1. Hobbes's View of the Economy: Philosophy, Politics and Material Life

Hobbes's view of the economy is a relatively neglected aspect of his thought. One reason for this may simply be the paucity of Hobbes's direct commentary about the economy and economic processes. Indeed, apart from debates concerning the bourgeois or “possessive individualist” character of his thought, Hobbes is often regarded as irrelevant to the development of economic theory.Footnote ² Paul Christensen (Reference Christensen1989), however, offers a compelling case for the importance of Hobbes's economic thought. He credits Hobbes with prefiguring many of the concepts that were central to classical political economy and contends that Hobbes develops what he terms a “provisioning” approach to economics.Footnote ³ Christensen demonstrates that Hobbes contributes to “a physiologically based psychology and a physiological economics” in which “human nature is not given but shaped through experience, education, and experiment. In Hobbes's metaphor of the artificer, humans not only construct their commonwealths and produce the terms of a commodious existence, they also fashion themselves. Humans are producers” (1989: 690, 708).Footnote ⁴ Christensen's perspective has the great merit of placing Hobbes's materialist ontology centre stage and stressing that, for Hobbes, people create and live in commonwealths as they simultaneously create and live in materially productive societies. These political and economic processes are mutually reinforcing and interdependent. Fundamentally, human beings are always and simultaneously political and economic artificers. Christensen's analysis, in my view, suggests that Hobbes's view of the economy may be understood extremely broadly. As he states: “Humans construct their language, symbols, and science. They fashion their persons, design and construct the societies they inhabit, and produce the commodities they need and desire from materials and energetic substances taken from the land. Indeed, desires themselves are produced, individual and socially” (Reference Christensen1989: 692). Hobbes's notion of the economy, then, may be understood to comprise the creation of a social totality that includes not only the production of things—the endless variety of goods and commodities that human beings require to live—but also human beings themselves and the society in which they live. One indication of this is the way in which Hobbes defines the aims of philosophy. For Hobbes, the utility of philosophy is not merely abstract, enabling people to speculate and muse about the cosmos and to correct erroneous doctrines such as Scholasticism. Rather its utility lies in its practical, material effects on the quality and character of human life. Hobbes advertises the utility of philosophy in De Corpore in explicitly material terms. He argues that philosophy, particularly the branches of natural philosophy and geometry, are valuable in that they lay the basis for the creation of all arts, technologies and techniques with which human beings can build more commodious societies. So, in this connection, Hobbes attributes the differences between societies (Europe, Asia, Africa and the Americas) not to any innate characteristics (such as quick-wittedness) of groups of people but simply to the differing levels of the development of philosophy (Hobbes, Reference Hobbes and Gaskin1999b: 189–90).

For Hobbes, philosophy, politics and economic activity are intertwined, as they share in the goal of understanding and enacting the principles that allow human beings to create peaceful and prosperous commonwealths. Moreover, they are all driven by human action. In the case of the economy, Hobbes emphasizes human beings’ role as creative, labouring beings who produce wealth as they interact with the natural world. In this connection, it is interesting to note Quentin Skinner's observation that if one looks carefully at the figures depicted in the body of the sovereign in the frontispiece of Leviathan, it is evident that all manner of persons are included—male civilians, soldiers, children and women (Reference Skinner2008: 191). That is to say, the body politic comprises all of the sovereign's subjects—including women. But it is also the case that we can press the point further and conceptualize all of those subjects as comprising not only a body politic but a complex economy as well. The subjects call into being a political system and simultaneously construct an economic system that undergirds the polity. One cannot exist without the other.

Hobbes's sense of the dynamism and complexity of economic activity is neatly captured in chapter 24 of Leviathan, “Of the Nutrition, and Procreation of a Common-wealth”:

What is notable about Hobbes's description of the economy, for our purposes, is the extent to which he depicts economic activities as essential, social endeavours. People are constrained by the natural environment insofar as they must contend with the specific character of the natural resources available to them. However, their collective capacity as labouring beings allows them to alter and extend the bounty of nature to serve their own purposes. And it is the systematic application of techniques learned over time and systematized and mobilized with the development of philosophy that allows them to improve their material condition. They produce wealth—“Plenty”—by their labour and industry, as natural resources are “concocted,” prepared, consumed and traded. The social enterprise of human labour transforms these gifts (from “the two breasts of our common Mother”: the land and sea) into commodities that are traded and circulated in either local or foreign territory. Trade—internal and foreign—is necessary for any economy “because there is no Territory under the Dominion of one Common-wealth . . . that produceth all things needfull for the maintenance, and motion of the whole Body” (Hobbes, Reference Hobbes and Tuck2002: 171).

