One issue that arose during the 2026 conflict with Iran was the effect of the War Powers Resolution (WPR) on President Donald J. Trump’s authority to continue using military force in that conflict. This statutory issue is separate from the question of whether President Trump had the constitutional authority to initiate the use of force against Iran in the first place, and it is also separate from the question of whether the U.S. actions in the conflict violated international law. Although the WPR helped structure some of the interactions between Congress and the president during the Iran conflict, that conflict also illustrated a number of the WPR’s well-known limitations. Given the significant scale and regional implications of the Iran conflict, and the fact that it continued well past the sixty-day cutoff mandated in the WPR, it may present a particularly strong case for WPR reform.
War Powers Resolution
Congress’s most significant modern effort to regulate presidential uses of military force is the WPR, a statute enacted in 1973 at the end of the Vietnam War.Footnote 1 As the House Foreign Affairs Committee explained regarding the bill that became the WPR, Congress had perceived that “the constitutional ‘balance’ of authority over warmaking ha[d] swung heavily to the President in modern times,” and it designed the WPR “[t]o restore the balance provided for and mandated in the Constitution.”Footnote 2
The WPR begins by expressing the view, in a provision that the executive branch does not view as legally binding, that presidents have the constitutional authority to introduce U.S. armed forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities “only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.”Footnote 3
Next, the WPR mandates that “in every possible instance,” the president is to “consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.”Footnote 4 It also states that, after introducing U.S. forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities, the president is to “consult regularly with the Congress until United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from such situations.”Footnote 5
The WPR then proceeds to impose two key requirements on the president. First, it states that, when presidents introduce U.S. armed forces “into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances,” they must file a report with congressional leadership within forty-eight hours describing “(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed Forces; (B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took place; and (C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.”Footnote 6 Presidents have regularly filed these 48-Hour Reports. In doing so, they typically state that they are submitting the reports “consistent with” the requirement in the WPR, without conceding that they are legally obligated to make the submission.Footnote 7
Second, the WPR states that, within sixty calendar days after a 48-Hour Report is submitted or required to be submitted under the WPR, “the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted),” unless Congress has declared war or enacted a specific authorization of force, has extended the sixty-day deadline, or is physically unable to meet because of an attack on the United States.Footnote 8 Presidents can extend the sixty-day deadline by up to an additional thirty days if they certify to Congress in writing “that unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces.”Footnote 9 A separate section of the WPR states that presidential authority to introduce armed forces into hostilities shall not be inferred from statutes that do not specifically contain an authorization provision (such as appropriations statutes) or from treaties.Footnote 10
The WPR also has a provision that purports to give Congress the authority to stop presidential uses of military force through a “concurrent resolution,” which is a resolution approved by both houses of Congress but not presented to the president for signature.Footnote 11 Many observers assume that this provision is unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in INS v. Chadha, which held that a legislative veto provision violated the requirements in Article I of the Constitution for the enactment of legislation.Footnote 12
Finally, the WPR provides for expedited congressional consideration of resolutions to authorize the continued use of U.S. armed forces.Footnote 13 A 1983 amendment to the WPR that was adopted in the wake of Chadha further provides for expedited congressional consideration of proposed statutes that call for the termination of the use of U.S. armed forces.Footnote 14
One notable absence from the WPR is any mention of international law restrictions on the use of force. Under the UN Charter, to which the United States has been a party since 1945, nations are allowed to use military force against other nations only in individual or collective self-defense or when authorized to do so by the UN Security Council.Footnote 15 But those restrictions are not referenced in the WPR.
Although a statute, the WPR operates against the backdrop of contested issues of U.S. constitutional law. Many scholars believe that the Constitution is best interpreted to require that presidents obtain congressional authorization before using military force, except in narrow circumstances such as responding to attacks on the United States or U.S. forces. Although Congress expressed a similar view about the Constitution in the first section of the WPR, the statute does not purport to mandate advance congressional authorization for uses of force. In any event, executive branch lawyers have long maintained that presidents have broad authority to use military force in the absence of congressional authorization, at least if the use of force does not rise to the level of “war.”Footnote 16 The constitutional analysis is complicated by the fact that there have been over two hundred years of practice under the Constitution, and this practice includes many instances of unilateral presidential uses of force.Footnote 17 Under some theories of constitutional interpretation, such longstanding practice is relevant when discerning the respective powers of Congress and the president.
