago in 1894, and apparently received some economic training in Germany (Llona Reference Llona1990, p. 44), but details of his German education are unknown. Apart from El papel moneda, Subercaseaux’s (Reference Subercaseaux1920b) monetary and banking history of Chile also attracted some attention from European and American scholars (see, e.g., Edgeworth Reference Edgeworth1922, Williams Reference Williams1923). It became a standard reference after its publication in English as part of the series sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Subercaseaux Reference Subercaseaux1922).
We investigate how Subercaseaux became the first Latin American economist widely read abroad. Whereas many studies about the international spread of economic ideas focus on their reception at the “periphery,” this paper is concerned with their transmission from a South American country to the core represented by North America and western Europe. One should not, however, overlook the role played by foreign economic literature in shaping Subercaseaux’s approach to the economics of paper money. His contributions to the field reflected two major influences: the lively debate that took place in Chile (and in some other South American countries, such as Brazil and Argentina) at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries about the organization of the monetary system; and the international literature about inconvertible paper money started by Adolf Wagner’s (Reference Wagner1868) seminal history of Russian paper money, followed by Carlo Ferraris’ (Reference Ferraris1879) Italian monograph, Wilhem Lexis’ (Reference Lexis and Conrad1893) paper money entry in Conrad’s Handwörterbuch, and W. C. Mitchell’s (Reference Mitchell1903, Reference Mitchell1908) well-known studies about the greenback era in the United States.
The “monetary question” (“la question monetaria”) dominated the economic and political debate in Chile from 1878, when the gold standard was replaced by a paper currency regime, until the creation of the Central Bank and the return to convertibility in 1925. Supporters of the gold standard and of inconvertible paper money were called, respectively, “oreros” (from “oro,” which means “gold”) and “papeleros.” The corresponding terms in Brazil and Argentina were “metalistas” and “papelistas.” One of the key issues was the determination of the gold premium of depreciated South American paper currencies. (For the Chilean debate, see Fetter Reference Fetter1931; Hirschman Reference Hirschman1963, ch. 3; Pinto Reference Pinto1968, pp. 129–133; Drake Reference Drake1989, ch. 3; Llona Reference Llona1990, ch. 2. For the Brazilian and Argentine debates, see Fritsch and Franco Reference Fritsch, Franco, Martin Aceña and Reis2002, and Cortés-Conde Reference Cortés-Conde1989, respectively.) The word “metallism” became part of monetary theory after Georg-Friedrich Knapp (Reference Knapp1905) coined it in opposition to what he called “cartalism” or “nominalism” (see Mises Reference Mises1980, p. 515; and Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter1954, p. 288; the subject has been revisited by Charles Goodhart Reference Goodhart[1998] and others in the context of the creation of the European Monetary Union). The meanings were related to, but not quite the same as, the early South American terms.
Subercaseaux referred often to contributions made by Wagner, Ferraris, Lexis, Mitchell, and others to the working of paper money economies.Footnote 1 Just like those authors, the Chilean economist attempted to develop a theory of inconvertible paper money based on careful historical research. As announced by Subercaseaux (1912, p. 3; 1920a, p. 1), his goal was not to criticize or praise the paper currency regime, but to study its causes and effects. He claimed that El papel moneda filled a gap in the literature, as it was the first systematic treatise on the subject, and expected that the hitherto unknown history of paper money in South American countries (the “pathology of paper money”) would draw some attention from European scholars (Subercaseaux Reference Subercaseaux1912, p. 4; 1920a, p. 2). Except for Supino (Reference Supino1922)—who considered the book a merely descriptive work inferior to Wagner (Reference Wagner1868) and Ferraris (Reference Ferraris1879) from the point of view of theory—the reviewers broadly accepted Subercaseaux’s claim and confirmed his expectation of interest in episodes of South American monetary history, such as the hyperinflation that took place in Colombia at the end of the nineteenth century and the Conversion Office (“Caixa de Conversão”) experiments of return to metallic standard in Argentina and Brazil. The Economist reported that the scheme of Subercaseaux’s book was “ambitious,” as the author set out “to write a complete account of paper money in all countries and at all times.”Footnote 2 The scope of El papel moneda explains why Wicksell referred his readers to that book (instead of better-known works by Wagner or Lexis) for a comprehensive treatment of the subject, and based his own interpretation of the dynamics of inconvertible paper money on Subercaseaux’s findings. In the same vein, the empirical and theoretical discussion in part II of the book, on the determination of the exchange rate in depreciated paper-standard regimes, would attract increasing attention in the 1920s, when the topic became central to international monetary economics (see, e.g., Angell Reference Angell1965, pp. 286–289).
One of the main results drawn by Subercaseaux from his study of monetary history up to the beginning of the twentieth century was the essentially temporary character of paper currency regimes. Following upon that observation, he organized the 400 pages of his 1912 book around three parts: the origins, life, and end (that is, return to a metallic standard) of inconvertible paper money. Indeed, Subercaseaux was the first to introduce the idea of a complete cycle of paper money (Bernholz 2003, p. 114). This paper deals mainly with the first two parts of El papel moneda—the determination of the value of paper money in relation to goods in general and gold in particular—with only passing reference to his detailed account of the several methods of returning to a metallic standard.
II. THE ACCEPTANCE AND POSITIVE VALUE OF PAPER MONEY
When Subercaseaux set out to write El papel moneda, there were two competing explanations of the public acceptance of inconvertible paper money without intrinsic use value. The first, called “orthodox” (Subercaseaux Reference Subercaseaux1909, p. 21), was associated with the commodity theory of money developed by Karl Knies (1873–1879) in Germany and J. Laurence Laughlin (Reference Laughlin1903) in the United States, which explained the positive value of paper money by the expectation of future convertibility of the notes into metal (Laughlin Reference Laughlin1903, p. 530). Accordingly, the changing value of paper money was supposed to be determined by the degree of belief in the occurrence and date of future redemption, falling towards zero if confidence in the government’s ability to redeem its notes was destroyed. Mitchell (Reference Mitchell1903) deployed Laughlin’s commodity theory of money in his thesis about the greenbacks (written under Laughlin’s supervision at the University of Chicago), as discussed in the next section. The alternative explanation was represented by Knapp’s (Reference Knapp1905) famous “state theory of money,” which regarded money as the creature of law. From Knapp’s cartalist perspective, money had a purely formal or conventional character—its acceptance as medium of exchange and its ensuing positive value derived entirely from the legal authority of the state.
