I Introduction: The Greatest Possible Freedom in the context of the pre-existing scholarship
The importance of the Court of Justice of the EU for the development of EU law is undisputed. The founding fathers integrated an independent and strong court in the institutional design of the European communities. Since its early days, the Court has made it clear that it gladly uses its powers. It has also created constitutional case law and applied a sui generis methodology: a methodology different to the one foreseen in the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties (1969). So much for the consensus in the literature.
In contrast, scholars disagree in their assessment of the Court’s approach. Has the Court been right in choosing that approach? Some scholars have praised the Court and others have criticised it. The first group has supported the dynamic shaping of the law, the latter group has criticised the methodology as being biased towards deeper European integration. Some prominent examples include Weiler and Maduro,Footnote 1 who have looked favourably on the Court’s preference for a teleological interpretation of the law. Rasmussen, in contrast, criticised the Court’s activism.Footnote 2
How does Thomas Burri’s The Greatest Possible Freedom fit into this dichotomy? His monograph is neither a supportive praise nor a critical disapproval of the Court’s approach. In his opus magnum of 600 pages, the author takes a very different approach. He does not rate the performance of the Court. His language is descriptive and is more reminiscent of an empirical study than a classic law book. Some readers may miss the lack of a qualifying “guidance”. However, Burri’s unemotional and non-qualifying tone makes his monograph a true reference text that will be difficult to ignore for scholars and practitioners alike.
II Objectives and structure of the book
The objectives of The Greatest Possible Freedom are essentially twofold, which translates into the structure of the monograph. The book intends to comprehensively tell the story of natural persons in the Internal Market by gathering all relevant judgements and orders – roughly 1400 decisions. It further aims to assess the evolution and impact of a certain number of recurring interpretive formulas in the free movement case law regarding natural persons.
Part A
The book begins with a general introduction. Considering the monumental size of the project, this first part is indispensable, as it allows the reader to grasp the author’s approach. Burri outlines the structure of the book and the inclusion and exclusion criteria that he applied in selecting the decisions. While, generally speaking, the study focuses on natural persons, the scope is widened to companies where the primary freedoms of establishment and services are concerned, the rationale being that those primary law provisions on natural persons are too intricately entwined with those on companies. The opinions of the Advocates General were excluded (p. 18).
Burri’s methodology is in many regards characterised by rigour. The book is very comprehensive and the author applies what could be called – with reference to empirical studies – a quantitative rather than a qualitative discussion. He gathers a sheer amount of data (Part B) and describes correlations (Part C).
Part B
Part B is a voluminous (almost 400 pages) collection of the Internal Market case law on natural persons, i.e., citizens, workers, establishment, services, diplomas, and social security, irrespective of whether the decision was taken in relation to primary or secondary law. For each decision, a summary of the facts and findings is provided. Each chapter encompasses a decade of decisions, which are broken down along the categories ‘workers’, ‘establishment’, ‘social security’ etc. These sections are further divided into sub-themes (e.g., ‘workers’ divided into ‘maintenance grants’, ‘family members’, ‘diploma recognition’ and so on).
This part represents an exercise of monumental dimension. In must have been a painstaking and painful exercise for the author: he perused all printed volumes of the European Court Reports manually and then scrutinised, due to the delay in publishing the reports, the last two years of jurisprudence on the online database (pp. 17–18). Thanks to its comprehensiveness and its systematic order, the summaries in Part B represent an invaluable tool, especially for practitioners who wish to efficiently navigate through the development of a given theme in the Court’s jurisprudence. In line with his descriptive approach, the author avoids qualifying adjectives in Part B.
Part C
After the data collection in Part B, the author moves to the intellectually most interesting part, notably for scholars: he traces the evolution and power of certain interpretive formulas regularly applied in the case law. This exercise is done in three chapters. Chapter I looks at three categories of formulas: the “broad” interpretation of key notions such as “workers”, the “restrictive” interpretation of exception clauses, and third, the recurring formula of “the greatest possible freedom” that the Treaties seek to ensure in the Court’s view. Chapter II looks at the formula “coordinated” (coordination) in the context of social security law. Finally, Chapter III addresses the “fundamental status” formula, which the Court has kept referring to in relation to Union citizenship. Every instance within the 1400 decisions in which these interpretive formulas were applied is considered (p. 551).
Given the high number of formulas that can be found in the Court’s jurisprudence the author had to make a selection. He succeeded in making a sound choice and in shedding light on very different aspects. The first chapter illustrates how the Court has been “generous” in its broad interpretation of key notions and at the same time restrictive in relation to exceptions, thereby favouring deeper integration. The second chapter deals with an issue – the coordination in social security – that has not been sufficiently addressed by scholarship in spite of its great practical relevance for the market freedoms. And the third chapter raises the readers’ awareness of an essential element in the Court’s constitutional language: the use of the formula “fundamental” to create a sense of hierarchy among Treaty provisions: a hierarchy that can shift over time, as could also be observed in other ‘fundamental’ fields of the case law, namely regarding fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights (compare, for instance, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 1970 and Schmidberger, 2003).
Importantly, the book examines, in relation to each formula, its “spin”, that is, the power or impact that it has featured in the case law. On each occasion, the author inquires whether and to what extent the interpretive formula exerted a certain power on the outcome of the case. From this detailed account, it is possible to draw valuable conclusions.
This is first of all a refreshing intellectual addition to the countless works on the Court’s methodology. The latter are normally occupied with the Court’s use (or negligence) of the traditional methods of interpretation, at times extended to the aspects of “effet utile” and “dynamic interpretation”. Second, in the drafting of their pleadings practitioners can find evidence with which to remind the Court of its own precedence. The book primarily answers questions regarding “when” and “how” interpretive formulas were used, rather than in relation to the question “why” they were used (or indeed not used).
Part D
In his conclusions, Burri stays loyal to the descriptive and differentiated language that is characteristic of the whole monograph. Over-arching generalising conclusions are avoided where they cannot be clearly based on evidence. To illustrate: at times a formula exerted strong power (“spin at its clearest”, p. 458), at other times hardly any impact could be found (“empty spin”, p. 459). In Part D the author offers conclusions in relation to each of the assessed formulas: broadness (and restrictiveness), coordination, and fundamentality.
III Contribution
Some scholars may disagree with the objectives of this book (e.g., whether the case summaries were necessary). Others may disagree with its methodology, expressing a preference for a qualitative discussion. But the bottom line is that Burri’s monograph meets its two major objectives. It comprehensively summarises the Internal Market case law on natural persons. And it systematically assesses the evolution and impact (“spin”) of three categories of interpretive formula. The various contributions this monograph provides to scholars and practitioners have been pointed out in this review.
In sum, The Greatest Possible Freedom offers a notable addition to legal scholarship by using a methodology rarely applied in law books: a descriptive quantitative methodology that is more characteristic of empirical sciences. It is an opus magnum on which future scholarship can build. Other authors may wish to qualitatively discuss the aforementioned three categories of formulas, contextualising them in their specific historical context and their accompanying legislative developments. Yet other authors may wish to inquire into formulas different to the ones in Burri’s monograph. For these scholars, too, The Greatest Possible Freedom will be an invaluable reference.