Moreover, Hobbes is clear that successful economic activity requires the existence of a stable, political framework. The political role of the sovereign looms large in economic matters, as his or her laws delineate the legitimate parameters of economic life, sanctioning the division of property, all property rights, taxes, and the terms of all trade—internal and external. As Hobbes writes, “The Distribution of the Materials of this Nourishment, is the constitution of Mine, and Thine, and His, . . . in one word Propriety; and belongeth in all kinds of Common-wealth to the Soveraign Power” (Reference Hobbes and Tuck2002: 171). And so, “It belongeth to the Common-wealth, (that is to say, to the Soveraign,) to appoint in what manner, all kinds of contract between Subjects, (as buying, selling, exchanging, borrowing, lending, letting, and take to hire,) are to bee made; and by what words, and signes they shall be understood for valid,” and “it belongeth to the Common-wealth (that is, to the Soveraign only,) to approve, or disapprove both of the places, and the matter of forraign Traffique” (Reference Hobbes and Tuck2002: 174, 173–74).Footnote ⁶ The state of nature is an object lesson for the sovereign's economic authority. The horror of the state of nature is not simply that it is a condition of uncertainty; it is also that a stable economy cannot be established, and so human beings cannot enjoy the fruits of their labours. In the state of nature, “there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society” (Reference Hobbes and Tuck2002: 89).Footnote ⁷ It is only with a stable society and property regime that people may enjoy prosperity and plenty. Economic activity undergirded by correct philosophic principles, then, is the life-sustaining, organic basis on which people are able to construct commonwealths. And the desire for a secure economy is key to driving human beings to form a commonwealth. As Hobbes writes, “The Passions that encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death; Desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them” (2002: 90).

Furthermore, the sovereign's duty to ensure the physical safety and defence of the people is not to be understood narrowly and may be seen to encompass a vibrant economy. As Hobbes states in On the Citizen: “By safety one should understand not mere survival in any condition, but a happy life so far as that is possible. For men willingly entered commonwealths which they had formed by design . . . in order to be able to live as pleasantly as the human condition allows. Those who have taken it upon themselves to exercise power in this kind of commonwealth, would be acting contrary to the law of nature . . . if they did not do what can be done by laws to ensure that the citizens are abundantly provided with all the good things necessary not just for life but for the enjoyment of life” (Reference Hobbes, Tuck and Silverthorne2006: 143–44).Footnote ⁸ Hobbes repeatedly emphasizes the importance of material and economic well-being as a foundational goal of the commonwealth that must be ensured by the sovereign. In Elements of Law, Hobbes formulates this duty of the sovereign as follows: “For the temporal good of people, it consisteth in four points: 1. Multitude. 2. Commodity of living. 3. Peace amongst ourselves. 4. Defence against foreign power” (Reference Hobbes and Gaskin1999a: 173).Footnote ⁹ Hobbes is explicit, then, that “multitude,” or population growth, is essential to the health of the body politic, and so the sovereign must proactively promote it with suitable policies. He writes: “Concerning multitude, it is the duty of them that are in sovereign authority, to increase the people. . . . And seeing this is to be done by ordinances concerning copulation: they are by the law of nature bound to make such ordinances . . . as may tend to the increase of mankind” (173).Footnote ¹⁰ The inclusion of population growth as a prime goal of the commonwealth necessarily gives women a critical role in the health and prosperity of any state. Their role in biological reproduction makes them vital to the possibility of a successful economy on this ground alone. Moreover, this formulation blurs the distinction between reproductive and productive labour. It offers an image of economic life that comprises a full circuit of human endeavour. In so doing, Hobbes's image of the economy not only reflects the character of women's economic participation in the seventeenth century but also provides a view of the economy that, by definition, includes the reproductive/productive labour of women. So we now turn to consider this question in terms of early modern economic and social life.