Subercaseaux rejected both approaches. Instead, he further developed and applied to inconvertible paper currency the Mengerian theme of money as an unintended social consequence of the process of exchange. Subercaseaux (1909, pp. 2–3) referred to Carl Menger’s (Reference Menger and Conrad1892) argument that the use of the most marketable commodity as money arose out of the self-interest actions of economic agents in trade. In particular, the state can increase the acceptability of a money commodity by proclaiming it as legal tender, but cannot create money as such. As put by Subercaseaux (1909, p. 3), “the law which introduces the legal course does no more than to sanction and perfect an institution which is already sanctioned by usage … the state perfects by its intervention an institution that was born through the free interplay of economic life.” However, he did not share Menger’s opinion that the exchange value of money would disappear if currency lost its property of usability as a commodity (metal); that is, if a paper currency regime was adopted. Instead, Subercaseaux (1909, pp. 3–21; 1912; and 1920a, part I) extended Menger’s original framework in order to explain the spontaneous social process of the creation of convertible claims to commodity money and the eventual introduction of inconvertible paper money with positive value.
Subercaseaux’s (1909, p. 5; 1912, p. 76; 1920a, p. 81) historical research indicated that inconvertible paper money was introduced into monetary circulation due to its character as promise of payment or purely temporary substitute for metallic money.Footnote 3 Mises (1980, ch. 4, sec. 3) endorsed Subercaseaux’s interpretation that, since it is not the state but the common practice of traders that creates money, the state can create fiat money only by turning convertible claims to money (metal) that are already in circulation as money substitutes into inconvertible paper currency. Historically, the confidence inspired by promises of future redemption of notes had acted as a “powerful factor in order to break the resistance which otherwise would present itself when the introduction of note circulation is attempted within a people used to regard metallic money as the true and only kind of money. Money must be accepted or appreciated by the public, which is why it is necessary that certain psychological roots act in its favour” (Subercaseaux Reference Subercaseaux1912, pp. 80–81; 1920a, pp. 84–85). Although, from a purely theoretical perspective, inconvertible paper money issued in limited amounts is able to fulfil all monetary functions, the public, who “does not understand theories,” would not accept worthless paper money if its character as a temporal substitute for metallic money had not given it an initial value. That was how paper money penetrated the “channels of circulation,” according to Subercaseaux’s framework.
The practice of issuing paper money was a relatively recent development in economic history, originally associated with the creation of convertible banknotes. In times of financial stress, when banks were unable to redeem their issues, the government suspended convertibility, and the note, originally a promise to pay in standard coin, was turned into paper money proper. Another important historical source of paper money was the inability by government treasury to cover expenditures in times of fiscal difficulty, which led to printing irredeemable notes endowed with legal tender (Subercaseaux Reference Subercaseaux1912; and 1920a, part I, ch. 4).Footnote 4 Paper money was called “fiduciary circulation” because its value was supposed to be based on the confidence of its future reimbursement in metal. Likewise, it was regarded as a debt of the state, an internal debt without interest sometimes called a “forced loan.”
However, one should not mix up the historical origin of paper money as a promise to pay with its economic aspect of “independent and true means of exchange and measure of value in the territory or state where it circulates” (Subercaseaux Reference Subercaseaux1909, p. 14). Whereas the study of paper money as a debt of the state belongs in public finance, the investigation of its character as an instrument of circulation pertains to monetary economics. Subercaseaux’s sharp distinction between the historical origin and the actual working of paper money may be found in other authors, as well. Schumpeter (1954, p. 289, n. 5), for instance, pointed out the risk of confusion between the origins of money—as a commodity used as the medium of exchange—and its nature or logic, “which is entirely independent of the commodity character of its material.” In the same vein, Simmel (1978, ch. 2) argued that money convertibility into an intrinsically valuable commodity, although historically important, was incidental to its nature as the unintended product of social evolution and “trust.”
Because paper money was originally introduced as a promise to pay (a temporary substitute for metallic money), its value was held by some economists to depend upon, and to be determined by, the degree of confidence that the promise of future conversion inspired, a view rejected by Subercaseaux:
This assumption, however, is erroneous; the value of paper money derives principally from the monetary functions which it performs. Its value inheres in its character as legal means of payment of taxes, of liquidating debts and storing up wealth. This value can be maintained without regard to any promise of future conversion into metal, provided of course that the volume of circulating media is regulated to conform to the monetary requirements of trade. (Subercaseaux Reference Subercaseaux and Seligman1933, p. 569; see also 1909, p. 18)
Neither did Subercaseaux accept the notion that the circulation of inconvertible paper money and the maintenance of its positive value were imposed by the authority of law. At some point, he seemed to side with some aspects of Knapp’s approach. In an article contributed to a German journal, Subercaseaux (1913, p. 90) remarked that metallic regimes had dominated monetary history, interrupted temporarily by the adoption of a “monetary system that deduced its value from its legal statute only, i.e. a cartal monetary system, such as Knapp puts it, like the paper money with legal tender.” However, a careful reading of his 1912 book and 1909 essay shows that the acceptance of paper money was due to the recognition of its monetary functions by the public; without that factor, “every attempt to put paper money into circulation is bound to be fruitless” (Subercaseaux Reference Subercaseaux1909, p. 10). Moreover, such “monetary functions are those that should not be imposed against the public will, for it is useless to resort to severe punishment” in order to force the acceptance of inconvertible paper money (1912, p. 82; 1920a, p. 86). Monetary history had provided evidence that, when confidence is lacking, the public repudiates the inconvertible note regardless of the government’s attempt to impose its positive value by the force of law, as illustrated by American “continental currency” in 1777, Colombia at the time of its independence war (1811), Uruguay during periods of financial crises (1868, 1875, and 1890), and Peru during the war of the Pacific in the 1880s (Subercaseaux Reference Subercaseaux1912, pp. 82–89; 1920a, pp. 87–94; 1909, pp. 11–12). In all those cases, as pointed out by Subercaseaux, the repudiation and loss of value of paper money were not provoked by overissue (hyperinflation), but by lack of confidence in the monetary institutions.
Monetary history had also provided examples of the establishment of paper currency regimes without the necessity to resort to the declaration of legal course and even less to the forced course imposed by authority. A case in point was the suspension of convertibility of Bank of England notes in 1797 at the beginning of the Napoleonic Wars. These paper notes became the nation’s medium of exchange, despite the fact that they lacked legal-tender status. It was only in 1812 that the Bank of England notes were declared legal tender, after having been already accepted as the true circulating money for a long time (Subercaseaux Reference Subercaseaux1912, pp. 93–94; 1920a, pp. 97–98; see also McCallum Reference McCallum1989, pp. 24–25). Similar episodes of acceptance and circulation of inconvertible notes without legal course took place also in Argentina and Brazil in the 1820s, as documented by Subercaseaux. Historical evidence suggested, therefore, that legal-tender legislation was not the key factor in determining the medium of exchange used by economic agents.
