Guerillas in Northern Xinjiang—Ili, Tarbaghatay, and Altay

The Nilka guerillas were the major guerilla forces in Ili. By the time they occupied Nilka County, east of Ghulja in October 1944, the Nilka guerillas consisted of three divisions with 800 members in total (YLHZZ 2004: 329). Fatih Muslimov, a Tatar with Soviet connection, was a central figure in the organization of Nilka guerillas. Fatih was a manager of the Local Products Company in Nilka County in the 1930s. For fear of Sheng Shicai’s arrest, he escaped to Soviet Union in late 1943 and went back to Xinjiang in August 1944 (Wang, Reference Wang2013: 142; Zhang, Reference Zhang1980, 11: 6258). At the Soviet Union, he met many people who were later to become the central leaders in the ETR and INA (Wang Reference Wang1999a: 97, 140–41).

During his stay at Nilka County, he not only incorporated guerillas organized independently by local Kazakhs but he also actively recruited local populations (ZLHB n.d., 3: 30–31). His propagandist activities were welcomed with great popularity; the local people actively joined the guerillas and the herdsmen donated their horses and sheep (YNXZ 2003: 622–23; Zha-yi-er 1989: 3). Soviet weapons brought by Fatih were critical, without which the guerillas would probably be defeated by local police force (NLKXZ 2000: 496). Other guerilla forces followed similar pattern with the Nilka guerillas. They rose independently around mid-1944 and were soon appropriated by the intermediaries who were associated with the Ili regime (table 1).

Table 1.

Guerillas in Ili, Tarbaghatay, and Altay

Sources: YLHZZ (2004: 329–30), YNXZ (2003: 622–23), Song-ha-shi (1995: 87–90), HCXZ (1998: 473), Zha-yi-er (1989: 11–13, 30), Mu-he-mai-ti (1986: 98–99), Yi-bu-la-yin (1984: 98–99), WQXZ (2003: 646), BLSZ (1992: 255), Ya-Sheng (1992: 7), Tu-er-di-you-fu (1993: 121–22, 124), Shu-mu-tong (1990: 46–47), Feng-an-tai (1990: 95–96), ZLHB (n.d. vol. 4: 38–39), TCDQZ (1997: 666, 672), HBKSEMXZ (1999: 418, 422–23), TCSZ (1995: 545), ALTDQZ (2004: 933–34), JMNXZ (2005: 432, 447–48), Mai-he-mu-tuo-fu (1987: 100–9), HBHXZ (2004: 668), Ka-li (1995: 69–70).

Note: The “INA” column documents whether the guerilla was later incorporated into and reorganized under the INA after April 1945. Ethnic categories are abbreviated as follows: T. (Tartar), R. (Russian), K. (Kazakh), Uy. (Uyghur), and M. (Mongol).

Meshür Roziev was Fatih Muslimov’s counterpart in Tarbaghatay (Freeman Reference Freeman2019: 112–13; Wang Reference Wang2013: 101, 209). Menshür Roziev was a Uyghur born in Almaty who was heavily involved in politics in Xinjiang during the 1930s (Freeman Reference Freeman2019: 54–60). He was jailed by Sheng Shicai in 1938 but was soon released and sent back to Soviet Central Aisa under Soviet lobbying (ibid.: 69). In early 1944, Menshür Roziev and another Uyghur exile established “Fight for Liberation Organization” in Chöchek and a military headquarter in Soviet Almaty to coordinate underground guerilla activities in Xinjiang (Wang Reference Wang2013: 210).

The military headquarter played a crucial role in associating local resistances with the ETR’s military initiative; from July to November 1944, “Fight for Liberation Organization” dispatched about 100 liaisons to the headquarters, which contributed to the military takeover of Chöchek (ibid.: 201–11). In existing records, at least Re-bo-fu and Ba-le-ha-shi’s guerillas had connections with the headquarters (table 1).

