This book is not easy to summarize. What the author provides is stimulating, rich, and very well informed. Despite copious subheadings, however, it does read more like a work in progress than a finished analysis.
Coherence has to be conferred on any outline of the argument since it does not possess this in its original form. Such an outline has to be assembled from a careful reading of a somewhat dense and repetitive text.
Braun begins by comparing primitive, “traditional” societies (he also says they are not only tribal but also simple, which anyone versed in cultural anthropology is likely to find reductionist), with authoritarian, class-bound, “feudal” ones. On the one hand he sees, for example, Arab and “to a large extent” Islamic societies. On the other hand he sees, for example, European societies with their “remnants of feudalism” (134). People in the former are said to cope in extremis by becoming hysterical. People in the latter are said to cope in extremis by becoming paranoid, that is, by seeking scapegoats.
He then goes on to compare both with contemporary “post-feudal” societies, where people are said to be more anonymous and to cope in extremis by becoming schizophrenic (before they reach this point, however, Braun says they resort to narcissistic pursuits like consumption, addiction, and social media). The United States he sees as the quintessential example in this regard.
Narcissism is a key theme throughout. Braun highlights how modernizing traditional societies become authoritarian but societies already modernized (and hence more individualistic) become narcissistic. This seems to be the main reason he sees the moral example of the United States as currently failing to inspire.
Braun is a rationalist and a utilitarian. He is a rationalist because his whole perspective articulates the priority placed on reason as an end in itself. It is telling that he promotes uncritically the writings of Max Weber and sees human history in evolutionary terms, that is, as a story of social and cultural progress where “patterns of power” give way to “patterns of respect” (33) and tyrants become less acceptable as people become more reasonable (this does not stop people tipping over into nihilism if negative circumstances prevent their reason being used). He is a utilitarian since he says that describing and explaining any political issue should be done first and foremost in terms of how it affects the “greatest good for the greatest number” (10). This is also revealing, first, about what Braun subsequently has to say, and second, about what he does not have to say. With regard to the former he refers, for example, to Montesquieu's idea of self-interest. His own account of the individual is underpinned by the same calculative concept. With regard to the latter he rejects Hegel's ideas of philosophical idealism. This is bad news for international relations constructivism. (He does not, as it happens, reject the mixed materialist/idealist conclusions of the Frankfurt School.)
Along the way Braun talks about nationalism, pragmatism, the formal and informal uses of law, and the relationship between the United States and Islam. He also talks about personal versus impersonal forms of exploitation.
In conclusion he discusses politics from the bottom up rather than the top down, personal relationships in terms of means and ends, the sense of self in democracies, the functions of fantasy, and the alienation—as well as the vulnerability to anxiety—that he sees in postmodern societies.
If there is an ultimate value in Braun's world it seems to be “self-expression based on self-understanding” (227). At the same time what he seems to fear are communities based on fictional forms of “social closeness” since they do not modernize properly, that is, they become fictional forms of more contemporary and impersonal ones. What he wants are people with a sense of association who have enough of a sense of community to tell their governments what to do and to have them listen. What he wants, in short, is what he thinks of as being the best “America” has to offer.
This book is problematic for a number of reasons. The question of coherence has already been mentioned. The whole work is also centered on the United States (to say “America” is to ignore South America and Central America, neither of which seems to merit a mention). This raises issues of its own. Assertions are made like “we pioneered in ‘rights talk’” (103). The problem here is that it would not wear with British readers who have a rights tradition extending back to the Magna Carta. The latter received the king's seal well before the United States even existed.
The whole argument of the book is about making the form of democracy particular to the United States attractive to the rest of the world. No alternative is entertained as being possible or desirable, which is something that Indians or the Japanese or the Germans, for example, would tend to contest.
In addition, the book's understanding of Islam is unidimensional. Most Muslims live in different parts of Asia, not Saudi Arabia or the Middle East. Moreover, “Islam” is riven by major sects such as the Sunni and Shi'ite ones. Both facts matter since broad-brush conclusions about such an important contemporary force in world affairs are not convincing in the light of its diversity and complexity.
A key distinction that is returned to repeatedly is the one Ferdinand Tonnies first made between gemeinschaft and gesellschaft, and yet his contribution is not referenced when this dichotomy is introduced. No mention is made either of the voluminous literature debating its utility and significance.
Many other references do appear in the body of the book, though the usual scholarly practice of digesting their arguments so they can become an intrinsic part of what is said is forgone in favor of telling the reader to consult the works recommended. Instead of footnotes documenting the source of a concept, and comments made there on why the reference is deemed to be of particular relevance, a running list is built into the text. This lends it a somewhat provisional air.
Lastly there is an issue which is even harder to understand since both the author and the publisher's editors must have read the manuscript in the original and in galley form. Four paragraphs from pages 136 and 137 are reproduced word for word as part of the text on pages 146 and 147. Is it unfair to ask that scholars, particularly those whose works appear under the imprint of such a reputable house, be held to the same standards as those uniformly applied to the students they teach?