Subercaseaux’s conclusion that both metallist and cartalist theories of paper money were wanting was supported by B.-S. Chlepner (Reference Chlepner1914), a member of the Belgian Institut de Sociologie Solvay founded by Ernest Solvay. Chlepner’s article was part of the general interest at that institute on the characteristics of payment systems, associated with Solvay’s proposal to abolish metallic money and replace it by an abstract system of accounts called “social comptabilism” (see Boianovsky and Erreygers Reference Boianovsky, Erreygers, Fontaine and Leonard2005), a concept briefly discussed by Subercaseaux (1909, p. 15; 1911a, p. 74). Chlepner (Reference Chlepner1914) referred extensively to Subercaseaux’s Essai, and quoted his conclusion that, just as the value of gold in a metallic system is not due to its non-monetary use as consumption or industrial good, the value of paper money is determined mainly by its monetary demand instead of by the expectation about the government’s ability and intention to back the paper money with gold in the future. True, if there is such an expectation, it will influence its value as the date of resumption of conversion approaches (see also Wicksell Reference Wicksell and Classen1935, pp. 151–152). The value of inconvertible paper money is, therefore, decided by the double influence of its character as promise of payment and by its monetary functions, but, even if the first factor ceases to operate, the monetary demand alone is able to sustain its value, provided it is accepted by the public with confidence (Subercaseaux Reference Subercaseaux1909, p. 22; 1912, p. 97; 1920a, p. 103).
Recent monetary experience had, according to Subercaseaux and Chlepner, provided convincing evidence that the value of paper money was derived not from its character of promise of payment but from its monetary functions. The history of inconvertible paper money in Austria between the 1860s and 1890s was probably the best illustration of that proposition (Subercaseaux Reference Subercaseaux1909, pp. 24–25; 1912, pp. 170–173; 1920a, pp. 181–184). The Austrian government had succeeded over a long period—through the periodical issue of state bonds and corresponding control of money supply—in stabilizing the gold value of its inconvertible paper money at a value even higher than that of the silver into which it was once redeemable. Laughlin (1903, pp. 530ff), however, claimed that that did not disprove the metallist theory of money, since he found in the prospect of a future conversion of the Austrian notes into gold the factor that tied the value of paper to the gold standard. Subercaseaux (1909, pp. 25–26; 1912, pp. 174–175; 1920a, pp. 185–186), just like Lexis (Reference Lexis and Conrad1893) and Mises (1980, pp. 148–149), did not accept the metallist account of the stability of the Austrian exchange rate. If economic agents had a “prophetic forecast” of the future development of Austrian monetary policy, they would anticipate that, in the distant future, metallic money would be established with a value determined by the value itself of the international exchange of Austrian paper currency. Under these circumstances, it would be wrong to assume that the rate of exchange was kept stable by the promises of redemption of paper money. Actually, it was the other way around: the rate of the future gold money resulted from the gold exchange value kept by paper money during the course of its monetary functions.
Subercaseaux concluded that even if, on many occasions, the nominal value of paper money and the expectation of future redemption at par had influenced the rate of exchange, those factors had not represented a sine qua non condition for keeping the gold value of paper.
Paper money monetary functions are themselves the capital source of its value and by that the primordial bases that maintain the quotations of international exchange. It is absolutely evident that under normal conditions of confidence it could be perfectly possible to maintain the monetary circulation of a note declared forever inconvertible. (1912, p. 180; 1920a, p. 190)
Clearly, the determination of the exchange rate or the gold premium was central to the theory of inconvertible paper money, as discussed next.
III. THE FOREIGN EXCHANGES OF PAPER CURRENCY REGIMES
Subercaseaux (1909, p. 27; 1911b, p. 107)—like Lexis (1893) and Ferraris (Reference Ferraris1879) before him—reaffirmed the sharp distinction established by Wagner (Reference Wagner1868) between the value of paper money in relation to domestic goods and its value in relation to gold (gold premium or foreign exchange). According to the Chilean economist, the “confusion” between the purchasing power of money and the price of gold was widespread at the time. Although it was true that there were important connections between those two phenomena, there was also a distinction. A main feature of paper currency regimes is that gold is just a commodity; fluctuations in the gold premium directly affect prices of imported and exported commodities. Prices of domestic goods are only indirectly influenced by changes in the exchange rate. It often happens that a significant depreciation of paper in terms of gold comes about because of demands for gold or bills of exchange to settle international transactions, but the value of paper money in relation to domestic goods remains stable or is not depreciated to the same extent (Subercaseaux Reference Subercaseaux1911b, p. 107).
As pointed out by Tugan-Baranovsky (1987, pp. 131–136), Wagner’s distinction played a crucial role in the development of the notion of the value of paper money as an “autonomous” variable, in contrast with Knies’ (1873–1879) contention that, since paper money has no use value, its exchange value is derivate from the value of metal in which it was originally redeemable (on Knies’ metallist monetary theory, see Trautwein Reference Trautwein, Böhm, Gehrke and Kurz2002). Knies’ approach implied the coincidence between the purchasing power of paper money and the agio level. In Tugan-Baranovsky’s (p. 136) words, Wagner’s empirical and analytical argument about the distinction between gold agio and purchasing power of paper money represented a “mortal blow to the metallic theory of the value of the latter.” In the same vein, Altmann (1908, pp. 41–42) observed in his survey of German monetary theory of the nineteenth century that Wagner’s emphasis on the difference between the “external” and the “domestic” values of paper money illustrated the combination of induction and deduction displayed in his study of Russian paper money. In particular, Wagner (1868, chs. 5–7) argued that there was no simple ratio between gold premium and the amount of paper money. The relationship depended on the intensity of the desire of paper-money holders to get metal, and the real demand for metal, especially for international payments, but, above all, on the confidence of the country’s economic and political stability and the prospect of resumption (see also Angell Reference Angell1965, pp. 336–339).
Wagner provided—as part of his essay on “public credit” he contributed to Schönberg’s Handbuch der Politischen Ökonomie—a convenient summing up of his studies about inconvertible paper money. The version published in the fourth edition (1898) of Schönberg’s Handbuch was appended as volume 3 of the French translation of his treatise on public finance; chapter 4 of that volume dealt with state paper money or “Staatspapiergeld” (Wagner Reference Wagner and Heller1912, pp. 80–128). The distinction between the purchasing power of money and the gold premium had been put forward by Thomas Tooke in his well-known History of Prices. However, whereas Tooke had discussed it as a phenomenon peculiar to the bank restriction period (1797 to 1819) in Great Britain, Wagner (1912, p. 104) elaborated it as a general proposition. Like Tooke, Wagner’s approach to the determination of the foreign exchanges of paper currency systems was developed as a criticism of the 1810 Bullion Report (reproduced in Cannan Reference Cannan1969) and its claim that the gold premium, just like other prices, was directly proportional to the issue of paper money. Wagner—and Subercaseaux (1912 and 1920a, part II, ch. 3) after him—challenged the quantity theory of money and its application to the determination of the exchange rate. The “immediate” determinants of the gold premium, for a given state of confidence, were the relative demand for paper money and gold by asset holders, and the balance of payments. The quantity of paper money affected (indirectly) its foreign value only to the extent that such changes influenced the intermediate factor of confidence and, by that, the composition of demand for gold and paper money in the portfolio of economic agents (Wagner Reference Wagner and Heller1912, p. 105).
