The presidential election of 2016 left many Americans looking for a golden era of political campaigning where candidates talked about the “real issues,” and where substance, rather than style, was a vital criterion in selecting a president. Geoffrey Cowan's Let the People Rule: Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth of the Presidential Primary and Charles Musser's Politicking and Emergent Media remind us that the politics of presidential elections past were not necessarily more dignified or as substantive as popular memory might hold. The two books help us to see how technology and political process influenced the ways in which candidates campaigned during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Cowan's Let the People Rule focuses on the role that the presidential primaries played in the election of 1912. Cowan's interest in 1912 is personal: in 1964 he worked in Batesville, Mississippi, as part of Freedom Summer. Recognizing that the people with whom he worked in 1964 were still attempting to achieve the rights of full citizenship fifty years after Theodore Roosevelt promised to “let the people rule,” Cowan's study explores how “the lessons from 1912 still resonate with us today” (4). Cowan asserts that his is the first in-depth study of the ways in which Theodore Roosevelt systematically excluded African Americans from the new Progressive Party. While known to specialists, this fateful decision is one that few generalists appreciate. Cowan, whose professional career in politics and journalism spans fifty years, is perfectly suited to demonstrate the lasting consequences that Roosevelt's decision had not only on the Republican Party, but on the electoral process itself.
Written in narrative style, Let the People Rule analyzes the role that influential businessmen, southern states, and new presidential primaries played in Theodore Roosevelt's dramatic attempt to recapture the Republican nomination from incumbent William Howard Taft. Cowan's focus on the oversized importance of southern states is particularly instructive. The path to securing a nomination, party strategists had long recognized, was through the states of the former Confederacy. William Howard Taft's ability to shore up his southern flank was critical to securing the 1912 Republican nomination. In the process, it also alienated Roosevelt and his supporters, who believed that when given the choice, people (rather than party elites) would chose Roosevelt over Taft.
Roosevelt and his supporters, of course, knew that the people did not get to choose their candidates directly. Primaries were new in 1912. They were so new that only twelve states on the Republican side used the process for selecting their nominee. Roosevelt carried nine of those states, including California, Illinois, and Taft's home state of Ohio. But the key decisions would be made by two bodies: first, the Republican credential committee, which resolved issues involving contested delegates; and the Republican National Committee itself. Here the Roosevelt forces lost both battles. The former president convinced himself that the southern delegates had been manipulated and therein lay the cause of his defeat.
Cowan notes a similarity between the power of the credential committee on the Republican side in 1912 and that on the Democratic side in 1964. During the latter contest, sharecropper Fannie Lou Hamer captivated a national audience on behalf of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, which sought representation as the rightful constituents of the Magnolia State. Choosing instead to seat the “regular” delegation from the state of Mississippi, members of the Democratic Party seemed to choose order over racial justice. Republicans in 1912 also chose a process that excluded diverse voices, thereby setting in motion Roosevelt's bolt.
When forming his new Progressive Party, Theodore Roosevelt instructed his followers to choose a path that demonstrates to Cowan the hollowness of Roosevelt's mission. Some of Roosevelt's southern African American supporters had joined their white brethren in abandoning the Republican Party. They would soon learn that there was no place for them in the new organization. Arguing that African Americans could not command the respect of the “best men” in the south, Roosevelt sided with politicos who stipulated that the new party be led only by white men. To Massachusetts delegate Matthew Hale, this was particularly devastating. Roosevelt's dictates, according to Hale, told African Americans “Get out of here, we don't want you” (271).
Cowan's fast-paced account is ideal for those readers seeking an introduction to a particularly important facet of the 1912 campaign. Although the volume does not have scholarly endnotes, it embraces the documentation that has become commonplace among trade publications: referenced quotations by page number in the back of the volume. For such a book, Cowan documents his sources well. His narrative is informed not only by relevant historical monographs, but also manuscript collections and an array of periodicals. One can imagine using the book in a variety of topical classes at the undergraduate level.
If Cowan's work makes readers reconsider one of the highpoints of American presidential history, Charles Musser's Politicking and Emergent Media urges them to consider how new forms of media influenced political practice in the 1890s. Musser, professor of American Studies and Film and Media Studies at Yale University, is an expert on “early cinema,” or the history of film prior to 1908. Fascinated by the role that new media forms (including YouTube) played in elections of the twenty-first century, Musser began pondering the political uses of new technology during the dawn of early film in the 1890s.