It is sometimes said that all presidents have claimed that the sixty-day cutoff provision in the WPR is unconstitutional, but that is not correct. To be sure, President Nixon did make that claim in his veto message,Footnote 18 and certain other presidents (including President Trump) have made the claim as well. But other presidential administrations, such as the Carter and Obama administrations, have not contested the constitutionality of the sixty-day cutoff provision.Footnote 19 When a president acts in violation of the sixty-day provision, he is in what Justice Robert Jackson described as the “lowest ebb” of presidential power, a situation in which courts can uphold his action “only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.”Footnote 20
The 2026 Iran Conflict
The 2026 conflict with Iran was in some ways a resumption of a conflict that occurred in 2025. On June 13, 2025, Israel began a substantial military campaign against Iran, which came to be referred to as the “Twelve-Day War.” About a week after Israel began its campaign, President Trump authorized U.S. airstrikes against several nuclear facilities in Iran, a campaign that his administration called “Operation Midnight Hammer.”Footnote 21 President Trump submitted a 48-Hour Report to Congress in connection with these strikes, emphasizing that the strikes were “limited in scope and purpose” and that “Iranian troops and other military facilities were not targeted.”Footnote 22 The Report also asserted that the strikes were “taken to advance vital United States national interests, and in collective self-defense of our ally, Israel, by eliminating Iran’s nuclear program.”Footnote 23 The campaign ended a few days later when Israel and Iran agreed to a ceasefire. Because the U.S. bombing operation was completed quickly, the WPR’s sixty-day deadline never came into play.
About eight months later, on February 28, 2026, President Trump initiated a much broader and longer-lasting military campaign against Iran, in coordination with Israel. The campaign, which the administration referred to as “Operation Epic Fury,” was conducted against a wide range of targets, and the U.S. and Israeli airstrikes killed a number of Iranian officials, including Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Iran responded by attacking Israel, U.S. bases in the region, and other neighboring countries. The extensive conflict caused, among other things, substantial disruptions in the world’s oil supply.
Shortly after initiating Operation Epic Fury, President Trump sent Congress a 48-Hour Report. In that report, the president explained that the strikes “were undertaken to protect United States forces in the region, protect the United States homeland, advance vital United States national interests, including ensuring the free flow of maritime commerce through the Strait of Hormuz, and in collective self-defense of our regional allies, including Israel.”Footnote 24 He also emphasized that “[n]o United States ground forces were used in these strikes, and the mission was planned and executed in a manner designed to minimize civilian casualties, deter future attacks, and neutralize Iran’s malign activities.”Footnote 25 He acknowledged, however, that “[a]lthough the United States desires a quick and enduring peace, it is not possible at this time to know the full scope and duration of military operations that may be necessary.”Footnote 26
After about five weeks of hostilities, President Trump announced on April 7 that he had ordered a two-week ceasefire so that the United States and Iran could pursue negotiations to end the conflict. On April 21, he extended the ceasefire indefinitely. Meanwhile, the United States imposed a naval blockade on Iranian ports in an effort to pressure Iran to reach a deal, an operation that the administration labeled “Project Freedom.”Footnote 27 After Iran shot down a U.S. helicopter in early June, the United States conducted a series of military strikes against Iran, which it described as defensive in nature, although President Trump suggested that some of the strikes were also conducted in an effort to pressure Iran to conclude an agreement.Footnote 28
During this conflict, Democratic members of Congress tried on numerous occasions to force a vote on the president’s use of force, and each time their efforts were blocked by their Republican colleagues.Footnote 29 Some Republican members of Congress began signaling, however, that they might join the Democratic efforts if the conflict dragged on.Footnote 30
Despite President Trump’s declaration of a ceasefire in April, many observers assumed that, because the conflict had not been resolved, the sixty-day clock in the War Powers Resolution was still ticking. If so, the clock was set to run out at the beginning of May 2026. In late April 2026, the administration responded to concerns about the upcoming expiration of the sixty-day clock by suggesting that the ceasefire had paused the clock’s operation.Footnote 31 Then, on May 1, 2026, President Trump sent congressional leadership a letter asserting that the clock had in fact stopped operating. His letter claimed that, because of the ceasefire, “[t]he hostilities that began on February 28, 2026, have terminated.”Footnote 32 He made this claim even though the United States was imposing a naval blockade and had continued to fire on Iranian ships and other targets, and even though he had threatened at various times to resume the bombing campaign.Footnote 33 The Trump administration subsequently suggested that if the negotiations collapsed, the United States might have to initiate a new military operation against Iran, potentially under the name “Sledgehammer.”Footnote 34