The determination of the exchange rate was central to South American monetary controversies of that period. Whereas the “oreros” maintained that exchange-rate depreciation was caused by increases in the supply of paper money and ensuing excess aggregate demand, the “papeleros” claimed that depreciation was brought about by a “basic” or “original” disequilibrium of the balance of payments associated with the economic structure. Hence, “oreros” argued for a return to convertibility as the way to achieve economic stability, in contrast with the contention of the “papeleros” that, because of the tendency to external disequilibrium, the adoption of the gold standard would be accompanied by contraction of domestic money supply with perverse effects on production (see Pinto Reference Pinto1968, pp. 129–132; Llona Reference Llona1990, pp. 58–60).Footnote 5
Subercaseaux referred not just to Wagner but to the large South American literature on paper money and foreign exchanges as well, including Vieira Souto (Reference Vieira Souto and Luz1980), Calogeras (Reference Calogeras1910), and Cavalcanti (Reference Cavalcanti1893) on Brazil; Alcorta (Reference Alcorta1880) and Terry (Reference Terry1893, Reference Terry1899) on Argentina; Iregui (Reference Iregui1905) on Colombia; and Acevedo (Reference Acevedo1903) on Uruguay. Despite referring often to the debate between “oreros” and “papeleros” in Chile, Subercaseaux (Reference Subercaseaux1912, Reference Subercaseaux1920a) did not mention other contemporary Chilean authors. Agustin Ross (Reference Ross1910) was one of the leaders of the Chilean “oreros,” whereas Francisco Valdes Vergara (Reference Valdes Vergara1913) was a representative of the “papeleros” position (see Llona Reference Llona1990, ch. 2). Vieira Souto’s conclusion about Brazil—that the amount of paper money was not a “fundamental and direct cause” of changes in gold premuim, but only an “indirect and secondary” one—was quoted approvingly by Subercaseaux (1912, p. 150; 1920a, p. 159). He could have referred as well to Rui Barbosa (Reference Barbosa1892), who made use of the international literature in order to interpret the course of the Brazilian exchange. Barbosa (pp. 48–55) reproduced from Ferraris (1879, pp. 30–35) statistical tables displaying annual data about paper money issue and gold agio in several periods of inconvertible paper money in four different countries (Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and the United States). Barbosa’s interpretation of the data echoed Ferraris’ (p. 37) conclusion that “the amount of paper money has not had any influence on the agio level,” which Barbosa applied to the Brazilian conditions (see also Wileman Reference Wileman[1969] for a contemporary review of the debate between “papelistas” and “metalistas” in Brazil; and Williams’ 1920 classic study of Argentine-depreciated currency, which refers to the monetary debate in that country at the end of the nineteenth century).Footnote 6
Ferraris (Reference Ferraris1879), a student of Wagner’s in Berlin in the early 1870s (see Tusset Reference Tusset, Augello and Guidi2003, p. 525), assembled the first data set relating paper money supply and gold premium for a number of European countries and the United States. Subercaseaux (1912; and 1920a, part II, ch. 3) updated Ferraris’ series and extended the data set to Brazil, Colombia, Argentina, and Chile. The time series indicated, as observed by Subercaseaux (1912, p. 142; 1920a, p. 150), that quite often issues of paper money had been incorporated into circulation without producing direct or indirect effects on the exchange rates. However, he did not repeat Ferraris’ conclusion that there was no connection whatsoever between changes in inconvertible paper money supply and the gold premium. According to Subercaseaux (1912, p. 144; 1920a, p. 152), an increase in the note issue affected the foreign exchanges only so far as the new notes were applied directly or indirectly to the purchase of gold or foreign bills. As observed by Wicksell (1935, pp. 166–167), the data collected by Subercaseaux indicated that if the issues of paper money were kept within reasonable limits, “the economic forces which resist too violent a decline in its value and which are invoked by this very decline operate so strongly that only a slight tendency to depreciation of the paper money is discernible,” a tendency that increases with the effort to use paper money for foreign payments or to acquire precious metals.
Subercaseaux (1912, p. 147; 1920a, p. 155) distinguished a gradual slight change from a “great exaggeration” in the increase of note issue. In that case, one could not assume that it is possible to increase indefinitely the amount of notes without provoking an increase in the price level, which, in its turn, would affect the foreign exhanges through its effect on imports of commodities or exports of capital. The historical episodes of the assignats during the French revolution (1789–1796) and of the hyperinflation in Colombia between 1886 and 1900—when the circulation of inconvertible paper money increased from 3 million to 800 million pesos, accompanied by an increase of the gold premium from 35% to 10,000%—provided powerful illustrations of that proposition. Wicksell (1935, pp. 167–168) carefully examined Subercaseaux’s data about the various stages of Colombian hyperinflation, which, in Wicksell’s view, made clear that “large and continuous issues of paper money lead to a corresponding fall in the value of paper money, which, as might be expected, is in exact accordance with the principles of the Quantity Theory.” According to Wicksell (p. 168), this would be accompanied by inflationary expectations and an (apparent) rise in interest rates (see also Boianovsky Reference Boianovsky2013b). Despite Subercaseaux’s mention of the interaction among paper money supply, domestic prices, and the gold premium, it is true that he never approached “the question of the mutual relations of the note circulation, the foreign exchanges and the prices of commodities in a systematic or comprehensive manner” (Hawtrey Reference Hawtrey1921, p. 627; see also Angell Reference Angell1965, p. 289). By the early 1930s, under the impact of the German hyperinflation of the 1920s, Subercaseaux (1933, p. 569) had no doubts that “the overissue of paper money invariably leads to depreciation of the money unit” in the foreign exchange market.
