Since its creation in 1970, the word “bioethics” has had two competing points of view. Van Rensselaer Potter, who coined the word “bioethics,” envisioned a multidisciplinary approach to global issues of human survival, such as environmentalism.1
Potter VR. Bioethics: The science of survival. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 1970;14:127–53. Another influential early work is Passmore J. Men's Responsibility for Nature. London: Duckworth; 1974 (2nd ed. 1980), where responsibility is interpreted with regard to the protection of nature and setting limits on human population growth.
Recently we have witnessed the rise of a third trend, which appears as a sort of fusion of the “global” with the “clinical.” It is characterized by global perspectives related primarily to immediate human concerns, such as exposure to health hazards and gaps in quality and availability of healthcare worldwide. An illustrative example of this new focus is the “Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights” issued by UNESCO in 2005.
In this article we trace the development of the concept of responsibility as reflected through the above three bioethical points of view: the clinical, the environmental, and the global.
Accountability as Context-Specific Responsibility
Since the first systematic philosophical discussion of responsibility,2
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics, Bk 3, ch. 1–5.
For recent discussions, see Arpaly N. Unprincipled Virtue. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2003, for the “merit based camp, and Dennet D. Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press; 2004, for the consequentialists.
Strawson G. Freedom and resentment. Proceedings of the British Academy 1962;48:1–25.
Another major theme in the philosophy of responsibility is the question of “moral luck,” namely, the relationships between the internal mechanisms of moral action, such as good will, foresight, and deliberation, and the eventual outcome of one's actions in the world. For example, we may judge a person praiseworthy for being virtuous and wise in spite of a terrible outcome that, nevertheless, evolved from his deeds. But we may also find the same person guilty simply because the terrible outcome could have been avoided had he chosen to act differently. Effects that are not compatible morally with the mental state of mind that produced them are attributed to “moral luck.” Donna Dickenson has recently discussed some implications on bioethics of this topic.5
Dickenson D. Risk and Luck in Medical Ethics. Oxford: Polity; 2003.
Common to these discussions is the seeing of responsibility within the framework of imputation. According to Paul Ricouer, to impute means to attribute an action to a cause.6
Ricouer P. Le concept de responsabilité. Essai d'analyse sémantique. In: Ricoeur P. Le Juste. Paris: Éditions Esprit; 1995:41–70.
The word “responsibility” appeared for the first time in 1787 in a text attributed to Alexander Hamilton, in reference to the government's obligation to answer (respondere means to answer) questions raised by the parliament.7
Issue 63 of the “Federalist,” published in 1787 in various New York News Papers. For a web version see: http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/fed63.htm, accessed Jan 4, 2007.
Evidently, every person is responsible for his or her own actions. If John hits a stranger or gives him money, John's very action is the context of responsibility. In other contexts such as clinical medicine, inaction could be as morally laden as active action. Following Strawson, we may say that each social context creates roles along with its relative moral expectations, which responsibility is bound to answer. Responsibility in the sense of context-specific answerability is accountability.
Historians have shown that the concept of responsibly has evolved through a threefold process comprised of humanization, individualization, and interiorization.8
Fauconnet P. La Responsabilité. Etude de sociologie. Paris: Alcan; 1920; Gernet L. Recherches sur le développement de la pensée juridique et morale en Grèce. Etude sémantique. Paris: Ernest Leroux; 1917; Husson L. Les Transformations de la responsabilité. Etude sur la pensée juridique. Paris: PUF; 1947.
At a certain point in history, animals, spirits, and inanimate objects stopped being considered guilty and liable for punishment. As late as the Middle Ages, animals were put on trials and punished in European tribunals.9
Evans EP. The Criminal Prosecution and Capital Punishment of Animals: The Lost History of Europe's Animal Trials. London: William Heinemann; 1906.
History also shows a passage from the traditional practice of collective revenge (clan, tribe, family) to the notion of individual responsibility. The idea that children should not suffer the sins of their fathers is exemplary of individualization.