The self-organized guerillas in Tarbaghatay, however, differed with their Ili counterparts in two major ways (table 1). First, they were smaller in size and weaker in force. They were thus more vulnerable to repressions. Second, fewer of them were later incorporated into the INA. In mid-1944, Sheng Shicai ordered three waves of military crackdowns on the Kazakh-Mongol guerillas in Tarbaghatay, and by early August, almost all such guerrillas were defeated (Zhang Reference Zhang1980, 11: 6329–31). Although timing and geostrategic location were important, the lack of Soviet support was the primary cause of the unsuccessful guerilla activities in Tarbaghatay. Whereas the Soviets supported guerillas in Ili with weapons and military personnel, they seemed only to have involved in actions as distributing leaflets in Tarbaghatay (ibid., 11: 6328). Indeed, the most successful guerilla was the Ebinor guerillas, which was the only guerilla forces in Tarbaghatay to have ammunitions provided by the Soviets (Wang Reference Wang2013: 210).

Further north, the Kazakh guerillas in Altay under the leadership of Osman were the strongest among all nomad guerillas. The local Kazakh forces took over the eastern part of Altay on their own (ALTDQZ 2004: 934; ALTSZ 2001: 371–72). Osman was born into a poor Kazakh family in Altay. He participated in the Altay Kazakhs’ resistance against Sheng Shicai in the 1930s but was not a prominent figure back then. Only in the early 1940s, with the weaponry support he got from Outer Mongolia, Osman was able to successfully attack several Sheng Shicai’s outposts (Benson Reference Benson, Linda and Ingvar1988: 156). Being able to provide his followers with weapons, led them to win battles and accumulate fortune, and thus being able to buy more weapons, win more battles, and attract more followers, Osman rose as a charismatic leader in 1943.

Delilkhan Sugirbaev, a local Kazakh elite, helped to connect Osman with the ETR. Delilkhan was originally a deputy administrator of Sharasume County in the early 1940s (BGWX 1995: 148). In 1941, for fear of Sheng Shicai’s capture, he escaped to Almaty through Jeminay with the help a Soviet consulate (Wang Reference Wang2013: 215, 229). He received political and military training in Almaty and was sent back to Altay in late 1943 and helped Osman to reorganize his Kazakh forces (Sha-wu-lie-xi 1987: 71; Wang Reference Wang1999a: 122). Delilkhan was Osman’s cousin by Kazakh tribal tradition (Jian Reference Jian2015: 39). Kinship ties and the practical needs of military support perhaps explain why Osman accepted Delilkhan—a fellow Kazakh with Soviet background—so easily despite his persistent opposition of Soviet Union.

Aside from Soviet military support through Delilkhan Sugirbaev, the remarkable organizational and military strength of the Kazakh forces in Altay should also be attributed to its effective organization. Compared to the Kazakhs in Ili and Tarbaghatay, who were subjected to heavier Russian agricultural, commercial, and cultural influences throughout the nineteenth century (Moseley 1966: 16–18), Kazakhs in Altay (especially the east part of Altay) largely preserved their traditional patrilineal social structures (Jian Reference Jian2015: 33; Svanberg Reference Svanberg, Linda and Ingvar1988: 122–23). Building on such hereditary and aristocratic social structure, they were able to organize and fight much more effectively than their counterparts in Ili and Tarbaghatay.

After a series of mutually reinforcing dynamics of resistance and repression throughout the early 1940s (A-hei-ti 1987: 80–82, 88–90; Benson Reference Benson, Linda and Ingvar1988: 151–53; La-ti-fu 1979: 92–103), Osman came to the forefront of Kazakh resistance in Altay and became the Kazakh “Batur”—meaning “hero.” In December 1943, Osman established the Altay Kazakh People’s Recovery Committee in north Chinggil County and served as the chairman (ALTDQZ 2004: 933). The rise of Osman as a Kazakh “Batur” was the culmination of the escalating confrontation between Sheng Shicai’s repression and Altay Kazakhs’ resistance.