The literature on foreign exchanges of depreciated paper currencies in the interwar period began to focus on two main aspects of Subercaseaux’s contributions to the topic: the influence of confidence on the determination of the exchange rate, and the effect of exchange rate fluctuations on domestic prices. As pointed out by Chi-Yuen We (1939, p. 261), Subercaseaux (Reference Subercaseaux1912, Reference Subercaseaux1920a) and Mitchell (Reference Mitchell1903) shared an emphasis on the importance of the “psychological factor” in the working of paper-standard economies. Chi-Yuen ascribed to both authors the view that if confidence in the stability of the exchanges was established, it would be enough to maintain their stability (see Subercaseaux [1912, p. 120; and 1920a, p. 128], who referred to Wagner Reference Wagner[1868] in that connection). Confidence was deemed to depend on the current and anticipated political and financial situation of the government. In fact, such a view had been clearly expressed by Lexis’ (1895, p. 535) statement that “an inconvertible paper money which is forced into circulation is always a sign of an unfavourable financial state, and the greater the agio as compared with the original standard metal, the more certainly may we expect this unfavourable state to continue.”
Mitchell’s (1903, p. 199) interpretation of the American greenbacks era, based on Laughlin’s commodity theory of money, stressed the effect of “every suggestion of an increase in the amount of paper currency” on diminishing the perspective of future redemption and, therefore, of decreasing the value of the greenbacks already in circulation. Subercaseaux (1912, p. 149; 1920a, p. 157) quoted Mitchell’s remarks about the effects on gold premium of the announcements of note issues. Mitchell (1903, pp. 207–208) denied the relevance of the quantity theory of money on the grounds that what mattered was not the actual issue of notes but the effect of their expectation or probability on gold premium. Subercaseaux, on the other hand, understood the confidence factor in terms of the price expectation created by the anticipated note issue in the context of the quantity theory: “The businessman does not understand quantity theories, but knows very well that it is not possible to keep the lithographic machines working indefinitely without producing a depreciation of the note, and fears the abuse of emissions” (1912, p. 149; 1920a, p. 157; italics in the original).
Subercaseaux’s (1912; and 1920a, part II, ch. 6) empirical and theoretical treatment of the effects of fluctuations of foreign exchanges on prices and wages followed upon Wagner (Reference Wagner1868) and Mitchell (Reference Mitchell1908). As put by Angell (1965, p. 289), referring to Le papier-monnaie, “Subercaseaux’s analysis of the interfiliations of the price-structure, and of the way in which different parts of this structure are affected by exchange-rate fluctuations under a paper standard is unique in the history of French thought.” Subercaseaux’s (1912, p. 209; 1920a, p. 223) main conclusion in that regard was that the rise in the gold premium tends to raise the price level by first affecting the prices of tradeable goods and then spreading with various speeds to domestic goods and wages. He then confirmed Wagner’s (Reference Wagner1868) hypothesis that the agio acted as a duty against import and a bounty upon export goods (Subercaseaux Reference Subercaseaux1912, p. 195; 1920a, p. 209), a result of some importance from the point of view of protectionist policy (see also Lexis Reference Lexis1895).Footnote 7 Moreover, Subercaseaux’s finding that the effect of the rate of exchange upon price levels was more pronounced than the reverse effect of the price level upon foreign exchange, together with his emphasis on the “confidence” factor, represented an important piece of criticism of some aspects of the purchasing power parity theory, as pointed out by Ellis (1934, pp. 257–258).
The notion that fiscal deficits of paper-standard countries may affect the foreign exchange through the degree of confidence in paper money became influential in the 1920s (see Chi-Yuen Reference Chi-Yuen1939, p. 262), as shown especially by Young (Reference Young1924) and Rist (Reference Rist1924). Although Charles Rist (p. 116) did not refer to Subercaseaux in that connection, he did mention that Le papier-monnaie provided full evidence of “South America as the classic field of paper money experiences,” and gave a quotation (from Subercaseaux Reference Subercaseaux1912, p. 240; 1920a, p. 256) about the negative effects on economic activity of deflations associated with sharp increases of the value of national paper currency in terms of gold and foreign currencies. Young did not mention Le papier-monnaie, but, as informed by Mehrling (1997, pp. 53–54), he had a copy of the book (which he donated to Harvard’s Widener Library) and was familiar with its contents. The “Young–Subercaseaux” view about the determination of the exchange rate has been contrasted by Mehrling (p. 54) with Gustav Cassel’s (Reference Cassel1922) quantity theoretic interpretation that exchange depreciation had been caused by monetary expansion and price inflation in each country, along the lines of the purchasing power parity theory. Differently from Cassel, Young (Reference Young1924) argued that the sequence of events in Europe in the post-First World War period had been unbalanced budget to disordered exchanges to inflation.
Young shared with Subercaseaux the notion that the exchange rate was determined primarily by the supply and demand of bills of exchange—the so-called “Balance-of-Payments Theory” of foreign exchanges as opposed to the “Inflation Theory of Foreign Exchanges” (see, e.g., Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter1954, p. 736). The balance-of-payments explanation of German hyperinflation as a case of reverse causation between money and prices was developed in detail by Karl Helfferich (1923; see Laidler and Stadler Reference Laidler and Stadler1998), based on ideas that had been originally introduced into German literature—much to Mises’ regret (1932, pp. 227–228)—by Adolf Wagner. However, it is worth noting that even authors (such as Dennis Robertson) who otherwise supported the purchasing power parity approach argued that the German hyperinflation had originated in a sharp increase in the price of foreign money, with ensuing effects on the price level and money supply (see Robertson Reference Robertson1948, pp. 119–121).
With the exception of a brief passage mentioned above from Subercaseaux (Reference Subercaseaux and Seligman1933), the Chilean economist did not discuss the German hyperinflation. However, the view that some inflationary episodes may be explained by the impact of currency depreciation on domestic prices, followed by monetary expansion, may be found in Subercaseaux’s (1912, pp. 210–211; 1920a, pp. 223–225; see also 1922, p. 127) account of inflation in Chile between 1904 and 1912. The main factor behind the higher gold agio was not a budget deficit, but the economic boom experienced by the Chilean economy at the time. The increase of the premium on gold affected the price level, which led to pressures from businessmen to expand the issue of inconvertible notes. Such expansion of money supply contributed to intensify the “spirit of optimism” and credit speculation, and, by that, to further depreciate the foreign exchange, until the depreciation of paper currency reached its maximum during the eventual crisis. The same sequence of events had been observed, according to Subercaseaux, in Argentina (1885–1891) and Brazil (1890–1900). The instability of the foreign exchange, and its perverse effect on the economy, was perceived as one of the main handicaps of paper currency regimes.Footnote 8
IV. MONETARY NORMS AND THE REAL BILLS DOCTRINE
The Chilean inflationary cycle of the beginning of the twentieth century reflected the influence of the “papeleros” and their views about the positive nexus between note issue and economic growth, which had contributed to the acceptance of inconvertible paper money in South America on some occasions (Subercaseaux Reference Subercaseaux1912, p. 68; 1920a, p. 70). As observed by Subercaseaux, the South American “papeleros” corresponded to the “inflationists” of the United States and other countries in other times (on “inflationism,” see Mises Reference Mises1980, pp. 251–262). Subercaseaux’s remark on the relative “passive” character of money supply in paper currency regimes was noticed by Wicksell: “It actually happens, as Subercaseaux observes, that an inconvenient shortage of money often arises in countries with depreciated paper money, and businessmen besiege the Government with demands for increased note issues” (Wicksell Reference Wicksell and Classen1935, p. 168). That was related to the complex matter of the regulation of money supply under inconvertible paper money.