Interiorization is related to the development of inner speech, which enables one to engage oneself with imaginary interlocutors and particularly with inner “voices” calling for action or inaction, praising or rebuking the self. Socrates mentions a “demon” within his psyche; Philo of Alexandria described consciences as an internal perception of accusation,10
Philo. On the Special Laws, I, 235, pp. 236–7 in Loeb's edition.
Kant I. Die Metaphysik der Sitten. Berlin: Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften [1797] 1915;VI:438.
Interiorization is not the ability to forecast a future event, to see in one's imagination what the judge might rule. Rather, interiorization is the ability to conduct an independent process of moral valuation, of being able to exercise rationality in order to adopt or reject a sense of guilt or approbation in emulation of authentic judgment, yet without actual processes of social evaluation, and even in opposition to them. “I know that it is me, and nobody else, who is responsible for this action.”12
The responsible person is the one who chose to act (Plato, Republic, 617e), the origin and “father” of the action (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1113bff.). For contemporary literature, see Ben Ze'ev A. The Subtlety of the Emotions. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press; 2000:243–8.
The discriminatory power of interiorization is particularly attuned to the eliminative trends of humanization and individualization. The inner tribunal, so to speak, sifts out events that are not strongly enough linked to the acting agent, for example, secondary effects, and situations in which others' contribution to the production of an event are much greater than the agent's.
The element of interiorization has taken prominence in the recent bioethical literature belonging to the clinically oriented point of view. Responsibility is rendered at the level of moral excellence, even supererogation, an internal sense of duty to answer to moral standards that are richer and more demanding than mere compliance with laws and regulation.13
For example, Tauber AI. Patient Autonomy and the Ethics of Responsibility. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press; 2005.
See note 13, Tauber 2000:202ff.
The advent of “care-ethics” in the 1980s highlighted responsibility as holistic reckoning with divergent and even contradictory undertakings of care. Moreover, Feminist theoreticians argue that complete accountability in a few contexts of responsibility is irresponsible unless it “best responds to the needs of everyone in the story.”15
Hirschman NJ. Rethinking Obligation: A Feminist Method for Political Theory. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; 1989:236.
Technology and the Globalization of Responsibility: from Context-Bound Responsibility to Antecedent Responsibility
The 20th century placed unprecedented technological powers in human hands. Much of it was harnessed in the service of mutual destruction during the World Wars and in other political conflicts. It was particularly the specter of nuclear warfare that infused new meanings into Max Weber's notion of “the ethics of responsibility.” Hans Jonas stressed responsibility with regard to humanity and its potential for mass destruction.16
Jonas H. The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of Ethics in the Technological Age. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1985.
This new vision introduces antecedent responsibility—a kind of responsibility that is not a response to already extant expectations or contracted obligations. Antecedent responsibility depends on an ability to foresee the possible outcomes of our actions in the distant future and in other dimensions that are not part of the ordinary legal and moral discourses on accountability. Antecedent responsibility is free from given cultural contexts; its only relevant context is the human experience, broadly conceived.
Theodor Adorno explains responsibility with these words: “You are not just acting out of pure conviction, but you include the end, the intention and even the resulting shaping of the world as positive factors in your considerations.”17
Adorno T. Problems of Moral Philosophy. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press; 2000:162. These words are taken from a lecture given in 1963.
Karl Otto Apel draws our attention to the gap between traditional systems of ethics, which are centered on “micro” contexts such as the clinical encounter, and the incumbent duty to make decisions and shape policies that ultimately bear on the environment as a whole and on future generations as well. He refers to this as “planetary macroethics.” Paradoxically, this “macroethics” is so expansive as to render everybody responsible somehow, without providing any context for personal accountability. In fact, Apel speaks of a “primeval joint responsibility of all people,” and maintains that primeval joint responsibility is based on a proto-phenomenon in which an event is perceived to be morally relevant, but it is not yet imputable. At this stage, responsibility is too raw to be individualized; it still belongs to all people.
Indeed, it is the responsibility of society as a whole to regulate morally its energy production and consumption as well as its armed forces and other instruments of destruction. At the level of democratic society, we all share the burden of responsibility.18
See Apel KO. Diskurs und Verantwortung. Das Problem des Übergangs zur postkonventionellen Moral. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp; 1988.
