The case for patriotism and the dangers of system

The status of patriotism in Smith’s theory is often rightly maligned because of his caution about the science of the bad statesman—the purported man of system who pursues his plans for society at the expense of others. Smith also strongly condemns economic nationalism as it was practiced in the eighteenth century as the doctrine of mercantilism. After all, as he states in a letter to Andreas Holt, Commissioner of the Danish Board of Trade and Economy, the Wealth of Nations was a “very violent attack … upon the whole commercial system of Great Britain.”Footnote ¹¹ Yet, for Smith and his friend David Hume, intimacy with family, friends, and nation can be an important impetus to sympathy and, consequently, moral norms that underlie justice. These “circles of sympathy” are recognized as essential for the functioning of the moral sentiments in Smith’s theory.Footnote ¹² We can most readily sympathize, or imaginarily change places and feel with, those closest to us whom we interact with regularly.Footnote ¹³ However, as has often been the focus of scholarship for Smith specialists and liberalism more broadly, these connections can be problematic for human freedom and prosperity if sympathetic relationships are limited to these circles. Yet Smith’s defense of patriotism is not partial in the sense of following one’s interests, but only in having concern for one’s countrymen as a pathway for promoting the common interest.

Smith defines love of country as based on two principles: “The love of our country seems, in ordinary cases, to involve in it two different principles; first, a certain respect and reverence for that constitution or form of government which is actually established; and secondly, an earnest desire to render the condition of our fellow-citizens as safe, respectable, and happy as we can.” He then distinguishes that citizens should “obey the civil magistrate,” but “good citizen[s]” “promote … the welfare of the whole society of his fellow-citizens.”Footnote ¹⁴ In short, for Smith, patriotism involves affording special privilege to one’s countrymen and the laws of one’s country as opposed to those of other nations or those of one’s particular faction. Smith’s understanding of patriotism here is sentiment for both the laws and others within a nation, and he argues that this sentiment drives individuals to promote the public interest. This definition has been separated into three models of patriotism distinguished by what motivates the individual to act: the heroic, aesthetic, and humane.Footnote ¹⁵ However, I locate in Smith’s description an argument that patriotism also requires political judgment. I show that judgment is central for achieving the goals for human flourishing of Smith’s systems of natural liberty and sympathy. First, Smith establishes the relationship between patriotism and judgment:

In this statement, Smith ties together concern for fellow citizens to political wisdom. Patriotism sometimes involves supporting one’s established government and other times requires clamor and protest.Footnote ¹⁷ Smith notes that much “political wisdom” or, as am I calling it, political judgment, is required to determine which course of action is best. For Smith, this is not simply the judgment of the statesman, though these figures also need to make judgments. It also includes the judgment of the common person in society. He argues that citizens’ connection to one another and participation in and support of government help create stability. For example, in his analysis of how Great Britain should seek to deal with America, he argues that America should have “freedom of trade,” equal “burden of taxation,” and “the benefit of representation.” If they are given representation, it would be cheaper for Britain to maintain defense, but he makes a further claim about national sentiment and stability: “The principal security of every government arises always from the support of those whose dignity, authority and interest, depend upon its being supported.”Footnote ¹⁸ For Smith, citizens, not just political leaders, need to have affection for their fellow citizens and the laws of their country to ensure stability and security, but they also must weigh when government is not fulfilling its duty in maintaining “public tranquillity.” In these instances, the people might be induced to protest the actions of the government. But before they do so, they should weigh various concerns about stability and the responsibility of government to judge whether or not clamor is warranted. Smith often expresses worry about too much protest leading to political instability because of the “madness of fanaticism” and “the turbulence and disorder of faction.” He claims that the “great body of the party” can easily be “duped” by the “sophistry” of the leaders, and leaders too can have a hard time “preserv[ing] their own heads.”Footnote ¹⁹ Patriotism, for Smith, neither means consistently challenging political leaders nor never challenging them. Citizens must use political judgment to weigh whether government is serving the good of the majority of citizens.

Second, political judgment, for Smith, requires judging not only how one’s nation supports one’s individual interests, but also understanding that one’s individual interests are connected to the flourishing of fellow citizens. Smith cements this idea with his description of the real man of public spirit, as compared to the man of system. He argues that his desire to help the public “is founded upon the love of humanity, upon a real fellow-feeling with the inconveniencies and distresses to which some of our fellow-citizens may be exposed.”Footnote ²⁰ Smith argues that patriotism necessitates sympathetic exchange with one’s relevant peers and judging how to act based on this understanding of not only individual interests, but also those of one’s fellows.