Guerillas in Southern Xinjiang—Tashkurghan

Guerilla disturbances broke out in Tashkurghan, southwest of Kashgar, as early as 1943. These guerillas were organized by Ishaq Beg along with local Kirghiz and Uyghur leaders (KZLSKZZ 2004: 1186–87). At the early stage, the guerillas only occasionally clashed with local police forces and the violence remained small in scale (ZLHB n.d., 4: 99–101). It was not until August 1945, when Ishaq Beg sent a group of reinforcement to support guerillas in Tashkurghan, that large-scale military operations started (TSKEGTXZ 2009: 495; ZLHB n.d., 4: 41).

Ishaq Beg, a Kirghiz born in Tashkurghan, was on the Soviet side commanding a Kirghiz cavalry force in southern Xinjiang in the 1930s (BGWX 1995: 92). In 1942, to evade Sheng Shicai’s capture, he fled to the Soviet Union and received training there. He went back to Tashkurghan in 1943 and helped organize local guerillas. Later, he was appointed the commander in chief of the INA in 1945.

Due to the scarcity of sources, we know very little about the members and organizations of the Tashkurghan guerillas. Even though these guerillas were initially organized by Ishaq Beg and was later named “Ishaq Beg Victorious Regiment,” these guerillas were most probably independently operated. Ishaq Beg had left Tashkurghan in mid 1944 and would not be back until early 1946 (Zha-yi-er 1989: 54; ZLHB n.d., 4: 98). Given contemporary logistical conditions, direct coordination between Ghulja and Tashkurghan was next to impossible.

There is still another possibility that the ETR might want to use military pressure in southern Xinjiang as a leverage in their negotiation with the GMD. However, a closer look suggests otherwise. During the first phase of negotiation between the ETR and the GMD, which extended from October to December 1945, the Tashkurghan guerillas were not even mentioned (ZLHB n.d., 6: 1–3). However, it was precisely during this period that military attacks by Tashkurghan guerillas intensified (TSKEGTXZ 2009: 495). This excludes the possibility of the ETR using the guerilla activities as a bargaining chip. Only in the second phase of negotiation in April 1946 was the situation in southern Xinjiang formally addressed (Zhang 1985: 447–48). The result was the dissolution of Tashkurghan guerillas carried out by Ishaq Beg in June and July according to the negotiated truce (AKTXZ 1996: 489; ZPXZ 1992: 372). The fact that Ishaq Beg was sent to dismiss the guerillas indicated their autonomy from the ETR previously.

The Scope Conditions

As we have seen, most of the guerillas rose independently at first. Later, intermediaries were critical in the alliance formation between the ETR and the guerillas. The incorporation of the guerillas took the form of brokerage on an ad hoc basis because Xinjiang in the 1940s lacked institutionalized forms of ethnic mobilization—like those in the Soviet Republics in the 1980s (e.g., Gorenburg Reference Gorenburg2003). However, the GMD also had their potential collaborators (Jian Reference Jian2015: 40–41). Why were the intermediaries on the GMD side less successful than those on the Soviet-ETR side?

A look at the careers of the central figures just discussed might help (table 3). I should note here that this is not a comprehensive list of intermediaries, but only a very selective one—a selection based upon their ex post political prominence. This selection bias was inevitable given my singular reliance on Chinese sources, though I have incorporated Meshür Roziev, who was almost absent in Chinese sources, into the list. These individuals’ escape to the Soviet Union in the late 1930s and early 1940s were all related to Sheng Shicai’s waves of arrest during this period. Although they left Xinjiang with the help of the Soviets and received military training thereafter, the cause of their departure could only be attributed to Sheng Shicai’s shifting political allegiance and his capture of all individuals whom he deemed unreliable. In other words, the Soviet Union did not coordinate their escape. However, the fact that they received military training in the Soviet Central Asia and were sent back to Xinjiang in 1944 suggests that their return was intentional. Other rank-and-file participants were trained in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, no later than May 1944, months before the Ghulja Uprising (Kamalov Reference Kamalov, Millward, Shinmen and Jun2010: 273–74). This echoes an earlier point that although the Soviets did not initiate the rebellion in the first place, they did prepare for, contribute to, and seek to patronize it.