It follows that antecedent responsibility also contains an element of regression from individualization of responsibility toward joint responsibility. Every single person's contribution to air pollution is negligible. Therefore, not a single individual is to be blamed for the impact of air pollution on rain forests and on the health of its inhabitants. Moreover, it is not possible at all to function in Western society without the use of cars, plastics, and numerous other technologies whose impact on future generations could be devastating. According to the “asymmetry thesis,” whereas active action always carries with it some measure of responsibility, a person needs the availability of alternative courses of action in order to be responsible for inanity.19
Fisher JM. Responsibility and failure. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1985–6;86:251–70.
Conscientious individuals do not exempt themselves from antecedent responsibility on the grounds of inaction that has no alternatives; rather, they search for venues for moral involvement, alternatives to passive existence with regard to global concerns. Besides, the powerful and the affluent are more responsible than the disadvantaged and the poor, whose openings for alternative actions are much more limited.
Antecedent responsibility is a care that is in search for contexts of accountability with regard to basic interests of distant people and the environment. Earlier theoreticians of antecedent responsibility emphasized guilt, shame, and fear resulting from human destructiveness. Their key message was restraint of technology, consumerism, and even of population growth.
The Philosophical Challenges of Antecedent Responsibility
Paul Ricoeur and Robert Spaemann, reflecting on Jonas' concept of responsibility, stress how the risk of an ethics that pushes responsibility to its extremes, so much so as to consider everyone responsible for everything, might eventually turn into its opposite, that is to say into an ethics that does not hold anyone responsible seriously for anything.20
Ricoeur P. Le concept de responsabilité. Essai d'analyse sémantique. In: Ricoeur P, ed. Le Juste. Paris: Éditions Esprit; 1995:41–70. Spaemann R. Nebenwirkungen als moralisches Problem. Philosophisces Jahrbuch 1975:82.
This same criticism can also be applied to Emmanuel Lévinas, who, like Jonas, extends the boundaries of responsibility almost endlessly. Lévinas writes:
Responsibility is what is incumbent on me exclusively and what, humanly, I cannot refuse. This charge is a supreme dignity of the unique. I am I in the sole measure that I am responsible, a non-interchangeable I. I can substitute myself for everyone, but no one can substitute himself for me…. It is in this precise sense that Dostoyevsky said “We are all responsible for all men before all, and I more than all the others.”21
Levinas E. Ethics and Infinity. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press; 1985:101.
In the spirit of the “merit-based” school of responsibility, and in opposition to the “consequentialists,” who regard the real events of the world as more important morally than personal attitudes, Lévinas' ethics is strongly oriented toward states of mind. The novelty in his approach lies in placing attunement to worldly events in the heart of the phenomenology of responsibility as a personal virtue and in casting Augustine's notion of “truths that confront,”22
Augustine. Confessions, bk 10, 23:34. The Latin adjective is “redarguens.”
Nietzsche FW. On the Geneology of Morals. New York: Random House; 1989:70. Levinas E. Otherwise Than Being. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press; 1998:112. Later Levinas grappled with an idea of “guiltless responsibility.” Hand S. The Levinas Reader. Oxford: Blackwell; 1989:83. Martin Heidegger also discusses guilt as a psychic event that may precede any particular context such as indebtedness. Heidegger M. Being and Time. Oxford: Blackwell; 1967:337. Both philosophers stress the role of shame.
Augustine meant that some ordinary facts possess an intrinsic moral power, such as Abel's blood crying out from the ground. Antecedent responsibility is not necessarily guilt related; it does not search for verbal or symbolic responses and excuses either. Augustine wrote about facts that confront us with our misdeeds. According to Lévinas, responsibility is about recognizing moral callings in certain kind of acts such as sufferings, injustices, and existential threats. This recognition produces emotional dispositions to act. Morally appropriate emotional responses to reality and the manner by which we perceive it are virtues to be cultivated through education and art.24
On the cultivation of the right emotions see Oakley J. Morality and the Emotions. London: Routledge; 1992:ch. 4. For seeing reality as a kind of virtue, see Little MO. Seeing and caring: The role of affect in feminist moral epistemology. Hypatia 1995;10:117–37. For the role of the dramatic arts, see Belfiore ES. Tragic Pleasures: Aristotle on Plot and Emotion. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; 1992:ch. 10.