The quantity theory of money provided an obvious starting point. Subercaseaux (1912, p. 253; 1920a, p. 272), under the influence of Wagner and other German authors, was skeptical about its general application to concrete reality. Indeed, Hawtrey (1921, p. 627) suggested that Subercaseaux “has never thought it worthwhile to inquire what the [quantity] theory is all about.” However, if one reads carefully, Subercaseaux’s reservation boils down to the view that the proportionality between money supply and prices was largely a long-run tendency proposition inapplicable to short-run monetary dynamics.
The old quantitative theory, according to which every increase of the amount of currency would have to be followed by a proportional decrease of its value, is, it is true, no longer held in modern economic science. It cannot be said, for example, as stated by Courcelle Seneuil, that if an issue is increased from 100 to 150 the value of the bill will decrease one-third; but it is also true that the underlying principle of this theory still has to be taken into consideration, and it is the one which establishes that it is impossible constantly to increase the issues without decreasing the value of the bill or, in other words, that the increase of paper issues always carries with it a tendency to decrease the value of money. (Subercaseaux Reference Subercaseaux1911b, pp. 120–121)
That was behind Subercaseaux’s (1909, p. 18) statement that the limitation to the right to issue paper money was essential to warrant its existence as a monetary standard. Whereas, under a metallic standard, the ultimate determinant of the value of money is the cost of production of precious metals, under a paper currency regime, it is the amount of note issue and the “degree of confidence inspired by the state and its monetary policy” (1911a, p. 75). The matter had been discussed by Wagner (1868, pp. 46–48; see also Wagner Reference Wagner and Heller1912, p. 103), who held that while it is possible in theory to give value to a paper money that cannot be exchanged at fixed parity with another money, in practice it would be necessary to introduce the “most reliable guarantees to prevent that paper money would ever be used to create artificial purchasing power,” and to secure that, it would be increased according to the “true necessities of the economy” (the latter requirement has to do with the real bills doctrine, as discussed further below). Wagner expected that “a somewhat greater security against the abuse of the right to issue money might perhaps be provided by one or the other constitutional form,” but doubted such constitutional arrangement would be effective.Footnote 9 Indeed, at least since David Ricardo (1951, p. 356), economists had argued that the unrestricted power of issuing paper money had been historically abused, and should, therefore, be checked by subjecting the issuers of paper money to the obligation of paying their notes in metal.
The notion of (what we now call) “inflation tax” is implicit in Subercaseaux’s (1912, p. 52; 1920a, pp. 53–54) reference to paper money as a “forced loan” that is not paid back, through which the government appropriates resources from the public. Subercaseaux was probably influenced by Wagner’s (1868, pp. 111–112) mention of inflation as a perverse form of taxation, but both authors missed J. S. Mill’s (1909, p. 552) notion of inflation as a tax on all holders of paper cash balances, which would be further elaborated by J. M. Keynes in the 1920s and Milton Friedman in the 1950s (see Kleiman Reference Kleiman2000).Footnote 10 It was not clear by then—probably because the concept of demand for money was still wanting—that the inflation tax idea applied strictly to expected inflation, whereas Wagner and Subercaseaux usually had in mind shifts in income distribution brought about by unexpected inflation.
Nearly twenty years after the publication of El papel moneda, Subercaseaux took part in the 1931 Conference of South American Central Banks held in Lima (Peru), when he drafted the two “norms” that should guide the monetary policy of central banks in the region under a paper currency regime. Such norms were reproduced in Subercaseaux’s (Reference Subercaseaux1938) report of his six-year-period as president of the Central Bank of Chile. Given that the amount of circulating medium was a “fundamental factor” in deciding the price level, it was of “capital importance” to “assure budget equilibrium in order to avoid that the Government resorts to the Central Bank to demand credits which translate themselves into inflation of the circulating medium.” That norm was followed by another one, concerning money supply: “The regulation of the circulating medium must be exclusively in the hands of the Central Bank, through the discount and rediscount of documents originating from agricultural, industrial and commercial operations, in the terms specifically determined by the organic laws of the Central Banks” (Subercaseaux Reference Subercaseaux1938, p. 6).
The second norm takes us into the realm of the real bills doctrine, which had played such an important role in the origins of the Federal Reserve System in 1913. Indeed, Edwin Kemmerer, who had been involved in the creation of the Fed, participated in the Lima conference and “explicitly accepted” the two norms (Subercaseaux Reference Subercaseaux1938, p. 6).Footnote 11 Moreover, the law that created the Central Bank of Chile in 1925, the work of Kemmerer, included provisions restricting its rediscount operations to short-term papers, close to the spirit of the real bills doctrine (Fetter Reference Fetter1931, p. 176). Subercaseaux had proposed the creation of a central bank after the First World War, without success (Carrasco Reference Carrasco2009, ch. 1). In a letter of 18 April 1925 to Kemmerer, he wrote that his failure had led him to support the “intervention of a North-American expert who, with its prestige, could bring about the planned reform. You are the best name for the job” (Subercaseaux Reference Subercaseaux1925). Soon after Subercaseaux started his term as president of the Central Bank in 1933, he announced a series of “postulates” that should be followed to assure price level stability “according to the principles of modern monetary policy” (Carrasco Reference Carrasco2009, pp. 267–268). First, the Central Bank should carry out its “normal and organic” functions by avoiding the supply of long-term credit in the capital market. Second, it should be restricted to “banking operations” in the sense established by its “organic original law”:
The primordial function of the Central Bank is the regulation of the circulating medium with the goal of adjusting its amount to the true and legitimate needs of the market. Such a function is only possible if the operations carried out by the Central Bank are liquidated within a normal period of three months and, only under exceptional circumstances, within a period no longer than six months. (ibid.)
Third, if necessary, the Central Bank should regulate the development of the market and prices through a “prudent interest rate policy.” Finally, the bank shoud be able to smooth out fluctuations in the exchange rate through the purchase and sale of gold and foreign exchange at market price.