In early June 2026, four Republicans joined with Democrats in the House to pass a concurrent resolution calling for withdrawal of U.S. troops from hostilities in Iran.Footnote 35 This vote took place after the Senate had voted in May to allow consideration of a different resolution that also called for a withdrawal of the troops.Footnote 36 These actions in Congress did not have any legal effects but were politically significant.Footnote 37
In mid-June, the United States and Iran entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) designed to end the conflict. Under the MOU, the two countries agreed to a ceasefire, and the United States agreed to end its naval blockade.Footnote 38 They also agreed to negotiate a final agreement within the next sixty days, although the period could be extended by mutual consent.
After the countries signed the MOU, a majority of the Senate voted in support of a concurrent resolution, which had already passed the House, calling for an end to the use of military force in Iran in the absence of congressional authorization.Footnote 39 This was the first time since the WPR’s enactment that both the House and Senate had voted in support of a concurrent resolution directing a president to end the use of military force.Footnote 40 As noted above, because of the Chadha decision, a concurrent resolution like this one may not be legally binding, but the development was nevertheless a milestone in the history of the WPR. Under pressure from the president, however, some Republicans switched their votes a day later and defeated a similar measure.Footnote 41 After these votes, the United States carried out additional strikes against Iran.Footnote 42 In July, the United States engaged in a series of strikes against Iran after accusing it of violating the ceasefire agreement, and President Trump subsequently declared that the ceasefire was over and proceeded to reimpose a naval blockade.Footnote 43 He also sent Congress a new WPR letter, suggesting that his administration viewed the renewed hostilities as restarting the sixty-day clock.Footnote 44 President Trump paused airstrikes in early August in an effort to resume negotiations.Footnote 45 When this Essay was being written, the conflict did not appear to be over, and it was difficult to tell whether or when active hostilities might once again resume. Meanwhile, Democrats in Congress continued to push for votes on the conflict.Footnote 46
Assessment
The WPR states that its purpose is to “insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.”Footnote 47 Measured against that standard, it is difficult to view the WPR as a success. Since the enactment of the WPR, presidents have introduced U.S. forces into hostilities on numerous occasions without seeking congressional approval.Footnote 48 Most of these operations have not reflected the “collective judgment” of Congress and the executive branch. The conflict with Iran is simply the latest example, although it is a particularly significant one given the scale and regional implications of the conflict.
As critics have long pointed out, there are a number of potential drawbacks to the WPR’s methods for regulating presidential war-making. First, the sixty-day clock gives presidents a substantial period of time in which they can use force without violating the statute. Especially given advances in aerial bombardment technology, presidents can often conclude military campaigns within the sixty-day period. Even some campaigns involving substantial uses of ground troops, such as the U.S. invasions in the 1980s of Panama and Grenada, have been completed in less than sixty days.Footnote 49
Second, the WPR does not define the key term “hostilities.” The absence of a definition has allowed presidents to claim that various uses of force by the U.S. military do not implicate the WPR. An especially controversial example is the claim by the Obama administration that its continued involvement in a bombing campaign in Libya in 2011 did not constitute hostilities because (among other things) there was little risk of U.S. casualties.Footnote 50 The Trump administration has made a similar argument with respect to its attacks on boats in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific allegedly operated by drug traffickers.Footnote 51
Third, the WPR’s sixty-day clock applies to particular military operations, and presidents sometimes divide military campaigns into multiple operations and claim that each one has its own sixty-day clock.Footnote 52 This workaround was evident in the Iran conflict, first when the Trump administration treated its blockade of Iranian ports as an operation separate from Operation Epic Fury, and then when it suggested that the hostilities that occurred after the collapse of the ceasefire constituted a new operation.