Whereas a spontaneous urge of responsibility is possibly the natural reaction to seeing a person collapsing in front of our own eyes, antecedent responsibility requires special moral sensibilities that include identification with distant events or complex entities such as future generations and the nonhuman environment. As antecedent responsibility is always about responsibility over a distance,25
Bridging over distances and respect for distances are two fundamental cognitive schemes in ethics. The expansion of the horizons of obligation and responsibility is always in a potential conflict with the language of human rights. The latter is based on the metaphor of unimpeded movement.
Thoreau, for one, spoke of “theological ecology.” Nash RF. The Rights of Nature: A History of Environmental Ethics. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press; 1989:36–7.
Levinas' approach might implode from placing too much moral burden on each and every person. It also risks the loss of freedom. When a conscientious agent starts seeing the relentless finger of responsibility pointing at him in relation to every other person in need, he does not feel free anymore to engage himself in anything but actions stemmed by responsibility for the very wretched.
Moreover, an overcharged mission of responsibility might easily degenerate into bigotry, condescending paternalism,27
Tronto TJ. Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethics of Care. London: Routledge; 1993:170.
Taking upon oneself all the consequences, including those most contrary to the initial intention and foresight, will eventually make the human agent responsible for too much. Moreover, if mere vulnerability creates responsibility, no chain of causality between deeds and consequences is necessary anymore. Ricoeur observes “As a result of this new change in emphasis [regarding the nature of responsibility] the idea of the vulnerable other tends to replace that of damage done as the object of responsibility.”28
Ricoeur P. The Course of Recognition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; 2005:9.
Ricoeur and Spaemann believe that ethics should be placed halfway between an ethos of responsibility that strives to take upon itself all the consequences along with the consequences of those consequences and all the consequences that branch out from them, and an ethos of virtue, which at the expense of consequentialist considerations focuses on internal moral processes of the psyche.
According to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, the opposing attitudes of consequences-dependent and of intention-dependent moral valuations are both manifestations of intellectual abstraction.29
Hegel GWF. Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. In: Sämtliche Werke, vol. VII, Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann Verlag; [1821] 1964.
Whereas Hegel saw social norms as “measures” for moral principles, Strawson (see note 4, Strawson 1962) went much further, claiming that social contexts actually define the very substance of responsibility.
Inspired by Hegel's notion of Sittlichkeit, Ricoeur explains that “between avoiding the responsibility of consequences and the over-inflation of responsibility, it is necessary to find out the right measure and to stress, as Robert Spaemann did, the Hellenic principle of ‘nothing in excess.’ ”31
See note 28, Ricoeur 2005:68–9.
A less discussed aspect of Jonas' philosophy of responsibility is his grim opinion on democracy and his anticipation that only some sort of moral tyranny can cope with the crisis of antecedent responsibility.32
For a recent discussion, see Wolin R. Heidegger's Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Lowith, Hans Jonas and Herbert Marcuse. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; 2001:123–9.
See, for example, Rolston III H. Feeding people vs. saving nature. In: Light A, Rolston III H, eds. Environmental Ethics: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell; 2003:451–62.
Third Phase: The Humanized Globalization of Responsibility
The recent UNESCO declaration signals the growing awareness of responsibility toward distant people and peoples.34
For a comprehensible discussion of the humanitarian sensibility see Haskell TL. Capitalism and the origins of the humanitarian sensibility. American Historical Review 1985;90:339–61, 547–66.
Beckerman W, Pasek J. Justice, Posterity and the Environment. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2001.
One should be cautious not to romanticize poor and nonindustrial people as earth friendly and ecologically responsible. As one anthropologist studying the relationship between tribal cultures and their natural environment remarks, “Data show that people who live in a tropical rain forest and wore few cloths, sometimes acted very much like people in Western societies.” Harms R. Games against Nature: An Eco-cultural History of the Nunu of Equatorial Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1987:245.
