In the five years since the Arab uprisings began, an array of books and articles have been written on these popular mobilizations for democracy and socioeconomic reform. Initial works sought to summarize the blow-by-blow events of the uprisings. These works provided an important overview of the key events and actors of the uprisings, which satisfied the appetites of eager readers interested in the timelines and storylines of those attempted revolutions for democracy. More recent books with a more theoretical approach have focused on the role of specific domestic variables that differed from one country to the next, like levels of military professionalism, Islamist electoral participation, oil wealth, and regime-type (specifically differences between monarchies and presidencies; see Marc Lynch, eds., The Arab Uprisings Explained: New Contentious Politics in the Middle East [2014], for example).
Striking out in a new direction from both of these extant streams of research, and opening many different possible pathways for future inquiry, are the three books reviewed here. Adam Hanieh, Daniel Ritter, and Holger Albrecht fruitfully explore how international and regional trends intersected domestic politics in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). They trace how regional and international trends began well before the Arab uprisings and left a lasting impact on domestic politics and institutions both during this period and after it.
A thought-provoking and innovative book in both its scope and theoretical conjecture, Hanieh’s Lineages of Revolt presents a Marxist political-economic account of the origins of the Arab revolutions . In this book, Hanieh seeks to decenter analyses of the revolutions from confrontations between states and citizens to an examination of the Middle East as a regional political-economic unit. Since the 1980s, he notes, the region has undergone economic transformations that have reorganized how individuals survive economically. These changes include globalized, transnational flows of capital, goods, and people. These international and regional trends, he surmises, have affected the formation of class and state in the MENA, creating the conditions that sowed the seeds of the 2011 uprisings. Particularly, he notes how the global economic crisis that began in 2008 did not cause the Arab uprisings, but it was an “essential ingredient” that contributed to the underlying structural conditions that led them to arise (p. 149). Masterfully written, Hanieh’s book details how neoliberal policies—including subsidy reductions, reductions in public-sector employment, and agricultural reforms—increased economic hardship among dispossessed citizens. At the end, one of the book’s main contributions is that it demonstrates—very effectively, in the opinion of this reader—how international and regional transformations in the structural nature of capitalism in the Middle East superseded more proximate, state–civil society dynamics in explaining the origins of the 2011 uprisings.
An exemplar of the comparative historical-analysis method, Daniel P. Ritter’s The Iron Cage of Liberalism echoes themes in Hanieh’s Lineages of Revolt. Like Hanieh, Ritter aims to show how both domestic and international variables interacted to shape the ways that dictators in the Middle East dealt with popular mobilizations against their rule. Comparing two contemporary autocrats, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak, with a historical one, the Shah Pahlavi, Ritter examines how foreign sponsorship enriched these dictators’ regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Iran, respectively, but ultimately constrained the actions that they could take to sustain their rule. In effect, Ritter explains that “the downside of Western patronage . . . was that as friends and allies of the democratic world the three leaders were implicitly expected…to behave as democrats” (p. 212). Whereas Ritter notes that these three autocrats did not actually favor democratizing their regimes, and what reforms they did implement were little more than “farcical,” each dictator felt compelled to “cast himself as a democrat” rhetorically. This act allowed them to sustain support from the Western democracies of the United States and Europe, which Ritter sees as ideationally committed to liberal values (p. 213).
Ritter posits an interesting, thought-provoking thesis, which contributes positively to a crucial debate about the role of foreign powers in the Arab uprisings. His book engages other recent pioneering works, such as Sean Yom’s (2015) From Resilience to Revolution: How Foreign Interventions Destabilize the Middle East and Jason Brownlee’s (2012) Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the U.S.–Egyptian Alliance, that show how the dynamics of the Arab revolutions intertwined with the interests and interventions of foreign actors. Yet while Yom and Brownlee see external actors as a largely negative force that decreases the possibility for democratization in the Middle East, Ritter takes the opposite position. The core of his argument is that when protestors mobilized in demonstrations that highlighted the contradictions between these autocrats’ liberal discourse and their regimes’ political reality, “the three dictators could not order naked repression of the crowds without risking both the international and domestic support upon which they depended” (p. 214).
Yet at this juncture in his argument, this reader thought that Ritter slightly misreads the sequence of historical events in Tunisia and Egypt, which does carry implications for his important book and future studies that could extend its argument. Historically speaking, at least for the cases of Ben Ali and Mubarak, the empirical record indicates that both rulers in fact did order their militaries to fire upon peaceful protestors. Yet key elites—top military generals—refused to follow these orders. Thus, extrapolating from Ritter’s logic, it was not Ben Ali and Mubarak alone who were bounded by what he calls the “discursive burden” of rhetorical liberalism but, rather, the broader set of military elites who backed their rule. To dig deeper and explore this dynamic, the book could have benefited considerably from use of Arabic sources (either field interviews or archival documents with military leaders) that would have helped to show the existence of such an epistemic community among Tunisian and Egyptian elites. What seems clear is that without this complementary evidence, it is difficult for the reader to fully discern whether military elites disobeyed orders because of their desire to uphold liberal rhetoric required for foreign-supplied patronage, as Ritter argues, or because of their desire to simply retain their powerful positions for domestic benefits, as Hicham Bou Nassif has claimed (“Wedded to Mubarak: The Second Careers and Financial Rewards of Egypt’s Military Elite, 1981–2011,” Middle East Journal 67 [no. 4, 2013]: 509–30). The reality is that both dynamics were probably actively at work, and future studies could interrogate whether Ritter’s Iron Cage of Liberalism bound military elites in the way he hypothesizes it did for Arab autocrats.