For Smith, patriotism and national sentiment should aim to benefit one’s countrymen or, as he more often states, “the great body of the people.”Footnote ²¹ He is therefore critical of those who claim national benefit or patriotism but utilize politics and economics to benefit their particular interests against their countrymen. Smith is concerned with how the mercantile system affects distant others, but especially with its domestic consequences. Detailing flaws in the theory from balance of trade to ideas about the relationship between specie and wealth, Smith argues that mercantilism is inconsistent with liberty and economic growth.Footnote ²² He calls for the repeal of several components of the mercantile system to bring about “natural liberty” and restore “freedom of trade,” such as “break down the exclusive privileges of corporations, and repeal the statute of apprenticeship … and add to these the repeal of the law of settlements, so that a poor workman, when thrown out of employment either in one trade or in one place, may seek for it in another trade or in another place, without the fear either of a prosecution or of a removal.”Footnote ²³ He also frequently refers to “the natural system of perfect liberty and justice” when arguing that Great Britain should gradually reduce its mercantile policy toward the colonies.Footnote ²⁴ Mercantilism fosters “national jealousy which prompt[s] them to spite and ill-will [toward] each other … and diminish the opulence of both,” and it “introduce[s] very dangerous disorders into the state of the body politick.”Footnote ²⁵ He points out that “many manufacturers have … obtained in Great Britain, either altogether, or very nearly a monopoly against their countrymen.”Footnote ²⁶ Elsewhere, when criticizing the Settlement Acts of the Poor Laws, he points to “[t]he common people of England,” who are “so jealous of their liberty,” that they are “never rightly understanding wherein it consists” in not allowing laborers to freely move between parishes in search of work for fear of becoming responsible for paying for their relief should they not find a job.Footnote ²⁷ Smith argues against nationalist claims and economic interventions that prioritize some groups in a nation over others rather than benefiting the whole.

Hedging against system: Cautious exceptions to free trade

For Smith, the natural system of liberty is the surest path to national opulence. He condemns proponents and believers of jealousy of trade arguments as “fools,” and yet these are the predominant economic arguments for national sentiment in Smith’s time. I argue that Smith reframes why such exceptions should be undertaken from arguments to beggar other nations to extending fellow feeling to one’s countrymen and developing political judgment.Footnote ³⁷ Though his various exceptions to the free market are increasingly recognized, no one, to my knowledge, has attempted to provide a theory behind these exceptions.Footnote ³⁸ In this section I will detail the exceptions to free trade, arguing that their unifying thread is Smith’s argument for human flourishing beyond opulence. I also emphasize the role of fostering political judgment as a check on problematic adherence to system, care for one’s countrymen, and a just administration of law.

These exceptions are not to be read as a recipe for politicians to undermine free trade. As I have established, the natural system of liberty was Smith’s preferred system, and he has harsh critiques of those who attempt to use politics or economics for their own ends at the expense of their countrymen. Smith specifically cautions that judgment is required, in one instance of a free trade exception, because the politician is an “insidious and crafty animal.”Footnote ³⁹ These are exceptions to the rule of the system of natural liberty. Smith is concerned about unthinking adherence to any system. Therefore, Smith understands that even the system he has the most faith in would necessitate occasional diversions. These exceptions are worthy of study because they demonstrate how nuanced his project is. In fact, almost always after introducing an exception to free trade, Smith immediately proposes extreme caution in enacting the exception or plants doubt that it will work with any degree of regularity. For example, with bounties he suggests that these will cause many individuals to undertake unnecessary risks: “The usual effect of such bounties is to encourage rash undertakers to adventure in a business, which they do not understand, and what they lose by their own negligence and ignorance, more than compensates all that they can gain by the utmost liberality of government.” Similarly, he points out that retaliatory tariffs often do not result in freer trade.Footnote ⁴⁰ While it is certainly true that for every exception Smith introduces, he almost as quickly introduces caution in the use of the exception and questions its utility, this practice should also give readers pause as to why he would bother to introduce exceptions at all. I argue that Smith introduces exceptions to direct readers to other values essential to human flourishing beyond opulence. For Smith, opulence is necessary but not sufficient. The presence of many nuanced exceptions also emphasizes Smith’s concern for judgment as opposed to system thought. In discussing these exceptions, however, it is beyond the scope of this essay to assess whether Smith was right that these exceptions would work to achieve his goals. Instead, the aim is to demonstrate that Smith realizes that some exceptions might occasionally be necessary, but that they only should be employed in rare cases and for the specific ends he outlines rather than for achieving balance of trade against a foreign nation or privileging certain domestic industries.

Most of Smith’s exceptions to free trade fall under two main themes: defense and encouraging a freer, more expansive market. He explains:

Smith’s exceptions to the system of free trade include tariffs that support national defense, retaliatory tariffs, export subsidies or bounties, export rebates or drawbacks, banking regulations, laws regulating usury or lending at interest, public works, education, intellectual property, and temporary monopolies such as to compensate for the security of a joint-stock company in starting a new trade route. I will focus on these, but there are certainly others. I argue that each exception also promotes a wider goal for human flourishing, namely, sympathy with fellow citizens and protecting the administration of law.