2. Women and Economic Life in Early Modern England

Joyce Youings notes that early modern English families were “self-contained units of production, as well as of consumption and procreation” (Reference Youings1988: 362). Household production as a key site of economic activity, and so of English economic life, was characterized by a relative unity of reproductive and productive labour.Footnote ¹¹ This was the case for both rural and urban households. Household production was pivotal to agriculture, crafts, trade and industry. A vast array of goods was produced within the household—food, clothing, medicines—not only for family consumption but also as part of the family economy, for sale at markets (Gowing, Reference Gowing2012: 43). Women's labour was essential to the English economy, and virtually all women worked. Although the character of women's work varied dramatically, particularly depending upon a woman's social and marital status, it is the case that there was a distinct sexual division of labour. The central premise was that all women were assumed to be responsible—in varying ways and to varying degrees, regardless of social class—for “reproductive” labour connected to the domestic sphere (Mendelson and Crawford, Reference Mendelson and Crawford1998: 256).Footnote ¹² The majority of English women were engaged in agricultural production to provide for all of their basic needs and those of household members. However, farming (which engaged the bulk of the population) did not comprise one single occupation focused on the production of food. Rather, as Youings writes, “Farming itself was not one occupation but many, for besides growing their crops and rearing their stock the farmer and his family were masters of many skills. Not only did they process from their own raw materials virtually everything they ate, drank, wore, and used for fuel, but they built shelter for themselves and their animals, and fashioned most of their own tools and implements” (Reference Youings1988: 25). Moreover, it must be emphasized, there was no clear divide between women's “public” and “private” tasks, as women's labour flowed between the realms of reproductive and productive labour endlessly. As Crawford and Gowing comment, “Women's work is not easily separated into paid and unpaid work, nor were their occupational identities always distinct. Certain work could be for pay or not, depending on a woman's status. Cleaning, for example, might be part of the duties of a servant, an occupation for older women in cities, or the expected task of wives” (Reference Crawford and Gowing2000: 72).Footnote ¹³And, as Gowing notes, “Every image of early modern marketplaces feature women, both selling and buying: a host of depositions describe women, both housewives and servants, going in and out of houses and up and down streets as a central part of their daily business” (Reference Gowing2012: 40).

The range of women's responsibilities and the expertise she was expected to have was extensive. In rural households, housewives’ skills could include the production of dairy products, thread and cloth, beer-making, cooking, cleaning, care of the garden, care of small animals, managing servants (particularly female servants), managing household accounts, and the production of medicines for all of the family's minor ailments. This is, of course, in addition to the direct tasks connected to reproduction: bearing children, breastfeeding, child-minding and education. Consequently, the English housewife's life was one of “unremitting labour” for “in addition to her domestic duties, she was faced with regular pregnancies, the constant presence of disease, and for the smaller landowner or labourer, the threat of poverty” (Best, Reference Best and Best1986: li). In crafts and trade-based households, women were partners in production and often, if widowed, took over responsibility for the family business. The wives of richer yeomen and gentlemen were frequently charged with overseeing servants and managing household accounts and were often expected to take over the entire administration of the family holdings when their husbands were absent (Clark, Reference Clark and Erickson1993: 14–40, 150–235). Women worked in cities, as well as the country, though urban dwellers made up only 15 per cent of the population. Women were present in trades and crafts but at dramatically lower levels than men. Even in cities, women's main work was connected to housewifery. Women, in their role as midwives, were indispensable economic actors at the centre of reproductive care in early modern England. They were often the wives and widows of tradesman and craftsmen. They were “vital participants in the reproductive cultural system” (Cressy, Reference Cressy1997: 61). Midwives were perhaps the most visible and respected female occupation. The eventual overtaking of this profession by men occurred gradually and gained a hold only in the eighteenth century (Cressy, Reference Cressy1997: 44).

