The applicant, JS, was a 14-year-old girl diagnosed with a rare and incurable cancer. At the time of the oral judgment, she was receiving palliative care and knew that she would soon die. There was a very bad relationship between her divorced parents, and JS had had no face-to-face contact with her father since 2008. JS had used the internet to investigate cryonics – freezing a dead body in the hope that resuscitation and a cure might be possible in the distant future – and had decided that she wished to be treated in that way after her death. The court was in no doubt that JS had the capacity to bring the application. Her mother supported JS in her wishes; her father opposed her.

The Hospital Trust was willing to do what it properly could to co-operate for JS's sake, because the prospect of her wishes being followed would reduce her agitation and distress about her impending death, though in doing so it was in no way endorsing cryonics. In addition, what JS proposed was not regulated by the Human Tissue Act 2004 and did not seem to be illegal. There was no objection to it from her social worker or her GP.

Peter Jackson J pointed out that much of the current problem arose from the fact that JS was a child, albeit a legally competent one, because under the law of England and Wales a child under the age of 18 cannot make a will. This meant, in effect, that JS was asking the court to make an order entrusting the disposal of her body to her mother. In his opinion, what JS proposed was practical and the court was not making orders against third parties. He emphasised that the case was not about whether cryonic preservation had any scientific basis or whether it was right or wrong; nor was the court approving or encouraging cryonics, still less ordering that JS's body should be cryonically preserved; nor was it about whether or not JS's wishes were sensible. He was satisfied that the court did have the power to make the order requested by JS. Accordingly, he made:

1. i. A specific issue order permitting the mother to continue to make arrangements during JS's lifetime for the preservation of her body after death;

2. ii. An injunction in personam preventing the father from applying for a grant of administration in respect of JS's estate, making or attempting to make arrangements for the disposal of JS's body, or interfering with arrangements made by the mother for the disposal of JS's body; and

3. iii. A prospective order under section 116 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 (or, alternatively, under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court), to take effect upon JS's death, appointing the mother as the sole administrator of JS's estate in place of the mother and father jointly and specifying that the mother should thereby have the right to make arrangements for the disposal of the body and to decide who should be permitted to view it. [Frank Cranmer and David Pocklington]