It is refreshing to find a text in which the foreign policies of several Middle East states are considered on their own terms instead of as a supposedly homogenous group. Although accessible to undergraduates, this anthology requires familiarity with at least the 20th century history of each country. Therefore, I recommend it as a companion to a standard history of the Middle East. The chapters are brief enough to be easily managed in one sitting. This book cries out for a second edition because, at the time of this writing (summer 2006), so many major changes have occurred that otherwise it could only be used for its analytical framework and what little historical background it provides.

The authors jointly developed “a modified form of realism” that considers systemic and domestic factors as their theoretical basis. They reason that, although there is an economic asymmetrical interdependence between states of the Middle East and the great powers, the former are not totally constrained in their foreign policy choices and tend to be rational actors. In each case study, the authors divide their analyses into the categories of foreign policy determinants, foreign policymaking, and foreign policy behavior. There are chapters on Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Tunisia, Yemen, Iran, Turkey, and Israel.

Hinnebusch writes the chapters on Egypt and Syria. In both, he provides an introduction to the factors that shape national identity and foreign policymaking, an outline of important events in the establishment of the states, and a discussion of major foreign policy events. He seems to be fascinated with Nasser in his chapter on Egypt. Although he mentions Sadat and Mubarak, they are not his main focus. The chapter on Syria, Hinnebusch's specialty, is quite thorough. Unlike many chapters in this volume, it would be useful to a novice as well as an expert. He admires Hafiz al-Asad as a realist and a rational actor. In a second edition, he could explain what he thinks the impact of the death of Asad in 2000 has been so far, how his son is faring in his place, and how Syria is being affected by the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

The chapter on Iraq by Charles Tripp provides a needed focus on how Iraq was constructed in 1920 and why this has led to a crisis of identity for the nation, one we see manifested in the U.S. war in Iraq. Tripp describes the construction of the identity of Saddam Hussein's Baעthist state in which Takritis are practically the only ones to be trusted and in which “the majority of Iraqis are seen in some sense as alien and possibly hostile … peculiarly amenable to the machinations of outside powers” (p. 172). This focus on domestic factors in Iraqi foreign policy shines a light on a part of Iraq not often seen and provides insight into the system. Tripp's analysis of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq is necessary for a second edition of this book.

F. Gregory Gause's rather brief chapter on Saudi Arabia makes clear that policymaking in the kingdom is a balancing act of sorts, because the regime must operate on three levels simultaneously: the international level in which it has an alliance with the United States, the regional level where it must deal with powerful neighbors, and the Arabian Peninsula level where Saudi Arabia is the hegemon. Gause weaves the essential details of the state's founding into an analysis of how Saudi policy is shaped by the conflicting demands of these three levels.

In his chapter on Turkey, Philip Robins periodizes the history of Turkish foreign policy since the creation of the state, including strategic decisions made by Attaturk. The quest for national security and the high value placed on maintaining the Kemalist ideology dominate foreign policy. This well-organized chapter contains a brief but thought-provoking discussion of twin roots of Kemalism: nationalism and secularism.

One of the best chapters in the book is co-editor Anoushiravan Ehteshami's comprehensive analysis of Iran. His discussion of Iranian identity is especially interesting. He traces the development of modern Iranian nationalism back to the 19th century when there was a strong public reaction against foreign interference. He writes, “Iran's historical impotence in the face of foreign influence has left a deep and seemingly permanent scar on the Iranian psyche.” Since the revolution, “the perception … that Iran has been able to overcome outside pressures has allowed for the rise of a condition that I call ‘the arrogance of nonsubmission [sic]’” (p. 285). This sounds like the stance taken by the recently elected President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In a second edition Ehteshami could no doubt shed light on his foreign policy.

Finally, Clive Jones' interesting analysis of Israel reminds us that in Israel foreign policy is always trumped by national security. He argues that this focus has weakened democracy because it obscures ongoing internal debates, one of which is the question of what Zionism truly considers to be the territorial dimensions of a Jewish state (p. 120). Jones also describes the way in which foreign policy is made and by whom. In a second edition, this chapter could easily be made more complete by adding a sketch of Israeli policy 1948–67 to fill in some missing detail. We also need Jones' analysis of Ariel Sharon's election, foreign policy, and demise; the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza; the election of Ehud Olmert; the death of Yassir Arafat and rise of Mahmoud Abbas; and the 2006 election of Hamas.