Smith allows that some exceptions to free trade might be necessary to support national defense. The defense exceptions emphasize the importance of sentiment for one’s fellow countrymen, especially by helping citizens weigh the cost of war; making the sovereign feel secure in their power, thus allowing more space for citizens to protest; allowing citizens to be able to revolt against a tyrannical sovereign; and providing military training that gives citizens opportunities to develop moral and political judgment. First, Smith emphasizes that defense exceptions to free trade help foster sentiment for one’s countrymen. The first and most famous of these exceptions is his support for the Navigation Acts,Footnote ⁴² which require that ships be domestically produced, owned, and operated by at least three-fourths British subjects and give a monopoly on importation of some goods to Britain only and on British ships. Smith argues that the Navigation Acts are necessary because “[t]he defence of Great Britain, for example, depends very much upon the number of its sailors and shipping. The act of navigation, therefore, very properly endeavours to give the sailors and shipping of Great Britain the monopoly of the trade of their own country.”Footnote ⁴³ In this exception, he still praises free trade as the best way to achieve wealth, but simultaneously argues that wealth is not always the ultimate goal: “The act of navigation is not favourable to foreign commerce, or to the growth of that opulence which can arise from it … . As defence, however, is of much more importance than opulence, the act of navigation is, perhaps, the wisest of all the commercial regulations of England.”Footnote ⁴⁴ We know from elsewhere in his work that freedom of trade is not just about opulence but also about human dignity, but here he suggests that defense might also be essential to human flourishing. Defense prioritizes the safety of one’s fellow countrymen and the protection of the government in which one can participate.

While the Navigation Acts make up the largest exception to free trade based on defense, Smith also details other exceptions that support national defense. These other exceptions help citizens learn to weigh the cost of war and develop skills they might need to defend the nation or themselves against a tyrannical sovereign. He argues that bounties or export subsidies on domestically produced gunpowder and sailcloth constitute another exception to free trade essential for national defense. He explains that these might be necessary for defense because “it might not always be prudent to depend upon our neighbours for the supply.”Footnote ⁴⁵ In contemporary terms, bounties or export subsidies induce foreign firms to cut their production and bolster the domestic market. They encourage the exports of goods by domestic firms by ensuring that they can be sold cheaply. Another defense exception is tonnage bounties on fish such as white herring and whale products. He explains that “though the tonnage bounties to those fisheries do not contribute to the opulence of the nation, it may perhaps be thought, that they contribute to its defence, by augmenting the number of its sailors and shipping. This, it may be alleged, may sometimes be done by means of such bounties at a much smaller expence, than by keeping up a great standing navy.”Footnote ⁴⁶ These industries are important because they help develop individuals’ skills that would be useful in defense, such as sailing, to augment Britain’s navy.

The reasoning he gives here, however, extends beyond defense. He also reasons that using small bounties is sometimes cheaper than paying for a standing army or navy and accomplishes the same goal. Smith often engages in this rhetorical sleight of hand. He appeals to the self-interest of his readers—merchants or capital owners—and in doing so makes a roundabout argument for a moral good. On the one hand, Smith makes a point about economic efficiency, but on the other, he is asking the public to judge what is best for the national interest—both having skilled sailors and the means of achieving that skill level. Also notice that he uses the language of “may” or “might,” inviting judgment about the policies. The exception to free trade might be in the national interest if it provides for defense and does so more cheaply than maintaining a standing army. Smith supports some national defense exceptions to free trade because they develop skills in the population that he argues are desirable, and these exceptions sometimes are more cost-effective than if the government created a program with the same aim. For this reason, he also notes “the carrying trade has been supposed peculiarly advantageous to such a country as Great Britain, of which the defence and security depend upon the number of its sailors and shipping.” Yet later in Book IV of the Wealth of Nations, in a discussion of Britain’s relationship with the American colonies, Smith points out the legislature’s interest in developing fisheries in the colonies for naval superiority, but that the fisheries in New England have flourished without extra encouragement.Footnote ⁴⁷ Even as Smith suggests the potential utility of exceptions to free trade, he also offers critiques of the necessity of those exceptions.

Another reason Smith gives in support of bounties is that the masses will develop skills they can use to defend their liberty against arbitrary power. He argues that a standing army is superior to a militia because they have more practice and can defend against foreign invasion, especially by less developed nations.Footnote ⁴⁸ However, at the same time Smith also implies that sailors might get better training than a standing army and accomplish another goal at the same time. He discusses the dangers of a standing army for liberty: “Men of republican principles have been jealous of a standing army as dangerous to liberty. It certainly is so, wherever the interest of the general and that of the principal officers are not necessarily connected with the support of the constitution of the state.”Footnote ⁴⁹ Here again, Smith points out that citizens might consider it in their best interest to have sailors and soldiers who are trained by other means, such as participating in the shipping trade, so that those soldiers cannot be used by political leaders against the people. Sovereigns are likely to call standing armies to their service, but Smith argues that those trained by other means might be more attached to the constitution and rule of law than to the person of the sovereign. In doing so, he highlights another key principle for human flourishing: rule of law. A militia is prepared should the nation need them for purposes of defense, but they cannot be used to tyrannize over their fellow subjects. Notice also that Smith thinks it is important that citizens, but especially soldiers, be attached to the constitution of a state rather than to whomever is in power. Furthermore, training sailors is cheaper than maintaining a standing navy. He again references economic efficiency, noting that standing armies get more expensive as wealth grows.Footnote ⁵⁰