The family was also a key institution in the structuring of social and gender relationships. As Gordon Schochet writes, “It was only as a member of a family that one acquired any meaning or status in society, for it was through the family that an individual came into contact with the outside world” (Reference Schochet1988: 65).Footnote ¹⁴ Thus, as with all English subjects, a woman's life trajectory was to a large degree conditioned by the social and economic circumstances of the family into which she was born, be it a peasant, wage labour, craft or trade-based, professional, gentry or aristocratic household. The household was an economic unit structured around various hierarchically organized relationships between its members—husband, wife, servants and apprentices; all had their preordained roles (Kussmaul, Reference Kussmaul1981: 3–4, 9, 11).Footnote ¹⁵ However, women had the added burden of the legal impediments of patriarchal rule that could give the males in their lives—fathers, brothers, masters and husbands—decisive sway over their lives (Gowing, Reference Gowing2012: 29–50). In particular, the twin legal patriarchal practices of coverture and primogeniture marked women as structurally inferior in the household and impeded their economic opportunities (Erickson, Reference Erickson1995: 223–36).Footnote ¹⁶ The system of coverture transformed a married woman's status to that of a “feme covert.” Moreover, as Gowing comments, “English coverture, the treatment of married women as subject to their husbands, was almost uniquely severe in Europe, limiting the extent to which married women could inherit, make financial transactions or pursue cases at law” (Reference Gowing2012: 57). This meant that married women were subsumed, or “covered” by and merged, into their husband's identity.Footnote ¹⁷ This had profound economic implications for married women, given that coverture meant that women's property (except for freehold land) was understood to belong to her husband. They had few legal rights in relation to their husband over their own bodies, and this imposed limits on their right to own property and to trade. Thus Gowing comments, “The definition of womanhood was not to be independent, but to be able to marry; with the skills, reputation and, preferable portion that made a useful wife. The transition from adolescence meant a move towards independence for men; for women, it meant a greater constraining of opportunities and financial independence” (Reference Gowing2012: 47). Unsurprisingly, the system of coverture meant that women were more likely to be poor, particularly in widowhood. The bulk of poor relief went to widows with dependent children.Footnote ¹⁸ The impact of such laws, of course, varied through the social hierarchy. For example, the practice of primogeniture, which dictated that property was to be inherited exclusively by the eldest male in a family, was felt most sharply by female (and young male) members of the gentry and aristocracy (Mendelson and Crawford, Reference Mendelson and Crawford1998: 175–80).

The harsh regime of coverture, however, was frequently softened by a variety of financial measures that ensured that women could retain some of their property and have greater financial benefits upon widowhood than the common law provided—one-third of her husband's movable property. Legal provisions that were more generous to married women and widows were often devised in the form of marriage settlements, bonds, contracts and trusts. Nonetheless, these provisions could be insecure. Married women, then, lived their lives in the shadow of the patriarchal rights of their fathers and husbands (Gowing, Reference Gowing2012: 45). It also appears that single women—not subject to the draconian system of coverture—may have had significant economic autonomy. Indeed, historical evidence suggests that single women played an important role in the development of financial markets via investments in the Bank of England, the stock market and government bonds. Historian Amy Erickson (Reference Erickson1995) even suggests that single women, in this way, played a pivotal role in the development of capitalism in England. And in a sample of wills of the period, 42 to 45 per cent of urban single women mentioned money lent out, to individuals as well as towns and corporations (Gowing, Reference Gowing2012: 46; 49–50).

This brief sketch gives a sense of the extent and depth of women's contribution to the early modern English economy. I now turn to consider the ways in which women's lived experience in the seventeenth-century English economy connects to Hobbes's economic thought.

3. Implications for Hobbes's Gender Politics

As I have attempted to demonstrate, Hobbes's view of economic processes is gender-inclusive and, consequently, reflects the reality of women's participation in the early modern English economy. His proposal that the sovereign ought to promote multitude as part of a prosperity-inducing state policy places women inescapably at the heart of this enterprise, given their biological role in reproduction. But apart from this obvious example, Hobbes's description of wealth creation as involving human interaction with and transformation of nature also describes women's role in the economy. As noted above, women engaged in a complex array of economic activity—food production, cloth-making, money exchange, crafts, production of medicines—all of which fit this notion of wealth creation. In addition, the types of social/reproductive labour in which women engaged, including child-rearing, education, nursing and midwifery—some paid, some unpaid—contributed to the sustenance, education and well-being of the English people, and so the English polity. Hobbes's view of the economy as not only the mobilization of human beings as creative, political and economic artificers who produce things but also human beings and the cultural, social and political world they inhabit logically entails that women must (always) be part of this creative process. Moreover, it should be stressed that within this framework, their reproductive contribution can be seen as but one moment in the production and reproduction of society; that is to say, their reproductive role is pivotal in importance but is necessarily not their sole contribution.

If this reading of Hobbes's economic theory, and the consequent centrality of women in it, is correct, what then follows? What are the implications for our understanding of Hobbes's gender politics that ensue from the conclusion that Hobbes's economic theory is gender- inclusive? While women did centrally contribute to the English economy, much of their activities, prospects and opportunities were severely curtailed by patriarchalism. Married women's status as “feme covert,” women's exclusion from equal education, their lack of access to the professions, trades, and crafts, as well as myths about their inferiority, ensured women were never free from some level of male control. Is there any indication that relying upon Hobbes's economic theory and political philosophy would result in the condemnation of such practices and lead to a championing of their abolition? I would suggest that a Hobbesian case could be made for both a negative and a positive response to this question.