An additional extension of Ritter’s important book— and possibly an area of inquiry for future scholars and doctoral students—might examine why his iron cage of liberalism seemed not to bind Arab Gulf dictators. Indeed, even though Saudi Arabia’s regime had issued rhetorical commitments to greater political liberalization, especially after the 2005 municipal elections (much heralded by the George W. Bush administration), it had no reservations about using unmitigated violence against Shia protestors in the Eastern province (and also in coordination with Bahraini and Emirati security forces in Bahrain’s Pearl Roundabout). The fact that these Gulf kings have close relations with the United States and have adopted some liberal discourse, yet did not shy away from using violence, present analytically fruitful counterfactual cases for Ritter’s thesis. Perhaps it is because Persian Gulf autocrats never thought—realistically—that the United States would (or could) withdraw its support for these regimes. This is especially true given U.S. oil reliance and its credible commitment of massive numbers of troops stationed in the Gulf countries, notably Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait. Whereas the United States could credibly threaten to withdraw its support for Egypt and Tunisia if autocrats behaved badly and ordered naked repression, this was not a credible threat toward Gulf autocrats who felt free to use violent methods. From what this reader has heard, Ritter has begun with follow-up research on Gulf kingdoms, especially Bahrain, to examine these dynamics. The scholarly community should look forward to the ultimate publication of these works.
Drawing extensively on Arabic sources and interviews, and many years of residence in Egypt, Holger Albrecht has written a pathbreaking book. Raging Against the Machine examines Egypt under Mubarak in order to analyze how the country became a “dynamic playground for contentious politics,” where different types of opposition movements could engage and challenge the state (p. xxi). In effect, Albrecht unpacks what Ritter called a façade democracy, where opposition was permitted yet could not realistically take power. While (echoing Ritter) Albrecht acknowledges that Egypt’s regime increased opposition pluralism in a “mirage of democracy and democratization to attract political rents” from the United States, he stresses that the “question of whether American strategic interests (Israel, regional stability, containment of political Islamism, security of oil resources have been supported or not” by Egypt played a more important role in shaping relations between the two countries. Indeed, in contrast to Ritter, he emphasizes that U.S. demands to increase the “degree of openness of the polity” in Egypt took a secondary position in importance to these strategic concerns (p. 26). Rather, in contrast to Ritter who saw liberalization as a tactic for appeasing foreign patrons who demanded that Egypt liberalize (or at least feign liberalization), Albrecht views it primarily as a domestic strategy. Mubarak used it to create a “higher degree of legitimacy of his rule.” This approach was far more effective and sustainable than “hegemonic, coercive forms of dictatorship,” which exist in neighboring Arab autocracies like Saudi Arabia (p. xxii).
In making his argument, Albrecht provides a unique, detailed account of the interactions between Egypt’s regime and its “oppositions.” Using the term oppositions is apt, because, as according to Albrecht’s description, it covers both the “loyal opposition” (political parties like the Wafd), the “tolerated opposition” (illegal but tolerated groups like the Muslim Brotherhood under Mubarak), and the “anti-system opposition” (like extremist groups). “Whereas liberalized authoritarian regimes,” he notes, “remain torn between coercive power maintenance and pluralism, political oppositions challenge incumbents while complying with the overall rules of the political game” (p. 22). The result, as Albrecht concludes, is that there is an “intimate dance” between the regime and the opposition, which demonstrates “two schizophrenic personalities [that] ultimately explains their co-habitation over time” (p. 22). Albrecht’s main argument, then, explains why the authoritarian regime does not fully eliminate these oppositions, even though it has the coercive capacity to do so, and why, further, the opposition can never fully overthrow the regime, as it embraces its underlying rules of engagement in the political system. In the remaining chapters, Albrecht deeply details these interactions between the regime and the opposition, focusing on (among others) the institutions of the syndicates, parliament, the judiciary, and the Islamic seminary (al-Azhar). In his analysis, Albrecht demonstrates a rich, thorough understanding of this complex country’s internal politics.
This reader found Albrecht’s discussion of strategies of co-optation particularly interesting. Although many past scholars have discussed how regimes use institutions to co-opt and control the opposition from above, Albrecht describes how the opposition can invert this relationship. The opposition, he notes, can use “co-optative entrapment” in which they “penetrate the societal support base of authoritarian regimes” to utilize them as launching pads to contest their rule. For example, once an institution of regime corporatism, opposition groups utilized Egypt’s professional syndicates in the 2000s to advance their interests and oppose the regime. Scholars of forthcoming and recent work on the processes of co-optation of opposition parties in Arab autocracies could benefit tremendously from reading and understanding this landmark study of Egypt’s opposition-regime relations. Albrecht’s book provides “a deep understanding of the control mechanisms of the authoritarian state” under Mubarak’s reign in a way that few past books have done (p. xxiv). For doctoral classes, this book would provide an excellent survey of authoritarian-opposition relations under liberalized autocracies like Mubarak’s Egypt.
Whereas many early accounts of the Arab uprisings provided a digest of names, groups, and events to satisfy readers’ interest in the storyline of these (largely unsuccessful) revolutions, the three books under review make a positive contribution to a growing and important body of academic scholarship more analytical and theoretical in its scope and aims. In particular, the books show how variables that are international in nature can shape the contours of domestic politics, especially regime-opposition relations. Taken as a whole, these three landmark studies of the uprisings help to bridge the divide between comparative politics and international relations to show how transnational trends contributed to either the stability or instability of autocratic regimes of the MENA.