Finally, Smith makes explicit the kind of deliberation he hopes citizens will undertake when considering how to achieve a good national defense, but also whether some exceptions to free trade are advantageous for human flourishing. He argues that citizens are more often able to revolt if the sovereign feels secure in their power. In this case, having a good national defense helps mitigate arbitrary or tyrannical abuses of power by the sovereign and allows citizens space to regularly contest the power of the sovereign. Smith explains:

I quote Smith at length here to demonstrate his concern for warding against arbitrary power through citizen participation. In his analysis, if standing armies have good leadership, they can allow citizens freedom to protest in a way not normally allowed if the sovereign did not feel protected were a protest to grow in size or intensity. They also prevent the sovereign from having to claim “discretionary power.” In a way similar to the case of having well-trained officers aware of constitutional constraints, Smith also advocates a standing army in some instances because it prevents extra-constitutional actions by the sovereign. Here again, Smith is promoting the importance of rule of law for the common good. In making this analogy between standing armies, militias, public protest, and exceptions to trade, Smith also models the kind of comparisons required for exercising political judgment that he hopes citizens will make when considering public policies. If he was only concerned with the judgment of the sovereign, he would not mention when sovereigns feel more or less secure. This is thus advice for citizens. He also demonstrates why this particular exception to free trade supports fellow feeling between countrymen. When there is a regular means of defense at the sovereign’s disposal, they will tolerate public protest.

Smith introduces another defense-based exception to free trade with state-sponsored martial education of the people and shows how this aspect of martial competency promotes the political judgment of the people. In his discussion of the effects of the division of labor on the people, Smith points out that in addition to limiting the development of the “intellectual” and “social” virtues, the division of labor limits “martial virtues.” Smith then combines the ideas that workers are unable to judge in moral issues “of the ordinary duties of private life” as well as stating that the worker “is altogether incapable of judging; and unless very particular pains have been taken to render him otherwise, he is equally incapable of defending his country in war.”Footnote ⁵² For Smith, work created by the division of labor does not provide sufficient stimulation to train workers in exercising moral and political judgment.Footnote ⁵³ An important aspect of developing public spirit and political judgment is learning martial virtues. Smith notes that the division of labor promotes “uniformity of his stationary life,” and therefore a worker does not have the opportunity to develop courage. Smith juxtaposes this to a soldier’s life, which is “irregular, uncertain, and adventurous.”Footnote ⁵⁴ It initially seems puzzling that Smith is combining comments about martial virtues with a discussion of workers’ lack of ability to develop moral and political judgment. But recall that Smith explains in The Theory of Moral Sentiments how moral judgment is developed. The individual is exposed to many different instances and, in trying to sympathize with those different interlocutors, through “[h]abit and experience” the individual can hone their moral judgment and their impartial spectator.Footnote ⁵⁵ In comparing the worker’s life to that of the soldier, Smith again affirms the importance of developing judgment through lots of different experiences—irregular, uncertain, and adventurous—like those one would have as a soldier. This exposure would better enable workers to judge moral and political issues because they will have the opportunity to refine that judgment. Because patriotism requires exercising political judgment about when to support the government and when to rise up against it, Smith wants to ensure that “the people … should not be disposed to judge rashly or capriciously concerning” government.Footnote ⁵⁶

In the next instance, Smith argues that the country should supplement the natural system of the market by providing military education so that the “whole body of the people” could come to the defense of “the constitution of the state” if the ruler starts exercising arbitrary power. He returns to his previous point about teaching military skills to sailors:

Smith aims to ensure that the common people will acquire a martial spirit. He wants the great body of the people (in addition to sailors) to be educated in martial virtues to hone their moral and political judgment of everyday matters, moral questions such as “the ordinary duties of private life,” and political questions like whether or not the country should go to war or implement a particular tax, or whether the people should protest against a leader.Footnote ⁵⁸ If the sovereign provides military exercises or bounties to train more sailors, citizens will be able to defend the country against foreign invaders, be prepared to defend themselves against the arbitrary power of their rulers, and develop moral and political judgment through exposure to many different situations. And importantly for freedom, a wide education in military spirit necessitates a smaller rather than a larger standing army for basic security and defense.

The second potential exception to the system of free trade, for Smith, entails restricting trade temporarily to open freer markets. In this instance, exceptions to free trade promote the interest of one’s countrymen because they help bring about freer trade in the long run. They also foster sympathy for one’s countrymen because they ease individuals into free trade and away from the restrictions on trade that may have benefited their particular group, prompting an extension of their judgment from mere individual interest to accounting for the interests of others.