Many people recognize the calling of antecedent responsibility as a primary motivation. It arises neither as a reaction to guilt nor in response to any question of accountability. Humanized antecedent responsibility creates its own moral questions as practical challenges for social life. This recognition involves two sets of motivations: an instinctive and compassionate moral rage at suffering and injustice along with nourishing, and creative solidarity with life.
The embrace of life, even one's own life, is the rejection of nihilism; the rejection of nihilism is the identification with some cares; one single care inevitably produces further cares.37
This is a commonplace topos in the philosophy of desire. We do not discuss here the different and the overlapping characteristics of cares and desires. One important point is that cares do not strive to satiate wants. Another crucial difference is that cares target something in the real world. See Barilan YM. Towards a dialogue between Utilitarianism and medicine. Medicine, Healthcare & Philosophy 2004;7:163–73. In Humean terms, desires are prerequisite for the adoption of moral goals; according to Levinas, cares evolve spontaneously when a human being becomes aware of a crisis of injustice or a vital need.
The exuberance in successful human action is expansive; it seeks new, more challenging, and broader areas of engagements.38
Jamison KR. Exuberance: The Passion for Life. New York: Vintage; 2005:ch. 4.
White RB. Motivation reconsidered: The concept of competence. Psychological Review 1959;66:297–333.
Nakamura J, Csikszentmihalyi M. The construction of meaning through vital engagement. In: Keyes CLM, Haidt J, eds. Flourishing: Positive Psychology and the Life Well Lived. Washington, D.C.: APA; 2003:83–104.
On the intrinsic value of truthfulness in linking us with reality see Williams B. Truth and Truthfulness. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; 2002. Such links involve freedom in our relations with the environment, p. 143.
Devotions to vocations driven by antecedent responsibility happen to involve much less degradation of the environment—one is simply too remote from or too busy for indulging oneself in conspicuous consumption or in other forms of profligacy. Heightened sensibilities for the future, for the past, and for the expanses of existence may scale down many extravagant desires that are dominated by the perspectives of here and now.
Of the many practical issues raised by the humanized and globalized responsibility we choose to point out a few.
Because the onus of burden of antecedent responsibility lies on social institutions and governments, these bodies of authority and power will accept an active role in the reduction of environmental damage along with an active commitment to the betterment of the lot of distant people and of the biosphere as a whole. Ordinary citizens will also heed the Hamiltonian vision and make their governments answer questions created by antecedent responsibility.
As experts are still searching for effective means of intervention, strong evidence exists in favor of the positive impact of medical plans of assistance.42
Kristof N. Aid: can it work? New York Review of Books 2006;53(15):41–4.
In the “global village,” one need not venture outside of one's immediate environment in order to encounter needy people who come from distant countries and cultures. These people are often poor labor-driven immigrants or political refugees. Today, every healthcare professional may find himself responsible for patients whose care depends on a holistic understanding of completely different social, cultural, and economic backgrounds. Hence, issues of globalized responsibility must now be part of medical education worldwide.
Every scientist and every person who works with and supports science will come to terms with the possible global impacts of his or her own work in areas such as genetics, microbiology, and the treatment of waste. The creation of practical and long-range plans for the sake of the environment and of future generations requires multidisciplinary enterprises of research, development, and implementation. The crowding of one fourth of the world population in slummy “megacities,” the ubiquity of toxic products, the threat of viral epidemics, and many other similar issues make it clear that regulation and cessation of ruinous habits are not enough. Humanized globalization of responsibility is a calling for democratic initiatives of intervention, change, and healing.
Research in philosophy, moral psychology, bioethics, and the social sciences may help us cultivate our raw sensibility of antecedent responsibility into a mature and operative virtue. We need to find the right balance among the motivations fostering antecedent responsibility: moral rage at suffering and injustice, love of life, adventurism, aesthetic fascinations, curiosity, personal growth, and happiness through vital engagements as well as humility that does not allow enthusiasm for globalized stewardship to deteriorate into tyranny and intolerance.
Another challenge is political, as it relates to the promises and dangers that lie in strategic alliances of antecedent responsibility with other economical and social interests.
As respect for nature, holistic identification with nature, and freedom are three of the earliest and strongest environmental values, and because acceptance is a fundamental clinical virtue, at certain points we should learn to leave nature alone, and let it be.