Table 3.

Intermediaries and their backgrounds

Sources: Wang (Reference Wang2013: 120, 142), Freeman (Reference Freeman2019: 54–69), Sha-wu-lie-xi (1987: 70–71), ZLHB (n.d. vol. 4: 95), BGWX (1995: 92, 148).

The Soviet Union benefited from its decades of cultural influence in northern Xinjiang, but the critical force that drove the non-Han ethnic population—both the elites and the ordinaries—to the Soviet side was Sheng Shicai’s draconian rule. However, when the GMD entered Xinjiang, it had the chance of presenting itself as a benevolent force to the non-Han ethnic population. Indeed, by freeing those minorities kept in prison under Sheng Shicai, the GMD also had their potential collaborators (Zhang 1985: 420). In general, however, the GMD did not trust these potential intermediaries, especially under the ongoing rivalry with the ETR. In late 1945, Burhan Shehidi, who was later to become a central figure in the coalition government, suggested to Wu Zhongxin about establishing a Kazakh militia south of Dihua—with only 100 members—in preemption of Osman’s guerilla attack. Wu Zhongxin rejected his proposal because Wu feared that Burhan might have “other aims” (Bao-er-han 1984: 279). In the end, a Kazakh militia was established, only that it was proposed by a Chinese officer. In his memoire, Burhan Shehidi also mentioned that at one night, when he still held post in the Dihua government, several police intruded his house and took his father-in-law and son away (Bao-er-han 1984: 280–81). Much the same as Sheng Shicai, if not worse, the GMD was no friend of the non-Han ethnic elites.

Only in very rare circumstances—in the case of Osman in Altay, the GMD was able to win over the non-Han ethnic groups in Xinjiang to their side. As I have mentioned, Osman and his Kazakh forces were incorporated into the ETR under the coordination of Delilkhan Sugirbaev. However, when the ETR sought to monopolize control over Kazakh forces in Altay in August 1946, Osman went to the GMD for military support and broke out in open conflict with the ETR in December (Jian Reference Jian2015: 39; Song 1986 241). The “defection” of Osman had popular roots among Altay Kazakhs.

In the 1930s, thousands of Kazakhs moved to Xinjiang because of the collectivization campaign in Soviet Central Asia (Svanberg Reference Svanberg, Linda and Ingvar1988: 115). A large proportion of Kazakh migration flowed to Altay, which was one of the reasons that Kazakhs made up of 85 percent of the population in Altay—compared to 60 percent in Tarbaghatay and 45 percent in Ili (Zhang Reference Zhang1980, 8: 4317–18). Osman claimed that he and his fellow Kazakhs had unhappy memories of the Russian Revolution and the collectivization campaign (Song 1986: 241). In fact, according to a contemporary account, Osman was “a rabid Russophobe” (Barnett 1963: 276).

As we can see from the personal experiences of intermediaries and Osman’s oscillation between the ETR-Soviet and the GMD, the allegiance of guerillas on either side was mostly the result of negative alienation rather than positive affection. The widespread resentment against Sheng Shicai’s rule and the GMD regime’s distrust of the non-Han ethnic population, especially the elites, provided fertile ground for the Soviets to exploit. This made possible the bundles of connections between the intermediaries and local guerillas.

Northern Xinjiang: The Major Battlefield

The ETR’s military operation in Ili, Tarbaghatay, and Altay comprised two parts. On the one hand, the intermediaries were sent out to incorporate self-organized guerillas. Later, most of these guerillas were reorganized under the INA. On the other hand, the Soviet troops (along with INA) marched north from Ili, sweeping through and eventually conquering the three districts. Here, I shall not offer a comprehensive overview of military operations in northern Xinjiang but only emphasize the strong Soviet military presence in the ETR’s expansion (see Wang [Reference Wang1999a] for a detailed account).