The first example of this kind of exception to free trade that Smith gives is retaliatory tariffs. He recommends them initially to prompt a foreign nation to reduce their trade barriers, resulting in freer trade overall. Smith cautions that such tariffs are unlikely to create freer trade in most instances because nations “seldom fail to retaliate.” He concludes that whether to implement retaliatory tariffs with the hope of a reduction of trade barriers overall is a matter of “deliberation” and “the science of a legislator.”Footnote ⁵⁹ Smith also recommends caution in removing these tariffs because of the effects they can have on the well-being of the mass of laborers: “Were those high duties and prohibitions taken away all at once, cheaper foreign goods of the same kind might be poured so fast into the home market, as to deprive all at once many thousands of our people of their ordinary employment and means of subsistence.” Although he ultimately wants reductions in these benefits to restore free trade, he continues to speak also of generating connections to fellow citizens in the nation: “Humanity may in this case require that the freedom of trade should be restored only by slow gradations, and with a good deal of reserve and circumspection.”Footnote ⁶⁰ Similarly, Smith argues that mercantile policies that artificially bolster some industries in trade with the colonies should also be gradually repealed. This will eventually “restore all the different branches … which perfect liberty necessarily establishes,” but most importantly this prevents “the most dangerous disorders upon the whole body politic.” Smith is concerned about the disruption both in the individual lives of those workers who must experience “a great permanent loss” and the stability of society as a whole undergoing lots of protests in response to swift removal of these benefits.Footnote ⁶¹ He cautions:

Smith speaks to his concern more generally with political disorder, such as factions or public protests motivated by enthusiasm. He advocates a gradual repeal of special privileges for two reasons. First, so that those with political power consider the situation of the least advantaged and not just their own interests. Second, so that the people are able to form a wider judgment of the political and economic order beyond the special privilege bestowed on their industry. He also wants to prevent a situation where judgment is rendered impossible because of chaos in the public sphere.

Smith also allows that drawbacks could incentivize the importation of goods and subsequent exporting of goods that are not being used in the home market to establish a freer trade. First, drawbacks are only needed because of all the duties, tariffs, and customs put on importing and exporting goods in the first place: “Such drawbacks cannot force into this trade a greater share of the capital of the country than what would have got to it of its own accord, had there been no duties upon importation. They only prevent its being excluded altogether by those duties.”Footnote ⁶³ Because these exceptions to free trade exist, drawbacks can be useful; they promote the exportation of goods not being used in the domestic market and help establish a freer trade. Still, Smith cautions against using drawbacks because of how often they can be manipulated. He encourages judgment about the use of drawbacks toward promoting the public good by exposing how often they can be “abused” by particular interests: “Drawbacks … are useful only in those cases in which the goods for the exportation of which they are given, are really exported to some foreign country; and not clandestinely reimported into our own. That some drawbacks, particularly those upon tobacco, have frequently been abused in this manner … is well known.”Footnote ⁶⁴

A third suggestion Smith gives for improving free trade is to remove import prohibitions and replace them with a tax on imported goods. In a letter to William Eden, member of parliament and lord of trade, he gives the example of Dutch cured herrings, which Smith states are “vastly superior to British cured you can scarce imagine the difference.” He suggests that this tax will allow the Dutch herrings to get “to the tables of the better sort of people” only because they are more expensive, but at the same time, it will encourage the British curers to “immediately endeavour to get this high price, and by superior care and cleanliness to raise their goods to an equality with the Dutch.”Footnote ⁶⁵ This tax has the effect of inducing British curers to compete on the foreign market.

Additionally, Smith supports financial regulations to promote the interests of one’s fellow countrymen by protecting individuals who participate in market transactions. He supports usury laws to protect the rule of law in two ways: to prevent “prodigals and projectors” from abusing people who loan money to them and, most importantly, to promote public sentiment by ensuring that individuals cannot be taken advantage of and that there will be money available to lend to those who need it.Footnote ⁶⁶ These laws promote the public good by ensuring there is money to loan at a fair price and the money is paid back. These laws prevent the “increase of the evil of usury.”Footnote ⁶⁷

For Smith, some banking regulations also facilitate commerce, secure rule of law, and protect the least advantaged. Regulations of paper money banking

Smith thinks that without such regulations, the least well-off could be taken advantage of and this would be detrimental to the public good. He states:

In these ways, regulations on banking and lending money facilitate commerce by ensuring security and stability as well as promote concern for materially distant members of the polity.