To begin with the negative case, there is much textual evidence to suggest that a Hobbesian perspective would either endorse or be complacent about the extreme limitations on women's economic activities that attended seventeenth-century patriarchalism. Hobbes's absolutist framework accepts the legitimacy of the laws of the sovereign. These may touch upon a broad range of human institutions and practices, including the structure of the family and sexual relations. Hobbes evinces no preference, or indeed great interest, in the structure and character of the family once commonwealths have been established. He appears to view the marriage laws that shape family structure as entirely conventional, historically variable, and contingent. For example, he notes that polygamy is the law in some societies, where “men have the Liberty of many wives; in other places, such Liberty is not allowed” (Reference Hobbes and Tuck2002: 152). And he states that “a relationship which in one commonwealth is marriage will be considered adultery in another and vice versa” (Reference Hobbes, Tuck and Silverthorne2006: 86). Hobbes also uncritically mentions the Amazons as a case where children are governed by mothers (Reference Hobbes and Tuck2002: 140). Yet what must hold in family structure is the principle of absolute rule. Just as there can be only one master in any political regime, so too can there be only one ruler in the family unit. As he comments, “the Rights and Conseqeuences of both Paternall and Despoticall Dominion, are the very same with those of Soveraign by Institution” (Reference Hobbes and Tuck2002: 142). He makes clear that in the state of nature, women are naturally equal to men and have original dominion over their children. However, if a mother abandons her child or if a male conquers her, dominion over both of them is transferred to the male and vice versa. He states, “If the Mother be the Fathers subject, the Child is in the Fathers power; and if the Father be the Mothers subject . . . the Child is subject to the Mother; because the Father also is her subject” (Reference Hobbes and Tuck2002: 140). Historical circumstance, rather than male superiority, explains the predominance of male-ruled households following the founding of states, as he says, “for the most part (but not always) the sentence is in favour of the Father; because for the most part Common-wealths have been erected by the Fathers, not by the Mothers of families” (2002: 139–40). So there is every indication that systems such as coverture and primogeniture would be uncritically respected by Hobbes on the grounds that they are legal. Moreover, at points, Hobbes contradicts his statements concerning natural male and female equality and suggests that male rule must just be more natural than female rule. For instance, in Leviathan, in a discussion about hereditary succession, he notes that monarchs prefer to transmit power to their male children, “rather a Male than a Female; because men, are naturally fitter than women, for actions of labour and danger” (Reference Hobbes and Tuck2002: 137).

In this context, Hobbes's comments about the sovereign's duty to promote multitude take on an ominous aspect. While it does suggest that women are crucial to the project of the creation of economic prosperity, this might have grim consequences for women that could presumably be defended in the name of the common good. To name but a few negative options that a sovereign might entertain: promoting early marriage for females, a ban on all contraceptive use by women, a ban on abortion, and a ban on a range women's activities (including economic participation) during pregnancy and periods of child-rearing. All of these policies that infringe on women's personal autonomy could easily be seen as viable options for the sovereign. So the gender-inclusive character of the promotion of multitude could simply result in women being regarded as a type of natural resource for the state to exploit. Further, in terms of women's direct economic activity, if patriarchal structures are to be upheld as the law of the land, on what grounds could there be an objection to the restrictions they place upon women? Limits on property ownership, infringements upon women's bodily integrity, their rights to the fruits of their labour, and even their own children, are part of this system and so would have to stand. That is to say, all of the positive aspects of the recognition of women's central contribution to labour found in Hobbes's description of the economy would come to naught.

Yet it is also that case that textual evidence may be mobilized to support the other option: that the limitations on women's lives and economic opportunities inherent in the patriarchal system should be rejected. If we focus on women's actual capacities to enter professions, to engage in all trades and crafts, to engage in scientific research and innovation, then Hobbes's comments concerning women's abilities, in the context of his discussion of the state of nature, would indicate that women are as naturally capable as men to engage in any endeavour of their choosing. Hobbes, in these formulations, removes commonplace sexist arguments that take women's secondary social status to be a consequence of physical and intellectual inferiority. Indeed, he makes the point unambiguously in his discussion of the character and origins of parental power, stating that “whereas some have attributed the Dominion to the Man onely, as being of the more excellent Sex; they misreckon in it. For there is not always that difference of strength, or prudence between the man and the woman, as that the right can be determined without War” (Reference Hobbes and Tuck2002: 139). Hobbes does not allow that sex differences inevitably translate into sexual inequality. Moreover, he contends that in the state of nature, there is no preordained family structure, maternal or female roles, or sexual hierarchy. Human beings may construct the ways in which gender relations will be made manifest.