The central idea of Subercaseaux’s monetary policy in the 1930s was the distinction between “organic” (short-term credit to the private sector) and “inorganic” (Central Bank assistance to the Treasury) note issue, reflecting the real bills view that only papers based on “production” should be rediscounted (Lüders Reference Lüders1968, pp. 160ff). The year before Subercaseaux took charge, money supply and wholesale prices had increased sharply because of massive Treasury borrowings from the Central Bank. As pointed out by Hirschman (1963, p. 180), Chile was the only country in the Western world that, in 1933, had to fight inflation rather than deflation. Economic recovery and price stability prevailed from 1933 to 1935, but, by 1936–37, prices rose by about 10% each year. The bank’s doctrine that expansions of short-term credit were self-liquidating was, according to Hirschman (p. 181), behind its inability to prevent inflation at the time.
Subercaseaux’s enthusiasm for the venerable real bills doctrine may be traced back to part II, chapter 9 (“The Regulation of the Amount of Paper Money to the Needs of Circulation”) of El papel moneda and to his 1911 Belgian article. It was part of the search for “elasticity” of a monetary system, defined as its property of “increasing or diminishing money supply in order to conform to the changing requirements of circulation” (Subercaseaux Reference Subercaseaux1912, p. 253; 1920a, p. 271). The notion of elasticity as a desirable feature of the monetary system was conspicuous in the debate between “papeleros” and “oreros” (see Llona Reference Llona1990), and had been historically associated with the real bills doctrine (see Mints Reference Mints1945, p. 9). According to Subercaseaux (1912, pp. 257–258; 1920a, pp. 276–277), the elasticity of circulation in metallic regimes was decided by the amount of precious metals in each country—as determined by the balance of payments and by the international production flow of gold and silver—and by the issue of convertible banknotes, regarded as an efficient way of providing the market with liquidity.
The bank note system under a metallic regime is a precious way of adjusting the amount of money to the needs of the market, an instrument of elasticity very interesting in its working. The danger of having to redeem at sight the issued notes makes the bank prudent in its issues, which is very much in agreement with the socio-economic convenience of increasing the amount of money only in the strictly necessary measure. (Subercaseaux Reference Subercaseaux1912, p. 257; 1920a, p. 277)
This is quite close to the “law of reflux” of the English nineteenth-century Banking School; that is, the proposition that the banking system cannot, under convertibility, produce an excess supply of notes, as there is a market mechanism that determines the quantity and composition of each bank’s liabilities, and, by that, induces banks to supply just the amount of money demanded by the public. Any excess note issue must be returned in exchange for assets held by the banking system (such as gold), instead of increasing the price level through the purchasing of goods. The law of reflux was related to, but distinct from, the somewhat older real bills doctrine, which was essentially a proposition about the asset composition of the banking system (Glasner Reference Glasner1992).
There is, however, another way to interpret the mechanism that assures price-level stability in a metallic regime, involving the balance of payments. Subercaseaux (1912, p. 265; 1920a, p. 285) referred to a passage from the 1810 Bullion Report about the effects of a larger supply of convertible notes on the price level (Cannan Reference Cannan1969, pp. 50–51). Notes would then be presented to banks for payment in gold, because prices of goods in the country cannot be higher than the price level in other countries with the same metal as standard of value. In other words, the exchange rate cannot fall below the gold-export point, as it would be more profitable to ship gold than to purchase foreign bills to pay for imports. This authomatic check to overissue of convertible paper currency was the mechanism put forward by bullionists such as David Ricardo. Convertibility, however, does not prevent overissue if a number of countries follow the same policy, as there would then be no reason why metallic money should flow out of any particular country (see Wicksell Reference Wicksell and Classen1935, p. 171). From that perspective, the gold standard may be an efficient way to prevent domestic inflation through the Ricardian exchange-rate mechanism (Subercaseaux Reference Subercaseaux1931, p. 251). It is, however, powerless against an international inflation, as happened during the First World War. “In cases like this, if the fall in the value of money produced by inflation becomes general, gold would have no power to prevent it. The value of gold finds itself influenced by that of the bank note with which it is combined in circulation. As gold influences the value of the bank note, conversely the bank note influences the value of gold” (Subercaseaux Reference Subercaseaux1931, p. 252).
By the time he wrote El papel moneda, the experience of the First World War had not yet made clear that the gold standard was not enough to assure price stability. Since, under an inconvertible paper currency regime, the law of reflux (or Ricardo’s exchange-rate mechanism) does not operate for the banking system as a whole, Subercaseaux sought an alternative mechanism in order to determine the supply of paper money consistent with price-level stability. South American experience had indicated that there were “no objective norms to adjust note issues to the needs of the market; arbitrary appraisals were deployed. It often happened that market operations had to adjust themselves to the amount of notes in circulation instead of the other way around” (1912, p. 259; 1920a, p. 278). Just like Robert Torrens (Reference Torrens1812) before him, Subercaseaux suggested in El papel moneda that adherence to the real bills doctrine under inconvertibility should be enforced as a strict rule through legislation (see Poitras Reference Poitras1998). In support of his view, Subercaseaux (1912, pp. 264–265; 1920a, pp. 284–285) quoted extensively from the replies provided by Bank of England directors John Whitmore and John Pearse to the questions put to them by Francis Horner and Henry Thornton as part of the Bullion Report, about the responsibility of the bank for exchange fluctuations during the restriction period (Cannan Reference Cannan1969, pp. 46–48; see also Fetter Reference Fetter1965, pp. 42–43). The Chilean economist agreed with the directors’ argument that the Bank of England had not overissued notes, since it had discounted only “legitimate mecantile paper” instead of seeking its own profit.
I want to call attention to this very important circumstance. If the bank issuing inconvertible notes with legal course seeks only its private profits, no doubt there is a danger of overissue because it does not face the Damocles sword represented by the obligation to redeem its notes into metal. For that reason, only a bank intelligently managed, with a view to the public interest of making exclusively loans which correspond to real short term market operations, such as, for example, commercial bills, only a bank under these conditions may enjoy the privilege of issuing inconvertible notes without the restriction of a maximum established by law. (Subercaseaux Reference Subercaseaux1912, p. 265–266; 1920a, p. 285; italics in the original; see also Subercaseaux Reference Subercaseaux1911a, p. 82)
Interestingly enough, Subercaseaux did not refer to the criticism (probably put forward by Thornton; see Fetter Reference Fetter1965, p. 43) of the real bills doctrine that followed the statements of the Bank of England directors quoted by him (see Cannan Reference Cannan1969, pp. 46–51). He seemed oblivious to the argument that the value of commercial bills is tied up with the prices of the traded goods, which renders the price level indeterminate. Subercaseaux was convinced that only short-term operations carried out by the banking system fit the role of money as a means of exchange and, therefore, contributed to stabilize its purchasing power.Footnote 12
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The 1920 French edition of his paper-money book significantly increased the international readership commanded by Subercaseaux, even though the 1912 original Chilean edition had already attracted some attention. The fact that Wicksell knew about, and had access in Sweden to, El papel moneda indicates that information about monetary economics literature was relatively widespread at the beginning of the twentieth century. Wicksell may have heard about the book through Sauvaire-Jourdan’s (Reference Sauvaire-Jourdan1913) review in the Revue D’Économie Politique. According to Sauvaire-Jourdan (p. 544), “it will not be possible anymore to study the matter of paper money without previous knowledge of the work of the young professor from the University of Chile.” Sauvaire-Jourdan probably met Subercaseaux during his visit to Santiago in 1912 as a member of a French scientific mission (see Mahlerbe Reference Mahlerbe1996, p. 417). He translated Marshall’s Principles for Alfred Bonnet’s “Bibliothèque Internationale D’Économie Politique,” and most likely played a role in bringing El papel moneda to Bonnet’s attention (for general information on Sauvaire-Jourdan and his association with Bonnet, see Rist Reference Rist1938). In any event, the publication of Subercaseaux’s Reference Subercaseaux1909Essai indicates the existence of French connections even before that.
