What wins US presidential elections? Political scientists first point to the economy. When the economy prospers, the incumbent party is usually reelected. When it does not, the “out” party generally takes over. Still, although economic variables readily can account for over half the variance in the incumbent-party vote, the economy is not everything. Campaigns also matter. Winning is usually attributed to running good campaigns and to losing bad ones. Perhaps by taking into account both the economy and the campaigns—and how campaigns clarify economic issues—it is possible to understand election outcomes better. This basic insight launches Lynn Vavreck's inquiry in The Message Matters.
The book's ambitious goal is to complete the explanation of presidential election outcomes beyond citing the economy. The economy is a valence issue in the sense that everyone presumably shares the same goal of national prosperity. But voters need to be informed about economic conditions and given a narrative about how they got that way. Voters also are influenced by other factors, such as party identification, candidate leadership characteristics, and voters' proximity to the candidates. The latter—issue proximity—plays a major role in this book since candidates have some ability to alter and solidify their issue positions for electoral advantage. Vavreck also emphasizes that candidates have the capacity to set the agenda. They can prime issues: By repetitively focusing on an issue on which they hold an advantage, candidates presumably can increase the issue's salience to their further advantage.
Central to the argument is a typology of campaigns as either “clarifying” or “insurgent.” A candidate favored by the economy (not necessarily the incumbent) gains votes by running a clarifying campaign, meaning that the candidate emphasizes the economy during the campaign. Candidates disadvantaged by the economy can overcome their handicap by mounting insurgent campaigns. To have a chance, Vavreck says, their campaign should avoid the economy and instead stress alternative issues that increase their appeal to voters. Insurgent candidates are only occasionally successful.
Over the 13 elections analyzed, from 1952 to 2000, most potential insurgents lost and lost badly. Some (e.g., George McGovern, Bob Dole) focused on economic issues to their detriment. Others chose issues that proved to be ineffective at connecting with voters (e.g., Adlai Stevenson in 1952 and 1956 on foreign policy and communism, Jimmy Carter in 1980 on nuclear proliferation). But in four instances out of the 13, the candidate with an insurgent strategy prevailed—in 1960, 1968, 1976, and 2000. Vavreck provides a narrative for each of these elections in which the out-party candidate succeeded despite reasonably sound economies. In 1960, John Kennedy successfully exploited America's supposedly faltering position in its rivalry with the USSR, which put Richard Nixon on the defensive. In 1968, Nixon exploited a fear of crime in an era of demonstrations and urban unrest. In 1976, Carter successfully exploited Watergate and the need for trustworthy leaders. In 2000, George W. Bush sold himself as a compassionate conservative, while Al Gore avoided credit claiming for the economic success of the Clinton years.
These are familiar stories, and Vavreck does an excellent job of telling how these winning campaigns triumphed over the predicted outcome from economic determinism. Yet, as narratives about insurgents finding new issues to overcome their initial disadvantage, they might seem too pat. All four elections were extremely close and could have gone either way. Arguably, except for perhaps 2000, the economic signals at the time were ambiguous rather than clearly favoring the incumbent party. And the four successful insurgent campaigns were aided by one unmentioned factor—in each case the incumbent party was seeking a third successive term, running the current vice president (Nixon, Hubert Humphrey, Gore) or in the case of Gerald Ford in 1976, the recently ascended vice president. Could it be that voters are particularly receptive to the out-party message when the in-party has held the presidency for two successive terms?
The book is much more than storytelling. To test her thesis, Vavreck has collected a rich array of data on the content of campaign speeches, ads, and news accounts. She has also analyzed Gallup Poll data on “the most important problem,” plus National Election Study data on candidate “likes and dislikes” and NES issue items indicating where survey respondents place themselves and the candidates. This is a wealth of data that makes for an intriguing, if sometimes densely packed, analysis.
In a nutshell, here are the central findings: Candidates generally campaign according to their predicted placement in the clarifier-insurgent typology, with clarifiers emphasizing the economy and insurgents other issues—and are more likely to be rewarded if they do so. The more a broad issue (e.g., the economy, foreign policy) is discussed in the campaign, the more voters see this as a major issue. The more a campaign stresses an issue, the more voters see it as important and learn where the candidate stands on it. Ultimately, both clarifying and insurgent candidates' issues influence the voters' candidate choices.
As a group, these findings are more suggestive than definitive, with statistical results that are uneven in their degree of certainty. The fault lies with limitations in the available data. There are only 13 available elections and 26 candidates. The NES-based analyses of issue proximity are limited to a mere eight elections. The issue proximity analysis is the least cooperative, but that can be attributed to the fact that the issues selected by the NES for detailed analysis are chosen more on the basis of fidelity to the NES time series than topicality for the election at hand.
If there is a place where Vavreck pushes the argument too far, it may be an exaggeration of the power that candidates have to set the agenda by priming voters to think about what they want them to think about. Consider the thought experiment of a president seeking reelection under conditions of economic adversity. Vavreck's prescription for this embattled president would be to try to change the subject in an effort to get voters to forget their economic misery. But would not this strategy only make voters see the president as admitting failure or even indifference to their plight? The salience of an issue to voters must at some level be driven by reality. Only at the margins is salience malleable by propaganda.
If the book overvalues candidates' ability to influence what voters think about, it is silent on another form of influence—convincing voters to change what they think in terms of their own policy preferences. Candidates can and do try to persuade voters to move their positions on issues closer to their own. Outside of the campaign context, propaganda campaigns often move voter policy preferences, with well-documented instances from Franklin Roosevelt's “Court packing scheme” to the 1964 Public Accommodations Law to national health care (now, twice). The unasked (and hard to answer) question is, are there instances when presidential campaigns have successfully wooed voters by convincing them to adopt the candidate's views?
The Message Matters succeeds in getting the reader to think more rigorously about presidential election outcomes. There is more to the story than the statistical modelers' account in terms of structural causes, such as the economy. Candidates can exploit or overcome the economy by their strategic decisions in the campaign. This book makes a good start in showing how these choices matter. As such, it is an important contribution and should become an indispensable part of one's library on presidential elections.