The Soviet Union was heavily involved in the rebellion from the very start. Several months before the Ghulja Uprising, the Soviet consulate inside the city was made into a fortification—embrasures appeared on the walls (Zhang Reference Zhang1980, 11: 6257), and a machine gun was unveiled on the roof (Jacobs Reference Jacobs2016: 140). Right before the uprising, soldiers with uniforms of the “Kazakhstan Republic” marched from Qorghas to the north of Ghulja with machine guns, grenades, and rifles (Zhang Reference Zhang1980, 11: 6296). Ahead of them, Soviet tanks and air forces were deployed to clear the way (Wang Reference Wang2013: 146, 157–58). Meanwhile, under the coordination of Soviet personnel, the Nilka guerillas attacked Ghulja from the east side (Kamalov Reference Kamalov, Millward, Shinmen and Jun2010: 271).

Being attacked inside and out, Ghulja was eventually controlled by the revolutionaries. Protracted conflicts between the Ili-Soviet forces and the GMD army lasted through the subsequent two months, when Ili was finally occupied by the revolutionaries in late February (BETLMZZ 1999: 784). The protracted military confrontations in Ili almost destroyed GMD’s major forces in Xinjiang. The ETR’s eventual occupation of the three districts was just a matter of time. In the occupation of Tarbaghatay in July 1945, although local guerillas and the military headquarters established by Meshür Roziev played their part, the pivotal force were Ishaq Beg’s cavalry brigade and the Soviet army, with about 5,500 soldiers in total (Sadri Reference Sadri1984: 302; Wang Reference Wang2013: 204). Finally, the ETR claimed suzerainty over Altay after Delilkhan helped to incorporate Osman. Now, the ETR’s military actions on the northern front concluded.

Eastern Xinjiang: Guerillas versus Militias

Guerillas in eastern Xinjiang operated independently and engaged in typical guerilla warfare—raiding and looting. Although the acting governor Zhu Shaoliang was aware of the Kazakh guerillas in eastern Xinjiang, he never considered them to be enemies as important as the ETR and the Soviets on the west side. Thus, these guerilla attacks were left to be coped with by local initiatives.

The only effective way to combat these mobile guerillas, as it turned out, was to organize local militias. Starting in mid-1944, local administrators in the counties east of Dihua—including Qiande, Fukang, Fuyuan, Qitai, and Mulei—dispatched military officers to organize local militias, first in Fuyuan and then in other counties (Zhang Reference Zhang1980, 11: 6322). In these counties, villages were combined into stockades for self-defense (Lu 1998: 31–32). At the initial stage, these militias largely operated outside the formal military organ, although local governments did provide them with weapons. Later, they were absorbed into the GMD’s local army; data in 1946 suggest that these militias were well-equipped (table 4).

Table 4.

Local militias in Eastern Xinjiang

Sources: MQXZ (1998: 473), CJHZZ (2002: 1640–41), FKXZ (2002: 534), QTXZ (1994: 477), JMSEXZ (2002: 252), Lu (1998: 30), MLHXZ (2003: 372).

Note: No exact data on weaponry equipment of these militias in 1944 were available, but most sources indicated that local governments provided militias with rifles and horses.

Despite the effectiveness of self-defense by local militias, the establishment of such militias were not always successful, and in some cases, not even desirable for the local Chinese administrators. The local militias were organized by Han Chinese military officers from the top-down, and ethnic category matters in such circumstances. Consider a case in Fuyuan. In 1944, a local Mongol leader in Fuyuan tearfully begged the local administrator, “we do not want to join the bandits, we all know that Osman is a bandit, even the livestock knows … we have no bad people among us, but we do not have weapons. We hope the magistrate can give us some guns to defend ourselves” (quote from Zhang Reference Zhang1980, 11: 6324). The administrator, however, rejected the proposal and suggested that the Mongols escape and migrate elsewhere.