Smith also argues for government supplying public works on two grounds: promoting the common good and facilitating commerce. He outlines three duties for government: defense, justice, and public works and institutions “which it can never be for the interest of any individual, or small number of individuals, to erect and maintain” and which “are chiefly those for facilitating the commerce of the society, and those for promoting the instruction of the people.”Footnote ⁷⁰ The public works Smith emphasizes that facilitate commerce are maintenance of “good roads, bridges, navigable canals, harbours, etc.,” and he further advocates a toll on luxury carriages for “the indolence and vanity of the rich” because they cause more wear and tear on the bridges and roads. This toll can also offset costs to poor consumers who need goods that are transported by “carriages of necessary use.”Footnote ⁷¹ Smith’s justification for this exception to the natural system here is not only to secure the safety of the public, but also to prevent private persons from cheating their fellow citizens by charging a toll and then not maintaining the road or bridge. But he is equally skeptical of fully turning over such maintenance to the government because the people would not have a means to monitor neglect or corruption.Footnote ⁷² These public works represent a kind of exception to a fully free market without government interference, but for Smith, they are necessary to promote the public good and, when implemented properly, as in the case of luxury tolls, to incentivize citizens to understand not only their own interests, but also those of fellow citizens.

Another public institution necessary for the public good is education. As has often been recognized, Smith argues that the sovereign should provide rudimentary education for the laboring poor. However, what has not often been recognized is why Smith advocates this education. It is not simply to ameliorate problematic aspects of the market or to develop military virtues as detailed above. It also serves to foster the judgment of the workers that will not be developed if they spend their time only putting heads on pins. This judgment is both moral and political. For Smith, the “laboring poor” in a “civilized society” ought to be able to “form a tolerable judgment concerning the interest of the society, and the conduct of those who govern it” just like citizens in a barbarous society where each member is a “warrior” and “in some measure a statesman.” The benefit of this judgment is not only for the private life of laborers, but also for “the good government or happiness of their society” and therefore “requires … the attention of the publick.”Footnote ⁷³ The government need not provide every aspect of this education, but it could establish schools in each parish, offer premiums or badges of distinction for children who excel in school, or require a test on “those most essential parts of education” before individuals would be allowed to establish a business or trade.Footnote ⁷⁴

Smith also advocates temporary monopolies to promote freer trade in the long run. In some cases, he is referring to intellectual property rights. For example, he discusses exclusive privileges given to “the inventor of a new machine” or “the author of a new book.” He argues that “[t]hese two priviledges therefore, as they can do no harm and may do some good, are not to be altogether condemned.”Footnote ⁷⁵ These exclusive monopolies are not harmful, because the inventor is likely to only make money when they have provided a service that is “profitable to mankind,” while many other monopolies are “extremely detrimental.”Footnote ⁷⁶ In another case, he recommends allowing joint-stock companies monopoly privileges, including the right to create a fort and garrison to protect this new trade for a specific period, as a way for “the state [to] recompense them for hazarding a dangerous and expensive experiment, of which the publick is afterwards to reap the benefit.”Footnote ⁷⁷ For Smith, they only have this right and privilege because it will open more free trade and benefit the public. But he cautions:

Although monopoly privilege and the joint-stock company’s right to hold a fort can benefit the public good, Smith also recommends caution in allowing this exception to free trade. Here, he signals that citizens’ judgment should be exercised in these cases because of potential wars that could be generated.

While Smith notes several potential exceptions to the system of natural liberty, his hesitation about each exception points to his overarching concern with limiting the power of systems. Just as he argues against the mercantile system as part of his fear of system worship, similarly he wants to avoid system worship of the natural system of justice and liberty such that adherence to it would supersede any use of judgment. Smith makes clear that the system of natural liberty is the best one, and none of these exceptions should be taken as the rule. However, he points to them to promote his concern for human flourishing beyond opulence and the importance of individual judgment.

Patriotism, political judgment, and human flourishing

Smith’s exceptions to free trade are often explained as merely “the duty of defense”Footnote ⁷⁹ or as a temporary method of bringing about freer trade. While these are part of his reasoning, for Smith, the exceptions to free trade also point to his belief that human flourishing is about more than wealth acquisition. One of these components is defense or security, but as we have seen, Smith prioritizes these issues because he wants to promote special concern for one’s fellows, limited potential for arbitrary power, and the possibility for individuals to exercise their own judgment. Especially because sometimes as many as half the troops in the British army were mercenaries and the rest were the poorest members of British society in his time,Footnote ⁸⁰ Smith’s encouragement to pay attention to issues of defense, especially regarding exceptions to the free system, highlights his goal of fostering fellow feeling for others in the nation rather than treating the nation as a proxy for wealth-building of the elite who collude with the legislature.Footnote ⁸¹ The political has not often been attended to in Smith’s work, because he is thought to be skeptical of politics, seeking to “downgrade” the political in a perversion of ancient understanding,Footnote ⁸² aiming to subordinate the political to the economic or to de-politicize morality,Footnote ⁸³ or emphasizing the moral over the political.Footnote ⁸⁴ However, there is a growing body of literature attending to the political aspects of Smith’s thoughtFootnote ⁸⁵ and, specifically, the importance of the participation of ordinary citizens in forming political judgment in his theory.Footnote ⁸⁶ In making the claim that political judgment matters to Smith, I do not mean to say it is more important than economic concerns or moral judgment. What I do argue, however, is that the political is not an entirely separate realm of the human experience, and that the same things Smith thinks are necessary for human flourishing in the private realm also apply in the political realm. In this section, I tie this patriotism back to political judgment in the cases of exceptions to free trade. I show that by combining Smith’s comments about patriotism in The Theory of Moral Sentiments with his discussion of the importance of judgment and deliberation rather than systematic thinking in his exceptions to free trade, we see the importance of political judgment and its role in promoting the good of one’s countrymen and human flourishing.