The note by the Scottish-American economist David Kinley (Reference Kinley1914) in the American Economic Review may have been another likely source of information about El papel moneda. Kinley saw the book as an attempt to shed some light on Chilean monetary controversies at the time, and welcomed it “as evidence of the activity in economics of our neighbors to the south” (p. 170). Kinley’s connections with South America had started in 1910 when he was appointed by the American government to be a delegate to the Fourth International Conference of American States at Buenos Aires and also an envoy on special mission to Chile to represent the US at the centennial of Chilean independence, when he met Subercaseaux (Kinley Reference Kinley1949, p. 65). In a letter of 18 February 1913, Kinley (Reference Kinley1913) acknowledged receipt of a copy of El papel moneda, and informed Subercaseaux of his plans to review the book. They would meet again at the second Pan American Scientific Congress held in Washington, DC, between December 1915 and January 1916, when Subercaseaux (Reference Subercaseaux1917) presented his paper “A Common Monetary Unit for America” (see Litman Reference Litman1945). In January 1919, Kinley invited Subercaseaux to write a monograph on the monetary history of Chile, as part of the publications of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace edited by him (Subercaseaux Reference Subercaseaux1922). Kinley (Reference Kinley1919) expected the book “would help so much to a better understanding of relations between your country and mine.”
Indeed, the reception of Subercaseaux (Reference Subercaseaux1912, Reference Subercaseaux1920a) may be, in part, explained by the demand for information about South American monetary conditions. Alfred Marshall, for instance, had a copy of Wileman’s 1896 monograph about Brazilian paper currency, which was read by the Brazilian economist Celso Furtado (1985, p. 215) while working in Cambridge on his 1959 book about Brazilian economic history. Interest in South American economic literature would increase again in the 1950s, but this time in connection with the burgeoning literature on economic development produced by Furtado, Raul Prebisch, and other Latin American economists attached to the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America.
Whereas Subercaseaux’s mix of theory and history looked attractive to some, others (see Hawtrey Reference Hawtrey1921, p. 627) criticized his approach for being “rigorously a posteriori.” In Hawtrey’s view, Le papier-monnaie consisted of successive inferences, each based on a collection of historical experiences, a method he found unfit for studying currency problems. True enough, Subercaseaux made extensive use of historical evidence, but he was not a South American heir to the German Historical School. In the textbook written for his classes at the University of Chile, Subercaseaux (1907, pp. 29, 56–58) argued for a combination of induction and deduction along the lines of C. Menger and A. Wagner, instead of Schmoller’s historicism (see also Hutchison Reference Hutchison1953, pp. 145–146). Wagner’s influence was visible not just in the treatment of inconvertible paper money phenomena, but also in Subercaseaux’s deployment of the real bills doctrine. The second (1946) edition of Subercaseaux’s textbook was reviewed by Joseph Solterer (Reference Solterer1949), who noticed the overall influence of the continental literature on the organization of the book, and the absence of topics such as the theories of the firm, the consumer, and the market. Indeed, a discussion of demand for money along the lines of Wicksell, Alfred Marshall, or Irving Fisher is lacking in Subercaseaux.
Subercaseaux’s use of the quantity theory on occasion to interpret the working of paper currency regimes may look contradictory with the role played by the real bills doctrine in his approach to credit and banking. However, hardly any economist had disputed the long-term effect on prices of paper money issued to pay for goods and services demanded by the government (although there were divergences concerning the modus operandi, as shown by the commodity theory of money, etc.). The theoretical debates, since Thomas Tooke and continuing through Wagner, were essentially about the monetary effects of banknotes issued in the form of loans (Wicksell Reference Wicksell and Classen1935, p. 173; Fetter Reference Fetter1965, p. 192). Although Subercaseaux’s discussion of the “elasticity” of credit was occasionally mentioned in the literature (Edgeworth Reference Edgeworth1922, p. 531), it was his historical-analytical treatment of the determination of the value of inconvertible paper money that attracted attention and granted him an invitation as the only Latin American economist to contribute to the Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences. The editor of the Encyclopaedia, E. R. Seligman, was familiar with the topic, having written a book about inconvertible paper himself (Seligman Reference Seligman1921). Seligman probably met Subercaseaux at the second Pan American Scientific Congress, attended by both men (Proceedings 1915–16).
Although not a “theoretical metallist,” Subercaseaux may be described as a “practical metallist,” in the sense that he believed that the association of the monetary unit with gold was the best way to establish a monetary system (for the distinction between theoretical and practical metallism, see Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter1954, p. 290). The main difference between metallic and paper currency regimes was the fact that paper money had national circulation only, and therefore implied oscillating exchange rates and the stability problems associated with it (Subercaseaux Reference Subercaseaux1913). Nevertheless, Subercaseaux cannot be classified as an “orero” in the South American debates, since his approach to the determination of the exchange rate took into account factors other than paper money supply. His stand in that debate may be described as “pragmatic” (Llona Reference Llona1990, ch. 2), as he sided with the “papeleros” in their main demand: the creation of a central bank of issue. By the time he wrote his 1933 entry, Subercaseaux still believed that paper money’s limited life was due to its incompatibility with fixed exchange rates, but, as president of the Central Bank of Chile, he would soon elect price-level stability as the primary feasible goal of monetary policy in paper currency regimes, even at the risk of a fluctuating rate of foreign exchange. The Bretton Woods system, which prevailed after the Second World War, represented a return to the fixed exchange-rate regime, this time as a form of gold exchange standard. Countries declared their par values in terms of the United States dollar, which was convertible into gold at a fixed price, and became the key currency of the system. That international monetary system had similarities with the one previously defended by Subercaseaux, but we do not know of any records of the Chilean economist’s reaction to Bretton Woods.