Politicking and Emergent Media is aptly titled, because it is both a study of emergent media and of presidential elections. In four main chapters, plus an introduction and a “coda,” Musser explores the relationship between new media forms and politics. Musser's expertise allows him to consider the role of stereopticon images, telephones, and early motion pictures in the presidential elections between 1888 and 1900. During these years, the author observes, “commercial amusement and political performance began to merge after a long antagonism” (180).
Musser's mastery of all things related to early cinema, including the stereopticon, is one of Politicking and Emergent Media’s evident strengths. Engaged with the scholarship in film and media studies, Musser's monograph probes for meaning with new forms of technology. His assertion that stereopticon lectures in the 1890s functioned as documentaries similar to those by Michael Moore in the twenty-first century is both interesting and compelling. For historians not familiar with the state of the field in film and media studies, the volume also offers a window into nomenclature, periodization, and theory that could prove quite useful.
Musser would not claim to be an expert on the politics of the “long Progressive Era” or extended Gilded Age, depending on one's preference for periodization. Here he misses the greatest opportunities to connect his impressive knowledge of film and media to the extant political history of the period. Readers who have digested the work of Rebecca Edwards, Charles Calhoun, Mark Summers, Lewis Gould, Michael Kazin, Michael McGerr, Jackson Lears, and others will appreciate the possibilities that Musser's study could bring for our understanding of the nature of political campaigning in the 1890s. Musser does not engage with the work of these authors, which means that the influence of the new types of media that he examines can be difficult to ascertain.
Because his work considers emergent technologies, Musser explicitly addresses the way that digitized newspapers inform his work. Musser uses that technology to provide numerous primary accounts from New York City and Chicago that illustrate that Americans were cognizant that new media forms were becoming part of their political landscape. A more systematic and geographically varied employment of those sources would have made their usage even more effective.
Musser argues that William McKinley's brother Abner has been unfairly looked at by historians. The latter, a patent attorney, was also an investor in the American Mutoscope Company, which Musser describes as “the world's preeminent motion picture enterprise by 1897–98” (91). In September 1896, the company staged a reenactment of William McKinley's notification that he had received the Republican nomination for president. The resulting film, McKinley at Home, is the first known film of an American presidential candidate (and is readily findable on the Internet). The one-minute film, combined with novel usage of telephonic messaging and political pageants, meant that “the Republican Party effectively adopted the promise of the new and technologically dynamic future as a third, largely unspoken element of its platform” (130).
Leading Republican Party strategists like Mark Hanna, Matthew Quay, John Wannamaker, and James Clarkson rarely appear in Politicking and the Emergent Media. Here, many of the insights about the maturing Republican organization from Charles Calhoun's 2008 Minority Victory would have been particularly useful. Had Musser spent more time connecting the Republican media approach in 1896 to the sophisticated orchestration behind the front porch campaign of the McKinley administration, for instance, he would have been able to demonstrate the full extent to which the Republicans attempted to construct an image of McKinley. That constructed image was made possible through mature transportation modes and a blend of traditional and novel campaign techniques, as well as the new technological forms that are of particular interest to Musser.
In thinking about the changes that political practice and technology brought to voting behavior over a twenty-year period, one is struck by how dramatic many of the changes appeared to be. In 1888, two traditional candidates (one a Civil War veteran) waged a campaign in which neither candidate was supposed to campaign for the position. By 1912, presidential primaries had changed the way in which a candidate sought the nomination and a new political party based largely on personality had been formed. New technologies made it easier for candidates to convey their messages and images to citizens in ways that previous generations would have envied. Yet turnout in 1912 (for a host of reasons familiar to political historians of the period) was dramatically lower (around 59 percent of the eligible electorate) that year than the ones that preceded it. Thus, even though the politics of 1912 might seem more recognizable to many people today, contemporaries could lament a process that saw less voter engagement than a previous generation had enjoyed.
As political intrigue and contested elections in the twenty-first century seem likely to persist, books such as Let the People Rule and Politicking and the Emergent Media will be increasingly useful to an informed public that wants to understand its political past with more clarity and sophistication. The most radical conclusion that they could draw from these two works is that the primary system, when combined with emergent communication and media forms, may have created the system in which style could substitute for substance. The line from Theodore Roosevelt to Donald Trump is a circuitous one at best, but one that is discernable when synthesizing these two fine pieces of scholarship.