Smith details a number of goods for human flourishing that result from the love of country he describes. He suggests that patriotism can bring about the security and protection from the state that comes from “the stability and permanency of the whole system.”Footnote ⁸⁷ He also argues that it helps develop fellow feeling for others by playing on the natural order of our affections:

Love of country is natural as one of the circles of sympathy after ourselves and our families, where we can most easily relate to others, practice sympathy, and have our fellow feeling stirred. Patriotism is thus part of the realization of Smith’s sympathetic system. Beyond inspiring benevolent feelings, he also notes here that being tied to a nation can help citizens reflect on the consequences of the government’s actions and how they affect others. We compare our society to other nations, and our affection for our own nation helps us understand when to be proud and when to be “mortified” by it. In other words, loving our own country in the particular helps provide a concrete example from which to judge national behavior more generally. Loving our country helps us judge the actions of our own nation and other nations because we are politically interested enough to be able to make the comparison. Finally, the self-sacrifice of the patriot as compared to the traitor also “excites … our highest wonder and admiration.”Footnote ⁸⁹ For Smith, there is beauty in patriotic behavior, and it can inspire care for other citizens.

When discussing the removal of a trade barrier or using that barrier to bring about freer trade, Smith often mentions “fellow-subjects,” reminiscent of his language of fellow feeling when discussing how sympathy generates moral judgment. For example, when discussing the removal of a monopoly that was in place to protect a joint-stock company’s profits while they open trade in a dangerous country and repay their role in providing protection through “possessing forts and garrisons,” Smith says that the company will, at “the expiration of the term” of the monopoly, have to sell the forts and garrisons back to the government and “the trade to be laid open to all the subjects of the state.” Smith also notes that after the company has enjoyed an exclusive privilege to open trade, they only have the right to continue their corporation and the trade that accompanies it “in common with the rest of their fellow-subjects.”Footnote ⁹⁰ If a monopoly is allowed, it should be temporary and then the benefit of the trade should be open to all citizens. He uses similar language when discussing bounties on herring. He explains that “in many parts of Scotland, during certain seasons of the year, herrings make no inconsiderable part of the food of the common people. A bounty, which tended to lower their price in the home market, might contribute a good deal to the relief of a great number of our fellow-subjects, whose circumstances are by no means affluent.”Footnote ⁹¹ Here again, he uses the language of fellow subjects to point out how an exception to free trade can generate national bonds. Smith hedges on whether the trade intervention would even be necessary by saying “might,” but if it is used, it should be to “relief … of fellow-subjects.” He also uses the language of fellow subjects when discussing why forcing America to submit to Britain’s dominion would be a “disgrace.” He compares the people of America to family members of the citizens of Britain: “[A] people whom we have long talked of, not only as of our fellow subjects, but as of our brethren and even as of our children.” While Smith’s advice here seems anti-patriotic or against Britain’s interests, he seeks to restore the “antient affection” between Britain and America against the “party of men in Great Britain” who oppose “a constitutional union.”Footnote ⁹² He redefines patriotism from benefiting the interest of the few to that of the many. Smith promotes a solution that would reduce war and establish affection against the factions that promote the contrary.

The exceptions to free trade create opportunities for sympathizing beyond one’s own situation. We see this potential especially in Smith’s idea that government should help facilitate education. But part of acknowledging these exceptions is to provide opportunities to think about citizens in a different station or with different interests as well as how policies affect them. For Smith, this is part of political judgment. Just as sympathy and moral judgment can be practiced in the home among the family, so too the next circle of sympathy—the nation—is the best realm for honing political judgment. Developing sympathy where one can most easily sympathize and avoid the problem of sympathetic distance,Footnote ⁹³ or the challenge of sympathizing with distant others, allows individuals to better foster moral judgment. Then, having honed this skill, they can better sympathize with strangers. Smith argues that “[n]o society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far great part of the members are poor and miserable.”Footnote ⁹⁴ For Smith, exceptions to free trade should only be used to benefit citizens’ connection with one another and their connection to the rule of law. For him, these bonds and the well-being of all members of the society are essential to individual and national happiness and flourishing.

Patriotism and liberalism

The role of exceptions to the system of free trade speaks to contemporary questions about the relationship between economic policy and patriotism or special duty to fellow citizens. Smith offers a different take. For him, economic nationalism is tied to self-interest and exploiting one’s fellow countrymen for personal gain. He instead argues that patriotism should strengthen bonds between countrymen, citizens’ attachment to the rule of law, and ordinary citizens’ ability to exercise political judgment. Smith cautions against a fixed system with little flexibility. While he offers specific prescriptions that might seem like a recipe book for contemporary problems, one should exercise caution in looking to the history of thought for a mechanistic answer. Rather, Smith’s arguments give ideas about the approach one should take to the intersection of economic and political policies when the question of what special concern we owe our compatriots is at the forefront.