Connected to this, he gives no indication that women are somehow naturally fit solely for work in the domestic sphere. As Joanne Wright notes, “Hobbes invests little energy either in delineating the roles and duties of wives . . . he does not elaborate on the position of wives with respect to their husbands. Nor does he even suggest that the private sphere is the female sphere” (Reference Wright2004: 83–84). In a similar vein, Susanne Sreedhar finds in Hobbes an “anti-essentialism about gender: he never posits any kind of womanly nature or essence that would tie her to the practice of child-rearing and so to the domestic sphere” (Reference Sreedhar2020: 775). Ingrid Makus also emphasizes the extent to which Hobbes describes motherhood as a rational, self-interested activity, as opposed to an instinctual one (Reference Makus1996: 15–20).

In terms of fitness to rule, Hobbes indicates that a male or female is equally able to rule the body politic. He writes, “Where the Custome is, that the next of the Male Kindred succeedeth, there also the right of Succession is in the next of the Kindred Male. . . . And so it is if the Custome were to advance the Female” (Reference Hobbes and Tuck2002: 137). On this point, Quentin Skinner insists that Hobbes's general conception of sovereignty is entirely gender-neutral, as it is grounded in his theory of representation, whereby the sovereign is an abstracted creation of the people via the social contract. As he states, “We must be careful not to suppose that the person of the state is male or female. The sovereign will be male or female, but the state is neither” (Reference Skinner, Hirschmann J. and Wright2012: 27). This point is strengthened if we consider Hobbes's views on intellectual equality. In the state of nature, Hobbes is clear that all physical differences between people are levelled, in that “Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as that though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind then another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, . . . For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himself” (Reference Hobbes and Tuck2002: 86–87). Moreover, as to intellectual differences, Hobbes finds “a greater equality amongst men, than that of strength. For Prudence, is but Experience: which equall time, equally bestowes on all men, in those things they equally apply themselves unto” (Reference Hobbes and Tuck2002: 87).

Putting these pieces together, if women are fit for the highest political office, if women are men's physical and intellectual equals, then it would seem to follow that if given the opportunity, they would be well equipped to practice all types of occupations—to work as physicians and as lawyers, to work within the skilled crafts and trades, to conduct scientific research, and so on. There is no credible case to be made that they would be unable to be successful and offer their talents to society. Indeed, it might be irrational for the sovereign to deprive the economy and society of their contributions. There also may be a politically pragmatic case to end patriarchal structures that restrict women's personal autonomy, access to property and economic opportunity. Hobbes advises that the sovereign should institute laws that publicly acknowledge the equality of all subjects. For Hobbes, natural human equality is acknowledged as a law of nature, which must be recognized in positive law. On this score, he posits that the ninth law of nature calls for every person to “acknowledge other for his Equall by Nature” and the tenth ensures that no one “require to reserve to himselfe any Right, which he is not content should be reserved to every one of the rest” (Reference Hobbes and Tuck2002: 107). To breach the former law is to display pride; and to breach the latter, arrogance (Reference Hobbes and Tuck2002: 107). The conquest of pride and arrogance on the part of political subjects is indispensable to Hobbes's political project. The acknowledgment of our commonality as human beings is fundamental to the creation of a peaceful commonwealth.

The recognition of human equality has strong ontological grounds for Hobbes, but it is also to be recommended on pragmatic grounds. This approach undercuts the possibility of creating simmering political discontent in the commonwealth. The official and public recognition of human equality softens human pride and competition. In terms of the consequences for gender politics, if women are acknowledged to be as fit and able as men (as Hobbes says), then it might be possible that the failure to acknowledge this in law would breed discontent among women and so present a potential to disrupt the political system. Further, if we grant that women are essential economic agents who contribute to the prosperity of the commonwealth, it would seem that to limit their rights as regards property and the use of their labour would violate the notion that “sovereigns can do no more for the citizen's happiness . . . than to enable them to enjoy the possessions their industry has won them, safe from foreign and civil war” (Reference Hobbes, Tuck and Silverthorne2006: 144). To exclude women, then, from full citizenship, to encumber their lives with patriarchal restrictions, can be seen to violate fundamentally the promise of the social contract. Again, this might create a layer of persons in the system that have legitimate grounds to resent it and even rebel against it.