Fourth, because the WPR does not specify any penalties for non-compliance (such as funding cutoffs), it puts the enforcement burden on Congress, and for a variety of reasons, Congress is often not well positioned to carry out that burden. Once a military campaign is initiated, Congress typically feels compelled to continue funding it, in order to support U.S. troops and ensure U.S. success in the operation. Moreover, once Congress does provide supplemental funding, presidents can assert that this constitutes sufficient authorization to meet the WPR’s requirement. Although (as noted above) the WPR expressly tries to preclude such a claim, the executive branch has plausibly argued that a 1973 statute cannot control how a later appropriations statute is construed.Footnote 53
Some of these issues could be addressed by amendments to the Act. But there is a broader challenge to reining in presidential war-making, which is that, regardless of what the WPR requires, Congress often lacks sufficient institutional incentives to enforce the statute. This is especially true when Congress is controlled by the president’s own party, something that was evident in the early parts of the Iran conflict. Even separate from the issue of partisan loyalty, Congress often seems reluctant to assume accountability for decisions about the use of force, preferring instead for the president to assume the political risk.
A potential alternative to congressional enforcement of the WPR would be judicial enforcement. Any judicial challenge to a president’s use of force, however, faces daunting justiciability challenges relating to standing, ripeness, and the political question doctrine. To date, the lower courts have consistently dismissed challenges brought to enforce the WPR.Footnote 54
Despite these limitations, it is apparent from the Iran conflict that the WPR has important effects on the inter-branch dynamics concerning the use of military force. Even though presidents try to work around it, the WPR’s sixty-day clock appears to increase political pressure on the president to conclude operations before the clock expires. This may be because, by specifying a concrete cutoff date, the WPR provides a focal point that members of Congress can coordinate around, as compared with the more uncertain and debatable constitutional standards concerning presidential uses of force.Footnote 55 The WPR may also give members of Congress, especially those of the president’s party, political cover, since they can maintain that they are simply enforcing the statute, not opposing the president. It is noteworthy that, even though presidents have sometimes claimed that the sixty-day rule is unconstitutional, no president has admitted to violating it.Footnote 56
In addition, provisions in the WPR for expedited consideration of resolutions to authorize or disallow the use of force help the minority party in Congress focus attention on the issue, something that was evident throughout the Iran conflict. Minority party members can also more easily force members of the majority party to take a position on a conflict.Footnote 57 And, even if the WPR’s concurrent resolution provision is unconstitutional under Chadha and thus unenforceable in court, a resolution from one or both houses of Congress opposing the use of force is likely to be politically very significant. The fact that both houses of Congress eventually supported a concurrent resolution disallowing the continued use of force in Iran signaled that domestic support for the conflict was weak.
Whether the WPR has ex ante effects on presidential decisions to use military force is less clear. It is conceivable that when a president perceives that a potential military conflict is unlikely to be resolved quickly, the existence of the WPR might give the president an incentive to seek advance congressional authorization, in order to avoid potential disputes with Congress over the sixty-day clock. It may not be coincidental that presidents sought congressional authorization for what turned out to be the most protracted U.S. military operations since the WPR’s enactment: the two Iraq wars and the post-9/11 “war on terror.”
In any event, the WPR would likely be more effective if some of its well-known design limitations were addressed through amendments—for example, if its sixty-day clock were shortened.Footnote 58 The sixty-day clock is treated by presidents as, in effect, a permission slip for short-term uses of force, even though that was almost certainly not Congress’s intent.Footnote 59 Because of this phenomenon, as a check on presidential power, the WPR as currently drafted may be doing more harm than good by providing an aura of legitimacy to short-term presidential uses of force.