This case indicates that a genuine distrust to non-Han population might prevent militias other than Han and Hui from being organized. The counties mentioned in the preceding text almost all had Han as the majority population, except for Qiande, which had a Hui majority (ibid., 11: 6319). Although there were nomads in these counties, they largely lived in the northern parts. Under such conditions, Chinese military officers could effectively organize local militias, and it would be reasonable to speculate that these militias were made up of Han and Hui members.

Southern Xinjiang: Two Separated Zones of Conflict

The ETR’s military attack on the southern front was carried out by the INA alone—with three cavalry battalions and the Mongol battalion from Bayinbulak (ibid., 11: 6508). On the GMD side, their troops in the south were directly inherited from Sheng Shicai. Unlike that of eastern Xinjiang, the GMD completely failed to establish local militias in Aksu district. To be sure, GMD did make great efforts, but the established “militias” were either only involved in performing public-order-related tasks or simply lacked weapons and military training (AKSSZ 1991: 590; WSXZ 1993: 661).

Near Aksu, therefore, the INA and the GMD’s regular army stood at the two sides of military confrontation; INA with Abdukerim Abbasov, and GMD with Zhao Hanqi as their chief commander, respectively. Starting in June 1945, the two sides engaged in a military tug-of-war in Aksu district for four months—both in critical transportation corridors along the Tianshan mountains, and in major counties and cities—forming a largely insulated zone of conflict (Lu 1987: 87–89). At any rate, the conflict near Aksu was a relatively close match. A comparison of forces and their weapons should give us a general outlook on their respective military capacity (table 5).

Table 5.

ETR and GMD forces near Aksu

Sources: Zhang (Reference Zhang1980 vol. 11: 6508), AKSDQZ (2008: 1799), BCHXZ (2004: 188–89), KCXZ (1993: 507–8), Lu (1987: 88).

Sheer size and military equipment alone could not predict the outcome of military conflicts. Tactics, the occupation of strategic locations, timing, and other contingencies may completely alter the scenario. Nevertheless, we can see clearly from the table that the two sides were roughly comparable. Indeed, this was vindicated by the subsequent battles: cities and critical transportation routes shifted hands many times during the latter half of 1945 (Zhang Reference Zhang1980, 11: 6509–15). Only in early October, limited by its military logistics and under severe food shortages, the INA start to show fatigue. In a fight for airdropped supplies outside Aksu city on October 6, the GMD side gained an upper hand under the supreme command and military acumen of Zhao Hanqi (AKSSZ 1991: 603–4; WSXZ 1993: 670). The INA retreated. Battles in Aksu concluded in mid-October when the first phase of peace negotiation was worked out (AKSDQZ 2003: 1800).

Counties near Kashgar formed yet another isolated zone of conflict. As mentioned previously, the Tashkurghan guerillas—comprised primarily of Kirghiz, Tajiks, and Uyghurs—rose in late 1943, but only started large-scale military attacks in late 1945. Unlike the well-matched confrontations in Aksu, however, the Tashkurghan guerillas were in a much more inferior position vis-à-vis GMD’s local forces. Since September 1945, Tashkurghan guerillas started their military attack on Kashgar, Yengisar, Yarkand, and other counties in vicinity. Until December, despite a handful of military successes, Tashkurghan forces failed in their attempt to take over the major counties nearby (KSDQZ 2004: 1432; SCXZ 1996: 628; YJSXZ 2003: 475–76). Finally, after the ETR sent Ishaq Beg to Tashkurghan in June 1946, the guerillas were dismissed.

On the Chinese side, the GMD-commanded local armies were directly inherited from Sheng Shicai (Zhou Reference Zhou1948: 581–82). Although these troops were low in morale and poor in discipline (Kamalov Reference Kamalov2013b: 65), they proved just enough to prevent the Tashkurghan guerillas from taking over major cities. It is worth briefly mentioning that much the same with Aksu district the GMD sought to organize local militias but ended up in failure (AHQXZ 1993: 395; ATSSZ 1996: 599).