In politics and economics, just as in theory, Smith argues for a nuanced approach. He argues that exceptions to the system of natural liberty and justice should be employed with great restraint and only for the conditions I outline above: defense, benefiting fellow citizens, bringing about freer trade, and securing against arbitrary power. Because exceptions are often utilized to corrupt the system in favor of the elite, Smith recommends deliberation and political judgment in determining when or whether they ought to be used at all. For Smith, exceptions to free trade are only acceptable when they involve special care or concern for one’s fellow countrymen, as when their lives are under threat, when they might be subject to arbitrary or unfair political power, or when the exception causes special consideration for a group that is routinely overlooked because of our moral propensities.

Smith’s ideas also offer fruitful paths forward for thinking about a liberal society that takes special concern or duty for one’s countrymen into account. Critics of liberalism worry about a strong state jeopardizing the ends of human flourishing that liberalism ought to defend, such as limited government, civic participation, and meaningful connections in the private sphere.Footnote ⁹⁵ Proponents of liberalism often express concern about nationalism violating liberalism’s emphasis on individual rights.Footnote ⁹⁶ Still other advocates of liberalism argue that the nation-state is not going to fade away, as was once thought at the end of the twentieth century.Footnote ⁹⁷ As Pierre Manent puts it: “It is in the political body, and only in the political body, that we seriously put things in common,” and “only within the political body can liberty be truly effective.”Footnote ⁹⁸ Smith’s discussion and examples bring to the fore questions of the possibility of liberal nationalism, described by Isaiah Berlin as “the notion of freedom in its ‘positive’ sense that is at the heart of the demands for national or social self-direction which animate the most powerful and morally just public movements of our time.”Footnote ⁹⁹

Smith suggests that liberalism or, in his formulation, the natural system of liberty, ought to make room for national affection because it can promote human flourishing by cultivating sympathetic bonds between individuals, hone judgment, and offer attachment to the rule of law essential for protecting liberal rights. Like some contemporary attempts to reclaim patriotism for liberal society by focusing on deliberation,Footnote ¹⁰⁰ Smith’s patriotism is defined by exercising judgment about how to extend fellow feeling to one’s compatriots and how to defend liberty through the rule of law. Systematically treating exceptions to free trade in Smith’s work reveals an argument for judging politics with an eye to not only individual interest but also the interest of others in one’s nation. He places important limits on patriotism informed by nationalism that would seek to benefit one’s nation at the expense of other nations in a kind of zero-sum game. Smith’s patriotism is not incompatible with cosmopolitan ends. His ideas about patriotism call to mind discussions of cosmopolitan patriotism that allows for pride in one’s nation, but also seeks to understand and engage with individuals in other nations.Footnote ¹⁰¹ For Smith, a healthy patriotism can help secure the system of natural liberty as well as extend sympathy beyond national borders by practicing it well within national borders.

After all, Smith demonstrates the patriotism he promotes by participating in his own government. During the last years of his life, he worked as Commissioner of Customs at the behest of Lord North’s administration. One biographer, referencing Smith’s record of attendance at Board of Customs meetings, writes: “All in all it was the attendance record of a Commissioner who took his office seriously and who understood the importance of maintaining the rules of justice for the security, prosperity and happiness of a nation.”Footnote ¹⁰² Smith’s letters attest to his attempt to reform British trade policy from within through his position as commissioner. In a letter to William Eden, he jokes that “[a]bout a week after I was made a Commissioner of the Customs, upon looking over the list of prohibited goods … and upon examining my own wearing apparel, I found, to my great astonishment, that I had scarce a stock, a cravat, a pair of ruffles, or a pocket handkerchief which was not prohibited to be worn or used in Great Britain. I wished to set an example and burnt them all.” He advises Eden to refrain from such an examination lest he should be compelled to follow the restrictions. But in the rest of the letter, Smith suggests “three very obvious methods by which the public revenue can be increased without laying any new burthen upon the people.” He promotes alternative ways—namely, taxes and duties—to generate money for the Crown that are less severe than “absolute prohibitions” on trade.Footnote ¹⁰³ As he validates by his own practice, only by paying attention to and participating in the national situation was it possible to improve it.

Smith recognizes, in his own version of liberal patriotism, that cultural and communal ties cannot and should not be overridden by liberalism’s defense of individual autonomy and rights.Footnote ¹⁰⁴ A key takeaway from this essay is that, for Smith, affection for and participation in one’s polity is an important aspect of human flourishing; just as one needs others to form moral judgments, one needs others in the political community to form political judgments. For Smith, part of the wealth of nations involves care for those within one’s nation.